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* fix(frontend): harden artifact and markdown rendering * fix(#4117): restore allow-scripts for scroll-restore, fix citation XSS bypass willem-bd identified these issues: 1. [REGRESSION] sandbox removed allow-scripts which broke HTML artifact scroll-restoration — the injected postMessage script could not run. The prior config (allow-scripts allow-forms without allow-same-origin, i.e. opaque origin) was already safe. Restored with corrected comment. 2. [XSS bypass] CitationLink rendered <a href={href}> directly before isSafeHref ran, so prompt-injected [citation:x](javascript:...) bypassed the safety check. Moved citation block after the guard. Also: - Added mailto: and tel: to SAFE_HREF_PROTOCOLS - Kept anchor-only attributes off the <span> fallback (React DOM warning) Note: the loadMessages re-throw originally in this commit was dropped during the rebase — upstream #4065 rewrote useThreadHistory as a TanStack useInfiniteQuery that already surfaces fetch failures. * test(e2e): update sandbox assertion to match allow-scripts allow-forms The artifact preview iframe's sandbox was restored to 'allow-scripts allow-forms' for scroll-restoration. Update the E2E test to expect the corrected value. * fix(#4117): address review — ArtifactLink XSS guard, urlOfArtifact sandbox e2e - Apply the isSafeHref guard to ArtifactLink (artifact-link.tsx) so a prompt-injected javascript:/data: href in a .md artifact preview cannot reach a real anchor in the main document, matching the guard in createMarkdownLinkComponent. - Add an e2e asserting the urlOfArtifact iframe (non-code browser-previewable files like PDF) keeps its empty sandbox. Note: the loadMessages error-surfacing changes originally in this commit were dropped during the rebase — upstream #4065 rewrote useThreadHistory as a TanStack useInfiniteQuery whose queryFn already throws on !response.ok and surfaces the failure via a toast. * fix(frontend): let write_file non-code previewable artifacts render in sandboxed iframe When a write_file artifact such as PDF is clicked in chat, the component receives a path that forced isCodeFile=true, hiding the sandboxed iframe behind the code editor. Now non-code browser-previewable files are detected early so the sandboxed iframe renders correctly. Fixes the E2E test: renders sandboxed iframe for a browser-previewable non-code file. * fix(#4117): align PDF artifact route pattern with convention (drop /mock/ prefix) The test used /mock/api/threads/... for the PDF artifact content route, but the urlOfArtifact helper generates /api/threads/... (without /mock/) when isMock=false. The other tests (e.g. presented artifacts) already use the correct /api/threads/... pattern. * test(frontend): add render-level coverage for unsafe markdown/artifact links - Render MarkdownLink and ArtifactLink via renderToStaticMarkup and assert an unsafe javascript: href produces a disabled <span> (never an <a>), including through the citation-labelled branch, and that safe https hrefs render hardened anchors (target=_blank, rel=noopener). - The new ArtifactLink render test caught the unsafe href leaking onto the fallback <span> through the {...rest} spread; drop the spread in both span fallbacks so anchor-only attributes (href/target/rel) and react-markdown's node prop never reach the span. - Cover mailto:/tel: in the isSafeHref unit cases and fix the stale SAFE_HREF_PROTOCOLS docstring that still claimed http/https-only. * fix(frontend): route the agent save-hint through the safe localStorage facade Export safeLocalStorage from core/settings/local and use it for the agent-create save-hint read/write so blocked browser storage (Safari private mode, strict containers, embedded WebViews) cannot throw from the effect. core/agents/feature-cache.ts already guards its localStorage access with try/catch, so settings + agent pages are now consistently best-effort. * fix(frontend): allow scheme-less relative markdown links in isSafeHref
92 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
92 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from "@rstest/core";
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import { createElement } from "react";
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import { renderToStaticMarkup } from "react-dom/server";
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import {
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createMarkdownLinkComponent,
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isSafeHref,
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} from "@/components/workspace/messages/markdown-link";
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describe("isSafeHref", () => {
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it("allows web URLs and same-origin paths", () => {
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expect(isSafeHref("https://example.com/path")).toBe(true);
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expect(isSafeHref("http://example.com/path")).toBe(true);
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expect(isSafeHref("/workspace/chats/1")).toBe(true);
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expect(isSafeHref("#section")).toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows scheme-less relative references", () => {
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expect(isSafeHref("report.md")).toBe(true);
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expect(isSafeHref("./report.md")).toBe(true);
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expect(isSafeHref("../assets/chart.png")).toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows non-executing contact schemes", () => {
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expect(isSafeHref("mailto:someone@example.com")).toBe(true);
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expect(isSafeHref("tel:+15551234567")).toBe(true);
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});
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it("rejects executable, local, and protocol-relative URLs", () => {
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expect(isSafeHref("javascript:alert(1)")).toBe(false);
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expect(isSafeHref("data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>")).toBe(false);
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expect(isSafeHref("file:///etc/passwd")).toBe(false);
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expect(isSafeHref("//example.com/path")).toBe(false);
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expect(isSafeHref("\\\\evil.com")).toBe(false);
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expect(isSafeHref(undefined)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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// Render-level coverage: these tests exercise the component itself, so
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// removing (or inverting) the isSafeHref guard inside MarkdownLink fails
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// them even though isSafeHref stays untouched.
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describe("MarkdownLink rendering", () => {
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const MarkdownLink = createMarkdownLinkComponent();
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it("renders an unsafe href as a disabled span, never an anchor", () => {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(MarkdownLink, { href: "javascript:alert(1)" }, "click me"),
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);
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expect(html).not.toContain("<a");
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expect(html).toContain("<span");
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expect(html).toContain("click me");
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expect(html).not.toContain("href=");
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});
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it("blocks unsafe hrefs before the citation branch", () => {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(
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MarkdownLink,
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{ href: "javascript:alert(1)" },
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"citation:evil",
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),
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);
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expect(html).not.toContain("<a");
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expect(html).not.toContain("href=");
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});
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it("renders a safe https href as a hardened anchor", () => {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(
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MarkdownLink,
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{ href: "https://example.com/report" },
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"report",
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),
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);
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expect(html).toContain("<a");
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expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com/report"');
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expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
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expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
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});
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it("renders a scheme-less relative href as a navigable anchor", () => {
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const tests = ["report.md", "./report.md", "../assets/chart.png"];
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for (const href of tests) {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(MarkdownLink, { href }, "doc"),
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);
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expect(html).toContain("<a");
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expect(html).toContain(`href="${href}"`);
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}
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});
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});
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