mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
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fix(frontend): harden artifact and markdown rendering (#4117)
* fix(frontend): harden artifact and markdown rendering * fix(#4117): restore allow-scripts for scroll-restore, fix citation XSS bypass willem-bd identified these issues: 1. [REGRESSION] sandbox removed allow-scripts which broke HTML artifact scroll-restoration — the injected postMessage script could not run. The prior config (allow-scripts allow-forms without allow-same-origin, i.e. opaque origin) was already safe. Restored with corrected comment. 2. [XSS bypass] CitationLink rendered <a href={href}> directly before isSafeHref ran, so prompt-injected [citation:x](javascript:...) bypassed the safety check. Moved citation block after the guard. Also: - Added mailto: and tel: to SAFE_HREF_PROTOCOLS - Kept anchor-only attributes off the <span> fallback (React DOM warning) Note: the loadMessages re-throw originally in this commit was dropped during the rebase — upstream #4065 rewrote useThreadHistory as a TanStack useInfiniteQuery that already surfaces fetch failures. * test(e2e): update sandbox assertion to match allow-scripts allow-forms The artifact preview iframe's sandbox was restored to 'allow-scripts allow-forms' for scroll-restoration. Update the E2E test to expect the corrected value. * fix(#4117): address review — ArtifactLink XSS guard, urlOfArtifact sandbox e2e - Apply the isSafeHref guard to ArtifactLink (artifact-link.tsx) so a prompt-injected javascript:/data: href in a .md artifact preview cannot reach a real anchor in the main document, matching the guard in createMarkdownLinkComponent. - Add an e2e asserting the urlOfArtifact iframe (non-code browser-previewable files like PDF) keeps its empty sandbox. Note: the loadMessages error-surfacing changes originally in this commit were dropped during the rebase — upstream #4065 rewrote useThreadHistory as a TanStack useInfiniteQuery whose queryFn already throws on !response.ok and surfaces the failure via a toast. * fix(frontend): let write_file non-code previewable artifacts render in sandboxed iframe When a write_file artifact such as PDF is clicked in chat, the component receives a path that forced isCodeFile=true, hiding the sandboxed iframe behind the code editor. Now non-code browser-previewable files are detected early so the sandboxed iframe renders correctly. Fixes the E2E test: renders sandboxed iframe for a browser-previewable non-code file. * fix(#4117): align PDF artifact route pattern with convention (drop /mock/ prefix) The test used /mock/api/threads/... for the PDF artifact content route, but the urlOfArtifact helper generates /api/threads/... (without /mock/) when isMock=false. The other tests (e.g. presented artifacts) already use the correct /api/threads/... pattern. * test(frontend): add render-level coverage for unsafe markdown/artifact links - Render MarkdownLink and ArtifactLink via renderToStaticMarkup and assert an unsafe javascript: href produces a disabled <span> (never an <a>), including through the citation-labelled branch, and that safe https hrefs render hardened anchors (target=_blank, rel=noopener). - The new ArtifactLink render test caught the unsafe href leaking onto the fallback <span> through the {...rest} spread; drop the spread in both span fallbacks so anchor-only attributes (href/target/rel) and react-markdown's node prop never reach the span. - Cover mailto:/tel: in the isSafeHref unit cases and fix the stale SAFE_HREF_PROTOCOLS docstring that still claimed http/https-only. * fix(frontend): route the agent save-hint through the safe localStorage facade Export safeLocalStorage from core/settings/local and use it for the agent-create save-hint read/write so blocked browser storage (Safari private mode, strict containers, embedded WebViews) cannot throw from the effect. core/agents/feature-cache.ts already guards its localStorage access with try/catch, so settings + agent pages are now consistently best-effort. * fix(frontend): allow scheme-less relative markdown links in isSafeHref
This commit is contained in:
黄云龙
GitHub
parent
b565e6c0f0
commit
97ca7f88cf
@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ import {
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type HumanInputResponse,
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} from "@/core/messages/human-input";
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import { isHiddenFromUIMessage } from "@/core/messages/utils";
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import { safeLocalStorage } from "@/core/settings/local";
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import { useThreadStream } from "@/core/threads/hooks";
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import { uuid } from "@/core/utils/uuid";
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import { isIMEComposing } from "@/lib/ime";
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@ -130,11 +131,11 @@ export default function NewAgentPage() {
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if (typeof window === "undefined" || step !== "chat") {
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return;
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}
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if (window.localStorage.getItem(SAVE_HINT_STORAGE_KEY) === "1") {
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if (safeLocalStorage.getItem(SAVE_HINT_STORAGE_KEY) === "1") {
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return;
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}
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setShowSaveHint(true);
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window.localStorage.setItem(SAVE_HINT_STORAGE_KEY, "1");
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safeLocalStorage.setItem(SAVE_HINT_STORAGE_KEY, "1");
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}, [step]);
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const handleConfirmName = useCallback(async () => {
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@ -129,7 +129,13 @@ export function ArtifactFileDetail({
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}, [filepath]);
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const { isCodeFile, language } = useMemo(() => {
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if (isWriteFile) {
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let language = checkCodeFile(filepath).language;
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const codeResult = checkCodeFile(filepath);
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// Non-code browser-previewable files (PDF, images, audio, video)
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// should render in the sandboxed iframe, not the code editor.
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if (!codeResult.isCodeFile && canBrowserPreviewFile(filepath)) {
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return codeResult;
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}
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let language = codeResult.language;
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language ??= "text";
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return { isCodeFile: true, language };
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}
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@ -360,6 +366,7 @@ export function ArtifactFileDetail({
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{!isCodeFile && canPreviewInBrowser && (
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<iframe
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className="size-full"
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sandbox=""
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src={urlOfArtifact({ filepath, threadId, isMock })}
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/>
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)}
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@ -528,6 +535,11 @@ export function ArtifactFilePreview({
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ref={iframeRef}
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className="size-full"
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title="Artifact preview"
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// allow-scripts is needed for the scroll-restoration injected
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// script (appendHtmlPreviewScrollRestoration) which communicates
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// via postMessage. allow-same-origin is deliberately omitted: the
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// opaque origin prevents access to parent.document and cookies,
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// and postMessage(..., "*") works fine from it.
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sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms"
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src={htmlPreviewUrl}
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/>
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@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import type { AnchorHTMLAttributes } from "react";
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import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
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import { isSafeHref } from "../messages/markdown-link";
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import { CitationLink } from "./citation-link";
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function isExternalUrl(href: string | undefined): boolean {
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@ -10,6 +12,27 @@ function isExternalUrl(href: string | undefined): boolean {
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/** Link renderer for artifact markdown: citation: prefix → CitationLink, otherwise underlined text. */
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export function ArtifactLink(props: AnchorHTMLAttributes<HTMLAnchorElement>) {
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// Reject unsafe schemes so prompt-injected [label](javascript:...) in a .md
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// artifact preview cannot execute in the main document, matching the guard in
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// createMarkdownLinkComponent (markdown-link.tsx).
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if (props.href !== undefined && !isSafeHref(props.href)) {
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// Intentionally no {...props} spread: anchor-only attributes (href,
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// target, rel) are not valid on a <span> and would leak the unsafe URL
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// into the DOM / trigger React DOM warnings.
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const { className, children } = props;
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return (
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<span
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className={cn(
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"text-muted-foreground cursor-not-allowed underline decoration-dotted underline-offset-2",
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className,
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)}
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aria-label="Unsafe link omitted"
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title={`Unsafe link scheme in ${props.href}`}
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>
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{children}
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</span>
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);
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}
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if (typeof props.children === "string") {
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const match = /^citation:(.+)$/.exec(props.children);
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if (match) {
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@ -5,8 +5,55 @@ import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
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import { CitationLink } from "../citations/citation-link";
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/**
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* Schemes we are willing to render as a navigable ``<a href=...>``.
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*
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* Anything else (``javascript:``, ``data:text/html``, ``vbscript:``,
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* ``file:``, …) is blocked because once it lands in a real anchor the
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* browser happily executes the payload in the chat surface where
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* sessionStorage / CSRF cookies are reachable. We accept ``http(s)``
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* plus the non-executing ``mailto:`` / ``tel:`` schemes; same-origin
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* absolute paths (``/…``), scheme-less relative references (``report.md``,
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* ``./…``, ``../…``), and in-document anchors (``#…``) are also allowed
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* — they all resolve under the current HTTP(S) origin.
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*/
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const SAFE_HREF_PROTOCOLS = ["http:", "https:", "mailto:", "tel:"] as const;
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export function isSafeHref(href: string | undefined): boolean {
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if (typeof href !== "string" || href.length === 0) {
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return false;
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}
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// Same-document anchors (e.g. "#section").
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if (href.startsWith("#")) {
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return true;
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}
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// Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com/path) would inherit the current
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// page's scheme and navigate to an unknown host. Also reject
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// backslash-normalised variants (\\evil.com → //evil.com) because
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// browsers treat backslash as a path separator in URLs.
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if (/^(\/\/|\\\\)/.test(href)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Parse the href so we can inspect its scheme. Items without an explicit
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// protocol (report.md, ./report.md, ../assets/chart.png, /workspace/foo)
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// resolve relative to the dummy HTTPS base, producing an https: URL.
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// Explicitly-schemed URLs (https://…, mailto:, javascript:, data:, …)
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// keep their native scheme, which we then check against the allowlist.
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try {
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const parsed = new URL(href, "https://dummy.example/");
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return (SAFE_HREF_PROTOCOLS as ReadonlyArray<string>).includes(
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parsed.protocol,
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);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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function isExternalUrl(href: string | undefined): boolean {
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return !!href && /^https?:\/\//.test(href);
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if (typeof href !== "string") {
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return false;
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}
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return /^https?:\/\//.test(href);
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}
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/**
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@ -19,6 +66,31 @@ export function createMarkdownLinkComponent(threadId?: string) {
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href,
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...props
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}: AnchorHTMLAttributes<HTMLAnchorElement>) {
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// Reject unsafe schemes up front so a prompt-injected / pasted href can
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// never reach the rendered anchor — including through the citation
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// branch (which renders <a href={href}> directly). Check before the
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// citation block so prompt-injected [citation:x](javascript:...) is
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// blocked. Keep the visible label so the user can still see what the
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// link claimed to point at.
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if (href !== undefined && !isSafeHref(href)) {
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// Intentionally no {...props} spread: react-markdown props like `node`
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// (and anchor-only attributes such as target/rel) are not valid on a
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// <span> and would trigger React DOM warnings.
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const { className, children } = props;
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return (
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<span
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className={cn(
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"text-muted-foreground cursor-not-allowed underline decoration-dotted underline-offset-2",
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className,
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)}
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aria-label="Unsafe link omitted"
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title={`Unsafe link scheme in ${href}`}
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>
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{children}
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</span>
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);
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}
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// Safe-href check passed — citation links now route through CitationLink.
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if (typeof props.children === "string") {
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const match = /^citation:(.+)$/.exec(props.children);
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if (match) {
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@ -23,6 +23,45 @@ function isBrowser(): boolean {
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return typeof window !== "undefined";
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}
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/**
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* Best-effort localStorage facade.
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*
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* Safari private mode, Firefox strict containers, some embedded WebViews, and
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* quotas already filled by sibling tabs throw ``SecurityError`` or
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* ``QuotaExceededError`` from ``getItem``/``setItem``. Without a guard those
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* exceptions bubble into React render handlers and break the composer /
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* settings panel. This wrapper traps every storage exception so callers can
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* always fall back to a sane default.
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*/
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export const safeLocalStorage = {
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getItem(key: string): string | null {
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if (!isBrowser()) return null;
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try {
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return window.localStorage.getItem(key);
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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},
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setItem(key: string, value: string): boolean {
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if (!isBrowser()) return false;
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try {
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window.localStorage.setItem(key, value);
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return true;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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},
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removeItem(key: string): boolean {
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if (!isBrowser()) return false;
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try {
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window.localStorage.removeItem(key);
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return true;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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},
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};
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export interface LocalSettings {
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notification: {
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enabled: boolean;
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@ -72,7 +111,9 @@ export function getThreadModelName(threadId: string): string | undefined {
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if (!isBrowser()) {
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return undefined;
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}
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return localStorage.getItem(getThreadModelStorageKey(threadId)) ?? undefined;
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return (
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safeLocalStorage.getItem(getThreadModelStorageKey(threadId)) ?? undefined
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);
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}
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export function saveThreadModelName(
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@ -84,10 +125,10 @@ export function saveThreadModelName(
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}
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const key = getThreadModelStorageKey(threadId);
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if (!modelName) {
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localStorage.removeItem(key);
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safeLocalStorage.removeItem(key);
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return;
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}
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localStorage.setItem(key, modelName);
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safeLocalStorage.setItem(key, modelName);
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}
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export function applyThreadModelOverride(
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@ -110,7 +151,7 @@ export function getLocalSettings(): LocalSettings {
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if (!isBrowser()) {
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return DEFAULT_LOCAL_SETTINGS;
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}
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const json = localStorage.getItem(LOCAL_SETTINGS_KEY);
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const json = safeLocalStorage.getItem(LOCAL_SETTINGS_KEY);
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try {
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if (json) {
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const settings = JSON.parse(json) as Partial<LocalSettings>;
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@ -124,5 +165,5 @@ export function saveLocalSettings(settings: LocalSettings) {
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if (!isBrowser()) {
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return;
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}
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localStorage.setItem(LOCAL_SETTINGS_KEY, JSON.stringify(settings));
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safeLocalStorage.setItem(LOCAL_SETTINGS_KEY, JSON.stringify(settings));
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}
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@ -6,12 +6,14 @@ const ARTIFACT_PATH = "/artifact-fixtures/report.html";
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const MARKDOWN_ARTIFACT_PATH = "/artifact-fixtures/report.md";
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const JSON_ARTIFACT_PATH = "/artifact-fixtures/report.json";
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const PRESENTED_ARTIFACT_PATH = "/mnt/user-data/outputs/presented-report.md";
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const PDF_ARTIFACT_PATH = "/artifact-fixtures/report.pdf";
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const IN_PROGRESS_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003119";
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const COMPLETE_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003120";
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const MARKDOWN_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003121";
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const MARKDOWN_ANCHOR_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003123";
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const JSON_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003122";
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const PRESENTED_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003123";
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const PDF_THREAD_ID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000003124";
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function writeFileMessages({
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path = ARTIFACT_PATH,
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@ -109,6 +111,9 @@ test.describe("Artifact preview stability", () => {
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await expect(
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artifactsPanel.locator('iframe[title="Artifact preview"]'),
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).toBeVisible();
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await expect(
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artifactsPanel.locator('iframe[title="Artifact preview"]'),
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).toHaveAttribute("sandbox", "allow-scripts allow-forms");
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});
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test("renders preview iframe after the write artifact succeeds", async ({
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@ -320,4 +325,44 @@ test.describe("Artifact preview stability", () => {
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await presentedOption.click();
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await expect(artifactsPanel.getByText("Presented Report")).toBeVisible();
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});
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test("renders sandboxed iframe for a browser-previewable non-code file (urlOfArtifact path)", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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mockLangGraphAPI(page, {
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threads: [
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{
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thread_id: PDF_THREAD_ID,
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title: "PDF artifact preview",
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messages: writeFileMessages({
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path: PDF_ARTIFACT_PATH,
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content: "%PDF-fake-content",
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}),
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},
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],
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});
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await page.route(
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`**/api/threads/${PDF_THREAD_ID}/artifacts${PDF_ARTIFACT_PATH}`,
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(route) =>
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route.fulfill({
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status: 200,
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contentType: "application/pdf",
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body: "%PDF-1.4 fake pdf",
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}),
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);
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await page.goto(`/workspace/chats/${PDF_THREAD_ID}`);
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await expect(page.getByText(PDF_ARTIFACT_PATH)).toBeVisible({
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timeout: 15_000,
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});
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await page.getByText(PDF_ARTIFACT_PATH).click();
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const artifactsPanel = page.locator("#artifacts");
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await expect(artifactsPanel.getByText("report.pdf")).toBeVisible();
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const urlOfArtifactIframe = artifactsPanel.locator("iframe:not([title])");
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await expect(urlOfArtifactIframe).toBeVisible();
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await expect(urlOfArtifactIframe).toHaveAttribute("sandbox", "");
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});
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});
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from "@rstest/core";
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import { createElement } from "react";
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import { renderToStaticMarkup } from "react-dom/server";
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import { ArtifactLink } from "@/components/workspace/citations/artifact-link";
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// Render-level coverage for the .md artifact preview link renderer: a
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// prompt-injected javascript:/data: href must never reach a real anchor in
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// the main document (mirrors the MarkdownLink guard).
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describe("ArtifactLink rendering", () => {
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it("renders an unsafe href as a disabled span, never an anchor", () => {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(ArtifactLink, { href: "javascript:alert(1)" }, "click me"),
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);
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expect(html).not.toContain("<a");
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expect(html).toContain("<span");
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expect(html).toContain("click me");
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expect(html).not.toContain("href=");
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});
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it("renders a safe https href as a hardened anchor", () => {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(ArtifactLink, { href: "https://example.com/x" }, "site"),
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);
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expect(html).toContain("<a");
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expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com/x"');
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expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
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expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
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});
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it("renders scheme-less relative hrefs as navigable anchors", () => {
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const tests = ["report.md", "./report.md", "../assets/chart.png"];
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for (const href of tests) {
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const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
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createElement(ArtifactLink, { href }, "doc"),
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);
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expect(html).toContain("<a");
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expect(html).toContain(`href="${href}"`);
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}
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});
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});
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@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
|
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import { describe, expect, it } from "@rstest/core";
|
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import { createElement } from "react";
|
||||
import { renderToStaticMarkup } from "react-dom/server";
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
createMarkdownLinkComponent,
|
||||
isSafeHref,
|
||||
} from "@/components/workspace/messages/markdown-link";
|
||||
|
||||
describe("isSafeHref", () => {
|
||||
it("allows web URLs and same-origin paths", () => {
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("https://example.com/path")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("http://example.com/path")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("/workspace/chats/1")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("#section")).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("allows scheme-less relative references", () => {
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("report.md")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("./report.md")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("../assets/chart.png")).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("allows non-executing contact schemes", () => {
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("mailto:someone@example.com")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("tel:+15551234567")).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("rejects executable, local, and protocol-relative URLs", () => {
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("javascript:alert(1)")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("file:///etc/passwd")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("//example.com/path")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref("\\\\evil.com")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(isSafeHref(undefined)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Render-level coverage: these tests exercise the component itself, so
|
||||
// removing (or inverting) the isSafeHref guard inside MarkdownLink fails
|
||||
// them even though isSafeHref stays untouched.
|
||||
describe("MarkdownLink rendering", () => {
|
||||
const MarkdownLink = createMarkdownLinkComponent();
|
||||
|
||||
it("renders an unsafe href as a disabled span, never an anchor", () => {
|
||||
const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
|
||||
createElement(MarkdownLink, { href: "javascript:alert(1)" }, "click me"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(html).not.toContain("<a");
|
||||
expect(html).toContain("<span");
|
||||
expect(html).toContain("click me");
|
||||
expect(html).not.toContain("href=");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("blocks unsafe hrefs before the citation branch", () => {
|
||||
const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
|
||||
createElement(
|
||||
MarkdownLink,
|
||||
{ href: "javascript:alert(1)" },
|
||||
"citation:evil",
|
||||
),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(html).not.toContain("<a");
|
||||
expect(html).not.toContain("href=");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("renders a safe https href as a hardened anchor", () => {
|
||||
const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
|
||||
createElement(
|
||||
MarkdownLink,
|
||||
{ href: "https://example.com/report" },
|
||||
"report",
|
||||
),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(html).toContain("<a");
|
||||
expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com/report"');
|
||||
expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
||||
expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("renders a scheme-less relative href as a navigable anchor", () => {
|
||||
const tests = ["report.md", "./report.md", "../assets/chart.png"];
|
||||
for (const href of tests) {
|
||||
const html = renderToStaticMarkup(
|
||||
createElement(MarkdownLink, { href }, "doc"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(html).toContain("<a");
|
||||
expect(html).toContain(`href="${href}"`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
|
||||
import { expect, test } from "@rstest/core";
|
||||
import { afterEach, expect, rs, test } from "@rstest/core";
|
||||
|
||||
import { DEFAULT_LOCAL_SETTINGS } from "@/core/settings/local";
|
||||
import {
|
||||
DEFAULT_LOCAL_SETTINGS,
|
||||
getLocalSettings,
|
||||
getThreadModelName,
|
||||
saveLocalSettings,
|
||||
saveThreadModelName,
|
||||
} from "@/core/settings/local";
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
rs.unstubAllGlobals();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("defaults token usage to header total plus per-turn breakdown", () => {
|
||||
expect(DEFAULT_LOCAL_SETTINGS.tokenUsage).toEqual({
|
||||
@ -8,3 +18,16 @@ test("defaults token usage to header total plus per-turn breakdown", () => {
|
||||
inlineMode: "per_turn",
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("falls back when localStorage access is blocked", () => {
|
||||
rs.stubGlobal("window", {
|
||||
get localStorage() {
|
||||
throw new DOMException("Blocked", "SecurityError");
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
expect(getLocalSettings()).toEqual(DEFAULT_LOCAL_SETTINGS);
|
||||
expect(getThreadModelName("thread-1")).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
expect(() => saveLocalSettings(DEFAULT_LOCAL_SETTINGS)).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(() => saveThreadModelName("thread-1", "model-1")).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user