* fix(frontend): default to Webpack over Turbopack in dev to avoid PostCSS worker leak on macOS
On macOS arm64, Turbopack + Next.js 16.2.11 + Tailwind CSS v4 causes an
unbounded spawn of PostCSS evaluator processes that consume high CPU and
memory and never return a response. Webpack is unaffected.
Change the no-override default in getDevBundler() from platform-dependent
Turbopack (all non-Windows) to Webpack. DEER_FLOW_DEV_BUNDLER=turbo
continues to work as an explicit opt-in for local diagnosis.
Fixes#5132
* docs(frontend): address webpack default review feedback
* docs(frontend): clarify webpack default rationale
* fix(test): exclude blocking I/O suite from make test
Keep make test-blocking-io as the dedicated suite owner.
Add regression coverage for the Makefile contract.
Refs #5088
* test: pin blocking I/O workflow ownership
Document both targets required for full offline validation.
Keep the dedicated workflow and Makefile target under contract coverage.
Refs #5088
* docs(test): align blocking-I/O test guidance
* feat(scripts): support skipping frontend build on make start
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(scripts): validate skip-frontend-build before stop_all and format test
---------
Co-authored-by: PoetryLin <PoetryLin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* Stabilize Windows frontend development startup
Next.js Turbopack can infer a user-level workspace root and hit an internal Rust task panic on Windows. Keep the frontend root explicit and select Webpack on Windows while preserving Turbopack elsewhere.
Constraint: The existing non-Windows development workflow should keep Turbopack.
Rejected: Disable Turbopack on every platform | unnecessary performance regression.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Revisit the Windows Webpack fallback after the upstream Turbopack panic is resolved.
Tested: Prettier, ESLint, TypeScript, 139 frontend test files with 1060 tests, and Windows pnpm dev smoke test on port 3010.
Not-tested: Production build and browser E2E suite.
Related: #4957
* Make the frontend bundler fallback diagnosable
Keep the Windows Webpack fallback while allowing local diagnosis to select either supported Next.js bundler. Resolve the Turbopack root through the Node 20-compatible URL API so the explicit workspace boundary remains effective across the declared Next.js engine range.
Constraint: Windows defaults to Webpack because of the observed Turbopack panic, while non-Windows defaults to Turbopack.
Rejected: Accept arbitrary bundler values | Next.js only supports the two explicit flags and invalid values should fail early.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Revisit the default Windows fallback when the upstream TaskGuard issue is resolved; the override is intentionally retained for diagnosis.
Tested: Frontend format, ESLint, TypeScript, 139-file/1062-test Rstest suite, target launcher tests, and next.config.js absolute-root load check.
Not-tested: Production build and browser E2E suite.
Adds scheduler.recursion_limit to config.yaml (default 1000, clamped by
max_recursion_limit) so scheduled background runs can use a different
recursion limit than the web UI. The value is read at dispatch time, so
a YAML edit applies to the next scheduled run without a Gateway restart.
Also logs a warning when the resolver falls back to the default or
clamps the configured value.
* feat(extensions): add gateway services and routers
* feat(extensions): add standalone reference extension
* fix(extensions): harden contributed gateway routes
* docs(extensions): document gateway contribution points
* feat(extensions): add operator CLI for packaged extension management
Add `deerflow extensions install/list/enable/disable/remove` plus the root
`make extension-*` wrappers, backed by an `ExtensionManager` that owns one
transaction over backend/pyproject.toml, backend/uv.lock, the managed source
snapshot, the uv environment, and the `plugins:` block in config.yaml.
Install accepts a package requirement, a public HTTPS Git URL, or a local
directory. Local directories are copied to backend/extensions/sources/ as
deployable snapshots rather than editable installs, and the root .dockerignore
re-includes that tree so snapshots reach the backend builder. Remote sources are
HTTPS-only; SSH Git, file:// and local wheels are rejected because the stock
Docker builder cannot reproduce them.
Because environment configuration can still resolve a plain package name to a
local wheel (a UV_FIND_LINKS wheelhouse, say), every uv add/remove is followed
by an audit of the new lock: any local reference the stock image build cannot
reproduce rolls back the whole transaction. A config carrying duplicate
top-level `plugins:` keys is rejected outright rather than managed against one
block while the Gateway reads another.
Dependency synchronization now has one lock authority. The `extensions`
dependency group joins [tool.uv].default-groups, every startup path syncs the
same lock with --locked and launches with --no-sync, and the Docker images move
to uv 0.11.1 for the --no-workspace boundary the manager needs.
Loader gains `enabled`, `name` and `package` fields so a disabled extension is
skipped before resolution and import.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
* fix(extensions): stop the managed plugins rewrite from destroying config
Two data-safety defects in the managed `plugins:` block writer.
The "next top-level key" boundary was a regex matching only
`[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*` or a quoted key. `AppConfig` is `extra="allow"`, so a
config may legally carry any top-level key, and a key the pattern cannot
recognize did not fail loudly — it read as "no next section", and the rewrite
replaced that neighbour and its entire subtree with the managed block. `my.key`,
`2fa`, `$schema`, `my key` and non-ASCII keys were all silently deleted by a
plain `extension-enable`/`disable`. Both boundaries now come from the YAML
parser's node marks, so key shape is irrelevant.
The file-final branch never consulted the trailing-comment scan the has-next-key
branch used, so any comment below the block was dropped. Since the manager
appends `plugins:` at end of file, that is the steady-state shape for most
installs: an operator note below the block was destroyed on the next toggle.
Separately, every managed install wrote `required: true` while the loader
defaults to false. That turned any later load failure — broken wheel, missing
native library, deleted snapshot — into a Gateway startup abort recoverable only
with shell access. New records are now written `required: false`, with an
explicit `install --required` opt-in; adopting an existing hand-written record
still preserves the operator's own choice.
* fix(extensions): harden the manager transaction and correct its docs
Follow-up hardening on the extension package manager.
Security posture, which the docs already claimed:
- Scrub `UV_PYTHON`, `UV_INSECURE_HOST`, `UV_CONSTRAINT` and
`UV_NO_BUILD_ISOLATION` from the controlled uv environment. `UV_PYTHON` swaps
the interpreter that the entry-point probe then imports and calls, and every
later `uv run --no-sync` startup uses; `UV_INSECURE_HOST` removes the TLS
validation the HTTPS-only source rule depends on. Neither is an index, proxy,
cache or credential-provider setting, so neither was covered by the carve-out.
- Recognize run-together and all-caps secret query parameters (`accesstoken`,
`ACCESSTOKEN`, `key`, `pw`, `sas`, `code`). The camel-case splitter only fires
on case transitions, so only the separated spellings were caught. Short
generic words stay boundary-anchored, so `?keyword=` remains installable.
- Validate the config before running any uv command. `uv add`/`uv sync` execute
the package's build backend, so a config the manager could never write to must
fail before that code runs rather than afterwards through rollback.
Transaction integrity:
- Run the second dependency-file restore from a `finally`. The recovery sync
runs without `--locked` when the checkout had no lock, so uv writes one while
resolving; if that sync then failed, the restore was skipped and the operator
kept a lock file they never had. A failing recovery sync now also reports the
original failure instead of replacing it.
- Skip the recovery sync on cancellation. Answering Ctrl-C with a full
dependency resolve invites a second interrupt that escapes the handler and
strands the checkout mid-transaction; the declarations are already restored
and the next locked startup sync reconciles the environment.
- Retry a non-blocking lock on Windows instead of using `msvcrt.LK_LOCK`, which
gives up after ~10s — far shorter than a real `uv add` plus `uv sync`, so
contention surfaced as `Permission denied` rather than serializing.
- Locate the entry-point probe's JSON payload instead of parsing stdout's first
line, so a `sitecustomize`/`.pth` banner cannot roll back a good install.
- Warn when the lock records a loopback source. `127.0.0.1` inside the image
builder is a different machine, but unlike an environment-driven wheelhouse
resolution this is a source the operator typed deliberately, so it is reported
rather than rolled back. Private-network indexes are untouched: a builder on
that network can reach them.
Docs: the blanket claim that failed operations restore the config file was
wrong — the conflict branches deliberately preserve a concurrent external edit
and leave `remove` deactivated. Document that, the `required: false` default,
the config preflight, the interrupt behaviour, and where the plugins-block
boundaries come from.
* test(gateway): pin the request-path projection agreement
`get_request_route_path()` imports the private
`starlette._utils.get_route_path` so the auth and CSRF predicates classify
the exact string Starlette's router matches on. Its requirement is not
"strip root_path correctly" but "return what the dispatcher is matching",
so delegating to the router's own implementation keeps the two in lockstep
by construction. Keep the private import rather than vendoring a copy: an
import that disappears fails loudly at startup, while a stale copy diverges
silently at a security boundary.
Cover the property directly instead of the mechanism, so the tests survive
a future reimplementation:
- projection edge cases, including the segment-boundary guard that keeps
root_path="/api" from slicing "/apifoo/models" into a string the router
would never match
- agreement with the router under nested mounts
- the two bypasses these predicates exist to prevent: a protected route
mounted under the "/health" public prefix must still 401, and a POST
mounted under "/api/webhooks" must still require a CSRF token
Both are verified to fail when the projection is reverted to
`request.url.path` (9/13 red) and when a plausible vendored copy omits the
boundary guard (the 2 boundary cases red).
Declare starlette as a bounded direct dependency so a bump — which is
security-relevant here — shows up in review rather than arriving silently
through FastAPI.
* ci: pin uv to the version production ships
ExtensionManager is not a consumer of uv the build tool -- it is a program
whose whole job is driving `uv` as a subprocess, depending on its CLI
behavior (`--no-workspace`, `--no-sync`, what `uv add` writes into
`[dependency-groups] extensions`) and on the `uv.lock` serialization format.
uv is closer to a runtime dependency with a contract than to incidental
tooling.
backend/Dockerfile pins that binary to 0.11.1, but all eight
astral-sh/setup-uv steps installed whatever was latest at run time, so CI
exercised the manager against a uv that is not the uv production runs. The
sharpest failure that allows: a newer uv bumps uv.lock's `revision`, CI
stays green because the same uv reads back what it wrote, and the pinned uv
in the production image cannot read the committed lock. `uv lock --check`
is version-sensitive for the same reason -- it verifies the lock is what
*this* uv would produce, and two versions can emit equivalent but
non-identical output.
Pin every step to 0.11.1 and lift the one lingering setup-uv@v3 to v7 so
the steps share input and caching behavior.
Pinning alone drifts apart again on the next bump, so add a constraint test
in the style of test_compose_default_bind_host.py: the Dockerfile's
UV_IMAGE tag is the single source of truth, and both compose defaults plus
every setup-uv step must match it. Verified to fail when a pin drifts, when
a step omits `version`, and -- the real scenario -- when the Dockerfile is
bumped alone, which lights up the workflows and both compose files at once.
* fix(gateway): state the extension route auth limit and abort a failed dev sync
Two scoped review follow-ups.
README: contributed routers cannot enter the host's reserved public prefixes,
which makes every extension endpoint session-authenticated -- there is no way
to expose an unauthenticated route. The rejection rule was documented but its
consequence was not, so inbound provider webhooks and public status endpoints
read as merely undocumented rather than out of scope for this release.
docker/dev-entrypoint.sh: the self-heal retry reuses `--locked`, so it repairs
a corrupt .venv but never a lock that disagrees with pyproject.toml. `set -e`
already stopped the script there -- uvicorn was not being started against a
stale environment -- but it exited on a bare uv exit code with no indication of
what to do. Abort explicitly with the cause and the fix.
Tests slice the sync block out of the real script and run it against a stub uv,
so they exercise the shipped code rather than a copy of it (/app/backend only
exists inside the container). They cover the success path, the retry that
recovers, the abort, and the guidance. Verified against the pre-fix script:
only the guidance case goes red, confirming the abort itself was already
correct.
* fix(extensions): point Git SSH shorthand at the HTTPS correction
Git's SCP-like shorthand carries no URL scheme, so `git+git@host:org/repo.git`
reached the scheme rules looking like a bare path and was rejected with
"local path references are not deployable; pass a local directory so DeerFlow
can snapshot it". The operator asked for a remote source, so that guidance
points at the wrong fix. Detect the shorthand ahead of the scheme rules and
report the public-HTTPS correction instead.
The bare `git@host:org/repo.git` spelling took a different wrong turn: packaging
parses it as a direct reference named `git`, leaving `host:org/repo.git`, whose
`host` reads as a URL scheme and produced the generic HTTPS message. Both
spellings now share one message, as does the PEP 508 named form.
* docs: keep the root extension summary within its new budget
#4799 split the depth out of the module guides and added a size gate; the root
file's job is now orientation, and this branch had pushed it 192 bytes past the
soft limit. The manager transaction, source rules, and lock discipline are
already stated in full in the extensions guide, so the root keeps the one-line
orientation and points there instead of restating them.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
* feat(extensions): add middleware plugin foundation
* fix(extensions): stop config resolution from masking extension loading
`create_app()` resolved the configured plugin list inside the fail-open
guard around `load_extensions()`. CI has no `config.yaml` (gitignored and
never generated by the workflow), so `get_app_config()` raised
`FileNotFoundError` there and was swallowed as an extension failure --
`load_extensions()` never ran at all, and the four `create_app()` tests in
`test_extension_app_loading.py` passed locally but failed on every runner.
Resolve the plugin list before the guard. Only an absent `config.yaml` is
tolerated, mirroring `_resolve_trace_enabled_for_app_construction()`:
`create_app()` runs at import time, and lifespan still performs strict
config loading before serving. A `config.yaml` that exists but fails to
parse or validate now propagates instead of being reported as an extension
failure -- reporting it as the latter silently dropped a `required: true`
extension rather than failing the boot.
Make the tests config-independent with an autouse `stub_app_config`
fixture, following the existing pattern in `test_gateway_lifespan_shutdown.py`,
and cover both new branches of the config-resolution boundary.
* fix(extensions): bind the run's extension snapshot through subagent delegation
The lead-agent path resolves one immutable loaded-extension snapshot per run
and binds it through task-store allocation and graph construction, but the
subagent path re-read the process-wide singleton at execution time. In
production both are the same object, yet a `set_loaded_extensions()` between
the lead run's start and a subagent's execution (test teardown, a future
hot-reload path) would let one run mix two extension generations — exactly what
the documented invariant exists to prevent.
The graph-build binding is a ContextVar scoped to synchronous construction, so
it has already exited by the time a tool delegates; the snapshot has to travel
through runtime context instead. The run worker publishes it under the
host-internal `EXTENSION_SNAPSHOT_CONTEXT_KEY` (written after the caller merge,
popped when the run has none, so a caller-supplied value is never
authoritative), `task_tool` reads it back through the type-checking
`resolve_run_extensions()`, and `SubagentExecutor` binds it at construction.
Callers outside the Gateway run path — embedded `DeerFlowClient`, standalone
LangGraph Server — install no snapshot and keep the existing
`get_loaded_extensions()` fallback.
* refactor(extensions): defer the ordering table by call, not by a lying tuple
`CORE_ORDERING_CONSTRAINTS` was a `tuple` subclass that overrode only
`__iter__` and resolved into a class-level `_resolved` side channel. A tuple
cannot populate its own storage after construction, so the instance stayed the
empty tuple it was built as: `len()` was 0, `bool()` was False, `in` was always
False, indexing raised, slicing and `reversed()` came back empty, and it
compared unequal to the plain tuples tests substitute for it — all while
iteration yielded the real constraints. Only `assert_ordering` consumed it, and
only by iterating, so the split went unnoticed.
The sibling `_AnchorTable(dict)` uses the same idea soundly because dict is
mutable: `self.update()` fills the real storage, making every inherited
operation correct. That trick does not survive the port to an immutable type.
Replace it with `core_ordering_constraints()`, matching how `stack.py` defers
the same kind of table via `_anchors()`. The deferral is kept — it is about
dependency direction, not just cycles: `extensions/` is the layer the
middleware layer calls into, so a module-scope `agents.middlewares` import here
points the dependency backwards and closes a cycle as soon as any middleware
imports something under `extensions/` at module level. Resolution stays at
`assert_ordering` time, which already runs inside the middleware builder.
Tests pin both halves: the returned value is a plain tuple whose len/bool/
membership/indexing/reversal/equality agree with iteration, and a subprocess
probe asserts importing `extensions.ordering` does not load the middleware
layer while calling the function does.
README documents DeerFlow as deployed by default "in a local trusted
environment (accessible only via the 127.0.0.1 loopback interface)", but both
compose files published nginx as `"${PORT:-2026}:2026"`, which Docker binds to
0.0.0.0 and [::]. The shipped artifact did not match its own documented
default, so running it on a LAN or cloud host produced a wider surface than
the docs implied without the operator changing anything -- and the agent can
execute commands.
Publish as `"${BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${PORT:-2026}:2026"` in both compose
files, so the default matches the documented model while operators who front
the stack with their own TLS/auth can still widen it via BIND_HOST. The
Gateway keeps binding 0.0.0.0:8001 inside the container (nginx reaches it over
the compose network) and its port stays unpublished, so the published nginx
port is the entire external surface.
BREAKING CHANGE: a deployment that relied on the previous 0.0.0.0 default
becomes unreachable from other hosts after this upgrade. Set BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0
in .env to restore it, after putting authentication in front and completing
first-run setup.
Also:
- .env.example documents BIND_HOST and PORT with the reasoning.
- deploy.sh reports the address the stack actually bound and, when it is not
loopback, tells the operator to complete first-run setup immediately. It
reads BIND_HOST/PORT from .env via a new read_dotenv_value helper following
compose precedence; the shell does not source .env, so reading the
environment alone would have reported "loopback only" for a stack .env had
exposed. The pre-existing ${PORT} summary line had the same defect and is
fixed with it.
- test_compose_default_bind_host.py pins the loopback default, that BIND_HOST
stays overridable, and that no service in either compose file publishes a
port without an explicit bind address, so a later addition cannot drift back
to 0.0.0.0 unnoticed.
* feat: add lark cli integration
* fix: polish lark integration actions
* feat: support lark incremental permissions
* fix: detect lark authorization completion
* fix: harden lark integration install
* feat: expand lark auth scopes and reuse host auth in sandbox
Default lark auth to least-privilege (recommend=false, base sign-in only)
and expose the full set of lark-cli --domain business domains as native
--domain grants instead of a 4-domain read-only mapping. Resolve the
skill pack from the latest larksuite/cli GitHub release at install time
with content-hash integrity, and surface version/runtime drift in status.
Share the per-user lark-cli config/data profile between the Gateway
Settings auth flow and agent conversations by mounting the integration
dirs into the AIO sandbox and injecting the matching env for lark-cli
commands, with an allowlisted extra_mounts path in the provisioner/K8s
backend and traversal guards on integration paths.
* style: fix lint issues from ruff and prettier
Sort imports in the provisioner PVC test and re-wrap two long i18n
description strings to satisfy backend ruff and frontend prettier CI.
* fix(lark): address managed integration review feedback
* fix(frontend): stabilize integrations settings e2e
* test(sandbox): isolate remote backend legacy visibility check
* test: fix backend unit failures after merge
* Harden Lark integration review fixes
* Format Lark integration E2E test
* fix(lark): harden sandbox credential exposure and status disclosure
Address willem_bd's security review on PR #3971:
- Mount the per-user lark-cli config dir (long-lived appSecret) read-only
into the AIO sandbox; only the refreshable-token data dir stays writable.
- Redact host filesystem paths (install_path, cli.path) from
GET /lark/status and the config/auth complete responses for non-admin
callers, fail-closed on any auth error.
- Document the npm postinstall trade-off (--ignore-scripts is not viable
because @larksuite/cli fetches its platform binary in postinstall).
- Document the sandbox credential trust boundary in AGENTS.md and README,
pointing at the sidecar-broker follow-up (#4338).
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat(helm): add production-ready Helm chart for Kubernetes deployment
Adds deploy/helm/deer-flow, a native-Kubernetes translation of the
production docker-compose stack, plus CI to publish its images and chart.
* ci(release): gate releases on version-source consistency
Add a reusable verify-versions workflow invoked by both chart.yaml and
container.yaml on v* tags. It runs scripts/verify_versions.sh against the
tag and fails the release — skipping all image and chart publishing — when
Chart.yaml (version + appVersion), backend/pyproject.toml, or
frontend/package.json don't all match the tag.
Add scripts/verify_versions.sh (the check, also runnable locally) and
scripts/bump_version.sh (bumps all four sources in lockstep, then
self-verifies). Document the release flow in RELEASING.md and link it from
AGENTS.md.
* fix(deploy): address Helm chart review feedback (#3987)
Three review items from willem-bd:
1. nginx IPv6 listen strip never matched. The sed pattern required a `;`
immediately after `2026`, but the rendered config emits
`listen [::]:2026 default_server;` (space + `default_server` before the
`;`), so the line was never deleted and nginx crash-looped on pods
without IPv6 (`socket() :::2026 failed (97: Address family not
supported)`). Drop the trailing `;` from the pattern so it matches.
Same latent bug fixed in docker-compose-dev.yaml.
2. Passwords were spliced into DSNs verbatim, so a password containing
URL-special chars (@ : / # ? % [ ] space) produced a malformed DSN and
a confusing parse error. Add a `deer-flow.urlEscape` helper
(replace-based: Sprig lacks urlqueryescape, and regexReplaceAllLiteral
treats the replacement as a regex template so `[`/`]`/`?` break it) and
apply it to the password in the postgres and redis DSNs. The raw
`postgres-password` / `redis-password` keys stay unencoded - they back
POSTGRES_PASSWORD / REDIS_PASSWORD, not a URL segment.
3. NODE_HOST defaulted to "gateway", which can never route: the gateway
Service is ClusterIP:8001 and knows nothing of a sandbox NodePort, so a
user who skips the caveat gets unreachable sandboxes with no error at
install time. Default NODE_HOST to the provisioner pod's node IP via
the downward API (status.hostIP) - a NodePort is exposed on every node,
so <node-IP>:<NodePort> routes from the gateway on most clusters.
`provisioner.nodeHost` remains an override for CNIs/policies that block
pod->node-IP traffic. Updated NOTES.txt, values.yaml, and the chart
README. (#3929 remains the long-term fix - ClusterIP + cluster-DNS URL
removes NODE_HOST and the NodePort exposure entirely.)
Validated with helm lint, helm template (incl. a special-char password
rendering the encoded DSNs), and a sed pattern-match check.
* fix(deploy): address round-2 Helm chart review feedback (#3987)
Three "Medium" items from willem-bd:
1. No helm lint / helm template gate before publish. A template regression
ships as an immutable OCI artifact (GHCR won't overwrite --version), so
gate packaging on `helm lint` + `helm template --include-crds` in
chart.yaml before `helm package`. (ct lint / helm-unittest deferred.)
2. Action pinning inconsistent + PR body overstates it. SHA-pin
actions/checkout (v6.0.3, df4cb1c0) and actions/attest-build-provenance
(v2.4.0, e8998f94) across the publishing workflows (chart.yaml,
container.yaml, verify-versions.yml), matching the existing docker/*
SHA-pin pattern. Resolves the checkout @v4/@v6 mismatch and makes the
"SHA-pinned actions" claim accurate. Other pre-existing workflows left
untouched (out of scope for this PR).
3. Provisioner RBAC broader than needed. Dropped the unused update/patch
verbs and the pods/exec + events rules from the provisioner Role -
audited against docker/provisioner/app.py, which only calls
get/create/delete on pods and get/list/create/delete on services. Fixed
NOTES.txt to accurately describe the grant instead of understating it as
"create Pods and Services". The remaining scope concern - verbs apply to
all Pods in the namespace, not just sandbox Pods - is still deferred
(RBAC can't scope by label; needs a dedicated namespace or admission
control), now noted in NOTES.txt and README.
Validated with helm lint + helm template (narrowed Role renders with
exactly get/list/watch/create/delete).
* feat(helm): enable sandbox+web tools out of the box
The chart's default config loaded zero agent tools (config.tools empty ->
"Total tools loaded: 0"), so a fresh install gave an agent that could do
nothing useful. Add tool_groups + tools to the default config block:
- web: web_search (ddg), web_fetch (jina), image_search - no API key
- file:read: ls, read_file, glob, grep
- file:write: write_file, str_replace
- bash
The file/bash tools run inside the AIO sandbox the chart already
configures; the web tools need outbound internet from the gateway pod
(swap backends or drop entries for air-gapped clusters - see
config.example.yaml).
Also bump config_version 15 -> 19 to match config.example.yaml (the chart
had drifted behind). NOTES.txt and the README example updated to match.
* ci(helm): add chart validation + config_version drift check on PR
Extend the chart workflow with a PR-triggered validate-chart job that runs
helm lint, helm template --include-crds, and a config_version drift check:
it parses config_version from both config.example.yaml and the chart's
values.yaml and fails the build (with a ::error:: naming the files to bump)
if the chart is behind the example. This catches the kind of drift this
PR is fixing - the chart sat at v15 while the example moved to v19 - before
it can merge again.
verify-versions and publish-chart stay tag-only; publish-chart now
needs: [verify-versions, validate-chart]. validate-chart runs on both
PRs and tag pushes: the tag arm is required because a job that `needs`
a skipped job is itself skipped under the default success() check, so
validate-chart must actually run on tag pushes or publish-chart would
never fire.
* Bump config version to 20
* feat: add scheduled tasks MVP
* fix: harden scheduled task execution semantics
* feat(scheduled-tasks): preset-driven schedule form with timezone and live preview
Replace the raw cron input with a preset Select (hourly/daily/weekly/monthly/custom)
plus structured inputs (time picker, weekday toggles, day-of-month), datetime-local
for one-time tasks, a timezone selector defaulting to the browser timezone, and a
live human-readable preview. Reuses one ScheduledTaskScheduleInput for create and
edit; backend contract unchanged; zero new deps (pure Intl + DST-safe offset helpers).
* feat(scheduled-tasks): full-page i18n + recipe templates + E2E locale pin
Localize the rest of the scheduled-tasks page (filters, detail pane, actions,
edit form, run list, enum values) via t.scheduledTasks.* in en/zh. Add four
built-in recipe templates (GitHub Trending, news digest, issue triage, weekly
report) exposed as a chip row that pre-fills title + prompt + schedule. Pin
Playwright locale to en-US so E2E selectors stay stable against i18n. No backend
change, no new deps.
* fix(scheduled-tasks): idempotent 0003 migration, update head constants, future-date once test
Merge with main surfaced three CI failures:
- 0003_scheduled_tasks create_table collided with legacy test seeds that
build from full metadata; guard with inspector.has_table so the revision
no-ops when the table already exists (0004/0005 are already idempotent via
_helpers.py).
- persistence bootstrap concurrency/regression tests pinned HEAD to main's
0002_runs_token_usage; bump to the new head 0005_scheduled_task_thread_nullable.
- once-task router test used a fixed past run_at and tripped the
must-be-in-the-future validation; use a future date.
* address review: ok-check, 502 for trigger failure, mock fields, migration filename, doc fences
- fetchThreadScheduledTasks now checks response.ok like the other fetchers.
- trigger endpoint returns 502 (not 409) when dispatch fails outright, so
clients can distinguish a real conflict from a server-side failure.
- E2E mock normalizes scheduled-task objects with context_mode/last_thread_id
and nullable thread_id, matching the backend contract the UI renders against.
- Rename 0002_scheduled_tasks.py -> 0003_scheduled_tasks.py to match its
revision id (file was renamed in spirit already; filename now follows).
- CONFIGURATION.md: close the Tool Groups yaml fence and drop the stray fence
after the Scheduler notes so the sections render correctly.
* fix(scheduled-tasks): harden lease, poller, config, and frontend UX after review
* fix(scheduled-tasks): harden run lifecycle, overlap skip, non_interactive gating, and DST conversion after review
- defer a once task's terminal status to the run-completion hook; the task
stays running until the real outcome, and a startup sweep cancels once
tasks orphaned by a crash (launch-time 'completed' could stick forever)
- record interrupted runs as a distinct 'interrupted' run status with a
readable message; an interrupted once task ends 'cancelled', not 'failed'
- enforce overlap_policy=skip for fresh_thread_per_run via an active-run
pre-check (same-thread ConflictError can never fire across fresh threads)
- protect terminal run statuses from the late launch-path 'running' write
- honor context.non_interactive only for internally-authenticated callers;
arbitrary clients can no longer strip ask_clarification
- fix DST-stale timezone offset in zonedLocalToUtcIso by re-deriving the
offset at the resolved instant (once tasks fired an hour late around
spring-forward and the create->edit round-trip diverged)
- drop dead ScheduledTaskRunRepository.update_by_run_id; share one Gateway
API error helper between channels and scheduled-tasks frontends
* fix(scheduled-tasks): close review round-3 gaps in guards, concurrency, and API ergonomics
- scrub internal-only context keys (non_interactive) from the assembled run
config for non-internal callers: gating body.context alone left the same
key smuggle-able through the free-form body.config copied verbatim by
build_run_config
- guard update_after_launch with protect_terminal so the launch bookkeeping
write cannot clobber a once task already finalized by a fast-failing run's
completion hook (parent-row sibling of the run-row guard)
- reject a manual trigger while the task has an active run (409) instead of
launching a duplicate concurrent run on fresh_thread_per_run
- re-arm a terminal once task to enabled when PATCH pushes run_at into the
future; previously the endpoint returned 200 with a next_run_at that could
never be claimed
- make max_concurrent_runs a real global cap: each poll claims only into the
remaining budget of active (queued/running) scheduled runs
- paginate GET /scheduled-tasks/{id}/runs (limit<=200, offset) and push the
thread filter of /threads/{id}/scheduled-tasks into SQL
- stamp context.user_id on scheduler-launched runs, matching IM channels, so
user-scoped guardrail providers see the owning user
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat(scripts): add redacted community support bundle generator
Add `make support-bundle` (scripts/support_bundle.py) to help users file
high-signal, privacy-safe GitHub issues for local setup/config/runtime
problems.
The command produces:
- `*-issue-summary.md` to paste into the issue body
- `*-issue-draft.md` scaffold for AI-assisted filing (REQUIRED placeholders,
never invents repro/expected/summary facts)
- an optional evidence zip under `.deer-flow/support-bundles/` containing a
stable `triage.json` plus redacted environment/config/extensions/git/doctor
evidence
Privacy: secrets are redacted across config values, URL userinfo, query
strings, CLI flags, custom headers, bearer/sk- tokens, and home paths. The
bundle never includes `.env`, raw conversation messages, or user file
contents; optional `--thread-id` adds file manifests only. `thread_id` input
is validated against path traversal.
Wire it into the Makefile, AGENTS.md, README/README_zh, CONTRIBUTING, and the
bug-report issue template. Covered by backend/tests/test_support_bundle.py.
* fix(scripts): redact MCP env values by default in support bundle
Address PR #3886 review (willem-bd, P2): the key-name allowlist let literal
secrets under non-standard env keys (e.g. SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY,
R2_ACCESS_KEY, hardcoded AIza… keys) leak verbatim into the bundle that users
are told is safe to share publicly.
Mask all MCP `env` values by default, keeping only `$VAR`/`${VAR}` references
visible, and broaden SECRET_KEY_RE (access_key, pwd, private_key). Add tests
for non-keyword env secrets, broadened key names, and end-to-end zip redaction.
* docs: add root-level CLAUDE.md to orient the monorepo
Adds a thin top-level CLAUDE.md that maps the monorepo and delegates depth
to backend/CLAUDE.md and frontend/CLAUDE.md, per issue #3761.
Includes the project overview + service topology (Nginx 2026, Gateway 8001,
Frontend 3000, optional Provisioner 8002), a top-level repository map, root
`make` vs. per-module command sections, "where to go next" links to the module
guides and primary root docs, and the repo-wide cross-cutting conventions
(documentation-update policy, TDD expectation, format before pushing).
No code or behavior changes; root points down, modules own depth.
Closes#3761
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: make AGENTS.md the source of truth, CLAUDE.md a thin @AGENTS.md importer
Adopt the AGENTS.md convention so the same agent guidance serves Claude Code,
Codex, and other tools. At each level (root, backend, frontend) the content
lives in AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md just imports it via `@AGENTS.md`.
- root: move the monorepo orientation layer to AGENTS.md; CLAUDE.md -> @AGENTS.md.
Fix an incorrect "TUI" reference (not present on main) and repoint the module
links to the AGENTS.md files.
- backend: move the guide to AGENTS.md (was an AGENTS.md -> @CLAUDE.md pointer;
direction is now flipped). Refresh stale content: rebuild the full middleware
chain (~26 ordered steps incl. InputSanitization, ToolOutputBudget,
DynamicContext, TokenBudget, SafetyFinishReason) from the actual build
functions; drop the brittle "11 middleware components" count; expand the
community-tools list to the real set.
- frontend: merge the practical Next.js guide with the existing AGENTS.md's
unique sections (LangGraph diagram, tech-stack versions, interaction
ownership, resources) into one AGENTS.md (CLAUDE.md -> @AGENTS.md). Fix the
stale src/ layout (remove the no-longer-present server/ better-auth entry;
add the now-active auth/agents/blog/... modules and routes) and drop a bogus
interaction-ownership bullet referencing files that don't exist.
Docs only; no code or behavior changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
