Zeren Wang a58ab484a6
feat(projects): Projects MVP Phase 2 — instructions, document shelf, promotion, trash (#5443)
* feat(projects): Projects MVP Phase 2 — instructions, document shelf, promotion, trash

Implements docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-12-projects-mvp-phase2-design.md
(issue #5160, tracker #5129) in the slice order of the spec's §16.

Slices:
- A: ProjectsConfig + write-time 422 UTF-8 byte cap; PROJECT_CONTEXT_KEY
  admission pinning (both server-owned sets + worker hoist); latest-only
  request-scoped <project> block via DynamicContextMiddleware
  wrap_model_call/awrap_model_call (idempotent reassembly, reserved ID
  prefix + marker + provenance, never persisted); journal audit
  fingerprints; Instructions tab.
- B: ProjectDocumentRow + migration 0023; ProjectDocumentRepository with
  locked check-and-set; hash-qualified immutable shelf storage with
  Paths helpers; upload/list/content/delete-to-trash routes; project
  delete trashes the shelf in-transaction; request-scoped bounded
  <documents> index with honest count/shown + actionable overflow note;
  list_project_documents/read_project_document tools registered only on
  pinned runs; PAT allowlist + drift guards; blocking-IO anchors.
- C: shared thread-upload ingestion service (uploads router refactored to
  parity); POST from-thread with provenance; attach-to-thread with
  lock-staged copy (archived source allowed); read-only thread-files
  view with per-group truncation reporting.
- D: restore (restored/merged/not_found/no_target/content_missing; no
  file moves), purge (continuous row lock across unlink/delete/commit,
  retryable on FS errors), retention sweep (lazy + startup, 24h orphan
  guard, row-side reconciliation never deletes).
- E: Documents tab (shelf + conversation-files browser, provenance,
  archived banner, content-missing rows), /workspace/trash route,
  sidebar entry, composer attach handoff, i18n (en-US/zh-CN), e2e mocks
  + specs.

Review hardening folded in (10 rounds, all with tests):
- force active shelf content (HTML/XML family) to download; nosniff on
  artifact + content responses; unified unsandboxed-iframe PDF preview
  (fixes the pre-existing Chromium sandbox blank in the artifact viewer)
- scope document trash to the URL project under the document lock
- atomic no-overwrite filename reservation for ALL ingestion (seeded
  claims + os.link commit with suffix retry; same-name re-upload now
  unique-names instead of replacing); hidden staging only, no visible
  placeholders; lease cleanup on setup failure
- serialize conversion under the document lock with post-lock active
  revalidation; drain locked filesystem work on cancellation; preserve
  bytes when an insert's commit state is uncertain (including trashed
  rows)
- original-integrity checks before serving text or cached conversions;
  content_missing surfaced in list responses (UI reads the flag, no
  409-probe); downloads always serve original bytes
- bounded streaming document reads with cached char counts; shelf limits
  declared in middleware release identity
- thread-root confinement for from-thread sources; config fallback
  rejects fractional/infinite values; composer counts staged
  attachments; pending attachments persist until submission or removal;
  in-flight instruction/rename edits survive save refetches; shelf and
  trash pagination; conversation-file and thread-files pages stay
  subscribed to refetches

Docs: README/README_zh, backend API.md/ARCHITECTURE.md, AGENTS.md
contracts, config.example.yaml projects block.

Review follow-ups (head b4807477 → this revision):
- The trash retention sweep is split so repeated lazy triggers stay
  bounded: the indexed expiry purge still runs on every trigger
  (GET /api/trash/documents, POST /api/trash/purge) while the
  O(all rows + all files) reconciliation is throttled to one run per
  user per 15 minutes (process-local, per-user window). The startup
  sweep now runs as a background task instead of blocking gateway
  readiness, and shutdown awaits it (bounded).
- The export scrub (stripInternalMarkers) is fence- and indentation-aware
  like the render path, so a pasted, fenced <project>/<documents> snippet
  survives markdown export while real injected blocks (never fenced) are
  still removed. Fence regexes moved to a dependency-free leaf module to
  avoid the messages↔streamdown import cycle.
- The artifact viewer's PDF iframe no longer carries an added title
  attribute (the upstream e2e contract locates it via :not([title])), and
  the upstream artifact-preview spec now pins the new contract: PDFs
  render unsandboxed, images keep sandbox="".

* fix(projects): round-2 review — cancel an overrun trash sweep, restore the PDF frame title

- Shutdown cancelled only the shield around the background startup sweep,
  so an all-users reconciliation that outlived the 5s budget kept walking
  rows and files while the document repo and DB engine were disposed
  underneath it. The wait now lives in `_shutdown_startup_trash_sweep`,
  which cancels the task and drains it before worker exit: the shield
  keeps the wait bounded, the cancel makes it final (CancelledError lands
  at the sweep's next await, and `_run_startup_trash_sweep` only catches
  `Exception`, so nothing swallows it).
- The browser-preview iframe lost `title={getFileName(filepath)}` in the
  previous fix round, leaving the PDF frame without an accessible name
  while its siblings keep theirs. Restore it (WCAG frame titles), assert
  it in the DOM test, and anchor the e2e on `iframe[title="report.pdf"]`
  instead of `iframe:not([title])`.

* fix(projects): round-3 review — report the sweep's late finish, not a phantom cancel

`Task.cancel()` returns False when the sweep already finished inside the
window between the deadline firing and the cancel, so the shutdown log
claimed a cancellation that never happened. Branch on that outcome: the
warning stays for a real cancel, a late finish is logged at info, and both
paths still reap the task before worker exit.

* fix(projects): round-4 review — make Empty trash delete what it confirms

`POST /api/trash/purge` only ran the retention sweep, and the sweep's
candidate selection is age-gated, so a freshly trashed document survived
"Empty trash" even though the confirmation promises that every listed
document is permanently deleted. With one trashed row the route answered
`{"purged": 0}` and left it in place; `GET /api/trash/documents` sweeps
expired rows before listing, so the visible rows were normally ineligible
for the action by construction.

Empty trash now drives `purge_all_trashed`: the caller's trashed rows
(`list_all_trashed`, no age filter) each go through the same guarded,
row-locked `purge` as the single-document delete — bytes first, then the
row, in one transaction — so a row restored mid-flight is skipped instead of
force-deleted, and an unlink failure rolls that row back and answers 500 with
a retryable message. Retention expiry stays where it was: the sweep's
`purge_candidates` is now the only age-gated selection, and the lazy
retention sweep still runs on the listing and at startup.

Tests: the router suite replaces the retention-gated expectation with the
reviewer's repro (fresh row purged, bytes unlinked, shelf and other users'
trash untouched, a failing unlink stays retryable and 500); a blocking-I/O
anchor drives the new entry point through the offload; the mocked e2e covers
the action end to end; a new real-backend spec performs it against the real
gateway and re-reads `GET /api/trash/documents`. README, API, ARCHITECTURE
and the phase-2 design docs (en+zh) state the age-independent contract.
2026-09-16 18:46:18 +08:00

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# API Reference
This document provides a complete reference for the DeerFlow backend APIs.
## Overview
DeerFlow backend exposes two sets of APIs:
1. **LangGraph-compatible API** - Agent interactions, threads, and streaming (`/api/langgraph/*`)
2. **Gateway API** - Models, MCP, skills, uploads, and artifacts (`/api/*`)
All APIs are accessed through the Nginx reverse proxy at port 2026.
For agent conversations, clients can either pre-create a thread
(`POST /api/langgraph/threads`) or start immediately with the stateless stream
endpoint (`POST /api/langgraph/runs/stream`). The latter auto-creates a thread
and returns `thread_id` and `run_id` in the response `Content-Location` header.
## Authentication
Browser sessions authenticate with the `access_token` session cookie issued at
login. Programmatic clients can instead use a **personal access token (PAT)**
sent as a Bearer credential:
```http
POST /api/threads/search
Authorization: Bearer dfp_...
Content-Type: application/json
{}
```
PATs require a configured database backend (SQLite/PostgreSQL) — on the
memory-only backend, Bearer credentials are rejected and PAT management routes
return `503`.
### Account Preferences
`GET /api/v1/auth/preferences` returns the signed-in browser user's four
preferences. `PATCH` updates only explicitly supplied fields and returns `204`.
Both require `X-Expected-User-Id` matching the session user; PATCH also requires
the normal `X-CSRF-Token` header. The expected ID is a stale-tab guard, not an
authorization credential. PAT, internal, and auth-disabled callers receive
`403`; a different session user receives `409`.
```json
{
"notification_enabled": false,
"model_name": "my-model",
"mode": "pro",
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
```
All four fields accept `null` to restore the default. `mode` accepts `flash`,
`thinking`, `pro`, or `ultra`; `reasoning_effort` accepts `minimal`, `low`,
`medium`, or `high`; model names are at most 200 characters. Unknown fields and
invalid values return `422`. Missing preferences read as `null`. Separate-field
patches preserve each other's changes, and same-field writes are last-commit-wins.
Storage requires SQLite or PostgreSQL (`503` when unavailable). Browser
notification permission remains device-local and is not changed by this API.
### Personal Access Tokens
Base URL: `/api/v1/auth`
PAT management requires an **interactive session** (a PAT cannot manage PATs
or change passwords, so a leaked automation token cannot mint fresh
credentials). The raw token is returned **exactly once** at creation; only its
SHA-256 digest is stored server-side.
#### Create Token
```http
POST /api/v1/auth/pats
Content-Type: application/json
```
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"name": "ci-runner",
"scopes": ["threads:read", "runs:create", "runs:read"],
"expires_in_days": 90
}
```
- `scopes` — subset of the route permissions: `threads:read`, `threads:write`,
`threads:delete`, `runs:create`, `runs:read`, `runs:cancel`. A PAT can only
*narrow* its owning user's permissions, never widen them.
- `expires_in_days` — optional (`1``365`); omitted means the token never expires.
**Response (`201`):**
```json
{
"id": "0f0c6e6a-...",
"name": "ci-runner",
"scopes": ["runs:create", "runs:read", "threads:read"],
"expires_at": "2026-11-25T10:30:00Z",
"created_at": "2026-08-27T10:30:00Z",
"token": "dfp_..."
}
```
Save `token` immediately — it cannot be retrieved again.
#### List Tokens
```http
GET /api/v1/auth/pats
```
Returns the caller's tokens with `last_used_at` / `revoked_at` audit fields;
never returns digests or raw tokens.
#### Revoke Token
```http
DELETE /api/v1/auth/pats/{pat_id}
```
Revocation is immediate.
### PAT Constraints
- A request carrying an `Authorization` header that fails validation gets a
hard `401` — it never falls back to the session cookie.
- **Cancel capability requires `runs:cancel` on every request dimension that
carries it**, not just the dedicated cancel route: `?action=interrupt|rollback`
on `POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/stream` (action-less joins
stay at `runs:read`), and `multitask_strategy=interrupt|rollback` on run
creation (the default `reject` stays at `runs:create`). Joining a run's
stream is pure observation — an observer disconnecting never cancels the run.
- **Route-level default-deny:** PAT requests are admitted only to the
thread/run lifecycle routes the v1 scopes govern — `POST /api/threads`
(create), `POST /api/threads/search` (list), `GET/PATCH/DELETE
/api/threads/{thread_id}`, the thread `goal`/`state`/`compact`/`history`/
`branches` subroutes, and exactly the implemented `/runs` subroutes
(`GET|POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs`, the POST-only `stream`, `wait`,
`regenerate/prepare`, and `edit-regenerate/prepare` collection endpoints,
`GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}` plus its `cancel` (POST),
`join`/`messages`/`events`/`workspace-changes` (GET), and
`GET|POST .../runs/{run_id}/stream`), plus `POST /api/runs/stream|wait` and
`GET /api/runs/{run_id}/messages|feedback`. A route added under `/runs` is
denied until explicitly added to the policy.
Every other authenticated route — memory, agents, models, MCP/skills
config, integrations, channels, uploads — answers `403` to PAT callers
regardless of scopes. Scope enforcement alone only constrains
permission-decorated routes, so the allowlist is the outer boundary;
session-cookie callers are unaffected.
- PAT credentials never carry admin capability, even when the owning user is
an admin. This includes extension-contributed admin routes: the extension
principal projection suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers.
- Revoking or deleting the owning user invalidates their PATs on the next
request.
## LangGraph-compatible API
Base URL: `/api/langgraph`
The public LangGraph-compatible API follows LangGraph SDK conventions. In the unified nginx deployment, Gateway owns `/api/langgraph/*` and translates those paths to its native `/api/*` run, thread, and streaming routers.
### Threads
#### Create Thread
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads
Content-Type: application/json
```
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"metadata": {}
}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"thread_id": "abc123",
"created_at": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
"metadata": {}
}
```
#### Get Thread State
```http
GET /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/state
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"values": {
"messages": [...],
"sandbox": {...},
"artifacts": [...],
"thread_data": {...},
"title": "Conversation Title"
},
"next": [],
"config": {...}
}
```
### Runs
#### Create Run
Execute the agent with input.
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs
Content-Type: application/json
Idempotency-Key: <unique key for this logical request> # optional
```
The thread-scoped create, stream, and wait endpoints accept an optional
`Idempotency-Key` header. Retrying with the same authenticated user, `thread_id`,
and key reuses the existing run instead of executing the input again. The key is
shared across `/runs`, `/runs/stream`, and `/runs/wait` for a given user and
thread, so the same key string cannot back two different calls even across those
endpoints. Reuse is bound to the original `input`, `assistant_id` and
`conversation_references`; a retry that changes them returns 409. Generate a new key for every intentional user
action; reuse a key only when retrying that same action after an uncertain HTTP
result. Keys may be at most 255 characters. Stateless `/api/langgraph/runs/*`
endpoints do not support this header because requests without an explicit thread
create a new temporary conversation.
Retrying a still-running run that this worker cannot stream returns 409 from
`/runs/stream` (`Run ... is not active on this worker and cannot be streamed`)
with no `Retry-After`. The same shape on `/runs/wait` returns 200
`{"status": "<durable status>", "error": ...}` without blocking for a final
state. Retrying a finished run through `/runs/wait` also returns that durable
status payload rather than the latest thread checkpoint: a later run on the
same thread may have advanced the head, and `/wait` does not claim that head
as this run's result. That status is the durable row after completion, not
the hydrated record from admission time. The original creating `/wait` still
returns this run's checkpoint even if a retry overlaps while it is waiting. Retrying a finished run whose SSE log is gone emits a `gap` frame
(`stream_replay_gap`, `recovery: reload_durable_state`) on the creating
`/runs/stream` endpoint and closes without an `end` frame; reload durable
thread/run state instead of treating the stream as empty. Observer joins of
that same run still end with `end`. Stateless `/api/langgraph/runs/stream`
does not accept this header and keeps the existing missing-stream close of
`end`; the `gap` signal is only on a thread-scoped creating retry.
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"input": {
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Hello, can you help me?"
}
]
},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {
"model_name": "gpt-4",
"thinking_enabled": false,
"is_plan_mode": false
}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}
```
**Stream Mode Compatibility:**
- Use: `values`, `messages-tuple`, `custom`, `updates`, `debug`, `tasks`, `checkpoints`
- Unsupported modes, including `messages`, `events`, and `tools`, return `422` before a run is created. DeerFlow never substitutes `values` for an unsupported mode.
**Run Option Compatibility:**
- Supported concurrency strategies: `reject`, `rollback`, and `interrupt`
- Compatibility default: `if_not_exists="create"`; this matches DeerFlow's current behavior
- Artifact delivery is enforced automatically when a run creates or modifies regular files under `/mnt/user-data/outputs`. `present_files` must present at least one path produced by the current run (or a directory containing it), and the terminal receipt must be persisted; presenting only an unrelated file does not satisfy delivery. Runs without changed outputs retain ordinary conversational behavior. `artifact_delivery` is not a client-settable run option.
- Unsupported options return `422`: `webhook`, `stream_resumable=true`, `after_seconds`, `feedback_keys`, any non-null `on_completion` value (including the SDK values `"complete"` and `"continue"`), `if_not_exists="reject"`, and `multitask_strategy="enqueue"`
- `stream_resumable=false` is accepted: it is the LangGraph SDK's default and requests the non-resumable stream DeerFlow already serves
- Undeclared SDK options, including `checkpoint_during` and `durability`, also return `422` instead of being silently discarded
When outputs changed during the run, `run.delivery` events retain the Slice 1
facts (`presented`, `paths`, and `by_tool`) and add `produced_paths`,
`presented_paths`, `matched_paths`, plus an explicit verdict: `verification`,
`stage` (`presented`, `mismatched`, or `not_started`), and `satisfied`. Receipts
for runs without changed outputs keep their existing shape.
**Recursion Limit:**
`config.recursion_limit` caps the number of graph steps LangGraph will execute
in a single run. The unified Gateway path uses the top-level `recursion_limit`
from `config.yaml` (default `100`) when a request does not provide one. Clients
can still set `recursion_limit` explicitly in the request body, and a valid
request value takes precedence. Scheduled-task launches do not take a client body: they
use `scheduler.recursion_limit` from `config.yaml` (default `1000`, matching
the web UI). For safety, the Gateway clamps any supplied
or configured value to a server ceiling (`max_recursion_limit` in `config.yaml`,
default `1000`) so a single run cannot execute unbounded graph steps (runaway
LLM cost / DoS); invalid or non-positive request values fall back to the
configured default. Both top-level fields are read per run, so edits apply to
the next request without restarting the Gateway. This top-level setting applies
to Gateway API runs only; IM channel and embedded `DeerFlowClient` runs retain
their own defaults and override paths.
**Configurable Options:**
- `model_name` (string): Override the default model
- `thinking_enabled` (boolean): Enable extended thinking for supported models
- `is_plan_mode` (boolean): Enable TodoList middleware for task tracking
**Response:** Server-Sent Events (SSE) stream
```
event: values
data: {"messages": [...], "title": "..."}
event: messages
data: {"content": "Hello! I'd be happy to help.", "role": "assistant"}
event: end
data: {}
```
#### Referencing a previous conversation
With `read_conversation` enabled in `config.yaml` (see [configuration](CONFIGURATION.md#reading-referenced-conversations)),
Gateway API callers can attach up to three explicit references to create/stream/wait requests:
```json
{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Use the requirements agreed in the referenced conversation."}]},
"conversation_references": ["https://deerflow.example/workspace/chats/source-thread"]
}
```
A reference is a valid thread ID or an absolute `/workspace/chats/{thread_id}` URL
(also `/workspace/agents/{agent_name}/chats/{thread_id}` for custom agents)
with the same scheme and authority as the run request, without query or fragment.
URLs are parsed as local selectors and are never fetched. For split-origin clients
or internal proxies, pass the thread ID. The field is separate from message text:
links in pasted documents, tool results, or previous messages grant no access.
The server supplies source IDs to the model as background user-role data and
binds the reader to this run's references and authenticated identity.
Clients that cannot add top-level fields to a run request (the LangGraph JS SDK
builds a fixed body and drops unknown keys) may send the same list as
`context.conversation_references`:
```json
{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Use the requirements agreed in the referenced conversation."}]},
"context": {"conversation_references": ["https://deerflow.example/workspace/chats/source-thread"]}
}
```
The Gateway lifts the key out of `context` before the run context is assembled,
so it has the same bounds and error locations as the top-level field, is
recorded on the run in the same way, and never reaches the merged run context
or the checkpointed `configurable`. Sending the top-level field and the context
key together returns 422. `GET /api/features` reports
`conversation_references.enabled` (the tool is configured) and `max_references`,
so a client can hide its entry point on deployments without the tool.
The request requires `runs:read` as well as the normal run-creation permission.
The tool rechecks source ownership on each read; foreign, deleted and unowned
legacy threads are unavailable. `read_conversation(thread_id, cursor?, limit?)`
reads newest-first pages (messages within each page are chronological), at most
50 visible user/assistant messages, 4,000 characters per message and 20,000 text
characters per page. Each page also stays within the tool-output budget that
applies to `read_conversation` (`tool_output.tool_overrides.read_conversation`,
else `externalize_min_chars`, and `fallback_max_chars`; 12,000 serialized
characters by default), so results reach the model inline instead of being
externalized to a file. A message that does not fit starts the next page intact.
Only a message longer than 4,000 characters, or one whose serialized form alone
exceeds the budget, is truncated. Such a message carries
`continuation: {"message_seq", "offset"}`; `read_conversation(thread_id,
message_seq=..., offset=...)` without a cursor returns the next part of that one
message (at most 20,000 text characters, sized to the same budget) with its
`offset`, `text_length` and, while text remains, a new continuation. Offsets
refer to the source's current text: an offset past its end returns
`invalid_request`, and a message that is no longer visible is unavailable. If the
`read_conversation` budget is too small to return any text (below roughly 800
serialized characters), the result is `output_budget_too_small` rather than a
continuation that makes no progress.
Results include message IDs, sequence numbers, continuation, truncation and
unavailability. Hidden messages, reasoning blocks, raw tool
results and subagent internals are excluded. Source data is not changed.
**Live reads and retained copies.** Each call reads the source's current visible
history. Editing or regenerating the source can change subsequent reads, including
later pages; a reference does not pin an immutable transcript. Text already returned
to the destination is a copy and is not automatically refreshed by source changes.
Read permission lasts only for this run, including its internal continuation steps.
Every new run, including resume, regenerate or edit replay, must submit references
again; checkpoints and old hints never restore permission. A resume can reuse
IDs already visible in the interrupted conversation, but needs the explicit
request field again. Missing/expired transcripts are not reconstructed from
checkpoints or memory.
Permission expiry does not erase excerpts already stored in the destination
conversation or conclusions derived from them. Deleting the source does not
retroactively erase those copies either; they follow the destination's own
retention and deletion behavior. Once the source is unavailable, further source
reads report unavailability rather than reconstructing it from destination copies.
**Incomplete requirements.** When `truncated` is true, the tool's notice tells
the agent to read the rest through each cut message's continuation before relying
on it, and to acknowledge the omission and request the missing material if that
read is unavailable. `has_more: false` means there are no older messages to page
through, not that every returned message is complete. This is model guidance, not
a new confirmation mechanism or a guarantee of model compliance.
This first version adds no frontend picker or link-to-reference conversion. The
tool is unavailable to bootstrap agents, subagents and embedded clients without
a host-provided reader. Active tool/skill policies continue to apply.
#### Get Run History
```http
GET /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"runs": [
{
"run_id": "run123",
"status": "success",
"created_at": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z"
}
]
}
```
#### Stream Run
Stream responses in real-time.
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream
Content-Type: application/json
Idempotency-Key: <unique key for this logical request> # optional
```
Same request body as Create Run. Returns SSE stream.
#### Stateless Stream Run
Start a conversation without creating a thread first. Gateway auto-creates a
thread when `config.configurable.thread_id` is omitted, and returns both
identifiers in the response `Content-Location` header.
```http
POST /api/langgraph/runs/stream
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: text/event-stream
```
Through Nginx, `/api/langgraph/runs/stream` is rewritten to the native Gateway
path `POST /api/runs/stream`.
**Request Body:** Same as [Create Run](#create-run). Omit `thread_id` to start a
new conversation; include it to continue an existing one:
```json
{
"input": {
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Hello, can you help me?"
}
]
},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {
"model_name": "gpt-4",
"thinking_enabled": false,
"is_plan_mode": false
}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}
```
**Response:** Server-Sent Events (SSE) stream with a `Content-Location` header:
```http
Content-Location: /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}
```
Clients should parse `thread_id` and `run_id` from this header (the path ends
with `/runs/{run_id}`). Persist `thread_id` and send it back on the next turn
via `config.configurable.thread_id` to keep conversation history.
**Continuing a conversation:**
```json
{
"input": {
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What did I just ask?"
}
]
},
"config": {
"configurable": {
"thread_id": "abc123",
"model_name": "gpt-4"
}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}
```
---
## Gateway API
Base URL: `/api`
### Models
#### List Models
Get all available LLM models from configuration.
```http
GET /api/models
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"models": [
{
"name": "gpt-4",
"display_name": "GPT-4",
"supports_thinking": false,
"supports_vision": true
},
{
"name": "claude-3-opus",
"display_name": "Claude 3 Opus",
"supports_thinking": false,
"supports_vision": true
},
{
"name": "deepseek-v3",
"display_name": "DeepSeek V3",
"supports_thinking": true,
"supports_vision": false
}
]
}
```
#### Get Model Details
```http
GET /api/models/{model_name}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"name": "gpt-4",
"display_name": "GPT-4",
"model": "gpt-4",
"max_tokens": 4096,
"supports_thinking": false,
"supports_vision": true
}
```
### MCP Configuration
#### Get MCP Config
Get current MCP server configurations.
```http
GET /api/mcp/config
```
Requires an authenticated admin session. Sensitive env/header/OAuth secret
values are masked in the response. Environment placeholders outside secret
containers are returned in their raw form so editing cannot expose or persist
their expanded values. Invalid operator-authored JSON/config shapes return
`400` instead of being reported as a Gateway fault.
**Response:**
```json
{
"mcp_servers": {
"github": {
"enabled": true,
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "***"
},
"description": "GitHub operations"
}
}
}
```
#### Update MCP Config
Update MCP server configurations.
```http
PUT /api/mcp/config
Content-Type: application/json
```
Requires an authenticated admin session. API-managed `stdio` MCP servers may
only use allowed executable names for `command` (default: `npx`, `uvx`). Set
`DEER_FLOW_MCP_STDIO_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST` to a comma-separated list when a
deployment needs additional trusted launchers.
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"mcp_servers": {
"github": {
"enabled": true,
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "$GITHUB_TOKEN"
},
"description": "GitHub operations"
}
}
}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"mcp_servers": {
"github": {
"enabled": true,
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "***"
},
"description": "GitHub operations"
}
}
}
```
#### Update One MCP Server State
Enable or disable one configured MCP server without replacing the full
extensions configuration.
```http
PATCH /api/mcp/config
Content-Type: application/json
```
Requires an authenticated admin session. Enabling a `stdio` server validates
that server's `command` against the same allowlist used by the full `PUT`
endpoint. Disabling a server does not require its command to be allowlisted, and
invalid commands on other servers do not block the update. The endpoint
preserves secrets, environment-variable placeholders, skills, custom server
fields, and other top-level extensions config. SSE/HTTP targets may use either
DeerFlow's `type` field or the MCP-spec `transport` field.
**Request Body:**
```json
{
"server_name": "semantic-scholar",
"enabled": false
}
```
The response is the full masked MCP configuration, matching `GET` and `PUT`.
An unknown `server_name` returns `404`; attempting to enable a server with a
disallowed `stdio` command returns `400`.
#### Add MCP Servers
Add one or more servers without replacing existing entries. The Gateway
re-reads the file under the shared configuration lock, so concurrent sibling
changes are preserved. Existing names return `409`.
```http
POST /api/mcp/config/servers
Content-Type: application/json
```
The request body uses the same `mcp_servers` map as the full `PUT` endpoint.
#### Replace One MCP Server
Completely replace one existing server while preserving sibling entries.
Omitted ordinary fields are deleted or reset; explicit `***` placeholders
restore the corresponding stored secret.
A disabled `stdio` replacement may keep a syntactically valid command outside
the allowlist for offline editing. Command-shape and code-injecting environment
variable checks still run when saving; the allowlist and executable-argument
policy run when the server is enabled.
```http
PUT /api/mcp/config/server
Content-Type: application/json
```
```json
{
"server_name": "github",
"server": {
"enabled": true,
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {"GITHUB_TOKEN": "***"}
}
}
```
#### Delete One MCP Server
Delete one server without replacing sibling entries. The server name is a
path parameter and the DELETE request has no body. Percent-encode names before
placing them in the URL; the path converter also keeps legacy empty and
slash-containing names addressable.
```http
DELETE /api/mcp/config/servers/{server_name}
```
All targeted mutations return the full masked MCP configuration. Before any
write, the Gateway resolves environment variables in a copy and validates the
same expanded document the runtime will load while persisting the original raw
placeholders.
#### Reset MCP Tools Cache
Clear cached MCP tools and persistent MCP sessions process-wide. This affects
all threads and users in the current Gateway process. Tools are loaded again
from configured MCP servers on the next agent run or tool lookup.
```http
POST /api/mcp/cache/reset
```
Requires an authenticated admin session.
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "MCP tools cache reset. Tools will reload on next use."
}
```
### Skills
#### List Skills
Get all available skills.
```http
GET /api/skills
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"skills": [
{
"name": "pdf-processing",
"display_name": "PDF Processing",
"description": "Handle PDF documents efficiently",
"enabled": true,
"license": "MIT",
"path": "public/pdf-processing"
},
{
"name": "frontend-design",
"display_name": "Frontend Design",
"description": "Design and build frontend interfaces",
"enabled": false,
"license": "MIT",
"path": "public/frontend-design"
}
]
}
```
#### Get Skill Details
```http
GET /api/skills/{skill_name}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"name": "pdf-processing",
"display_name": "PDF Processing",
"description": "Handle PDF documents efficiently",
"enabled": true,
"license": "MIT",
"path": "public/pdf-processing",
"allowed_tools": ["read_file", "write_file", "bash"],
"content": "# PDF Processing\n\nInstructions for the agent..."
}
```
#### Enable Skill
```http
POST /api/skills/{skill_name}/enable
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Skill 'pdf-processing' enabled"
}
```
#### Disable Skill
```http
POST /api/skills/{skill_name}/disable
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Skill 'pdf-processing' disabled"
}
```
#### Install Skill
Install a skill from a `.skill` file.
```http
POST /api/skills/install
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
```
**Request Body:**
- `file`: The `.skill` file to install
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Skill 'my-skill' installed successfully",
"skill": {
"name": "my-skill",
"display_name": "My Skill",
"path": "custom/my-skill"
}
}
```
#### Export a Custom Skill
Admin session authentication is required for both requests. PAT credentials cannot export. Only the current user's custom skill is eligible; public, legacy and integration fallback is never used. A disabled custom skill remains eligible.
1. `GET /api/skills/custom/{skill_name}/export-manifest` returns `skill_name`, `revision` (SHA-256 or null), `can_export`, `file_count`, `directory_count`, `total_bytes`, `files` (`path`, `type`, `size`, `executable`), `requirements` (`compatibility`, `allowed_tools`, `required_secrets` names and optional flags), and structured `warnings`/`blockers`. Paths are relative; `.` is the package root, counted in directory/entry totals. Structural blockers return a non-downloadable manifest. Declarations are not credential values or dependency verification.
2. `GET /api/skills/custom/{skill_name}/export?expected_revision=<64 lowercase hex characters>` recaptures content and rejects stale previews with 409 before sending ZIP headers. Successful responses carry `application/zip`, attachment `<skill_name>.skill`, accurate `Content-Length`, `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
Error `detail` contains a safe `code`, `message`, and optional relative `path`. Codes/statuses: `skill_not_found` 404, `skill_changed` 409, `skill_export_limit_exceeded` 413, `skill_export_unsupported` 422, `skill_export_busy` 429, `skill_export_timeout` 503, `skill_export_failed` 500; existing 401/403 auth behavior applies. Limits are 4096 entries including directories, 64 MiB/file, 100 MiB raw/ZIP, 1 MiB frontmatter, 1024 UTF-8 bytes per ZIP path and depth 32. Frontmatter preflight rejects YAML aliases and bounds structure to 32 nesting levels / 16384 parser events before constructing YAML objects. A 5-second lock wait and 60-second cooperative worker deadline bound work; blocking OS calls cannot be forcibly interrupted. Two export slots are shared across all users in each Gateway process; both previews and downloads use them, and 429 means that process-wide capacity is occupied. Slots remain held through worker drain and temporary-file cleanup. The streaming phase has a separate 120-second inactivity deadline, reset after each successful ASGI send. A continuously progressing transfer may exceed 120 seconds overall; a stalled send does not reset the deadline. Expiry aborts the incomplete download (no replacement JSON after ZIP headers); clients must retry. Client disconnect during preparation cancels and drains the worker, then exits the handler normally rather than leaking a synthetic task cancellation. No export cache, persistent job or sharing URL is created.
Raw skill files, sidecars and empty directories are preserved. No hooks/scripts run during export and no secrets are redacted from package files. Import still uses normal security scanning and conflict checks. Export requires no-follow descriptor-relative host filesystem operations; unsupported platforms receive 422 rather than following links unsafely.
#### Reload Skills
Invalidate the skill prompt caches for every user in the current Gateway
process. Subsequent runs rescan the configured public, custom, and legacy skill
directories; runs that have already started keep their existing skill snapshot.
```http
POST /api/skills/reload
```
The request has no body and requires an authenticated administrator. For a
cookie-authenticated request, send the CSRF cookie value in the matching header:
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/skills/reload \
-b cookies.txt \
-H "X-CSRF-Token: <csrf_token-cookie-value>"
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"scope": "process",
"message": "Skill caches invalidated; subsequent runs in this Gateway process will rescan the latest skills."
}
```
`success` confirms cache invalidation, not that every file on disk was valid:
malformed skills retain the existing parser behavior of being skipped and
logged. The endpoint returns `401` for unauthenticated callers, `403` for
non-admin users, and a generic `500` if the invalidation mechanism itself
fails or the process-local background scan does not finish within the cache
refresh timeout. A loader-level failure, such as an unavailable mounted root,
does not publish an empty catalog: the last successfully loaded process cache
remains available. A timed-out scan continues in its daemon worker and can
still populate the process cache when it finishes.
The scope is deliberately process-local. Each Uvicorn worker or Kubernetes Pod
must be called directly; repeated requests through a load-balanced Service do
not guarantee that every instance is reached. External MinIO/NFS/CSI writes
bypass the validation, SkillScan, and history used by the install/edit APIs, so
the mounted directory must be writable only by trusted operators.
### File Uploads
#### Upload Files
Upload one or more files to a thread.
```http
POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
```
**Request Body:**
- `files`: One or more files to upload
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"files": [
{
"filename": "document.pdf",
"size": 1234567,
"path": ".deer-flow/threads/abc123/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"virtual_path": "/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"artifact_url": "/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"markdown_file": "document.md",
"markdown_path": ".deer-flow/threads/abc123/user-data/uploads/document.md",
"markdown_virtual_path": "/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.md",
"markdown_artifact_url": "/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.md"
}
],
"message": "Successfully uploaded 1 file(s)"
}
```
**Name collisions:** filenames are claimed unique against the thread's existing uploads and reserved atomically — a same-name upload never replaces the existing file; it lands as `document_1.pdf` (the response's `filename`/`original_filename` reflect the claimed name). Use the artifacts `PUT` endpoint for sanctioned in-place updates.
**Supported Document Formats** (auto-converted to Markdown):
- PDF (`.pdf`)
- PowerPoint (`.ppt`, `.pptx`)
- Excel (`.xls`, `.xlsx`)
- Word (`.doc`, `.docx`)
#### List Uploaded Files
```http
GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads/list
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"files": [
{
"filename": "document.pdf",
"size": 1234567,
"path": ".deer-flow/threads/abc123/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"virtual_path": "/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"artifact_url": "/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf",
"extension": ".pdf",
"modified": 1705997600.0
}
],
"count": 1
}
```
#### Delete File
```http
DELETE /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads/{filename}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Deleted document.pdf"
}
```
### Thread Cleanup
Remove DeerFlow-managed local thread files under `.deer-flow/threads/{thread_id}` after the LangGraph thread itself has been deleted.
```http
DELETE /api/threads/{thread_id}
```
**Response:**
```json
{
"success": true,
"message": "Deleted local thread data for abc123"
}
```
**Error behavior:**
- `422` for invalid thread IDs
- `500` returns a generic `{"detail": "Failed to delete local thread data."}` response while full exception details stay in server logs
### Projects
#### Get Projects Config
```http
GET /api/projects/config
```
The `projects` config-block knobs the UI needs for client-side validation. Requires the `projects:read` scope (PATs included).
**Response:**
```json
{
"instructions_max_bytes": 8192,
"trash_retention_days": 30
}
```
Values come from `projects.instructions_max_bytes` and `projects.trash_retention_days` in `config.yaml`; the documented defaults apply when the block is absent.
### Project Documents
Per-project document shelf (Projects Phase 2). All routes fail closed: a missing or foreign project/document is `404` (never `403`); uploads and individual trash require an active project — archived projects answer `404` for those while keeping reads; a memory-backend deployment answers `503` `"Projects not available"`. Trashed rows are invisible to every route.
#### List Documents
```http
GET /api/projects/{project_id}/documents?limit=100&offset=0
```
**Query Parameters:** `limit` (default 100, 1..1000), `offset` (default 0) — out-of-bounds values are `422`.
**Response:** `{"documents": [{"id", "name", "size_bytes", "sha256", "source_thread_id", "source_kind", "source_name", "created_at", "updated_at", "content_missing"}], "total", "limit", "offset"}` in `updated_at DESC, id ASC` order. `content_missing` is read-time truth (never persisted): `true` when the document's immutable original is missing or size-mismatched (external interference); the derived `converted.md` companion is not the integrity anchor.
#### Upload Document
```http
POST /api/projects/{project_id}/documents
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
```
Exactly one file per request (`file` part), plus an optional `name` form field (defaults to the multipart filename). The name is rejected with `400` when empty after normalization, separator-bearing, or over 255 UTF-8 bytes; empty files are `400`; files over `uploads.max_file_size` are `413`.
**Response:** `201 Created` with `{"document": {...}, "deduplicated": false}`. Re-uploading identical content returns the existing row with `200 OK` and `"deduplicated": true` — the first writer's name wins. Re-upload after trash creates a fresh row.
#### Save Thread File to Shelf (from-thread)
```http
POST /api/projects/{project_id}/documents/from-thread
Content-Type: application/json
```
```json
{"thread_id": "abc123", "kind": "upload", "name": "report.pdf", "shelf_name": "q3-report.pdf"}
```
Copies one file from the thread's own uploads (`"kind": "upload"`) or outputs (`"kind": "output"`) directory into the shelf as a project-owned snapshot; the source file is never moved. `name` locates the source file inside the thread; `shelf_name` is optional and defaults to the source name, following upload-name validation (`400`). A source that does not resolve inside that thread's directory — separator-bearing names, escapes, missing files, or a missing/foreign thread — is `404`, indistinguishable from absence. Files over `uploads.max_file_size` are `413`; empty files are `400`.
**Response:** same as Upload Document — `201 Created` with `{"document": {...}, "deduplicated": false}`, or `200 OK` on a content dedup hit. The created row records `source_thread_id` / `source_kind` / `source_name` provenance.
#### Attach Document to Thread
```http
POST /api/projects/{project_id}/documents/{document_id}/attach-to-thread/{thread_id}
```
Materializes an independent copy of a live shelf document into the target thread's uploads directory through the same ingestion pipeline as an ordinary upload (filename claiming, size checks, optional conversion under `uploads.auto_convert_documents`, sandbox-readable permissions, and sandbox sync for non-mounted providers; a caller denied `sandbox:execute` keeps the host upload without allocating a sandbox). Reading an archived source project's shelf is allowed and does not mutate it; a missing/foreign document, or a target thread the caller cannot write, is `404`. A row whose original bytes are missing or size-mismatched answers `409` `"content_missing"`.
**Response:** `200 OK` with `{"filename", "size_bytes", "virtual_path", "artifact_url"}` — returned only after ingestion succeeds.
#### Get Document Content
```http
GET /api/projects/{project_id}/documents/{document_id}/content?download=false
```
Serves the converted-markdown companion when present, else inline text when the original samples as text, else an attachment; `download=true` always attaches. Active content (`text/html`, `text/xml`, `application/xml`, `text/xsl`, any `+xml` type such as XHTML/SVG) is always forced to an attachment regardless of `download`, mirroring the artifacts router, so it never executes script on the application origin. A row whose original bytes are missing or size-mismatched answers `409` `"content_missing"`.
#### Delete Document (move to trash)
```http
DELETE /api/projects/{project_id}/documents/{document_id}
```
**Response:** `204`. Recoverable trash: the row keeps its bytes and a `{project_id, project_name}` origin snapshot. Deleting a project moves its whole shelf to trash in the same transaction. Restore/purge endpoints land with the trash-completion slice.
### Project Thread Files
Read-only conversation-files view over a project's member threads (Projects Phase 2) — the discovery route for Save Thread File to Shelf. Archived projects keep read access; a missing or foreign project is `404`.
#### List Thread Files
```http
GET /api/projects/{project_id}/thread-files?offset=0&thread_limit=20&file_limit=50
```
**Query Parameters:** `offset` (member-thread cursor, default 0), `thread_limit` (default 20, 1..50), `file_limit` (per-thread file cap, default 50, 1..200) — out-of-bounds values are `422`.
**Response:** `{"groups": [{"thread_id", "display_name", "updated_at", "truncated", "files": [{"kind": "upload"|"output", "name", "size_bytes", "modified_at", "artifact_url"}]}], "next_offset", "truncated"}`. Member threads are paged in the same non-archived order as the project thread list; `next_offset` is `null` when no threads remain. Each thread contributes up to `file_limit` files across its uploads and outputs; a group's `truncated` is `true` when that thread's listing was cut, and the envelope `truncated` is the OR over the page's groups. Entries disappear when their thread is deleted — the view keeps no storage of its own.
### Trash
Recoverable deletion tier for project shelf documents (Projects Phase 2). Trashed rows keep their bytes and a `{project_id, project_name}` origin snapshot for `projects.trash_retention_days` (default 30) before the retention sweep may purge them; permanent purge is a separate action. All routes fail closed: a missing or foreign document/project is `404` (never `403`), restoring into an archived or foreign target is the same `404`, and a memory-backend deployment answers `503` `"Projects not available"`. Purge endpoints carry no confirmation parameter — the "this cannot be undone" step is a UI contract, not a server-enforced handshake.
#### List Trashed Documents
```http
GET /api/trash/documents?limit=100&offset=0
```
**Query Parameters:** `limit` (default 100, 1..1000), `offset` (default 0) — out-of-bounds values are `422`.
**Response:** `{"documents": [{"id", "name", "size_bytes", "sha256", "source_thread_id", "source_kind", "source_name", "created_at", "updated_at", "trashed_at", "trash_origin": {"project_id", "project_name"} | null}], "total", "limit", "offset"}`, most recently trashed first. The retention sweep runs lazily before the listing (a sweep failure is logged and never blocks it).
#### Restore Document
```http
POST /api/trash/documents/{document_id}/restore
Content-Type: application/json
{"project_id": "…"}
```
**Body:** `project_id` optional. Target = the body value, else `trash_origin.project_id` when that project still exists, is owned, and is active; otherwise `404` (the UI offers the project picker). A foreign or archived target is the same `404` as a missing one.
**Response:** `{"outcome": "restored" | "merged", "document": <ProjectDocumentResponse>}`. `merged` means the target already had an active row with identical bytes: the trash row is deleted and `document` is the surviving active row. Restore re-points the row without moving any file. Missing or size-mismatched content answers `409` `"content_missing"` and leaves the row trashed.
#### Purge Document
```http
POST /api/trash/documents/{document_id}/purge
```
**Response:** `204`. Permanently unlinks the original and `derived/converted.md`, then deletes the row, in one row-locked transaction. Already-absent content counts as removed; any other file-cleanup failure rolls back, keeps the trashed row, and answers `500` with a retryable message.
#### Empty Trash
```http
POST /api/trash/purge
```
**Response:** `{"purged": <int>}` — permanently deletes every trashed document of the caller, regardless of age: the confirmation covers the whole listing, so the retention cutoff never gates this route. Each row goes through the same guarded row-locked transaction as the single-document purge — bytes first, then the row. A file-cleanup failure other than already-absent content answers `500` with a retryable message, leaving that row and every row not yet visited trashed. Retention expiry is enforced only by the sweep (lazily before `GET /api/trash/documents` and once at gateway startup).
### Artifacts
#### Get Artifact
Download or view an artifact generated by the agent.
```http
GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/artifacts/{path}
```
**Path Examples:**
- `/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/outputs/result.txt`
- `/api/threads/abc123/artifacts/mnt/user-data/uploads/document.pdf`
**Query Parameters:**
- `download` (boolean): If `true`, force download with Content-Disposition header
**Response:** File content with appropriate Content-Type. HTML and XML documents (`.html`, `.xml`, `.xhtml`, `.svg`, and other `+xml` types) are always returned as attachments, regardless of `download`, so generated markup never renders in the application origin.
---
## Error Responses
All APIs return errors in a consistent format:
```json
{
"detail": "Error message describing what went wrong"
}
```
**HTTP Status Codes:**
- `400` - Bad Request: Invalid input
- `404` - Not Found: Resource not found
- `422` - Validation Error: Request validation failed
- `500` - Internal Server Error: Server-side error
---
## Authentication
DeerFlow supports four HTTP identity sources. They share the same thread/run isolation rules but differ in whether a row is created in `users` and how external identities are mapped. See [AUTH_DESIGN.md](AUTH_DESIGN.md) for the full design.
| Model | Entry | `users` table | Isolation key |
|---|---|---|---|
| Browser session | `access_token` cookie after login/register | Yes | `users.id` |
| OIDC / SSO | OAuth callback → cookie | Yes | `users.id` (see [SSO.md](SSO.md)) |
| IM channel binding | Connect code + `channel_connections` | Bound to registered user | `channel_connections.owner_user_id` |
| **Internal Auth** | `X-DeerFlow-Internal-Token` + `X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id` | **No** | Owner string on `threads_meta.user_id` |
**IM channel binding** and **Internal Auth** are both *platform-trust* integrations: DeerFlow trusts the channel/platform to authenticate end users. IM bindings persist the mapping in `channel_connections` / `channel_conversations` and require a DeerFlow `users` row. Internal Auth lets a platform call the Gateway API directly with a deployment-shared token and a per-request owner header—no `users` row, but thread/run/checkpoint isolation works the same way.
### Browser session (default)
DeerFlow enforces authentication for all non-public HTTP routes. Public routes are limited to health/docs metadata and these public auth endpoints:
- `POST /api/v1/auth/initialize` creates the first admin account when no admin exists.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/login/local` logs in with email/password and sets an HttpOnly `access_token` cookie.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/register` creates a regular `user` account and sets the session cookie.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` clears the session cookie.
- `GET /api/v1/auth/setup-status` reports whether the first admin still needs to be created.
The authenticated auth endpoints are:
- `GET /api/v1/auth/me` returns the current user.
- `POST /api/v1/auth/change-password` changes password, optionally changes email during setup, increments `token_version`, and reissues the cookie.
Protected state-changing requests also require the CSRF double-submit token: send the `csrf_token` cookie value as the `X-CSRF-Token` header. Login/register/initialize/logout are bootstrap auth endpoints: they are exempt from the double-submit token but still reject hostile browser `Origin` headers.
User isolation is enforced from the authenticated user context:
- Thread metadata is scoped by `threads_meta.user_id`; search/read/write/delete APIs only expose the current user's threads.
- Thread files live under `{base_dir}/users/{user_id}/threads/{thread_id}/user-data/` and are exposed inside the sandbox as `/mnt/user-data/`.
- Memory and custom agents are stored under `{base_dir}/users/{user_id}/...`.
Note: MCP outbound connections can still use OAuth for configured HTTP/SSE MCP servers; that is separate from DeerFlow API authentication.
### Internal Auth (platform HTTP integration)
For server-to-server integrations (e.g. a Feishu or WeCom/Enterprise WeChat bot backend), configure:
```bash
export DEER_FLOW_INTERNAL_AUTH_TOKEN="<long-random-secret>"
```
| Header | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `X-DeerFlow-Internal-Token` | Yes | Must match `DEER_FLOW_INTERNAL_AUTH_TOKEN`; missing/invalid → `401` |
| `X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id` | Yes for per-user isolation | Platform user id (e.g. `feishu_ou_alice`, `wecom_user_bob`); omit → `default` bucket |
Does **not** use browser cookies or CSRF tokens. Does **not** insert into `users`; sets `threads_meta.user_id` / `runs.user_id` from the owner header. DeerFlow validates only the platform token—not whether the owner id represents a real end user; user validity is entirely the platform's responsibility. See [AUTH_DESIGN.md — Internal Auth](AUTH_DESIGN.md#internal-auth-direct-http) for trust boundaries, persistence, and security notes.
Use the standard Gateway thread/run endpoints (`POST /api/threads`, `POST /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream`, etc.) with the headers above on every request.
---
## Rate Limiting
No rate limiting is implemented by default. For production deployments, configure rate limiting in Nginx:
```nginx
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api:10m rate=10r/s;
location /api/ {
limit_req zone=api burst=20 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://backend;
}
```
---
## Streaming Support
Gateway's LangGraph-compatible API streams run events with Server-Sent Events (SSE).
**Thread-scoped streaming** (thread must exist):
```http
POST /api/langgraph/threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream
Accept: text/event-stream
```
**Stateless streaming** (no pre-created thread; Gateway auto-creates one):
```http
POST /api/langgraph/runs/stream
Accept: text/event-stream
```
Both endpoints return `Content-Location: /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}`.
The DeerFlow web UI and LangGraph SDK clients rely on this header to discover the
assigned `thread_id` and `run_id` on the first message of a new chat.
### SSE replay retention and gaps
Clients may reconnect to a run stream with `Last-Event-ID`. Replay history is
bounded by `stream_bridge.queue_maxsize` (default `256`) and, for Redis, by the
rolling `stream_ttl_seconds`. A retained cursor resumes after that event with no
additional control frame.
When a syntactically valid cursor is older than the retained watermark, the
server sends exactly one `gap` event before any retained data and closes that
subscription without an `end` event:
```text
event: gap
data: {"code":"stream_replay_gap","run_id":"run-123","requested_event_id":"1718000000000-1","earliest_available_event_id":"1718000000100-42","latest_available_event_id":"1718000000200-84","recovery":"reload_durable_state"}
```
The frame deliberately has no SSE `id:`. Both `earliest_available_event_id` and
`latest_available_event_id` are `string | null` (they are `null` when no events
are retained in the buffer). Consumers must reload durable thread state and
persisted run events/messages, then may reconnect from `latest_available_event_id`
to follow newer live events, or rejoin without a cursor when the buffer is empty
(`latest_available_event_id` is `null`). A gap does not cancel the active run.
The same signal applies when a no-cursor subscriber has already established an
empty-stream wait but the first Redis wake-up falls behind before delivery; in
that case `requested_event_id` is `null`. Malformed cursor handling is
backend-specific and is not the same as a valid cursor that was evicted.
---
## SDK Usage
### Python (LangGraph SDK)
```python
from langgraph_sdk import get_client
client = get_client(url="http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph")
run_meta: dict[str, str] = {}
def on_run_created(meta) -> None:
# langgraph-sdk 0.3.x parses Content-Location only when this callback is set.
if meta.thread_id:
run_meta["thread_id"] = meta.thread_id
run_meta["run_id"] = meta.run_id
# Option A: stateless stream — no thread pre-creation
# Gateway auto-creates a thread and returns thread_id/run_id in Content-Location.
async for event in client.runs.stream(
None,
"lead_agent",
input={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
config={"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}},
stream_mode=["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
on_run_created=on_run_created,
):
print(event)
thread_id = run_meta["thread_id"] # persist before the next turn
# Option A (continued): same thread on the next turn
async for event in client.runs.stream(
None,
"lead_agent",
input={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "What did I just ask?"}]},
config={"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id, "model_name": "gpt-4"}},
stream_mode=["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
on_run_created=on_run_created,
):
print(event)
# Option B: thread-scoped stream — create thread first, then stream
thread = await client.threads.create()
async for event in client.runs.stream(
thread["thread_id"],
"lead_agent",
input={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
config={"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}},
stream_mode=["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
on_run_created=on_run_created,
):
print(event)
```
### JavaScript/TypeScript
```typescript
// Using fetch for Gateway API
const response = await fetch('/api/models');
const data = await response.json();
console.log(data.models);
function parseRunLocation(contentLocation: string | null) {
if (!contentLocation) return null;
const match = /\/threads\/([^/]+)\/runs\/([^/]+)/.exec(contentLocation);
if (!match) return null;
return { threadId: match[1], runId: match[2] };
}
// Option A: stateless stream — no thread pre-creation
let threadId: string | undefined;
const firstResponse = await fetch("/api/langgraph/runs/stream", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
Accept: "text/event-stream",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
input: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Hello" }] },
stream_mode: ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
}),
});
const created = parseRunLocation(firstResponse.headers.get("Content-Location"));
threadId = created?.threadId;
console.log("thread_id:", created?.threadId, "run_id:", created?.runId);
// Option B: continue the same thread on the next turn
const followUpResponse = await fetch("/api/langgraph/runs/stream", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
Accept: "text/event-stream",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
input: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "What did I just ask?" }] },
config: { configurable: { thread_id: threadId } },
stream_mode: ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
}),
});
// Option C: thread-scoped stream when you already have a thread_id
const streamResponse = await fetch(`/api/langgraph/threads/${threadId}/runs/stream`, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
Accept: "text/event-stream",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
input: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Hello" }] },
stream_mode: ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"],
}),
});
const reader = streamResponse.body?.getReader();
// Decode and parse SSE frames from reader in your client code.
```
### cURL Examples
```bash
# List models
curl http://localhost:2026/api/models
# Get MCP config
curl http://localhost:2026/api/mcp/config
# Upload file
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/threads/abc123/uploads \
-F "files=@document.pdf"
# Enable skill
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/skills/pdf-processing/enable
# Stateless stream — no thread pre-creation
curl -s -D - -N -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/runs/stream \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: text/event-stream" \
-d '{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}'
# Read Content-Location: /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id} from the headers.
# Continue the same thread on the next turn
curl -s -N -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/runs/stream \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: text/event-stream" \
-d '{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "What did I just ask?"}]},
"config": {
"configurable": {"thread_id": "abc123", "model_name": "gpt-4"}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}'
# Thread-scoped flow — create thread first, then stream
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/threads \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
curl -X POST http://localhost:2026/api/langgraph/threads/abc123/runs/stream \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: text/event-stream" \
-d '{
"input": {"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
"config": {
"recursion_limit": 100,
"configurable": {"model_name": "gpt-4"}
},
"stream_mode": ["values", "messages-tuple", "custom"]
}'
```
> The unified Gateway path defaults `config.recursion_limit` to 100 for
> plan-mode and subagent-heavy runs. Clients may still set
> `config.recursion_limit` explicitly — see the [Create Run](#create-run)
> section for details. Scheduled-task launches use
> `scheduler.recursion_limit` from `config.yaml` instead of a client body.
## Chat archive and restore
`POST /api/threads/search` accepts `archived: true` for archived chats or
`archived: false` for recent chats (including legacy rows without an archive flag).
Omit the field or use null to include both. Filtering applies before `limit` and
`offset` and is scoped to the authenticated user. Combine it with the existing
`metadata` and `status` filters when needed.
Archive with `PATCH /api/threads/{thread_id}` and body
`{"metadata":{"deerflow_archived":true}}`; use false to restore. The flag must be
a JSON boolean. Writes containing only boolean pin/archive flags preserve
`updated_at` and all other metadata. The owner-checked endpoint returns the normal
thread metadata response; original thread and artifact URLs remain available.
Archiving does not cancel runs, pause schedules, or change retention.