mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
synced 2026-04-28 20:58:16 +00:00
* feat(auth): introduce backend auth module Port RFC-001 authentication core from PR #1728: - JWT token handling (create_access_token, decode_token, TokenPayload) - Password hashing (bcrypt) with verify_password - SQLite UserRepository with base interface - Provider Factory pattern (LocalAuthProvider) - CLI reset_admin tool - Auth-specific errors (AuthErrorCode, TokenError, AuthErrorResponse) Deps: - bcrypt>=4.0.0 - pyjwt>=2.9.0 - email-validator>=2.0.0 - backend/uv.toml pins public PyPI index Tests: 12 pure unit tests (test_auth_config.py, test_auth_errors.py). Scope note: authz.py, test_auth.py, and test_auth_type_system.py are deferred to commit 2 because they depend on middleware and deps wiring that is not yet in place. Commit 1 stays "pure new files only" as the spec mandates. * feat(auth): wire auth end-to-end (middleware + frontend replacement) Backend: - Port auth_middleware, csrf_middleware, langgraph_auth, routers/auth - Port authz decorator (owner_filter_key defaults to 'owner_id') - Merge app.py: register AuthMiddleware + CSRFMiddleware + CORS, add _ensure_admin_user lifespan hook, _migrate_orphaned_threads helper, register auth router - Merge deps.py: add get_local_provider, get_current_user_from_request, get_optional_user_from_request; keep get_current_user as thin str|None adapter for feedback router - langgraph.json: add auth path pointing to langgraph_auth.py:auth - Rename metadata['user_id'] -> metadata['owner_id'] in langgraph_auth (both metadata write and LangGraph filter dict) + test fixtures Frontend: - Delete better-auth library and api catch-all route - Remove better-auth npm dependency and env vars (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, BETTER_AUTH_GITHUB_*) from env.js - Port frontend/src/core/auth/* (AuthProvider, gateway-config, proxy-policy, server-side getServerSideUser, types) - Port frontend/src/core/api/fetcher.ts - Port (auth)/layout, (auth)/login, (auth)/setup pages - Rewrite workspace/layout.tsx as server component that calls getServerSideUser and wraps in AuthProvider - Port workspace/workspace-content.tsx for the client-side sidebar logic Tests: - Port 5 auth test files (test_auth, test_auth_middleware, test_auth_type_system, test_ensure_admin, test_langgraph_auth) - 176 auth tests PASS After this commit: login/logout/registration flow works, but persistence layer does not yet filter by owner_id. Commit 4 closes that gap. * feat(auth): account settings page + i18n - Port account-settings-page.tsx (change password, change email, logout) - Wire into settings-dialog.tsx as new "account" section with UserIcon, rendered first in the section list - Add i18n keys: - en-US/zh-CN: settings.sections.account ("Account" / "账号") - en-US/zh-CN: button.logout ("Log out" / "退出登录") - types.ts: matching type declarations * feat(auth): enforce owner_id across 2.0-rc persistence layer Add request-scoped contextvar-based owner filtering to threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback repositories. Router code is unchanged — isolation is enforced at the storage layer so that any caller that forgets to pass owner_id still gets filtered results, and new routes cannot accidentally leak data. Core infrastructure ------------------- - deerflow/runtime/user_context.py (new): - ContextVar[CurrentUser | None] with default None - runtime_checkable CurrentUser Protocol (structural subtype with .id) - set/reset/get/require helpers - AUTO sentinel + resolve_owner_id(value, method_name) for sentinel three-state resolution: AUTO reads contextvar, explicit str overrides, explicit None bypasses the filter (for migration/CLI) Repository changes ------------------ - ThreadMetaRepository: create/get/search/update_*/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg; read paths filter by owner, writes stamp it, mutations check ownership before applying - RunRepository: put/get/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg - FeedbackRepository: create/get/list_by_run/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg - DbRunEventStore: list_messages/list_events/list_messages_by_run/ count_messages/delete_by_thread/delete_by_run gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg. Write paths (put/put_batch) read contextvar softly: when a request-scoped user is available, owner_id is stamped; background worker writes without a user context pass None which is valid (orphan row to be bound by migration) Schema ------ - persistence/models/run_event.py: RunEventRow.owner_id = Mapped[ str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True) - No alembic migration needed: 2.0 ships fresh, Base.metadata.create_all picks up the new column automatically Middleware ---------- - auth_middleware.py: after cookie check, call get_optional_user_from_ request to load the real User, stamp it into request.state.user AND the contextvar via set_current_user, reset in a try/finally. Public paths and unauthenticated requests continue without contextvar, and @require_auth handles the strict 401 path Test infrastructure ------------------- - tests/conftest.py: @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) _auto_user_context sets a default SimpleNamespace(id="test-user-autouse") on every test unless marked @pytest.mark.no_auto_user. Keeps existing 20+ persistence tests passing without modification - pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options]: register no_auto_user marker so pytest does not emit warnings for opt-out tests - tests/test_user_context.py: 6 tests covering three-state semantics, Protocol duck typing, and require/optional APIs - tests/test_thread_meta_repo.py: one test updated to pass owner_id= None explicitly where it was previously relying on the old default Test results ------------ - test_user_context.py: 6 passed - test_auth*.py + test_langgraph_auth.py + test_ensure_admin.py: 127 - test_run_event_store / test_run_repository / test_thread_meta_repo / test_feedback: 92 passed - Full backend suite: 1905 passed, 2 failed (both @requires_llm flaky integration tests unrelated to auth), 1 skipped * feat(auth): extend orphan migration to 2.0-rc persistence tables _ensure_admin_user now runs a three-step pipeline on every boot: Step 1 (fatal): admin user exists / is created / password is reset Step 2 (non-fatal): LangGraph store orphan threads → admin Step 3 (non-fatal): SQL persistence tables → admin - threads_meta - runs - run_events - feedback Each step is idempotent. The fatal/non-fatal split mirrors PR #1728's original philosophy: admin creation failure blocks startup (the system is unusable without an admin), whereas migration failures log a warning and let the service proceed (a partial migration is recoverable; a missing admin is not). Key helpers ----------- - _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size=500): async generator that cursor-paginates across LangGraph store pages. Fixes PR #1728's hardcoded limit=1000 bug that would silently lose orphans beyond the first page. - _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id): Rewritten to use _iter_store_items. Returns the migrated count so the caller can log it; raises only on unhandled exceptions. - _migrate_orphan_sql_tables(admin_user_id): Imports the 4 ORM models lazily, grabs the shared session factory, runs one UPDATE per table in a single transaction, commits once. No-op when no persistence backend is configured (in-memory dev). Tests: test_ensure_admin.py (8 passed) * test(auth): port AUTH test plan docs + lint/format pass - Port backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md and AUTH_UPGRADE.md from PR #1728 - Rename metadata.user_id → metadata.owner_id in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md (4 occurrences from the original PR doc) - ruff auto-fix UP037 in sentinel type annotations: drop quotes around "str | None | _AutoSentinel" now that from __future__ import annotations makes them implicit string forms - ruff format: 2 files (app/gateway/app.py, runtime/user_context.py) Note on test coverage additions: - conftest.py autouse fixture was already added in commit 4 (had to be co-located with the repository changes to keep pre-existing persistence tests passing) - cross-user isolation E2E tests (test_owner_isolation.py) deferred — enforcement is already proven by the 98-test repository suite via the autouse fixture + explicit _AUTO sentinel exercises - New test cases (TC-API-17..20, TC-ATK-13, TC-MIG-01..07) listed in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md are deferred to a follow-up PR — they are manual-QA test cases rather than pytest code, and the spec-level coverage is already met by test_user_context.py + the 98-test repository suite. Final test results: - Auth suite (test_auth*, test_langgraph_auth, test_ensure_admin, test_user_context): 186 passed - Persistence suite (test_run_event_store, test_run_repository, test_thread_meta_repo, test_feedback): 98 passed - Lint: ruff check + ruff format both clean * test(auth): add cross-user isolation test suite 10 tests exercising the storage-layer owner filter by manually switching the user_context contextvar between two users. Verifies the safety invariant: After a repository write with owner_id=A, a subsequent read with owner_id=B must not return the row, and vice versa. Covers all 4 tables that own user-scoped data: TC-API-17 threads_meta — read, search, update, delete cross-user TC-API-18 runs — get, list_by_thread, delete cross-user TC-API-19 run_events — list_messages, list_events, count_messages, delete_by_thread (CRITICAL: raw conversation content leak vector) TC-API-20 feedback — get, list_by_run, delete cross-user Plus two meta-tests verifying the sentinel pattern itself: - AUTO + unset contextvar raises RuntimeError - explicit owner_id=None bypasses the filter (migration escape hatch) Architecture note ----------------- These tests bypass the HTTP layer by design. The full chain (cookie → middleware → contextvar → repository) is covered piecewise: - test_auth_middleware.py: middleware sets contextvar from cookies - test_owner_isolation.py: repositories enforce isolation when contextvar is set to different users Together they prove the end-to-end safety property without the ceremony of spinning up a full TestClient + in-memory DB for every router endpoint. Tests pass: 231 (full auth + persistence + isolation suite) Lint: clean * refactor(auth): migrate user repository to SQLAlchemy ORM Move the users table into the shared persistence engine so auth matches the pattern of threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback — one engine, one session factory, one schema init codepath. New files --------- - persistence/user/__init__.py, persistence/user/model.py: UserRow ORM class with partial unique index on (oauth_provider, oauth_id) - Registered in persistence/models/__init__.py so Base.metadata.create_all() picks it up Modified -------- - auth/repositories/sqlite.py: rewritten as async SQLAlchemy, identical constructor pattern to the other four repositories (def __init__(self, session_factory) + self._sf = session_factory) - auth/config.py: drop users_db_path field — storage is configured through config.database like every other table - deps.py/get_local_provider: construct SQLiteUserRepository with the shared session factory, fail fast if engine is not initialised - tests/test_auth.py: rewrite test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields to use the shared engine (init_engine + close_engine in a tempdir) - tests/test_auth_type_system.py: add per-test autouse fixture that spins up a scratch engine and resets deps._cached_* singletons * refactor(auth): remove SQL orphan migration (unused in supported scenarios) The _migrate_orphan_sql_tables helper existed to bind NULL owner_id rows in threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback to the admin on first boot. But in every supported upgrade path, it's a no-op: 1. Fresh install: create_all builds fresh tables, no legacy rows 2. No-auth → with-auth (no existing persistence DB): persistence tables are created fresh by create_all, no legacy rows 3. No-auth → with-auth (has existing persistence DB from #1930): NOT a supported upgrade path — "有 DB 到有 DB" schema evolution is out of scope; users wipe DB or run manual ALTER So the SQL orphan migration never has anything to do in the supported matrix. Delete the function, simplify _ensure_admin_user from a 3-step pipeline to a 2-step one (admin creation + LangGraph store orphan migration only). LangGraph store orphan migration stays: it serves the real "no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path where a user's existing LangGraph thread metadata has no owner_id field and needs to be stamped with the newly-created admin's id. Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation) Lint: clean * security(auth): write initial admin password to 0600 file instead of logs CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data flagged 3 call sites that logged the auto-generated admin password to stdout via logger.info(). Production log aggregators (ELK/Splunk/etc) would have captured those cleartext secrets. Replace with a shared helper that writes to .deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt with mode 0600, and log only the path. New file -------- - app/gateway/auth/credential_file.py: write_initial_credentials() helper. Takes email, password, and a "initial"/"reset" label. Creates .deer-flow/ if missing, writes a header comment plus the email+password, chmods 0o600, returns the absolute Path. Modified -------- - app/gateway/app.py: both _ensure_admin_user paths (fresh creation + needs_setup password reset) now write to file and log the path - app/gateway/auth/reset_admin.py: rewritten to use the shared ORM repo (SQLiteUserRepository with session_factory) and the credential_file helper. The previous implementation was broken after the earlier ORM refactor — it still imported _get_users_conn and constructed SQLiteUserRepository() without a session factory. No tests changed — the three password-log sites are all exercised via existing test_ensure_admin.py which checks that startup succeeds, not that a specific string appears in logs. CodeQL alerts 272, 283, 284: all resolved. * security(auth): strict JWT validation in middleware (fix junk cookie bypass) AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8 expects junk cookies to be rejected with 401. The previous middleware behaviour was "presence-only": check that some access_token cookie exists, then pass through. In combination with my Task-12 decision to skip @require_auth decorators on routes, this created a gap where a request with any cookie-shaped string (e.g. access_token=not-a-jwt) would bypass authentication on routes that do not touch the repository (/api/models, /api/mcp/config, /api/memory, /api/skills, …). Fix: middleware now calls get_current_user_from_request() strictly and catches the resulting HTTPException to render a 401 with the proper fine-grained error code (token_invalid, token_expired, user_not_found, …). On success it stamps request.state.user and the contextvar so repository-layer owner filters work downstream. The 4 old "_with_cookie_passes" tests in test_auth_middleware.py were written for the presence-only behaviour; they asserted that a junk cookie would make the handler return 200. They are renamed to "_with_junk_cookie_rejected" and their assertions flipped to 401. The negative path (no cookie → 401 not_authenticated) is unchanged. Verified: no cookie → 401 not_authenticated junk cookie → 401 token_invalid (the fixed bug) expired cookie → 401 token_expired Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation) Lint: clean * security(auth): wire @require_permission(owner_check=True) on isolation routes Apply the require_permission decorator to all 28 routes that take a {thread_id} path parameter. Combined with the strict middleware (previous commit), this gives the double-layer protection that AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.9 documents: Layer 1 (AuthMiddleware): cookie + JWT validation, rejects junk cookies and stamps request.state.user Layer 2 (@require_permission with owner_check=True): per-resource ownership verification via ThreadMetaStore.check_access — returns 404 if a different user owns the thread The decorator's owner_check branch is rewritten to use the SQL thread_meta_repo (the 2.0-rc persistence layer) instead of the LangGraph store path that PR #1728 used (_store_get / get_store in routers/threads.py). The inject_record convenience is dropped — no caller in 2.0 needs the LangGraph blob, and the SQL repo has a different shape. Routes decorated (28 total): - threads.py: delete, patch, get, get-state, post-state, post-history - thread_runs.py: post-runs, post-runs-stream, post-runs-wait, list_runs, get_run, cancel_run, join_run, stream_existing_run, list_thread_messages, list_run_messages, list_run_events, thread_token_usage - feedback.py: create, list, stats, delete - uploads.py: upload (added Request param), list, delete - artifacts.py: get_artifact - suggestions.py: generate (renamed body parameter to avoid conflict with FastAPI Request) Test fixes: - test_suggestions_router.py: bypass the decorator via __wrapped__ (the unit tests cover parsing logic, not auth — no point spinning up a thread_meta_repo just to test JSON unwrapping) - test_auth_middleware.py 4 fake-cookie tests: already updated in the previous commit (745bf432) Tests: 293 passed (auth + persistence + isolation + suggestions) Lint: clean * security(auth): defense-in-depth fixes from release validation pass Eight findings caught while running the AUTH_TEST_PLAN end-to-end against the deployed sg_dev stack. Each is a pre-condition for shipping release/2.0-rc that the previous PRs missed. Backend hardening - routers/auth.py: rate limiter X-Real-IP now requires AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES whitelist (CIDR/IP allowlist). Without nginx in front, the previous code honored arbitrary X-Real-IP, letting an attacker rotate the header to fully bypass the per-IP login lockout. - routers/auth.py: 36-entry common-password blocklist via Pydantic field_validator on RegisterRequest + ChangePasswordRequest. The shared _validate_strong_password helper keeps the constraint in one place. - routers/threads.py: ThreadCreateRequest + ThreadPatchRequest strip server-reserved metadata keys (owner_id, user_id) via Pydantic field_validator so a forged value can never round-trip back to other clients reading the same thread. The actual ownership invariant stays on the threads_meta row; this closes the metadata-blob echo gap. - authz.py + thread_meta/sql.py: require_permission gains a require_existing flag plumbed through check_access(require_existing=True). Destructive routes (DELETE/PATCH/state-update/runs/feedback) now treat a missing thread_meta row as 404 instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow", closing the cross-user delete-idempotence gap where any user could successfully DELETE another user's deleted thread. - repositories/sqlite.py + base.py: update_user raises UserNotFoundError on a vanished row instead of silently returning the input. Concurrent delete during password reset can no longer look like a successful update. - runtime/user_context.py: resolve_owner_id() coerces User.id (UUID) to str at the contextvar boundary so SQLAlchemy String(64) columns can bind it. The whole 2.0-rc isolation pipeline was previously broken end-to-end (POST /api/threads → 500 "type 'UUID' is not supported"). - persistence/engine.py: SQLAlchemy listener enables PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON on every new SQLite connection. TC-UPG-06 in the test plan expects WAL; previous code shipped with the default 'delete' journal. - auth_middleware.py: stamp request.state.auth = AuthContext(...) so @require_permission's short-circuit fires; previously every isolation request did a duplicate JWT decode + users SELECT. Also unifies the 401 payload through AuthErrorResponse(...).model_dump(). - app.py: _ensure_admin_user restructure removes the noqa F821 scoping bug where 'password' was referenced outside the branch that defined it. New _announce_credentials helper absorbs the duplicate log block in the fresh-admin and reset-admin branches. * fix(frontend+nginx): rollout CSRF on every state-changing client path The frontend was 100% broken in gateway-pro mode for any user trying to open a specific chat thread. Three cumulative bugs each silently masked the next. LangGraph SDK CSRF gap (api-client.ts) - The Client constructor took only apiUrl, no defaultHeaders, no fetch interceptor. The SDK's internal fetch never sent X-CSRF-Token, so every state-changing /api/langgraph-compat/* call (runs/stream, threads/search, threads/{tid}/history, ...) hit CSRFMiddleware and got 403 before reaching the auth check. UI symptom: empty thread page with no error message; the SPA's hooks swallowed the rejection. - Fix: pass an onRequest hook that injects X-CSRF-Token from the csrf_token cookie per request. Reading the cookie per call (not at construction time) handles login / logout / password-change cookie rotation transparently. The SDK's prepareFetchOptions calls onRequest for both regular requests AND streaming/SSE/reconnect, so the same hook covers runs.stream and runs.joinStream. Raw fetch CSRF gap (7 files) - Audit: 11 frontend fetch sites, only 2 included CSRF (login/setup + account-settings change-password). The other 7 routed through raw fetch() with no header — suggestions, memory, agents, mcp, skills, uploads, and the local thread cleanup hook all 403'd silently. - Fix: enhance fetcher.ts:fetchWithAuth to auto-inject X-CSRF-Token on POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH from a single shared readCsrfCookie() helper. Convert all 7 raw fetch() callers to fetchWithAuth so the contract is centrally enforced. api-client.ts and fetcher.ts share readCsrfCookie + STATE_CHANGING_METHODS to avoid drift. nginx routing + buffering (nginx.local.conf) - The auth feature shipped without updating the nginx config: per-API explicit location blocks but no /api/v1/auth/, /api/feedback, /api/runs. The frontend's client-side fetches to /api/v1/auth/login/local 404'd from the Next.js side because nginx routed /api/* to the frontend. - Fix: add catch-all `location /api/` that proxies to the gateway. nginx longest-prefix matching keeps the explicit blocks (/api/models, /api/threads regex, /api/langgraph/, ...) winning for their paths. - Fix: disable proxy_buffering + proxy_request_buffering for the frontend `location /` block. Without it, nginx tries to spool large Next.js chunks into /var/lib/nginx/proxy (root-owned) and fails with Permission denied → ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING → ChunkLoadError. * test(auth): release-validation test infra and new coverage Test fixtures and unit tests added during the validation pass. Router test helpers (NEW: tests/_router_auth_helpers.py) - make_authed_test_app(): builds a FastAPI test app with a stub middleware that stamps request.state.user + request.state.auth and a permissive thread_meta_repo mock. TestClient-based router tests (test_artifacts_router, test_threads_router) use it instead of bare FastAPI() so the new @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorators short-circuit cleanly. - call_unwrapped(): walks the __wrapped__ chain to invoke the underlying handler without going through the authz wrappers. Direct-call tests (test_uploads_router) use it. Typed with ParamSpec so the wrapped signature flows through. Backend test additions - test_auth.py: 7 tests for the new _get_client_ip trust model (no proxy / trusted proxy / untrusted peer / XFF rejection / invalid CIDR / no client). 5 tests for the password blocklist (literal, case-insensitive, strong password accepted, change-password binding, short-password length-check still fires before blocklist). test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted: closes a shipped-without-coverage gap on the new UserNotFoundError contract. - test_thread_meta_repo.py: 4 tests for check_access(require_existing=True) — strict missing-row denial, strict owner match, strict owner mismatch, strict null-owner still allowed (shared rows survive the tightening). - test_ensure_admin.py: 3 tests for _migrate_orphaned_threads / _iter_store_items pagination, covering the TC-UPG-02 upgrade story end-to-end via mock store. Closes the gap where the cursor pagination was untested even though the previous PR rewrote it. - test_threads_router.py: 5 tests for _strip_reserved_metadata (owner_id removal, user_id removal, safe-keys passthrough, empty input, both-stripped). - test_auth_type_system.py: replace "password123" fixtures with Tr0ub4dor3a / AnotherStr0ngPwd! so the new password blocklist doesn't reject the test data. * docs(auth): refresh TC-DOCKER-05 + document Docker validation gap - AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md TC-DOCKER-05: the previous expectation ("admin password visible in docker logs") was stale after the simplify pass that moved credentials to a 0600 file. The grep "Password:" check would have silently failed and given a false sense of coverage. New expectation matches the actual file-based path: 0600 file in DEER_FLOW_HOME, log shows the path (not the secret), reverse-grep asserts no leaked password in container logs. - NEW: docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md documents the only un-executed block in the test plan (TC-DOCKER-01..06). Reason: sg_dev validation host has no Docker daemon installed. The doc maps each Docker case to an already-validated bare-metal equivalent (TC-1.1, TC-REENT-01, TC-API-02 etc.) so the gap is auditable, and includes pre-flight reproduction steps for whoever has Docker available. --------- Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com>
382 lines
14 KiB
Python
382 lines
14 KiB
Python
import logging
|
|
import os
|
|
from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator
|
|
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
|
|
from datetime import UTC
|
|
|
|
from fastapi import FastAPI
|
|
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth_middleware import AuthMiddleware
|
|
from app.gateway.config import get_gateway_config
|
|
from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import CSRFMiddleware
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import langgraph_runtime
|
|
from app.gateway.routers import (
|
|
agents,
|
|
artifacts,
|
|
assistants_compat,
|
|
auth,
|
|
channels,
|
|
feedback,
|
|
mcp,
|
|
memory,
|
|
models,
|
|
runs,
|
|
skills,
|
|
suggestions,
|
|
thread_runs,
|
|
threads,
|
|
uploads,
|
|
)
|
|
from deerflow.config.app_config import get_app_config
|
|
|
|
# Configure logging
|
|
logging.basicConfig(
|
|
level=logging.INFO,
|
|
format="%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s",
|
|
datefmt="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _ensure_admin_user(app: FastAPI) -> None:
|
|
"""Auto-create the admin user on first boot if no users exist.
|
|
|
|
After admin creation, migrate orphan threads from the LangGraph
|
|
store (metadata.owner_id unset) to the admin account. This is the
|
|
"no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path: users who ran DeerFlow without
|
|
authentication have existing LangGraph thread data that needs an
|
|
owner assigned.
|
|
|
|
No SQL persistence migration is needed: the four owner_id columns
|
|
(threads_meta, runs, run_events, feedback) only come into existence
|
|
alongside the auth module via create_all, so freshly created tables
|
|
never contain NULL-owner rows. "Existing persistence DB + new auth"
|
|
is not a supported upgrade path — fresh install or wipe-and-retry.
|
|
|
|
Multi-worker safe: relies on SQLite UNIQUE constraint to resolve
|
|
races during admin creation. Only the worker that successfully
|
|
creates/updates the admin prints the password; losers silently skip.
|
|
"""
|
|
import secrets
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.credential_file import write_initial_credentials
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_local_provider
|
|
|
|
def _announce_credentials(email: str, password: str, *, label: str, headline: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Write the password to a 0600 file and log the path (never the secret)."""
|
|
cred_path = write_initial_credentials(email, password, label=label)
|
|
logger.info("=" * 60)
|
|
logger.info(" %s", headline)
|
|
logger.info(" Credentials written to: %s (mode 0600)", cred_path)
|
|
logger.info(" Change it after login: Settings -> Account")
|
|
logger.info("=" * 60)
|
|
|
|
provider = get_local_provider()
|
|
user_count = await provider.count_users()
|
|
|
|
admin = None
|
|
|
|
if user_count == 0:
|
|
password = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
|
|
try:
|
|
admin = await provider.create_user(email="admin@deerflow.dev", password=password, system_role="admin", needs_setup=True)
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
return # Another worker already created the admin.
|
|
_announce_credentials(admin.email, password, label="initial", headline="Admin account created on first boot")
|
|
else:
|
|
# Admin exists but setup never completed — reset password so operator
|
|
# can always find it in the console without needing the CLI.
|
|
# Multi-worker guard: if admin was created less than 30s ago, another
|
|
# worker just created it and will print the password — skip reset.
|
|
admin = await provider.get_user_by_email("admin@deerflow.dev")
|
|
if admin and admin.needs_setup:
|
|
import time
|
|
|
|
age = time.time() - admin.created_at.replace(tzinfo=UTC).timestamp()
|
|
if age >= 30:
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async
|
|
|
|
password = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
|
|
admin.password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
|
|
admin.token_version += 1
|
|
await provider.update_user(admin)
|
|
_announce_credentials(admin.email, password, label="reset", headline="Admin account setup incomplete — password reset")
|
|
|
|
if admin is None:
|
|
return # Nothing to bind orphans to.
|
|
|
|
admin_id = str(admin.id)
|
|
|
|
# LangGraph store orphan migration — non-fatal.
|
|
# This covers the "no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path for users
|
|
# whose existing LangGraph thread metadata has no owner_id set.
|
|
store = getattr(app.state, "store", None)
|
|
if store is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
migrated = await _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_id)
|
|
if migrated:
|
|
logger.info("Migrated %d orphan LangGraph thread(s) to admin", migrated)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("LangGraph thread migration failed (non-fatal)")
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size: int = 500):
|
|
"""Paginated async iterator over a LangGraph store namespace.
|
|
|
|
Replaces the old hardcoded ``limit=1000`` call with a cursor-style
|
|
loop so that environments with more than one page of orphans do
|
|
not silently lose data. Terminates when a page is empty OR when a
|
|
short page arrives (indicating the last page).
|
|
"""
|
|
offset = 0
|
|
while True:
|
|
batch = await store.asearch(namespace, limit=page_size, offset=offset)
|
|
if not batch:
|
|
return
|
|
for item in batch:
|
|
yield item
|
|
if len(batch) < page_size:
|
|
return
|
|
offset += page_size
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id: str) -> int:
|
|
"""Migrate LangGraph store threads with no owner_id to the given admin.
|
|
|
|
Uses cursor pagination so all orphans are migrated regardless of
|
|
count. Returns the number of rows migrated.
|
|
"""
|
|
migrated = 0
|
|
async for item in _iter_store_items(store, ("threads",)):
|
|
metadata = item.value.get("metadata", {})
|
|
if not metadata.get("owner_id"):
|
|
metadata["owner_id"] = admin_user_id
|
|
item.value["metadata"] = metadata
|
|
await store.aput(("threads",), item.key, item.value)
|
|
migrated += 1
|
|
return migrated
|
|
|
|
|
|
@asynccontextmanager
|
|
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
|
|
"""Application lifespan handler."""
|
|
|
|
# Load config and check necessary environment variables at startup
|
|
try:
|
|
get_app_config()
|
|
logger.info("Configuration loaded successfully")
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
error_msg = f"Failed to load configuration during gateway startup: {e}"
|
|
logger.exception(error_msg)
|
|
raise RuntimeError(error_msg) from e
|
|
config = get_gateway_config()
|
|
logger.info(f"Starting API Gateway on {config.host}:{config.port}")
|
|
|
|
# Initialize LangGraph runtime components (StreamBridge, RunManager, checkpointer, store)
|
|
async with langgraph_runtime(app):
|
|
logger.info("LangGraph runtime initialised")
|
|
|
|
# Ensure admin user exists (auto-create on first boot)
|
|
# Must run AFTER langgraph_runtime so app.state.store is available for thread migration
|
|
await _ensure_admin_user(app)
|
|
|
|
# Start IM channel service if any channels are configured
|
|
try:
|
|
from app.channels.service import start_channel_service
|
|
|
|
channel_service = await start_channel_service()
|
|
logger.info("Channel service started: %s", channel_service.get_status())
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("No IM channels configured or channel service failed to start")
|
|
|
|
yield
|
|
|
|
# Stop channel service on shutdown
|
|
try:
|
|
from app.channels.service import stop_channel_service
|
|
|
|
await stop_channel_service()
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to stop channel service")
|
|
|
|
logger.info("Shutting down API Gateway")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_app() -> FastAPI:
|
|
"""Create and configure the FastAPI application.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Configured FastAPI application instance.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
app = FastAPI(
|
|
title="DeerFlow API Gateway",
|
|
description="""
|
|
## DeerFlow API Gateway
|
|
|
|
API Gateway for DeerFlow - A LangGraph-based AI agent backend with sandbox execution capabilities.
|
|
|
|
### Features
|
|
|
|
- **Models Management**: Query and retrieve available AI models
|
|
- **MCP Configuration**: Manage Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configurations
|
|
- **Memory Management**: Access and manage global memory data for personalized conversations
|
|
- **Skills Management**: Query and manage skills and their enabled status
|
|
- **Artifacts**: Access thread artifacts and generated files
|
|
- **Health Monitoring**: System health check endpoints
|
|
|
|
### Architecture
|
|
|
|
LangGraph requests are handled by nginx reverse proxy.
|
|
This gateway provides custom endpoints for models, MCP configuration, skills, and artifacts.
|
|
""",
|
|
version="0.1.0",
|
|
lifespan=lifespan,
|
|
docs_url="/docs",
|
|
redoc_url="/redoc",
|
|
openapi_url="/openapi.json",
|
|
openapi_tags=[
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "models",
|
|
"description": "Operations for querying available AI models and their configurations",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "mcp",
|
|
"description": "Manage Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configurations",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "memory",
|
|
"description": "Access and manage global memory data for personalized conversations",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "skills",
|
|
"description": "Manage skills and their configurations",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "artifacts",
|
|
"description": "Access and download thread artifacts and generated files",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "uploads",
|
|
"description": "Upload and manage user files for threads",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "threads",
|
|
"description": "Manage DeerFlow thread-local filesystem data",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "agents",
|
|
"description": "Create and manage custom agents with per-agent config and prompts",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "suggestions",
|
|
"description": "Generate follow-up question suggestions for conversations",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "channels",
|
|
"description": "Manage IM channel integrations (Feishu, Slack, Telegram)",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "assistants-compat",
|
|
"description": "LangGraph Platform-compatible assistants API (stub)",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "runs",
|
|
"description": "LangGraph Platform-compatible runs lifecycle (create, stream, cancel)",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"name": "health",
|
|
"description": "Health check and system status endpoints",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Auth: reject unauthenticated requests to non-public paths (fail-closed safety net)
|
|
app.add_middleware(AuthMiddleware)
|
|
|
|
# CSRF: Double Submit Cookie pattern for state-changing requests
|
|
app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
|
|
|
|
# CORS: when GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS is set (dev without nginx), add CORS middleware.
|
|
# In production, nginx handles CORS and no middleware is needed.
|
|
cors_origins_env = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "")
|
|
if cors_origins_env:
|
|
cors_origins = [o.strip() for o in cors_origins_env.split(",") if o.strip()]
|
|
# Validate: wildcard origin with credentials is a security misconfiguration
|
|
for origin in cors_origins:
|
|
if origin == "*":
|
|
logger.error("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS contains wildcard '*' with allow_credentials=True. This is a security misconfiguration — browsers will reject the response. Use explicit scheme://host:port origins instead.")
|
|
cors_origins = [o for o in cors_origins if o != "*"]
|
|
break
|
|
if cors_origins:
|
|
app.add_middleware(
|
|
CORSMiddleware,
|
|
allow_origins=cors_origins,
|
|
allow_credentials=True,
|
|
allow_methods=["*"],
|
|
allow_headers=["*"],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Include routers
|
|
# Models API is mounted at /api/models
|
|
app.include_router(models.router)
|
|
|
|
# MCP API is mounted at /api/mcp
|
|
app.include_router(mcp.router)
|
|
|
|
# Memory API is mounted at /api/memory
|
|
app.include_router(memory.router)
|
|
|
|
# Skills API is mounted at /api/skills
|
|
app.include_router(skills.router)
|
|
|
|
# Artifacts API is mounted at /api/threads/{thread_id}/artifacts
|
|
app.include_router(artifacts.router)
|
|
|
|
# Uploads API is mounted at /api/threads/{thread_id}/uploads
|
|
app.include_router(uploads.router)
|
|
|
|
# Thread cleanup API is mounted at /api/threads/{thread_id}
|
|
app.include_router(threads.router)
|
|
|
|
# Agents API is mounted at /api/agents
|
|
app.include_router(agents.router)
|
|
|
|
# Suggestions API is mounted at /api/threads/{thread_id}/suggestions
|
|
app.include_router(suggestions.router)
|
|
|
|
# Channels API is mounted at /api/channels
|
|
app.include_router(channels.router)
|
|
|
|
# Assistants compatibility API (LangGraph Platform stub)
|
|
app.include_router(assistants_compat.router)
|
|
|
|
# Auth API is mounted at /api/v1/auth
|
|
app.include_router(auth.router)
|
|
|
|
# Feedback API is mounted at /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback
|
|
app.include_router(feedback.router)
|
|
|
|
# Thread Runs API (LangGraph Platform-compatible runs lifecycle)
|
|
app.include_router(thread_runs.router)
|
|
|
|
# Stateless Runs API (stream/wait without a pre-existing thread)
|
|
app.include_router(runs.router)
|
|
|
|
@app.get("/health", tags=["health"])
|
|
async def health_check() -> dict:
|
|
"""Health check endpoint.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Service health status information.
|
|
"""
|
|
return {"status": "healthy", "service": "deer-flow-gateway"}
|
|
|
|
return app
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Create app instance for uvicorn
|
|
app = create_app()
|