Sunshine bf740ffa90
feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#5041)
* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#4849)

Backend-first implementation of the PAT contract from #4849: show-once
dfp_ tokens bound to their owning user (AUTH_SOURCE_PAT,
is_internal=false), digest-only storage (migration 0017), strict
credential precedence (invalid Bearer is a 401, never cookie fallback),
CSRF double-submit skipped only for Bearer requests while
auth-endpoint origin checks still run, scopes intersecting the authz
route permissions, session-auth-only PAT management and password
changes, and throttled best-effort last_used_at stamps.

* fix(auth): harden PAT scope boundary and schema parity from adversarial review

Independent review of the initial draft found: (1) scopes only constrained
the threads/runs permission axis while admin routes treated a PAT as its
(possibly admin) owner — is_admin_user now rejects PAT callers outright
since no scope grants admin capability; (2) the model declared a column
UNIQUE constraint while migration 0017 created a named unique index, so
downgrade failed on create_all-bootstrapped DBs — both now use the named
unique index; (3) auth-disabled mode is an operator override and now stays
ahead of the Bearer check so a stray Authorization header cannot 401 an
E2E sandbox; plus wiring the previously-unused constants, bounding the
last_used_at stamp cache, and four new tests (middleware-level expiry,
expires_in_days, admin-capability rejection with session control, and the
auth-disabled precedence).

* docs(api): document personal access tokens for programmatic API access

* fix(auth): close PAT security boundaries from review (default-deny routes, extension admin suppression)

P1-1: scope intersection only constrains @require_permission routes, so
undecorated mutation routes (DELETE /api/memory, POST /api/agents, Lark
credential switching, channel config) accepted a PAT holding a single read
scope. AuthMiddleware now enforces a default-deny route policy in
auth/pat.py: PAT requests are admitted only to the thread/run lifecycle
routes the v1 scopes govern; everything else answers 403 regardless of
scopes. Session-cookie callers are unaffected.

P1-2: the extension principal resolver projected is_admin/roles from the
raw system_role, so an admin-owned PAT passed
deerflow_extension_api.require_admin on contributed routes despite the
documented no-admin guarantee. The projection is now PAT-aware and
suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers, mirroring
deps.is_admin_user.

Both fixes carry regression tests (route outside policy 403 + session
control; production resolver admin suppression), and API.md documents the
default-deny boundary.

* fix(auth): enforce PAT scopes on stateless run entry and harden decorator

Follow-up hardening from an independent audit of the P1 fixes:

- POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait were the only allowlisted run
  entrypoints without @require_permission, so a threads:read-only PAT
  could still start runs (same bug class as P1-1, now closed): both now
  carry @require_permission("runs", "create"). POST /api/threads and
  POST /api/threads/search gain threads:write / threads:read for the
  same reason. Authorization-disabled deployments see no change (the
  permission set resolves to all permissions).
- require_permission now binds the wrapped signature to locate a
  positionally-passed request before injecting the test stub, fixing
  'got multiple values for argument' on direct positional unit-test
  calls.
- API.md: the intro PAT example used GET /api/models, which the new
  default-deny policy 403s — replaced with GET /api/threads; the
  default-deny route list now spells out method sets.

Regression test: threads:read-only PAT is 403 on the decorated stateless
entry while a runs:create PAT passes.

* fix(auth): address review P2s (empty Authorization header, PAT name trimming, API example)

- CSRFMiddleware treats an explicitly empty Authorization header as
  present (is None), so an invalid credential always reaches
  AuthMiddleware's uniform 401 instead of a CSRF 403 that varies by
  method/CSRF state. Regression: empty-header request dies at auth.
- PATCreateRequest strips the name and rejects whitespace-only values
  before token generation; created names are stored trimmed.
- API.md intro PAT example now uses the implemented
  POST /api/threads/search endpoint (GET /api/threads does not exist).
- AGENTS.md trimmed back under the guidance soft budget after the
  upstream merge.

* fix(auth): tighten PAT route policy to implemented methods only

The allowlist admitted GET /api/threads, a method no router implements.
Pre-authorizing a dead method weakens the default-deny boundary: a
future GET collection route added without a permission decorator would
become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. Restrict the
rule to POST, fix the stale GET description in API.md's PAT
constraints, and document the default-deny boundary accurately in the
gateway AGENTS.md guidance (only the threads/runs allowlist is
PAT-reachable; every other authenticated route 403s PAT callers).

Audited every remaining rule against the mounted routers: all other
method+path entries map to real routes. Regression:
test_pat_policy_does_not_pre_authorize_unimplemented_methods.

* test(auth): guarantee the negative digest test mutates the token

token[:-1] + "X" is identical to the original whenever the generated
token already ends in X (1/62), making the negative digest assertion
fail intermittently. Choose the replacement character based on the
existing tail so the mutated token always differs.

* fix(auth): require runs:cancel for cancel-then-stream requests

stream_existing_run is gated at runs:read so action-less stream joins
work with read-only credentials, but its ?action=interrupt|rollback
branch cancels the run — a separate permission. A runs:read-only PAT
passed both the PAT route policy and the route decorator and could
interrupt or roll back an active run, bypassing the runs:cancel scope.

Decorators cannot express query-parameter-conditional permissions, so
the check lives in require_cancel_permission_when_action(), applied at
the top of the handler. Regression drives the real helper through the
production middleware: runs:read-only PAT + action is 403, the same
token joins action-less, runs:read+cancel passes, session control
unaffected.

* docs(changelog): add the PAT feature entry

* docs(readme): add personal access tokens section

Repo documentation-update policy requires user-facing features to
update README.md in the same changeset; the PAT feature previously
touched only backend/docs/API.md and the gateway AGENTS.md.

* fix(auth): require runs:cancel for mutating multitask strategies

All five run-creation entrypoints were gated only by runs:create, but
RunCreateRequest.multitask_strategy accepts interrupt/rollback and
start_run forwards it to create_or_reject, which terminates an
already-active run. A runs:create-only PAT could therefore kill an
existing run through a create request, bypassing runs:cancel.

Decorators cannot express body-parameter-conditional permissions, and
per-route checks leave the same hole for the next entrypoint, so the
gate lives in start_run itself — the single choke point every
run-creation path (HTTP routes and internal launchers) flows through.
Regenerate launches pass multitask_strategy="reject" and are
unaffected; requests without a stamped auth context (internal/test
compositions) skip the gate.

The check is the shared authz.require_cancel_permission_if primitive;
require_cancel_permission_when_action now delegates to it, so every
request dimension that carries cancel capability (query action, body
strategy) flows through one gate.

Regression drives the real middleware stack: runs:create-only PAT +
interrupt/rollback is 403 with the exact detail, reject (explicit and
default) stays available, runs:create+cancel passes, session control
unaffected; a source anchor pins the gate inside start_run.

* fix(runs): keep observer joins from applying creator cancel-on-disconnect

sse_consumer's finally block applied the record's on_disconnect=cancel
policy on ANY consumer's disconnect. The join surfaces (GET /join and
the action-less GET/POST stream join) feed it the existing RunRecord,
so anyone with thread read access — including a runs:read-only PAT —
could cancel a locally-owned running run simply by closing the SSE
connection, without runs:cancel. The policy expresses the creator's
intent for their own connection; an observer's disconnect must never
be read as that intent.

sse_consumer gains apply_on_disconnect (default True). The two join
surfaces pass False; the creating endpoints (thread-scoped and
stateless create-and-stream) keep the creator semantics unchanged.
wait_for_run_completion needs no change: its callers are creator-side
or post-explicit-cancel paths only.

Regression exercises a real generator close — the same machinery
Starlette drives on client disconnect — against the production
sse_consumer: creator stream disconnect cancels, observer join
disconnect does not; a wiring anchor pins both join call sites and the
creator defaults. API.md documents the cancel-capability constraint
(this fix plus the action/strategy gates) in PAT Constraints.

* test(auth): pin the multitask gate behaviorally; state wait invariant

Independent adversarial review of the round-5 fixes found the P1-a
regression only mirror-pinned: the source anchor could be satisfied by
a comment, and deleting the gate from start_run would not fail the
suite. This drives the production start_run directly — a create-only
auth context gets 403 with the exact detail for interrupt, and a
reject request with no cancel permission at all proceeds past the gate
(never a permission 403).

Also documents wait_for_run_completion's creator-side invariant
(every caller is the creating endpoint or post-explicit-cancel) so a
future observer wiring thinks twice before reusing it — the one-caller-
away variant of the observer-disconnect P1.

* docs(changelog): correct the PAT entry's digest and route-policy description

The entry said HMAC digests (the implementation stores SHA-256 digests,
as documented in API.md and pinned by the repository tests) and claimed
the route policy admits 'implemented stateless endpoints' (it admits
the thread/run lifecycle routes, narrowing further by scopes). Also
notes the cancel-capability gate now covering action and multitask
strategies.

* fix(auth): enumerate the PAT runs route policy per implemented subroute

The runs subtree rule was a GET|POST /runs(/.*)? wildcard — it
pre-authorized every current and future subroute under /runs, including
methods the router never implemented (e.g. GET /runs/stream), which is
the same latent default-deny weakening the threads collection rule was
tightened for: a future route added under /runs would become
PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change.

The wildcard is replaced with six segment-precise rules covering exactly
the 14 implemented method+path combinations; the {run_id} slot
necessarily matches any single segment, so the POST-only collection
names (stream, wait, regenerate, edit-regenerate) are excluded from the
GET run-id rule via negative lookahead — no dead method stays
pre-authorized. Behavior for implemented routes is unchanged.

test_pat_runs_policy_admits_exactly_the_mounted_routes derives the
expected set from the mounted thread_runs router instead of a
hand-maintained list: every implemented GET/POST route under /runs must
be admitted, routes in this router outside the subtree stay denied, and
representative unimplemented neighbors are denied — so adding a route
under /runs now fails CI until it is explicitly allowlisted, and a
removed route leaves a dead rule visible. API.md's PAT constraints list
the enumerated routes and drops a feedback mention that belonged to the
stateless /api/runs axis.

* docs(migration): add the 0017 renumbering coordination note to 0017

The PR's migration-coordination comment states each migration file
carries the note; the file did not. Adds it: numbering was generated
against main head 0016 alongside #5078 and #4843; whoever merges first
keeps the slot, the others renumber on rebase (revision/down_revision
plus the bootstrap head assertions).

* fix(auth): pad base62 tokens to a fixed 43-char width

int.from_bytes discards leading zero bytes, so the unpadded encoder
returned a variable-length body — empty for all-zero input, and shorter
than 40 characters for any draw below 62**39 (~1 in 14.5M), leaving
test_generate_pat_token_format probabilistically flaky and the token
body without stable width (review round 6, P3).

_base62 now left-pads with "0" to _base62_width(len(data)) — the exact
integer digit count (62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42, so 43 for 32 bytes). The
format test asserts the exact fixed width instead of a probabilistic
floor, and a new unit test pins the all-zero, leading-zero-byte, and
max-value edges deterministically.
2026-08-29 23:50:45 +08:00

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# API Reference
This document provides a complete reference for the DeerFlow backend APIs.
## Overview
DeerFlow backend exposes two sets of APIs:
1. **LangGraph-compatible API** - Agent interactions, threads, and streaming (`/api/langgraph/*`)
2. **Gateway API** - Models, MCP, skills, uploads, and artifacts (`/api/*`)
All APIs are accessed through the Nginx reverse proxy at port 2026.
For agent conversations, clients can either pre-create a thread
(`POST /api/langgraph/threads`) or start immediately with the stateless stream
endpoint (`POST /api/langgraph/runs/stream`). The latter auto-creates a thread
and returns `thread_id` and `run_id` in the response `Content-Location` header.
## Authentication
Browser sessions authenticate with the `access_token` session cookie issued at
login. Programmatic clients can instead use a **personal access token (PAT)**
sent as a Bearer credential:
```http
POST /api/threads/search
Authorization: Bearer dfp_...
Content-Type: application/json
{}
```
PATs require a configured database backend (SQLite/PostgreSQL) — on the
memory-only backend, Bearer credentials are rejected and PAT management routes
return `503`.
### Personal Access Tokens
Base URL: `/api/v1/auth`
PAT management requires an **interactive session** (a PAT cannot manage PATs
or change passwords, so a leaked automation token cannot mint fresh
credentials). The raw token is returned **exactly once** at creation; only its
SHA-256 digest is stored server-side.
#### Create Token
```http
POST /api/v1/auth/pats
Content-Type: application/json
```
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"name": "ci-runner",
"scopes": ["threads:read", "runs:create", "runs:read"],
"expires_in_days": 90
}
```
- `scopes` — subset of the route permissions: `threads:read`, `threads:write`,
`threads:delete`, `runs:create`, `runs:read`, `runs:cancel`. A PAT can only
*narrow* its owning user's permissions, never widen them.
- `expires_in_days` — optional (`1``365`); omitted means the token never expires.
**Response (`201`):**
```json
{
"id": "0f0c6e6a-...",
"name": "ci-runner",
"scopes": ["runs:create", "runs:read", "threads:read"],
"expires_at": "2026-11-25T10:30:00Z",
"created_at": "2026-08-27T10:30:00Z",
"token": "dfp_..."
}
```
Save `token` immediately — it cannot be retrieved again.
#### List Tokens
```http
GET /api/v1/auth/pats
```
Returns the caller's tokens with `last_used_at` / `revoked_at` audit fields;
never returns digests or raw tokens.
#### Revoke Token
```http
DELETE /api/v1/auth/pats/{pat_id}
```
Revocation is immediate.
### PAT Constraints
- A request carrying an `Authorization` header that fails validation gets a
hard `401` — it never falls back to the session cookie.
- **Cancel capability requires `runs:cancel` on every request dimension that
carries it**, not just the dedicated cancel route: `?action=interrupt|rollback`
on `POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/stream` (action-less joins
stay at `runs:read`), and `multitask_strategy=interrupt|rollback` on run
creation (the default `reject` stays at `runs:create`). Joining a run's
stream is pure observation — an observer disconnecting never cancels the run.
- **Route-level default-deny:** PAT requests are admitted only to the
thread/run lifecycle routes the v1 scopes govern — `POST /api/threads`
(create), `POST /api/threads/search` (list), `GET/PATCH/DELETE
/api/threads/{thread_id}`, the thread `goal`/`state`/`compact`/`history`/
`branches` subroutes, and exactly the implemented `/runs` subroutes
(`GET|POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs`, the POST-only `stream`, `wait`,
`regenerate/prepare`, and `edit-regenerate/prepare` collection endpoints,
`GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}` plus its `cancel` (POST),
`join`/`messages`/`events`/`workspace-changes` (GET), and
`GET|POST .../runs/{run_id}/stream`), plus `POST /api/runs/stream|wait` and
`GET /api/runs/{run_id}/messages|feedback`. A route added under `/runs` is
denied until explicitly added to the policy.
Every other authenticated route — memory, agents, models, MCP/skills
config, integrations, channels, uploads — answers `403` to PAT callers
regardless of scopes. Scope enforcement alone only constrains
permission-decorated routes, so the allowlist is the outer boundary;
session-cookie callers are unaffected.
- PAT credentials never carry admin capability, even when the owning user is
an admin. This includes extension-contributed admin routes: the extension
principal projection suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers.
- Revoking or deleting the owning user invalidates their PATs on the next
request.
## LangGraph-compatible API
Base URL: `/api/langgraph`
The public LangGraph-compatible API follows LangGraph SDK conventions. In the unified nginx deployment, Gateway owns `/api/langgraph/*` and translates those paths to its native `/api/*` run, thread, and streaming routers.
### Threads
#### Create Thread
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads
Content-Type: application/json
```
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"metadata": {}
}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"thread_id": "abc123",
"created_at": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
"metadata": {}
}
```
#### Get Thread State
```http
GET /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/state
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"values": {
"messages": [...],
"sandbox": {...},
"artifacts": [...],
"thread_data": {...},
"title": "Conversation Title"
},
"next": [],
"config": {...}
}
```
### Runs
#### Create Run
Execute the agent with input.
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs
Content-Type: application/json
```
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"input": {
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Hello, can you help me?"
}
]
},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {
"model_name": "gpt-4",
"thinking_enabled": false,
"is_plan_mode": false
}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}
```
**Stream Mode Compatibility:**
- Use: `values`, `messages-tuple`, `custom`, `updates`, `debug`, `tasks`, `checkpoints`
- Unsupported modes, including `messages`, `events`, and `tools`, return `422` before a run is created. DeerFlow never substitutes `values` for an unsupported mode.
**Run Option Compatibility:**
- Supported concurrency strategies: `reject`, `rollback`, and `interrupt`
- Compatibility default: `if_not_exists="create"`; this matches DeerFlow's current behavior
- Artifact delivery is enforced automatically when a run creates or modifies regular files under `/mnt/user-data/outputs`. `present_files` must present at least one path produced by the current run (or a directory containing it), and the terminal receipt must be persisted; presenting only an unrelated file does not satisfy delivery. Runs without changed outputs retain ordinary conversational behavior. `artifact_delivery` is not a client-settable run option.
- Unsupported options return `422`: `webhook`, `stream_resumable=true`, `after_seconds`, `feedback_keys`, any non-null `on_completion` value (including the SDK values `"complete"` and `"continue"`), `if_not_exists="reject"`, and `multitask_strategy="enqueue"`
- `stream_resumable=false` is accepted: it is the LangGraph SDK's default and requests the non-resumable stream DeerFlow already serves
- Undeclared SDK options, including `checkpoint_during` and `durability`, also return `422` instead of being silently discarded
When outputs changed during the run, `run.delivery` events retain the Slice 1
facts (`presented`, `paths`, and `by_tool`) and add `produced_paths`,
`presented_paths`, `matched_paths`, plus an explicit verdict: `verification`,
`stage` (`presented`, `mismatched`, or `not_started`), and `satisfied`. Receipts
for runs without changed outputs keep their existing shape.
**Recursion Limit:**
`config.recursion_limit` caps the number of graph steps LangGraph will execute
in a single run. The unified Gateway path defaults to `100` in
`build_run_config` (see `backend/app/gateway/services.py`), which is a safer
starting point for plan-mode or subagent-heavy runs. Clients can still set
`recursion_limit` explicitly in the request body; increase it if you run deeply
nested subagent graphs. Scheduled-task launches do not take a client body: they
use `scheduler.recursion_limit` from `config.yaml` (default `1000`, matching
the web UI). For safety, the Gateway clamps any supplied
value to a configurable server ceiling (`max_recursion_limit` in `config.yaml`,
default `1000`) so a single run cannot execute unbounded graph steps (runaway
LLM cost / DoS); invalid or non-positive values fall back to the `100` default.
**Configurable Options:**
- `model_name` (string): Override the default model
- `thinking_enabled` (boolean): Enable extended thinking for supported models
- `is_plan_mode` (boolean): Enable TodoList middleware for task tracking
**Response:** Server-Sent Events (SSE) stream
```
event: values
data: {"messages": [...], "title": "..."}
event: messages
data: {"content": "Hello! I'd be happy to help.", "role": "assistant"}
event: end
data: {}
```
#### Get Run History
```http
GET /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"runs": [
{
"run_id": "run123",
"status": "success",
"created_at": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z"
}
]
}
```
#### Stream Run
Stream responses in real-time.
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream
Content-Type: application/json
```
Same request body as Create Run. Returns SSE stream.
#### Stateless Stream Run
Start a conversation without creating a thread first. Gateway auto-creates a
thread when `config.configurable.thread_id` is omitted, and returns both
identifiers in the response `Content-Location` header.
```http
POST /api/langgraph/runs/stream
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: text/event-stream
```
Through Nginx, `/api/langgraph/runs/stream` is rewritten to the native Gateway
path `POST /api/runs/stream`.
**Request Body:** Same as [Create Run](#create-run). Omit `thread_id` to start a
new conversation; include it to continue an existing one:
```json
{
"input": {
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Hello, can you help me?"
}
]
},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {
"model_name": "gpt-4",
"thinking_enabled": false,
"is_plan_mode": false
}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}
```
**Response:** Server-Sent Events (SSE) stream with a `Content-Location` header:
```http
Content-Location: /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}
```
Clients should parse `thread_id` and `run_id` from this header (the path ends
with `/runs/{run_id}`). Persist `thread_id` and send it back on the next turn
via `config.configurable.thread_id` to keep conversation history.
**Continuing a conversation:**
```json
{
"input": {
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What did I just ask?"
}
]
},
"config": {
"configurable": {
"thread_id": "abc123",
"model_name": "gpt-4"
}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}
```
---
## Gateway API
Base URL: `/api`
### Models
#### List Models
Get all available LLM models from configuration.
```http
GET /api/models
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"models": [
{
"name": "gpt-4",
"display_name": "GPT-4",
"supports_thinking": false,
"supports_vision": true
},
{
"name": "claude-3-opus",
"display_name": "Claude 3 Opus",
"supports_thinking": false,
"supports_vision": true
},
{
"name": "deepseek-v3",
"display_name": "DeepSeek V3",
"supports_thinking": true,
"supports_vision": false
}
]
}
```
#### Get Model Details
```http
GET /api/models/{model_name}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"name": "gpt-4",
"display_name": "GPT-4",
"model": "gpt-4",
"max_tokens": 4096,
"supports_thinking": false,
"supports_vision": true
}
```
### MCP Configuration
#### Get MCP Config
Get current MCP server configurations.
```http
GET /api/mcp/config
```
Requires an authenticated admin session. Sensitive env/header/OAuth secret
values are masked in the response.
**Response:**
```json
{
"mcp_servers": {
"github": {
"enabled": true,
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "***"
},
"description": "GitHub operations"
}
}
}
```
#### Update MCP Config
Update MCP server configurations.
```http
PUT /api/mcp/config
Content-Type: application/json
```
Requires an authenticated admin session. API-managed `stdio` MCP servers may
only use allowed executable names for `command` (default: `npx`, `uvx`). Set
`DEER_FLOW_MCP_STDIO_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST` to a comma-separated list when a
deployment needs additional trusted launchers.
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"mcp_servers": {
"github": {
"enabled": true,
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "$GITHUB_TOKEN"
},
"description": "GitHub operations"
}
}
}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"mcp_servers": {
"github": {
"enabled": true,
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "***"
},
"description": "GitHub operations"
}
}
}
```
#### Update One MCP Server State
Enable or disable one configured MCP server without replacing the full
extensions configuration.
```http
PATCH /api/mcp/config
Content-Type: application/json
```
Requires an authenticated admin session. Enabling a `stdio` server validates
that server's `command` against the same allowlist used by the full `PUT`
endpoint. Disabling a server does not require its command to be allowlisted, and
invalid commands on other servers do not block the update. The endpoint
preserves secrets, environment-variable placeholders, skills, custom server
fields, and other top-level extensions config. SSE/HTTP targets may use either
DeerFlow's `type` field or the MCP-spec `transport` field.
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"server_name": "semantic-scholar",
"enabled": false
}
```
The response is the full masked MCP configuration, matching `GET` and `PUT`.
An unknown `server_name` returns `404`; attempting to enable a server with a
disallowed `stdio` command returns `400`.
#### Reset MCP Tools Cache
Clear cached MCP tools and persistent MCP sessions process-wide. This affects
all threads and users in the current Gateway process. Tools are loaded again
from configured MCP servers on the next agent run or tool lookup.
```http
POST /api/mcp/cache/reset
```
Requires an authenticated admin session.
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "MCP tools cache reset. Tools will reload on next use."
}
```
### Skills
#### List Skills
Get all available skills.
```http
GET /api/skills
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"skills": [
{
"name": "pdf-processing",
"display_name": "PDF Processing",
"description": "Handle PDF documents efficiently",
"enabled": true,
"license": "MIT",
"path": "public/pdf-processing"
},
{
"name": "frontend-design",
"display_name": "Frontend Design",
"description": "Design and build frontend interfaces",
"enabled": false,
"license": "MIT",
"path": "public/frontend-design"
}
]
}
```
#### Get Skill Details
```http
GET /api/skills/{skill_name}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"name": "pdf-processing",
"display_name": "PDF Processing",
"description": "Handle PDF documents efficiently",
"enabled": true,
"license": "MIT",
"path": "public/pdf-processing",
"allowed_tools": ["read_file", "write_file", "bash"],
"content": "# PDF Processing\n\nInstructions for the agent..."
}
```
#### Enable Skill
```http
POST /api/skills/{skill_name}/enable
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Skill 'pdf-processing' enabled"
}
```
#### Disable Skill
```http
POST /api/skills/{skill_name}/disable
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Skill 'pdf-processing' disabled"
}
```
#### Install Skill
Install a skill from a `.skill` file.
```http
POST /api/skills/install
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
```
**Request Body:**
- `file`: The `.skill` file to install
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Skill 'my-skill' installed successfully",
"skill": {
"name": "my-skill",
"display_name": "My Skill",
"path": "custom/my-skill"
}
}
```
#### Reload Skills
Invalidate the skill prompt caches for every user in the current Gateway
process. Subsequent runs rescan the configured public, custom, and legacy skill
directories; runs that have already started keep their existing skill snapshot.
```http
POST /api/skills/reload
```
The request has no body and requires an authenticated administrator. For a
cookie-authenticated request, send the CSRF cookie value in the matching header:
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/skills/reload \
-b cookies.txt \
-H "X-CSRF-Token: <csrf_token-cookie-value>"
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"scope": "process",
"message": "Skill caches invalidated; subsequent runs in this Gateway process will rescan the latest skills."
}
```
`success` confirms cache invalidation, not that every file on disk was valid:
malformed skills retain the existing parser behavior of being skipped and
logged. The endpoint returns `401` for unauthenticated callers, `403` for
non-admin users, and a generic `500` if the invalidation mechanism itself
fails or the process-local background scan does not finish within the cache
refresh timeout. A loader-level failure, such as an unavailable mounted root,
does not publish an empty catalog: the last successfully loaded process cache
remains available. A timed-out scan continues in its daemon worker and can
still populate the process cache when it finishes.
The scope is deliberately process-local. Each Uvicorn worker or Kubernetes Pod
must be called directly; repeated requests through a load-balanced Service do
not guarantee that every instance is reached. External MinIO/NFS/CSI writes
bypass the validation, SkillScan, and history used by the install/edit APIs, so
the mounted directory must be writable only by trusted operators.
### File Uploads
#### Upload Files
Upload one or more files to a thread.
```http
POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
```
**Request Body:**
- `files`: One or more files to upload
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"files": [
{
"filename": "document.pdf",
"size": 1234567,
"path": ".deer-flow/threads/abc123/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"virtual_path": "/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"artifact_url": "/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"markdown_file": "document.md",
"markdown_path": ".deer-flow/threads/abc123/user-data/uploads/document.md",
"markdown_virtual_path": "/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.md",
"markdown_artifact_url": "/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.md"
}
],
"message": "Successfully uploaded 1 file(s)"
}
```
**Supported Document Formats** (auto-converted to Markdown):
- PDF (`.pdf`)
- PowerPoint (`.ppt`, `.pptx`)
- Excel (`.xls`, `.xlsx`)
- Word (`.doc`, `.docx`)
#### List Uploaded Files
```http
GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads/list
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"files": [
{
"filename": "document.pdf",
"size": 1234567,
"path": ".deer-flow/threads/abc123/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"virtual_path": "/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"artifact_url": "/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"extension": ".pdf",
"modified": 1705997600.0
}
],
"count": 1
}
```
#### Delete File
```http
DELETE /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads/{filename}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Deleted document.pdf"
}
```
### Thread Cleanup
Remove DeerFlow-managed local thread files under `.deer-flow/threads/{thread_id}` after the LangGraph thread itself has been deleted.
```http
DELETE /api/threads/{thread_id}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Deleted local thread data for abc123"
}
```
**Error behavior:**
- `422` for invalid thread IDs
- `500` returns a generic `{"detail": "Failed to delete local thread data."}` response while full exception details stay in server logs
### Artifacts
#### Get Artifact
Download or view an artifact generated by the agent.
```http
GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/artifacts/{path}
```
**Path Examples:**
- `/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/outputs/result.txt`
- `/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf`
**Query Parameters:**
- `download` (boolean): If `true`, force download with Content-Disposition header
**Response:** File content with appropriate Content-Type
---
## Error Responses
All APIs return errors in a consistent format:
```json
{
"detail": "Error message describing what went wrong"
}
```
**HTTP Status Codes:**
- `400` - Bad Request: Invalid input
- `404` - Not Found: Resource not found
- `422` - Validation Error: Request validation failed
- `500` - Internal Server Error: Server-side error
---
## Authentication
DeerFlow supports four HTTP identity sources. They share the same thread/run isolation rules but differ in whether a row is created in `users` and how external identities are mapped. See [AUTH_DESIGN.md](AUTH_DESIGN.md) for the full design.
| Model | Entry | `users` table | Isolation key |
|---|---|---|---|
| Browser session | `access_token` cookie after login/register | Yes | `users.id` |
| OIDC / SSO | OAuth callback → cookie | Yes | `users.id` (see [SSO.md](SSO.md)) |
| IM channel binding | Connect code + `channel_connections` | Bound to registered user | `channel_connections.owner_user_id` |
| **Internal Auth** | `X-DeerFlow-Internal-Token` + `X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id` | **No** | Owner string on `threads_meta.user_id` |
**IM channel binding** and **Internal Auth** are both *platform-trust* integrations: DeerFlow trusts the channel/platform to authenticate end users. IM bindings persist the mapping in `channel_connections` / `channel_conversations` and require a DeerFlow `users` row. Internal Auth lets a platform call the Gateway API directly with a deployment-shared token and a per-request owner header—no `users` row, but thread/run/checkpoint isolation works the same way.
### Browser session (default)
DeerFlow enforces authentication for all non-public HTTP routes. Public routes are limited to health/docs metadata and these public auth endpoints:
- `POST /api/v1/auth/initialize` creates the first admin account when no admin exists.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/login/local` logs in with email/password and sets an HttpOnly `access_token` cookie.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/register` creates a regular `user` account and sets the session cookie.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` clears the session cookie.
- `GET /api/v1/auth/setup-status` reports whether the first admin still needs to be created.
The authenticated auth endpoints are:
- `GET /api/v1/auth/me` returns the current user.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/change-password` changes password, optionally changes email during setup, increments `token_version`, and reissues the cookie.
Protected state-changing requests also require the CSRF double-submit token: send the `csrf_token` cookie value as the `X-CSRF-Token` header. Login/register/initialize/logout are bootstrap auth endpoints: they are exempt from the double-submit token but still reject hostile browser `Origin` headers.
User isolation is enforced from the authenticated user context:
- Thread metadata is scoped by `threads_meta.user_id`; search/read/write/delete APIs only expose the current user's threads.
- Thread files live under `{base_dir}/users/{user_id}/threads/{thread_id}/user-data/` and are exposed inside the sandbox as `/mnt/user-data/`.
- Memory and custom agents are stored under `{base_dir}/users/{user_id}/...`.
Note: MCP outbound connections can still use OAuth for configured HTTP/SSE MCP servers; that is separate from DeerFlow API authentication.
### Internal Auth (platform HTTP integration)
For server-to-server integrations (e.g. a Feishu or WeCom/Enterprise WeChat bot backend), configure:
```bash
export DEER_FLOW_INTERNAL_AUTH_TOKEN="<long-random-secret>"
```
| Header | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `X-DeerFlow-Internal-Token` | Yes | Must match `DEER_FLOW_INTERNAL_AUTH_TOKEN`; missing/invalid → `401` |
| `X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id` | Yes for per-user isolation | Platform user id (e.g. `feishu_ou_alice`, `wecom_user_bob`); omit → `default` bucket |
Does **not** use browser cookies or CSRF tokens. Does **not** insert into `users`; sets `threads_meta.user_id` / `runs.user_id` from the owner header. DeerFlow validates only the platform token—not whether the owner id represents a real end user; user validity is entirely the platform's responsibility. See [AUTH_DESIGN.md — Internal Auth](AUTH_DESIGN.md#internal-auth-direct-http) for trust boundaries, persistence, and security notes.
Use the standard Gateway thread/run endpoints (`POST /api/threads`, `POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream`, etc.) with the headers above on every request.
---
## Rate Limiting
No rate limiting is implemented by default. For production deployments, configure rate limiting in Nginx:
```nginx
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api:10m rate=10r/s;
location /api/ {
limit_req zone=api burst=20 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://backend;
}
```
---
## Streaming Support
Gateway's LangGraph-compatible API streams run events with Server-Sent Events (SSE).
**Thread-scoped streaming** (thread must exist):
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream
Accept: text/event-stream
```
**Stateless streaming** (no pre-created thread; Gateway auto-creates one):
```http
POST /api/langgraph/runs/stream
Accept: text/event-stream
```
Both endpoints return `Content-Location: /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}`.
The DeerFlow web UI and LangGraph SDK clients rely on this header to discover the
assigned `thread_id` and `run_id` on the first message of a new chat.
### SSE replay retention and gaps
Clients may reconnect to a run stream with `Last-Event-ID`. Replay history is
bounded by `stream_bridge.queue_maxsize` (default `256`) and, for Redis, by the
rolling `stream_ttl_seconds`. A retained cursor resumes after that event with no
additional control frame.
When a syntactically valid cursor is older than the retained watermark, the
server sends exactly one `gap` event before any retained data and closes that
subscription without an `end` event:
```text
event: gap
data: {"code":"stream_replay_gap","run_id":"run-123","requested_event_id":"1718000000000-1","earliest_available_event_id":"1718000000100-42","latest_available_event_id":"1718000000200-84","recovery":"reload_durable_state"}
```
The frame deliberately has no SSE `id:`. Both `earliest_available_event_id` and
`latest_available_event_id` are `string | null` (they are `null` when no events
are retained in the buffer). Consumers must reload durable thread state and
persisted run events/messages, then may reconnect from `latest_available_event_id`
to follow newer live events, or rejoin without a cursor when the buffer is empty
(`latest_available_event_id` is `null`). A gap does not cancel the active run.
The same signal applies when a no-cursor subscriber has already established an
empty-stream wait but the first Redis wake-up falls behind before delivery; in
that case `requested_event_id` is `null`. Malformed cursor handling is
backend-specific and is not the same as a valid cursor that was evicted.
---
## SDK Usage
### Python (LangGraph SDK)
```python
from langgraph_sdk import get_client
client = get_client(url="http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph")
run_meta: dict[str, str] = {}
def on_run_created(meta) -> None:
# langgraph-sdk 0.3.x parses Content-Location only when this callback is set.
if meta.thread_id:
run_meta["thread_id"] = meta.thread_id
run_meta["run_id"] = meta.run_id
# Option A: stateless stream — no thread pre-creation
# Gateway auto-creates a thread and returns thread_id/run_id in Content-Location.
async for event in client.runs.stream(
None,
"lead_agent",
input={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
config={"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}},
stream_mode=["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
on_run_created=on_run_created,
):
print(event)
thread_id = run_meta["thread_id"] # persist before the next turn
# Option A (continued): same thread on the next turn
async for event in client.runs.stream(
None,
"lead_agent",
input={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "What did I just ask?"}]},
config={"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id, "model_name": "gpt-4"}},
stream_mode=["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
on_run_created=on_run_created,
):
print(event)
# Option B: thread-scoped stream — create thread first, then stream
thread = await client.threads.create()
async for event in client.runs.stream(
thread["thread_id"],
"lead_agent",
input={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
config={"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}},
stream_mode=["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
on_run_created=on_run_created,
):
print(event)
```
### JavaScript/TypeScript
```typescript
// Using fetch for Gateway API
const response = await fetch('/api/models');
const data = await response.json();
console.log(data.models);
function parseRunLocation(contentLocation: string | null) {
if (!contentLocation) return null;
const match = /\/threads\/([^/]+)\/runs\/([^/]+)/.exec(contentLocation);
if (!match) return null;
return { threadId: match[1], runId: match[2] };
}
// Option A: stateless stream — no thread pre-creation
let threadId: string | undefined;
const firstResponse = await fetch("/api/langgraph/runs/stream", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
Accept: "text/event-stream",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
input: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Hello" }] },
stream_mode: ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
}),
});
const created = parseRunLocation(firstResponse.headers.get("Content-Location"));
threadId = created?.threadId;
console.log("thread_id:", created?.threadId, "run_id:", created?.runId);
// Option B: continue the same thread on the next turn
const followUpResponse = await fetch("/api/langgraph/runs/stream", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
Accept: "text/event-stream",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
input: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "What did I just ask?" }] },
config: { configurable: { thread_id: threadId } },
stream_mode: ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
}),
});
// Option C: thread-scoped stream when you already have a thread_id
const streamResponse = await fetch(`/api/langgraph/threads/${threadId}/runs/stream`, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
Accept: "text/event-stream",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
input: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Hello" }] },
stream_mode: ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
}),
});
const reader = streamResponse.body?.getReader();
// Decode and parse SSE frames from reader in your client code.
```
### cURL Examples
```bash
# List models
curl http://localhost:2026/api/models
# Get MCP config
curl http://localhost:2026/api/mcp/config
# Upload file
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/threads/abc123/uploads \
-F "files=@document.pdf"
# Enable skill
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/skills/pdf-processing/enable
# Stateless stream — no thread pre-creation
curl -s -D - -N -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/runs/stream \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: text/event-stream" \
-d '{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}'
# Read Content-Location: /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id} from the headers.
# Continue the same thread on the next turn
curl -s -N -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/runs/stream \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: text/event-stream" \
-d '{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "What did I just ask?"}]},
"config": {
"configurable": {"thread_id": "abc123", "model_name": "gpt-4"}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}'
# Thread-scoped flow — create thread first, then stream
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/threads \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/threads/abc123/runs/stream \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: text/event-stream" \
-d '{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}'
```
> The unified Gateway path defaults `config.recursion_limit` to 100 for
> plan-mode and subagent-heavy runs. Clients may still set
> `config.recursion_limit` explicitly — see the [Create Run](#create-run)
> section for details. Scheduled-task launches use
> `scheduler.recursion_limit` from `config.yaml` instead of a client body.