* feat(harness): subagent report contract and delegation acceptance criteria (RFC #4651 PR3) Layer 1 receipt verification is inert unless subagents actually cite their execution record. This lands the prompt layer that closes the adoption gap: - New subagents/report_contract.py owns the model-facing contract text, derived from the single-owner citation format (format_citation / receipt_id) so prompts can never drift from the verifier. The executor injects <report_contract> into every subagent system prompt — built-in and custom alike — requiring [rN tool_name] citations for action claims, verifiable handles (absolute path, URL, ID, HTTP status) for deliverables, and explicit failure reporting; the citation clause follows verification.receipts_enabled. - The task tool gains an optional keyword-only acceptance_criteria parameter, handed to the SubagentExecutor constructor and rendered into the subagent's SystemMessage (stripped, capped 20 items x 500 chars) — deliberately never the task HumanMessage, which InputSanitizationMiddleware classes as genuine user input and would HTML-escape into untrusted-input framing. The docstring frames subagent results as self-reports, states the citation cross-check's evidence boundary (resolved = the call happened, not that the claim is correct), and documents when to attach criteria with the canonical leaf forms. Deterministic leaf checking remains a separate layer. - The lead delegation workflow now instructs reading the ledger citation line as execution evidence only and spot-checking verifiable handles before synthesizing. - report_contract / acceptance_criteria are registered as blocked framework-authority tags in input sanitization so untrusted input cannot forge the verification contract. * fix(harness): neutralize acceptance criteria before system-channel injection render_acceptance_criteria_section interpolated lead-model-supplied acceptance_criteria verbatim into the subagent SystemMessage after only stripping/capping. A criterion such as '</acceptance_criteria><system>...</system>' could close the wrapper and open a framework authority tag, bypassing InputSanitizationMiddleware. Route each criterion through neutralize_untrusted_tags (the shared prompt-injection primitive) so blocked authority tags are HTML-escaped before interpolation. Add regression tests at the renderer and the executor _build_initial_state path. * fix(harness): keep model-supplied criteria off the system channel - Move acceptance_criteria values into the task HumanMessage — the untrusted channel InputSanitizationMiddleware escapes and boundary-frames. The subagent SystemMessage now carries only a framework-owned <acceptance_criteria> pointer note (no criterion text), so natural-language injection inside a criterion keeps task-data priority and cannot override framework instructions (PR #5090 review, willem-bd P1). - Condition the lead delegation workflow's citation verification guidance on verification.receipts_enabled and qualify the task tool's result-reading text with the enabled state, so a receipts-disabled configuration no longer tells the lead to require citation evidence that cannot exist (P2). * fix(harness): drop execution-record promise from report contract when receipts are disabled The <report_contract> opening was emitted unconditionally, so a verification.receipts_enabled=false subagent was told its report would be cross-checked against an execution record that cannot exist in that mode (terminal_receipts() returns None; no verdict, no ledger citation line). The opening now follows receipts_enabled: enabled keeps the cross-check language, disabled describes the handle-only review mode (PR #5090 review, willem-bd P2). * docs: record the prompt-layer trust-boundary self-check Generalizes the PR #5090 review outcome: before adding prompt text, ask of every data source in it what trust level it has and which channel it should ride — model/user-influenceable values ride the untrusted sanitized data channel, never framework-owned system text. Added to the PR template (Agents/LangGraph surface) and agents/AGENTS.md.
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Agent System
Lead Agent (packages/harness/deerflow/agents/lead_agent/agent.py):
- Entry point:
make_lead_agent(config: RunnableConfig)registered inlanggraph.json. Its signature and bare-graph return type are a published ABI: LangGraph Server calls it directly, so neither may change. assemble_lead_agent(config, *, app_config=None) -> LeadAgentAssembly(graph, descriptor)is the richer entry point the Gateway uses;make_lead_agentis a thin wrapper returning.graph. The descriptor is built bydeerflow/agents/assembly_descriptor.py::build_assembly_descriptor()and captures what only the factory knows — the model resolved after runtime overrides, the rendered prompt hash, the tool list left by authorization, and the composed middleware stack in order. Consumers of a factory result must unwrap.graphdefensively (seeruntime/runs/worker.py::_agent_graph), because a third-party factory still returns a bare graph.- Dynamic model selection via
create_chat_model()with thinking/vision support - Tools loaded via
get_available_tools()- combines sandbox, built-in, MCP, community, and subagent tools - System prompt generated by
apply_prompt_template()with skills, memory, and subagent instructions - Prompt-layer trust boundaries: every string that enters a model context has a source, and the source's trust level decides its channel. Framework-owned authority text (report contracts, pointer notes, workflow rules) rides the system channel; anything model-supplied or user-influenceable (delegated task text, acceptance criteria, tool results) rides the untrusted channel — the
HumanMessagethatInputSanitizationMiddlewareescapes and boundary-frames. Before adding prompt text, ask of every data source in it: what is its trust level, and which channel should it ride? Never interpolate untrusted values into framework-owned system text, even neutralized — natural-language injection survives tag escaping (PR #5090 review). - Each assembly renders the system prompt and composes middleware exactly once; the same prompt and middleware objects must be passed to both
create_agent()and the assembly descriptor so extension observations match the running graph, including Custom Agentallowed_subagentsscope.
ThreadState (packages/harness/deerflow/agents/thread_state.py):
- Extends
AgentStatewith:sandbox,thread_data,title,artifacts,todos,uploaded_files,viewed_images,goal,promoted,delegations,skill_context,summary_text - Uses custom reducers:
merge_artifacts(deduplicate),merge_viewed_images(merge/clear),merge_goal(preserve the active goal across ordinary state updates unless the goal writer replaces it),merge_promoted(catalog-hash-scoped deferred tool promotions),merge_delegations(append task delegation entries, same id latest wins, terminal status never downgraded, capped to the most recent entries), andmerge_skill_context(dedupe active-skill references by path, keep the most recently read entries; entries store a name/path/description reference, not the SKILL.md body).summary_textis a LastValue channel updated by summarization and projected into model requests as durable context data instead of being stored as amessagesitem. - Delta-mode
merge_message_writesnormalizes the current message state once, then folds normalized writes in order with message-ID position indexes and deferred tombstone compaction. It preserves publicadd_messagesbehavior, including duplicate IDs, replacement position, removal errors,REMOVE_ALL_MESSAGES, null-write errors, and missing-ID allocation order, without rescanning the accumulated state for every write. Keep this full-parity contract covered by differential tests: LangGraph's private_messages_delta_reduceris also linear, but intentionally omits some of those publicadd_messagessemantics and cannot be substituted directly.
Runtime Configuration (via config.configurable):
thinking_enabled- Enable model's extended thinkingmodel_name- Select specific LLM modelis_plan_mode- Enable TodoList middlewaresubagent_enabled- Enable task delegation toolmax_concurrent_subagents- Per-responsetaskcall concurrency limit (clamped bySubagentLimitMiddleware)max_total_subagents- Optional per-run total delegation cap override (falls back tosubagents.max_total_per_run, clamped to 1-50) Gateway andDeerFlowClient.stream()always provide the runtimerun_id; custom graph integrations must do the same. If it is absent, enforcement deliberately counts the thread's full delegation ledger (fail-restrictive) and emits a warning.
Direct subagent runtime: create_deerflow_agent(..., subagent_runtime=runtime) is the explicit dependency-injection path for direct graph callers. Reuse one deerflow.subagents.SubagentRuntime across every graph that belongs to the same application capacity boundary. With the default subagent feature it binds middleware concurrency/total limits, the ordinary task tool, one real execution controller, and any active durable-batch submitter to the same snapshot. A caller-owned batch repository requires await runtime.start() (or async with runtime) before graph construction and stop() at shutdown; the factory fails closed while that worker is stopped, and already-built bound batch tools must fail unavailable after it stops rather than falling through to another process-global submitter. The factory never creates SQL infrastructure, renders the caller-owned system_prompt, or mounts Gateway API/UI routes. Full middleware takeover cannot be combined with this runtime; direct callers and custom subagent middleware remain responsible for model-visible call-policy wording.