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* feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did
DeerFlow's extension system can contribute middleware, services and routes,
but an extension cannot answer basic questions about a run without reaching
into host internals. Several of the facts it would need are destroyed by the
operations that produce them:
* The middleware chain injects and rewrites a lot of context — date
reminders, recalled memory, compaction summaries, durable-context data,
image payloads, activated skill bodies. Downstream, none of it is
attributable: at the model-call boundary an injected HumanMessage is
indistinguishable from the user's own, and anything wanting to tell them
apart has to pattern-match prompt wording, which breaks on the next copy
edit.
* Two runs of "the same agent" are only comparable if the chain enforced the
same limits, prompts and thresholds. Recovering that from outside means
reading private attributes and guessing which of them change behaviour — a
guess that rots silently as middlewares gain fields.
* The lead-agent factory resolves a model after runtime overrides, renders a
prompt, filters tools through authorization and composes a stack, all
inside one synchronous call, and none of it survives: a middleware sees its
neighbours but not the prompt, the run worker sees a graph but not what
went into it.
* Summarization is destructive by design. N messages leave the context and
one summary enters it; afterwards only the summary exists, so "which
messages became this?" is not reconstructible.
This adds seven neutral facilities so those facts are recorded where they are
still true, and releases the contract package as 0.2.0.
Message provenance
Producers stamp `deerflow_content_kind` / `deerflow_producer_kind` onto the
messages they inject or rewrite. Stamping is unconditional — a fact whose
presence depends on whether an observer is installed is not a fact — and the
keys are server-owned, so provenance cannot be forged from a request.
Middleware self-description
Twelve middlewares declare their own behaviour-affecting parameters through
a duck-typed `release_policy_parameters()`. Long text is hashed rather than
embedded: a declaration is an identity, not a copy of the prompt.
Agent assembly descriptor
`assemble_lead_agent()` returns the graph plus a descriptor whose fingerprint
answers "did anything about this agent change between these two runs?".
`make_lead_agent()` keeps its graph-only signature — it is the LangGraph
Server ABI declared in langgraph.json. Tools and skills are sorted before
hashing because their assembly order is incidental; middlewares are not,
because stack order decides what wraps what. Host build identity is reported
but excluded from the fingerprint, so a redeploy does not invalidate every
agent's identity.
Context compaction observation
Summarization emits the content hashes of the messages it is about to remove
joined to the summary that replaced them. Content is the only identity
available at that seam: the summary does not become a message, and what later
projects it into a request renders it bounded and escaped rather than
verbatim.
Neutral policy, transform and MCP-source facts
Guardrail decisions are published to runtime context under a `__`-prefixed
key; result-rewriting middlewares append a declared, ordered transform trail;
MCP tools carry their credential-free logical origin.
Extension route identity
Contributed routes are session-authenticated and cannot opt out, but
"logged in" and "administrator" are different questions. Extensions get a
neutral projection of the caller rather than the host's auth context, and
`require_admin` fails closed when identity cannot be determined.
Extension-owned tables
An extension that persists data owns its own MetaData and migration chain, so
its tables are absent from Base.metadata and `alembic revision --autogenerate`
proposes dropping them. Extensions declare a table prefix, which is rejected
at registration if it would shadow a host table.
The contract package stays dependency-free and imports no host code; every new
Protocol method has a default so later additions remain additive. The loader's
pre-1.0 rule requires an exact major.minor match, so extensions written against
0.1 are now refused at startup with an actionable install hint rather than
loading into a host that implements a different surface.
uv.lock records the contract package's new version, so `uv sync --locked` still
resolves on a fresh checkout.
* fix(backend): sort gateway service imports
511 lines
20 KiB
Python
511 lines
20 KiB
Python
"""Projection of an assembled agent into a comparable descriptor.
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The factory knows things nothing downstream can recover: which model survived
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the runtime overrides, what the rendered prompt actually said, which tools
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authorization left in place, and the order the middleware stack ended up in.
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This module turns that transient knowledge into
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:class:`~deerflow_extension_api.assembly.AgentAssemblyDescriptor`.
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Two rules shape the projection:
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* **Declared beats probed.** A middleware that implements
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``release_policy_parameters()`` owns its own behaviour identity; probing
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private attributes is the fallback for the ones that do not, and is marked as
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such so a reader can tell a contract from a guess.
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* **Hash, do not copy.** Prompts, tool descriptions, and argument schemas are
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reduced to hashes. A descriptor is an identity, not a second copy of the
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agent's payload.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import os
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from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError, version
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from pathlib import Path
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from deerflow_extension_api import (
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AgentAssemblyDescriptor,
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MiddlewareDescriptor,
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ToolDescriptor,
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canonical_hash,
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collect_release_policies,
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)
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from deerflow.sandbox.env_policy import is_blocked_env_name
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from deerflow.tools.mcp_metadata import get_mcp_source, is_mcp_tool
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Fields on a model profile that are pure identity/presentation metadata: they
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# never reach the provider constructor (see ``create_chat_model``'s own
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# exclude set) and renaming/re-describing a model must not look like a
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# behaviour change. ``use`` is surfaced separately as ``provider``.
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_MODEL_METADATA_FIELDS = frozenset(
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{
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"name",
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"display_name",
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"description",
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"use",
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"context_window",
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"pricing",
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}
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)
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_MIDDLEWARE_PUBLIC_FIELDS = (
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"max_concurrent",
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"max_total",
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"warn_threshold",
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"hard_limit",
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"window_size",
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"max_tracked_threads",
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"tool_freq_warn",
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"tool_freq_hard_limit",
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"trigger",
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"keep",
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"trim_tokens_to_summarize",
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"fail_closed",
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"passport",
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"_tool_freq_overrides",
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"_top_k",
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"_deferred",
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"_catalog_hash",
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)
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_MIDDLEWARE_HASHED_TEXT_FIELDS = (
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"summary_prompt",
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"system_prompt",
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"tool_description",
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)
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_MODEL_IDENTITY_FIELDS = (
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"model",
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"model_name",
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"deployment_name",
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)
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_PROVIDER_PARAMETER_FIELDS = (
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"_allowed",
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"_denied",
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"_default_role",
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"_resource_type",
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"_action",
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)
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_DETECTOR_PARAMETER_FIELDS = (
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"_finish_reasons",
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"_stop_reasons",
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)
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def _plain_value(value: object) -> object | None:
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"""Reduce ``value`` to JSON-shaped data, or ``None`` when it cannot be.
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``None`` means "not describable", which is deliberately indistinguishable
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from a real ``None``: both are equally uninformative for identity, and
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inventing a marker would make two undescribable values look different.
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"""
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if value is None or isinstance(value, bool | int | float | str):
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return value
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if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
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children = [_plain_value(child) for child in value]
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if any(child is None and original is not None for child, original in zip(children, value, strict=True)):
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return None
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return sorted(children, key=str) if isinstance(value, (set, frozenset)) else children
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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result: dict[str, object] = {}
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for key, child in value.items():
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if not isinstance(key, str):
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continue
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plain = _plain_value(child)
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if plain is not None or child is None:
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result[key] = plain
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return result
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model_dump = getattr(value, "model_dump", None)
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if callable(model_dump):
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try:
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return _plain_value(model_dump(mode="python"))
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except Exception:
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return None
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return None
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def _stable_type_name(value: object) -> str:
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value_type = type(value)
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return f"{value_type.__module__}.{value_type.__qualname__}"
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def describe_model_identity(value: object) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Name a chat model without serialising it.
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Chat-model objects carry credentials and clients, so they are never plain
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data. What identifies them for comparison is the class plus the configured
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model name, unwrapped through any ``bound`` runnable wrapper the middleware
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stack layered on top.
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"""
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original = value
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if isinstance(value, str):
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return {"class": "builtins.str", "name": value}
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resolved = value
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seen: set[int] = set()
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for _ in range(8):
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if not hasattr(resolved, "bound") or id(resolved) in seen:
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break
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seen.add(id(resolved))
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bound = getattr(resolved, "bound")
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if bound is None or bound is resolved:
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break
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resolved = bound
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identity = {"class": _stable_type_name(resolved)}
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for candidate in (resolved, original):
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for field_name in _MODEL_IDENTITY_FIELDS:
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field_value = getattr(candidate, field_name, None)
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if isinstance(field_value, str) and field_value:
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identity["name"] = field_value
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break
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if "name" in identity:
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break
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return identity
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def _provider_identity(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
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identity: dict[str, object] = {
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"class": _stable_type_name(value),
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"name": str(getattr(value, "name", type(value).__name__)),
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}
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parameters: dict[str, object] = {}
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for field_name in _PROVIDER_PARAMETER_FIELDS:
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if not hasattr(value, field_name):
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continue
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raw_value = getattr(value, field_name)
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plain = _plain_value(raw_value)
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if plain is not None or raw_value is None:
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parameters[field_name.removeprefix("_")] = plain
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if parameters:
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identity["parameters"] = parameters
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nested = getattr(value, "_provider", None)
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if nested is not None and nested is not value:
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identity["provider"] = _provider_identity(nested)
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return identity
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def _tool_schema(tool: object) -> dict[str, object]:
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get_input_schema = getattr(tool, "get_input_schema", None)
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if callable(get_input_schema):
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try:
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schema_model = get_input_schema()
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schema = schema_model.model_json_schema()
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if isinstance(schema, dict):
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return schema
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except Exception:
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pass
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args_schema = getattr(tool, "args_schema", None)
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model_json_schema = getattr(args_schema, "model_json_schema", None)
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if callable(model_json_schema):
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try:
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schema = model_json_schema()
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if isinstance(schema, dict):
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return schema
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except Exception:
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pass
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return {}
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def _tool_source(tool: object) -> str:
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if is_mcp_tool(tool):
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source = get_mcp_source(tool)
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return f"mcp:{source['server_name']}" if source is not None else "mcp:unknown"
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metadata = getattr(tool, "metadata", None)
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if isinstance(metadata, dict):
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declared = metadata.get("deerflow_tool_source")
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if isinstance(declared, str) and declared:
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return declared
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callable_object = getattr(tool, "func", None) or getattr(tool, "coroutine", None)
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module = getattr(callable_object, "__module__", "") or ""
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if module.startswith("deerflow.tools.builtins") or module.startswith("deerflow.agents.memory"):
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return "builtin"
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if "skill" in module:
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return "skill"
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return "community" if module else "builtin"
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def describe_tool(tool: object) -> ToolDescriptor:
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"""Project one bound tool into its identity."""
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source = get_mcp_source(tool) if is_mcp_tool(tool) else None
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return ToolDescriptor(
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name=str(getattr(tool, "name", type(tool).__name__)),
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description_hash=canonical_hash(str(getattr(tool, "description", "") or "")),
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schema_hash=canonical_hash(_plain_value(_tool_schema(tool))),
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source=_tool_source(tool),
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mcp_server=source["server_name"] if source is not None else None,
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mcp_transport=source["transport"] if source is not None else None,
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)
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def _probe_middleware_parameters(middleware: object) -> dict[str, object]:
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"""Best-effort identity for a middleware that declares none of its own."""
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parameters: dict[str, object] = {}
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for field_name in _MIDDLEWARE_PUBLIC_FIELDS:
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if not hasattr(middleware, field_name):
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continue
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raw_value = getattr(middleware, field_name)
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plain = _plain_value(raw_value)
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if plain is not None or raw_value is None:
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parameters[field_name.removeprefix("_")] = plain
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for field_name in _MIDDLEWARE_HASHED_TEXT_FIELDS:
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raw_value = getattr(middleware, field_name, None)
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if isinstance(raw_value, str):
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parameters[f"{field_name}_hash"] = canonical_hash(raw_value)
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model = getattr(middleware, "model", None)
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if model is not None:
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parameters["model"] = describe_model_identity(model)
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provider = getattr(middleware, "provider", None)
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if provider is not None:
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parameters["provider"] = _provider_identity(provider)
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routing_index = getattr(middleware, "_routing_index", None)
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plain_routing_index = _plain_value(routing_index)
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if plain_routing_index is not None:
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parameters["routing_index_hash"] = canonical_hash(plain_routing_index)
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detectors = getattr(middleware, "_detectors", None)
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if isinstance(detectors, (list, tuple)):
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detector_descriptors: list[dict[str, object]] = []
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for detector in detectors:
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descriptor: dict[str, object] = {
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"class": _stable_type_name(detector),
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"name": str(getattr(detector, "name", type(detector).__name__)),
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}
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detector_parameters: dict[str, object] = {}
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for field_name in _DETECTOR_PARAMETER_FIELDS:
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if not hasattr(detector, field_name):
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continue
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raw_value = getattr(detector, field_name)
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plain = _plain_value(raw_value)
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if plain is not None or raw_value is None:
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detector_parameters[field_name.removeprefix("_")] = plain
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if detector_parameters:
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descriptor["parameters"] = detector_parameters
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detector_descriptors.append(descriptor)
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parameters["detectors"] = detector_descriptors
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config = getattr(middleware, "_config", None)
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plain_config = _plain_value(config)
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if isinstance(plain_config, dict):
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parameters["config"] = plain_config
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return parameters
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def _unwrap_middleware(middleware: object) -> tuple[object, str | None]:
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"""Return the middleware that owns the behaviour, plus its extension.
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Extension contributions reach the stack inside an isolation wrapper whose
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dynamically generated subclass is named after the wrapper, not the
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contribution — so every contributed middleware in the process shares one
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class name and one (empty) probe result. Describing the wrapper would
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collapse them all into a single indistinguishable descriptor and hide any
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policy change inside them.
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Duck-typed on ``inner``/``source`` rather than importing the wrapper type:
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``deerflow.extensions`` sits below this layer, so importing it here would
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point the dependency backwards, and any future wrapper of the same shape
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is handled for free.
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"""
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described = middleware
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extension: str | None = None
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for _ in range(4):
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inner = getattr(described, "inner", None)
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if inner is None or inner is described:
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break
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source = getattr(described, "source", None)
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if not isinstance(source, str) or not source:
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source = getattr(described, "name", None)
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if isinstance(source, str) and source and extension is None:
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extension = source
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described = inner
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return described, extension
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def describe_middleware(middleware: object) -> MiddlewareDescriptor:
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"""Project one middleware, preferring its own declaration over probing."""
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described, extension = _unwrap_middleware(middleware)
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name = type(described).__name__
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declared = collect_release_policies([described])
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if name in declared:
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parameters = _plain_value(declared[name])
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if not isinstance(parameters, dict):
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logger.warning("%s declared a release policy that is not plain data; recording it as unserialisable", name)
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parameters = {"error": "UnserialisableDeclaration"}
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else:
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parameters = {"probed": True, **_probe_middleware_parameters(described)}
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return MiddlewareDescriptor(
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name=name,
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module=type(described).__module__,
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policy_parameters=parameters,
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extension=extension,
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)
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def _build_identity() -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Which build produced this assembly, when the deployment says so.
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Reported on its own descriptor field rather than inside
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``effective_policies`` because the latter is hashed into the fingerprint:
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a redeploy that changes nothing about an agent must not change that
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agent's fingerprint.
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"""
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try:
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package_version = version("deerflow-harness")
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except PackageNotFoundError:
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package_version = "unknown"
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return {
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"package_version": package_version,
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"image_digest": os.environ.get("DEER_FLOW_IMAGE_DIGEST", "unknown"),
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"git_commit": os.environ.get("DEER_FLOW_GIT_COMMIT", "unknown"),
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}
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def _effective_model_fields(model_config: object) -> dict[str, object]:
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"""All fields the model profile actually carries, declared or extra.
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``ModelConfig`` is ``extra="allow"``, so a provider kwarg a user sets
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(``temperature``, ``max_tokens``, anything else) lives only as an extra
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field — a fixed allowlist would never see it. ``model_dump`` is the
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profile's own account of its fields, extras included, so it is preferred
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over probing named attributes. Falls back to plain instance attributes
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for a non-pydantic profile (e.g. the ``SimpleNamespace`` a subagent
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builds when its model name has no entry in the config table).
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"""
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model_dump = getattr(model_config, "model_dump", None)
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if callable(model_dump):
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try:
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dumped = model_dump(mode="python")
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except Exception:
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dumped = None
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if isinstance(dumped, dict):
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return dumped
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namespace = getattr(model_config, "__dict__", None)
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return dict(namespace) if isinstance(namespace, dict) else {}
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def _model_parameters(model_config: object, model_overrides: dict[str, object] | None = None) -> dict[str, object]:
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"""The behaviour-affecting half of a model profile, as actually constructed.
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Built from the profile's own effective fields plus any per-caller
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overrides actually applied on top (e.g. a custom agent's ``model_settings``
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sampling overrides, or a request's runtime overrides) — mirroring what
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``create_chat_model`` layers onto the constructor — rather than a fixed
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allowlist, so a changed ``temperature``/``max_tokens``/arbitrary provider
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kwarg is always visible here.
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Credential-shaped field names (``api_key`` and anything else
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``is_blocked_env_name`` flags) are never projected, and values that
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cannot be reduced to plain JSON-shaped data are silently dropped rather
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than raising (see ``_plain_value``).
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``thinking_enabled`` and ``reasoning_effort`` are descriptor fields in their
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own right, so they are deliberately not duplicated here.
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"""
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use = getattr(model_config, "use", None)
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result: dict[str, object] = {"provider": str(use) if use else None}
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effective = _effective_model_fields(model_config)
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if model_overrides:
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effective = {**effective, **{key: value for key, value in model_overrides.items() if value is not None}}
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for field_name, value in effective.items():
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if not isinstance(field_name, str) or field_name in _MODEL_METADATA_FIELDS:
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continue
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if is_blocked_env_name(field_name):
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continue
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plain = _plain_value(value)
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if plain is not None or value is None:
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result[field_name] = plain
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return result
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def _skill_content_hash(skill: object) -> str | None:
|
|
"""Digest of a skill's ``SKILL.md`` body.
|
|
|
|
``SkillActivationMiddleware`` injects this body as current-turn context
|
|
(see ``skill_activation_middleware._read_skill_content``), so it is what
|
|
actually drives the agent's behaviour when the skill is used — not just
|
|
the name/description/allowed-tools already projected above. ``Skill``
|
|
does not cache its content as a field (the middleware re-reads it from
|
|
disk at activation time), so this does the same rather than inventing a
|
|
cached-content field the rest of the system does not have. A skill whose
|
|
file has gone missing or become unreadable is recorded as undescribable
|
|
(``None``) rather than raising — assembly must not fail because a skill
|
|
file disappeared out from under it.
|
|
"""
|
|
skill_file = getattr(skill, "skill_file", None)
|
|
if not isinstance(skill_file, Path):
|
|
return None
|
|
try:
|
|
content = skill_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
return None
|
|
return canonical_hash(content)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def build_assembly_descriptor(
|
|
*,
|
|
namespace: str,
|
|
agent_name: str,
|
|
requested_model: str | None,
|
|
effective_model: str,
|
|
model_config: object,
|
|
model_overrides: dict[str, object] | None = None,
|
|
thinking_enabled: bool,
|
|
reasoning_effort: object,
|
|
rendered_base_prompt: str,
|
|
prompt_template_id: str = "deerflow-lead-agent-v1",
|
|
tools: list[object],
|
|
middlewares: list[object],
|
|
deferred_names: frozenset[str],
|
|
enabled_skills: list[object],
|
|
effective_policies: dict[str, object],
|
|
) -> AgentAssemblyDescriptor:
|
|
"""Describe one finished assembly.
|
|
|
|
``tools`` is the list bound to the graph; middleware-owned tools are folded
|
|
in because the model sees them exactly the same way. The skill catalog is
|
|
hashed rather than listed field-by-field so editing a skill's body changes
|
|
the fingerprint while the descriptor stays small.
|
|
"""
|
|
skill_catalog = [
|
|
{
|
|
"name": str(getattr(skill, "name", "")),
|
|
"description": str(getattr(skill, "description", "")),
|
|
"allowed_tools": sorted(str(item) for item in (getattr(skill, "allowed_tools", None) or ())),
|
|
"content_hash": _skill_content_hash(skill),
|
|
"secrets_autonomous": bool(getattr(skill, "secrets_autonomous", True)),
|
|
"required_secrets": sorted(f"{getattr(requirement, 'name', '')}:{bool(getattr(requirement, 'optional', False))}" for requirement in (getattr(skill, "required_secrets", None) or ())),
|
|
}
|
|
for skill in enabled_skills
|
|
]
|
|
assembled_tools = list(tools)
|
|
for middleware in middlewares:
|
|
middleware_tools = getattr(middleware, "tools", None)
|
|
if isinstance(middleware_tools, (list, tuple)):
|
|
assembled_tools.extend(middleware_tools)
|
|
|
|
resolved_policies = dict(effective_policies)
|
|
resolved_policies["prompt_template_id"] = prompt_template_id
|
|
resolved_policies["skill_catalog_hash"] = canonical_hash(sorted(skill_catalog, key=lambda item: item["name"]))
|
|
|
|
return AgentAssemblyDescriptor(
|
|
namespace=namespace,
|
|
agent_name=agent_name,
|
|
requested_model=requested_model,
|
|
effective_model=effective_model,
|
|
model_parameters=_model_parameters(model_config, model_overrides),
|
|
thinking_enabled=thinking_enabled,
|
|
reasoning_effort=_plain_value(reasoning_effort),
|
|
base_prompt_hash=canonical_hash(rendered_base_prompt),
|
|
tools=tuple(describe_tool(tool) for tool in assembled_tools),
|
|
middlewares=tuple(describe_middleware(middleware) for middleware in middlewares),
|
|
deferred_tool_names=tuple(sorted(str(name) for name in deferred_names)),
|
|
enabled_skills=tuple(entry["name"] for entry in skill_catalog),
|
|
effective_policies=resolved_policies,
|
|
build=_build_identity(),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
__all__ = [
|
|
"build_assembly_descriptor",
|
|
"describe_middleware",
|
|
"describe_model_identity",
|
|
"describe_tool",
|
|
]
|