mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
synced 2026-09-15 17:18:38 +00:00
* feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers `user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to register one MCP server entry per credential. Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets` carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block unmasked. Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key, because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"` opts out. Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context` and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning. Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from `langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the ambient-runtime fallback disabled. Closes #5005 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`. HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context` precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential. Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses. Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and the Gateway mirror. Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest` or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes `request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers. `_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context` instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`, not only a credential. The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`, which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names * fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
532 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
532 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
# MCP (Model Context Protocol) Configuration
|
||
|
||
DeerFlow supports configurable MCP servers and skills to extend its capabilities, which are loaded from a dedicated `extensions_config.json` file in the project root directory.
|
||
|
||
## Setup
|
||
|
||
1. Copy `extensions_config.example.json` to `extensions_config.json` in the project root directory.
|
||
```bash
|
||
# Copy example configuration
|
||
cp extensions_config.example.json extensions_config.json
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
2. Enable the desired MCP servers or skills by setting `"enabled": true`.
|
||
3. Configure each server’s command, arguments, and environment variables as needed.
|
||
4. Restart the application to load and register MCP tools.
|
||
|
||
## OpenViking MCP Tools
|
||
|
||
OpenViking's official server exposes a Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint at `/mcp`.
|
||
DeerFlow connects to it through the same generic MCP client used for other HTTP
|
||
servers:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"openviking": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"type": "http",
|
||
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:1933/mcp",
|
||
"headers": {
|
||
"X-API-Key": "$OPENVIKING_API_KEY"
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Set `OPENVIKING_API_KEY` to a normal owner-bound OpenViking **USER API key**.
|
||
The key determines the OpenViking account and user. Do not use a root/admin
|
||
key, trusted mode, or add `X-OpenViking-Account`, `X-OpenViking-User`, or
|
||
`X-OpenViking-Actor-Peer` headers for this personal single-owner setup.
|
||
`X-API-Key` is used here because DeerFlow expands a whole-string `$ENV_VAR`
|
||
value without storing a credential in the checked-in configuration.
|
||
If `OPENVIKING_API_KEY` is missing or empty during initialization, OpenViking
|
||
authentication fails and DeerFlow skips that MCP server, so no OpenViking tools
|
||
appear. Changing only the environment variable does not invalidate DeerFlow's
|
||
already-populated, file-signature-based MCP tool cache; after setting or fixing
|
||
the key, restart DeerFlow, modify and re-save the extensions config, or call the
|
||
MCP cache-reset endpoint at `POST /api/mcp/cache/reset`.
|
||
|
||
OpenViking owns the tool schemas and behavior. DeerFlow performs the standard
|
||
MCP initialization and discovery flow, prefixes the discovered names with
|
||
`openviking_` by default, and routes calls back through the generic MCP client.
|
||
For capability parity with other official OpenViking harnesses, DeerFlow exposes
|
||
the native `forget` tool with the other discovered tools. `forget` permanently
|
||
deletes a `viking://` URI and should be called only after explicit user
|
||
confirmation; DeerFlow does not enforce that confirmation.
|
||
|
||
Operators who do not want agents to call `forget` can block its default visible
|
||
name with DeerFlow's existing guardrail configuration:
|
||
|
||
```yaml
|
||
guardrails:
|
||
enabled: true
|
||
provider:
|
||
use: deerflow.guardrails.builtin:AllowlistProvider
|
||
config:
|
||
denied_tools: ["openviking_forget"]
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
If `tool_name_prefix` is disabled for the OpenViking server, block `forget`
|
||
instead.
|
||
|
||
This explicit tool path is separate from the automatic OpenViking memory backend
|
||
configured under `config.yaml -> memory`. Both may be enabled at the same time:
|
||
the memory backend handles automatic turn capture and recall, while MCP tools
|
||
are model-selected operations.
|
||
|
||
For Docker, point `url` at the OpenViking address reachable from the Gateway
|
||
container, such as `http://openviking:1933/mcp` for a shared Compose network or
|
||
`http://host.docker.internal:1933/mcp` for a host-installed server.
|
||
|
||
## Routing Hints
|
||
|
||
Use `routing` when an MCP server should be preferred for specific requests, such
|
||
as internal database questions that should use a PostgreSQL MCP tool before web
|
||
search. Routing hints are soft model guidance: they add a
|
||
`<mcp_routing_hints>` prompt section, but they do not forbid other tools. Use
|
||
agent-level allow/deny policy for hard restrictions. If `tool_search.enabled`
|
||
defers MCP tool schemas, matching routing metadata can also auto-promote the
|
||
deferred schema before the model call. Auto-promotion is controlled by the
|
||
top-level `config.yaml -> tool_search.auto_promote_top_k` setting.
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"postgres": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"type": "stdio",
|
||
"command": "npx",
|
||
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres", "postgresql://localhost/mydb"],
|
||
"routing": {
|
||
"mode": "prefer",
|
||
"priority": 50,
|
||
"keywords": ["orders", "users", "SQL", "database", "table"]
|
||
},
|
||
"tools": {
|
||
"query": {
|
||
"routing": {
|
||
"mode": "prefer",
|
||
"priority": 100,
|
||
"keywords": ["query database", "orders table", "metrics"]
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- `routing.mode`: `off` disables hints; `prefer` emits hints.
|
||
- `routing.priority`: `0` to `100`; higher-priority hints are rendered first.
|
||
When `tool_search.enabled=true`, priority also orders auto-promote matches.
|
||
- `routing.keywords`: operator-authored terms that describe when to prefer the
|
||
MCP tool. Empty keywords are allowed but do not emit a hint line and do not
|
||
trigger auto-promotion. Auto-promote matching is a case-insensitive substring
|
||
test against the latest user message (not token/word-boundary matching), so
|
||
prefer distinctive keywords — a short term like `api` also matches `rapid`.
|
||
Over-matching only exposes an extra tool schema (soft/additive), never
|
||
disables other tools.
|
||
- `tools.<original_tool_name>.routing`: overrides only the fields explicitly
|
||
set for that tool. The key is the MCP server's original tool name, before the
|
||
`<server>_` prefix added for model binding. If the server-level
|
||
`routing.mode` is `off`, a tool override must set `mode: "prefer"`; setting
|
||
only `priority` or `keywords` still inherits `off` and emits no hint.
|
||
- `tool_search.auto_promote_top_k`: global limit for auto-promoted deferred MCP
|
||
schemas per model call. Default `3`; valid range `1..5`.
|
||
|
||
## Tool Name Prefixes
|
||
|
||
DeerFlow prefixes discovered MCP tool names with `<server_name>_` by default.
|
||
This avoids collisions when two enabled servers expose tools with the same
|
||
name. A server that already namespaces its own tools can opt out:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"semantic-scholar": {
|
||
"type": "stdio",
|
||
"command": "uvx",
|
||
"args": ["s2-mcp-server"],
|
||
"tool_name_prefix": false
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
With this setting, a server tool named `semantic_scholar_search_papers` keeps
|
||
that name instead of becoming
|
||
`semantic-scholar_semantic_scholar_search_papers`. The default is `true` for
|
||
backward compatibility. Disable it only when every resulting tool name remains
|
||
unique across the enabled servers. Stdio tools continue to use DeerFlow's
|
||
persistent per-thread session pool regardless of this setting.
|
||
|
||
## Server Timeouts
|
||
|
||
Two independent settings bound stdio MCP servers and durable HTTP/SSE task
|
||
calls. `session_init_timeout` covers server bring-up — tool discovery
|
||
(subprocess spawn + `initialize` + `tools/list`) and persistent-session
|
||
initialization — plus ephemeral HTTP/SSE task-session initialization. It
|
||
defaults to 60s so a hung server (e.g. `npx` blocked on a package download, or
|
||
a server that never answers `initialize`) cannot block agent construction or
|
||
the task poller indefinitely. Set it to `null` to disable:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"github": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"type": "stdio",
|
||
"command": "npx",
|
||
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
|
||
"env": {
|
||
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "$GITHUB_TOKEN"
|
||
},
|
||
"session_init_timeout": 60,
|
||
"tool_call_timeout": 60
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`tool_call_timeout` limits each individual stdio tool call in seconds. Ordinary
|
||
durable-task submit/status/cancel calls also honor it for `http` and `sse`
|
||
servers, independently of transport idle timeouts, so a live connection that
|
||
never returns the matching MCP response cannot stall the task poller. Other
|
||
`http` and `sse` tools continue to use transport-level timeouts.
|
||
|
||
## Filesystem MCP Servers
|
||
|
||
DeerFlow already provides built-in file tools for thread-scoped workspace access.
|
||
Do not add an MCP filesystem server for the same DeerFlow workspace. The
|
||
overlapping file tools use different path semantics, which can make LLM tool
|
||
selection and file access behavior unstable.
|
||
|
||
DeerFlow does not currently adapt the MCP Roots mode for filesystem servers. In
|
||
particular, it does not publish per-thread MCP roots or map DeerFlow sandbox
|
||
paths such as `/mnt/user-data/...` to paths accepted by
|
||
`@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem`. Use DeerFlow's built-in file tools
|
||
for DeerFlow workspace files.
|
||
|
||
## Durable Background Tasks with Ordinary MCP Tools
|
||
|
||
An MCP server can expose a fast `submit` tool plus `status` and `cancel` tools
|
||
for long-running work. DeerFlow keeps the remote task ID in SQL and polls it
|
||
outside the Agent run, so the model does not have to remember or repeatedly
|
||
send that ID.
|
||
|
||
Enable the restart-required runtime in `config.yaml`:
|
||
|
||
```yaml
|
||
mcp_tasks:
|
||
enabled: true
|
||
poll_interval_seconds: 5
|
||
lease_seconds: 120
|
||
max_concurrent_polls: 8
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Then bind exact remote tool names in `extensions_config.json`. These names are
|
||
the server's raw names, before DeerFlow adds any `<server_name>_` prefix:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"report-service": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"type": "http",
|
||
"url": "https://reports.example.com/mcp",
|
||
"session_init_timeout": 60,
|
||
"tool_call_timeout": 60,
|
||
"task_toolsets": [
|
||
{
|
||
"name": "report-generation",
|
||
"submit_tool": "submit_report",
|
||
"status_tool": "get_report_status",
|
||
"cancel_tool": "cancel_report"
|
||
}
|
||
]
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The three remote tools must use MCP `structuredContent`; ordinary text blocks
|
||
are never parsed as a task protocol:
|
||
|
||
- `submit_report(<business arguments>)` returns
|
||
`{"task_id":"remote-123","status":"running"}` quickly.
|
||
- `get_report_status({"task_id":"remote-123"})` returns a status from
|
||
`running`, `input_required`, `completed`, `failed`, or `cancelled`. It may
|
||
also return `result`, `result_artifact` (`uri` plus `mime_type`), `error`,
|
||
`error_code`, `input_required`, and a finite positive
|
||
`poll_after_seconds`. DeerFlow caps that remote scheduling hint at 24 hours.
|
||
- `cancel_report({"task_id":"remote-123"})` is idempotent and returns the
|
||
actual terminal status: `cancelled`, `completed`, or `failed`.
|
||
|
||
For the status tool, `isError: true` means that the status call itself failed;
|
||
DeerFlow records a bounded snippet of its first text content block and retries
|
||
with capped exponential backoff. It does not infer that the remote task failed,
|
||
because MCP tool errors do not distinguish transient from permanent conditions.
|
||
A server must report a permanent remote-task failure through a normal tool
|
||
result (`isError: false` or omitted) whose `structuredContent` contains
|
||
`status: "failed"` and an optional `error`. This distinction lets a temporary
|
||
server or network outage recover without terminalizing work that may still be
|
||
running remotely.
|
||
|
||
Persisted task errors are capped at 4,000 characters. An `input_required`
|
||
payload must be valid JSON no larger than 64 KiB; an oversized or invalid
|
||
payload is treated as a permanent protocol failure instead of being truncated
|
||
into a different question. `result_artifact` must likewise serialize as JSON
|
||
within 64 KiB; it is a small external reference, not a second result channel.
|
||
Remote task IDs and task names are limited to 255 characters, and a task-enabled
|
||
server name is limited to 128 characters, matching the durable SQL schema on
|
||
both SQLite and PostgreSQL.
|
||
|
||
`error_code: "task_not_found"` is a permanent failure. Network and transport
|
||
errors remain retryable with capped exponential backoff; the query API reports
|
||
`tracking_degraded` after repeated failures. Oversized JSON results are not
|
||
cut into invalid JSON: DeerFlow stores a text preview, marks
|
||
`result_truncated`, and preserves any external `result_artifact` reference.
|
||
|
||
Only submit remains in the Agent's normal tool list. Status and cancel are
|
||
runtime-internal. Query the current thread through:
|
||
|
||
- `GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/mcp-tasks`
|
||
- `GET /api/threads/{thread_id}/mcp-tasks/{task_id}`
|
||
|
||
Task toolsets require `database.backend: sqlite` or `postgres`; startup fails
|
||
instead of falling back to a synchronous submit when persistence or the task
|
||
runtime is disabled. Restart recovery also requires the remote service to keep
|
||
the task alive and recognize its ID after DeerFlow reconnects. A stdio server
|
||
must therefore persist its own tasks; multi-instance deployments should
|
||
normally use an independently running HTTP/SSE service.
|
||
|
||
Server-level OAuth works during background polling and refreshes normally.
|
||
Request-scoped secrets from a particular Agent run are not durable task
|
||
credentials and are unavailable to later background polls; use server-level
|
||
authentication for a task toolset. `headers_from_context` follows the same
|
||
rule: submit is awaited inside the Agent run and carries the mapped headers,
|
||
while status and cancel polls skip them and authenticate with the server's
|
||
static or OAuth credentials — so `on_missing: "deny"` guards the submit but not
|
||
those polls. Declaring both on one server logs a warning at startup. Restart DeerFlow after changing
|
||
`mcp_tasks`, `task_toolsets`, `mcpInterceptors`, or any connection,
|
||
authentication, transport, or timeout setting on a task-enabled server.
|
||
DeerFlow rejects task-tool reloads that no longer match the Gateway's startup
|
||
snapshot instead of discovering tools with new settings while the background
|
||
poller still calls the old endpoint. Agent-facing description/routing changes
|
||
and changes to servers without task toolsets remain hot-reloadable.
|
||
|
||
## OAuth Support (HTTP/SSE MCP Servers)
|
||
|
||
For `http` and `sse` MCP servers, DeerFlow supports OAuth token acquisition and automatic token refresh.
|
||
|
||
- Supported grants: `client_credentials`, `refresh_token`
|
||
- Configure per-server `oauth` block in `extensions_config.json`
|
||
- Secrets should be provided via environment variables (for example: `$MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`)
|
||
|
||
Example:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"secure-http-server": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"type": "http",
|
||
"url": "https://api.example.com/mcp",
|
||
"oauth": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"token_url": "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
|
||
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
|
||
"client_id": "$MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID",
|
||
"client_secret": "$MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET",
|
||
"scope": "mcp.read",
|
||
"refresh_skew_seconds": 60
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Request-Scoped Headers (HTTP/SSE MCP Servers)
|
||
|
||
When the credential is chosen by the *caller* rather than by the operator —
|
||
multi-tenant gateways, per-run API keys, one shared MCP server fronting several
|
||
environments — declare a `headers_from_context` block instead of registering one
|
||
MCP server per credential.
|
||
|
||
Each entry maps an HTTP header name to a key of the run request's
|
||
`config.context.secrets` carrier:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpServers": {
|
||
"shared-api": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"type": "http",
|
||
"url": "https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
|
||
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer $MCP_DISCOVERY_TOKEN" },
|
||
"headers_from_context": {
|
||
"enabled": true,
|
||
"headers": {
|
||
"X-Tenant-Id": "tenant_id",
|
||
"Authorization": "tenant_token"
|
||
},
|
||
"on_missing": "deny"
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The caller supplies the values on each run request:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"config": {
|
||
"context": {
|
||
"secrets": {
|
||
"tenant_id": "acme",
|
||
"tenant_token": "Bearer <request-scoped credential>"
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- The config file stores **names only**, never a credential, so the block is
|
||
returned unmasked by `GET /api/mcp/config`. The values travel out-of-band with
|
||
each run and are stripped from persisted run configuration, API responses, and
|
||
trace payloads.
|
||
- The server's static `headers` are used for startup tool discovery. A mapped
|
||
header replaces the static one for that tool call, as shown above for
|
||
`Authorization`. Header names are matched case-insensitively, so a mapped
|
||
`Authorization` still replaces a static `authorization` instead of putting a
|
||
second copy of the field on the wire. Mapping one header under two spellings
|
||
is rejected at config load.
|
||
- `on_missing` defaults to `"deny"`: if the run carries no value for a mapped
|
||
key, the tool call fails with an actionable error rather than falling back to
|
||
the discovery credential — which in a multi-tenant deployment would send one
|
||
tenant's request under another tenant's authority. Set `"passthrough"` to opt
|
||
out and forward the static headers instead.
|
||
- Precedence for a server declaring several sources: static `headers` <
|
||
`oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context`. The value chosen for this one
|
||
request is the most specific, so it wins.
|
||
- `sse`/`http` only. A stdio server has no HTTP headers; declaring the block
|
||
there logs a warning and is ignored.
|
||
- Durable background tasks are the one exception, and only half of one: a
|
||
`task_toolsets` submit is awaited inside the Agent run and carries these
|
||
headers, but the status and cancel polls run after that run ends, so they skip
|
||
them and use the server's static/OAuth credentials. See *Durable Background
|
||
Tasks* above.
|
||
|
||
Use `user_auth` instead when the credential belongs to a configured DeerFlow
|
||
user rather than to the individual request.
|
||
|
||
## Custom Tool Interceptors
|
||
|
||
You can register custom interceptors that run before every MCP tool call. This is useful for injecting per-request headers (e.g., user auth tokens from the LangGraph execution context), logging, or metrics.
|
||
|
||
Declare interceptors in `extensions_config.json` using the `mcpInterceptors` field:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"mcpInterceptors": [
|
||
"my_package.mcp.auth:build_auth_interceptor"
|
||
],
|
||
"mcpServers": { ... }
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Each entry is a Python import path in `module:variable` format (resolved via `resolve_variable`). The variable must be a **no-arg builder function** that returns an async interceptor compatible with `MultiServerMCPClient`’s `tool_interceptors` interface, or `None` to skip.
|
||
|
||
Example interceptor that injects an authorization header from the request-scoped
|
||
LangGraph secret context. For a plain header mapping prefer the declarative
|
||
`headers_from_context` block above; write an interceptor when the header value
|
||
needs logic (signing, exchanging the secret for another token, routing on the
|
||
tool name):
|
||
|
||
```python
|
||
from deerflow.runtime.secret_context import extract_request_secrets
|
||
|
||
|
||
def build_auth_interceptor():
|
||
async def interceptor(request, handler):
|
||
runtime = getattr(request, "runtime", None)
|
||
secrets = extract_request_secrets(getattr(runtime, "context", None))
|
||
token = secrets.get("MCP_AUTH_TOKEN")
|
||
if token:
|
||
request = request.override(
|
||
headers={**(request.headers or {}), "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
|
||
)
|
||
return await handler(request)
|
||
|
||
return interceptor
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Read the run context from `request.runtime`, not from
|
||
`langgraph.config.get_config()`. The context is carried on the LangGraph
|
||
runtime, not on the `RunnableConfig` propagated to child runnables, so
|
||
`get_config().get("context")` is `None` inside a tool call. LangGraph's tool
|
||
node injects the runtime into any tool parameter named `runtime`, which is how
|
||
both the pooled stdio wrapper and `langchain-mcp-adapters`' HTTP/SSE tool
|
||
receive it. When the call originates outside a tool node, fall back to
|
||
`langgraph.runtime.get_runtime()` (see
|
||
`deerflow/mcp/context_headers.py::_current_runtime`).
|
||
|
||
Supply the credential on each run request through `config.context.secrets`:
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"metadata": {"source": "my-client"},
|
||
"config": {
|
||
"context": {
|
||
"secrets": {"MCP_AUTH_TOKEN": "<request-scoped credential>"}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Both `metadata.auth_token` and `config.metadata.auth_token` are rejected with HTTP 422 at run admission and are never supported
|
||
interceptor paths. Do not put credentials in either metadata surface; use
|
||
`config.context.secrets`, whose values remain available to the live interceptor
|
||
but are removed from persisted and API-visible run configuration copies.
|
||
|
||
- A single string value is accepted and normalized to a one-element list.
|
||
- Invalid paths or builder failures are logged as warnings without blocking other interceptors.
|
||
- The builder return value must be `callable`; non-callable values are skipped with a warning.
|
||
|
||
### Migrating legacy MCP credentials
|
||
|
||
Deployments that previously sent `metadata.auth_token` or `config.metadata.auth_token` must:
|
||
|
||
1. Update the caller and interceptor to use `config.context.secrets` as shown
|
||
above.
|
||
2. Rotate the exposed credential before resuming authenticated MCP traffic.
|
||
3. Locate and remove every retained legacy copy according to the deployment's
|
||
retention policy, including database rows, run events, application or proxy
|
||
logs, snapshots, exports, and backups.
|
||
|
||
Current history APIs hide legacy `metadata.auth_token` and `config.metadata.auth_token` values, but hiding a response does not erase
|
||
material already retained by those systems. Restarting or upgrading DeerFlow does
|
||
not rotate credentials or perform historical cleanup; operators must complete
|
||
both actions explicitly.
|
||
|
||
## How It Works
|
||
|
||
MCP servers expose tools that are automatically discovered and integrated into DeerFlow’s agent system at runtime. Once enabled, these tools become available to agents without additional code changes.
|
||
|
||
## Example Capabilities
|
||
|
||
MCP servers can provide access to:
|
||
|
||
- **Databases** (e.g., PostgreSQL)
|
||
- **External APIs** (e.g., GitHub, Brave Search)
|
||
- **Browser automation** (e.g., Puppeteer)
|
||
- **Custom MCP server implementations**
|
||
|
||
## Learn More
|
||
|
||
For detailed documentation about the Model Context Protocol, visit:
|
||
https://modelcontextprotocol.io
|