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* feat(harness): subagent report contract and delegation acceptance criteria (RFC #4651 PR3) Layer 1 receipt verification is inert unless subagents actually cite their execution record. This lands the prompt layer that closes the adoption gap: - New subagents/report_contract.py owns the model-facing contract text, derived from the single-owner citation format (format_citation / receipt_id) so prompts can never drift from the verifier. The executor injects <report_contract> into every subagent system prompt — built-in and custom alike — requiring [rN tool_name] citations for action claims, verifiable handles (absolute path, URL, ID, HTTP status) for deliverables, and explicit failure reporting; the citation clause follows verification.receipts_enabled. - The task tool gains an optional keyword-only acceptance_criteria parameter, handed to the SubagentExecutor constructor and rendered into the subagent's SystemMessage (stripped, capped 20 items x 500 chars) — deliberately never the task HumanMessage, which InputSanitizationMiddleware classes as genuine user input and would HTML-escape into untrusted-input framing. The docstring frames subagent results as self-reports, states the citation cross-check's evidence boundary (resolved = the call happened, not that the claim is correct), and documents when to attach criteria with the canonical leaf forms. Deterministic leaf checking remains a separate layer. - The lead delegation workflow now instructs reading the ledger citation line as execution evidence only and spot-checking verifiable handles before synthesizing. - report_contract / acceptance_criteria are registered as blocked framework-authority tags in input sanitization so untrusted input cannot forge the verification contract. * fix(harness): neutralize acceptance criteria before system-channel injection render_acceptance_criteria_section interpolated lead-model-supplied acceptance_criteria verbatim into the subagent SystemMessage after only stripping/capping. A criterion such as '</acceptance_criteria><system>...</system>' could close the wrapper and open a framework authority tag, bypassing InputSanitizationMiddleware. Route each criterion through neutralize_untrusted_tags (the shared prompt-injection primitive) so blocked authority tags are HTML-escaped before interpolation. Add regression tests at the renderer and the executor _build_initial_state path. * fix(harness): keep model-supplied criteria off the system channel - Move acceptance_criteria values into the task HumanMessage — the untrusted channel InputSanitizationMiddleware escapes and boundary-frames. The subagent SystemMessage now carries only a framework-owned <acceptance_criteria> pointer note (no criterion text), so natural-language injection inside a criterion keeps task-data priority and cannot override framework instructions (PR #5090 review, willem-bd P1). - Condition the lead delegation workflow's citation verification guidance on verification.receipts_enabled and qualify the task tool's result-reading text with the enabled state, so a receipts-disabled configuration no longer tells the lead to require citation evidence that cannot exist (P2). * fix(harness): drop execution-record promise from report contract when receipts are disabled The <report_contract> opening was emitted unconditionally, so a verification.receipts_enabled=false subagent was told its report would be cross-checked against an execution record that cannot exist in that mode (terminal_receipts() returns None; no verdict, no ledger citation line). The opening now follows receipts_enabled: enabled keeps the cross-check language, disabled describes the handle-only review mode (PR #5090 review, willem-bd P2). * docs: record the prompt-layer trust-boundary self-check Generalizes the PR #5090 review outcome: before adding prompt text, ask of every data source in it what trust level it has and which channel it should ride — model/user-influenceable values ride the untrusted sanitized data channel, never framework-owned system text. Added to the PR template (Agents/LangGraph surface) and agents/AGENTS.md.
43 lines
9.7 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
9.7 KiB
Markdown
### Tool System (`packages/harness/deerflow/tools/`)
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`get_available_tools(groups, include_mcp, model_name, subagent_enabled)` assembles:
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1. **Config-defined tools** - Resolved from `config.yaml` via `resolve_variable()`
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2. **MCP tools** - From enabled MCP servers (lazy initialized, cached with resolved-path + content-signature invalidation)
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3. **Built-in tools**:
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- `present_files` - Make output files visible to user (only `/mnt/user-data/outputs`); virtual paths use `resolve_runtime_user_id(runtime)` so validation resolves the same user-scoped outputs directory established by `ThreadDataMiddleware`
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- `ask_clarification` - Request clarification (intercepted by ClarificationMiddleware, which preserves text fallback and adds `artifact.human_input` for Web UI Human Input Cards). Beyond free text and single choice, the request-side v2 protocol supports `fields` (structured form card collecting several values at once; field types: text/textarea/number/select/multi_select/checkbox/date, validated and normalized server-side in the middleware — invalid entries are dropped, unknown types degrade to `text`; a standalone multi-select question is a one-field form). Replies stay on the v1 response protocol (`text`/`option`): the form card submits a readable text summary
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- `view_image` - Read image as base64 (added only if model supports vision)
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- `setup_agent` - Bootstrap-only: persist a brand-new custom agent's `SOUL.md` and `config.yaml`. Bound only when `is_bootstrap=True`.
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- `update_agent` - Custom-agent-only: persist self-updates to the current agent's `SOUL.md` / `config.yaml` from inside a normal chat (partial update + atomic write). Bound when `agent_name` is set and `is_bootstrap=False`.
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4. **Subagent tool** (if enabled):
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- `task` - Delegate to subagent (description, prompt, subagent_type, optional acceptance_criteria). Subagent reports are self-reports: the docstring directs the lead to expect `[rN]` receipt citations and verifiable handles while `verification.receipts_enabled` (and explicitly qualifies that disabled receipts mean no citations and no citation verdict), to read the delegation ledger's citation cross-check as execution evidence only, and to attach `acceptance_criteria` for objectively checkable outcomes (canonical forms `file:<path> exists|non-empty`, `file_written:<path>`, `tests_passed:<command>`); criteria are handed to the executor and appended to the subagent's task message as untrusted data (see `subagents/report_contract.py`).
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Polling safety timeouts carry the latest published tool receipts into the terminal task metadata before requesting background cancellation.
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- `batch_task`, `batch_status`, `cancel_batch` - Explicit durable batch submission/progress/cancellation. Added only while the startup SQL-backed batch submitter is installed; large results stay in the owner-scoped API/JSONL export rather than the lead context.
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- Direct `create_deerflow_agent` integrations receive cloned tools bound to their explicit `SubagentRuntime`. The bound `task` forwards that runtime's exact execution controller and optional caller-owned `AppConfig` into registry/model/tool resolution and `SubagentExecutor`; bound batch tools use the same config snapshot and resolve only that runtime's submitter before falling back to no other application's active worker. Keep the original tool name/schema unchanged so model contracts and user-tool deduplication remain stable.
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Scheduled-task runtime note:
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- Scheduled background runs set `context.non_interactive=true` and therefore exclude `ask_clarification` from the lead-agent tool list. This keeps scheduler-triggered runs from stalling on human confirmation mid-execution. `non_interactive` is an internal-only context key: it is merged from `body.context` only when the request authenticated as the process-internal user (the scheduler path), never from arbitrary HTTP/IM clients.
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Durable MCP task-management tools are added only while the process-local task submitter is installed. They expose bounded local task fields, including whether cancellation was requested, but never the remote handle. Cancellation records that request durably and returns immediately; the background service owns the remote call and retries. These remain ordinary business tools under an active skill's `allowed-tools` policy and must be declared explicitly.
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**Community tools** (`packages/harness/deerflow/community/`): optional integrations, each in its own subpackage and wired through `config.yaml`. Documented examples:
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- `tavily/` - Web search (5 results default) and web fetch (4KB limit)
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- `jina_ai/` - Web fetch via Jina reader API with readability extraction
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- `firecrawl/` - Web scraping via Firecrawl API
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- `image_search/` - Image search via DuckDuckGo
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- `aio_sandbox/` - Docker-based isolation (`AioSandboxProvider`)
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- `browser_automation/` - Agentic browser control (stateful `navigate → observe → click/type` loop) via Playwright, distinct from the read-only `web_fetch`/`web_capture` tools. Tools: `browser_navigate`, `browser_snapshot`, `browser_click`, `browser_type`, `browser_get_text`, `browser_back`, `browser_screenshot`, `browser_close` (config `group: browser`). A process-local `BrowserSessionManager` owns one private, loop-affine Playwright event-loop thread (same pattern as the BoxLite provider) so a per-thread browser session survives across turns regardless of the caller's loop (Gateway / TUI / test). Each action returns a fresh page snapshot whose interactive elements are addressed by a stable numeric `[ref]` index (stamped as `data-df-ref` during snapshot), so the model acts on what it just observed instead of holding stale handles or guessing selectors. URLs are SSRF-screened via the shared `validate_public_http_url` (opt-out `allow_private_addresses` only for intentional internal targets). CDP attachment cannot install the request guard on an existing Chrome context, so `cdp_url` fails closed unless the operator explicitly sets `allow_unguarded_cdp: true` for a trusted local browser. Browser REST/Live access also requires an exact non-NULL thread owner, rather than the general legacy shared-thread policy, because retained pages may contain authenticated state. Session admission is a hard `max_sessions` cap: pinned Live/operation sessions are never evicted, and a new thread is rejected when no unpinned session can be closed; one Live viewer owns a session at a time. Optional dependency: `cd backend && uv sync --extra browser && uv run playwright install chromium`; `scripts/detect_uv_extras.py` preserves the extra when `config.yaml` enables `browser_navigate`, and Gateway startup fails fast if configured browser control cannot import Playwright. Tests: `tests/test_browser_automation.py` (mocked tools + a real-Chromium integration test guarded by `importorskip`); `tests/manual_browser_live_check.py` is a manual DeepSeek-driven end-to-end check (not collected by pytest).
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Live UI input dispatch is kept independent from JPEG capture: non-move actions start a rate-limited background refresh loop, so pointer, wheel, or keyboard input stays responsive while continuous gestures still produce frames throughout the interaction.
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Additional providers also live here (`boxlite`, `brave`, `browserless`, `crawl4ai`, `ddg_search`, `e2b_sandbox`, `exa`, `fastcrw`, `groundroute`, `infoquest`, `searxng`, `serper`, `serply`, `tencent_wsa`, `tenki`); see each subpackage for specifics. `tencent_wsa` uses Tencent Cloud Web Search's service API key endpoint (`TENCENTCLOUD_WSA_APIKEY`), not Tencent Cloud SecretId/SecretKey signing. Its `max_results` is capped at 50; requests above 10 use Tencent's optional `Cnt` parameter, which needs a Tencent Cloud plan that supports it. E2B bootstrap is required. If it fails, the provider kills and closes the unusable remote sandbox. New sandbox creation raises an error. Warm-pool reclaim and remote discovery discard the sandbox and continue acquisition. E2B mounts remain optional.
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E2B output sync records remote file versions and actual host file metadata in a thread-local manifest. The manifest binds to the remote sandbox ID. A complete output listing removes entries for deleted files. This avoids repeat downloads when the host filesystem rounds modification times. A single release-time sync pass is bounded by aggregate ceilings (`_MAX_SYNC_TOTAL_BYTES`, `_MAX_SYNC_FILES`, `_SYNC_DEADLINE_SECONDS`) on top of the per-file `_MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE` cap, so a pathological outputs tree cannot make release download unboundedly; a truncated pass logs what it dropped and leaves the manifest un-pruned (only entries observed in that pass are reconciled), so files it never reached are retried on the next release rather than being forgotten.
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**ACP agent tools**:
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- `invoke_acp_agent` - Invokes external ACP-compatible agents from `config.yaml`
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- ACP launchers must be real ACP adapters. The standard `codex` CLI is not ACP-compatible by itself; configure a wrapper such as `npx -y @zed-industries/codex-acp` or an installed `codex-acp` binary
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- MiniMax Code speaks ACP directly: configure `command: mcode` with `args: ["acp"]`. It receives DeerFlow's enabled MCP servers and uses the per-thread ACP workspace; the Gateway process must have an authenticated `mcode` executable on `PATH`
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- ACP results collect only `agent_message_chunk` text. Thought chunks remain internal and must not be concatenated into the tool result
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- Missing ACP executables now return an actionable error message instead of a raw `[Errno 2]`
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- Each ACP agent uses a per-thread workspace at `{base_dir}/users/{user_id}/threads/{thread_id}/acp-workspace/`. The workspace is accessible to the lead agent via the virtual path `/mnt/acp-workspace/` (read-only). In docker sandbox mode, the directory is volume-mounted into the container at `/mnt/acp-workspace` (read-only); in local sandbox mode, path translation is handled by `tools.py`
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