11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Wenchao An
6d5d7bb1d5
feat(subagents): add opt-in parent context snapshots (#5367)
* feat(subagents): add opt-in parent context snapshots

* test(subagents): package synthetic snapshot evaluation

* fix(subagents): preserve output text and defer snapshot capture

* docs(subagents): keep snapshot guidance within chain budget

* fix(subagents): omit unpaired tool calls from snapshots

* fix(subagents): safely omit unserializable snapshot media
2026-09-12 16:20:31 +08:00
Ryker_Feng
f52818fe5e
feat(skills): export custom skill packages with revision-bound preview (#5332)
* feat(skills): export custom skill packages with revision preview

* docs(gateway): keep export guidance within size budget

* ci: retry checks after transient uv setup download failure

* docs: focus skill export agent guidance on maintenance invariants

* fix(skills): handle export disconnects and bound archive transfers

* docs(gateway): remove redundant export guidance to fit merged budget

* fix(skills): reset export idle deadline after transfer progress
2026-09-11 16:21:23 +08:00
zeng-bohan
a2808e8292
test(checkpoint): retention deletion contract + growth baseline (#4189 item 3) (#5255)
* test(checkpoint): retention deletion contract + growth baseline

Six contract scenarios x memory/sqlite/postgres pin what retention deletions
must never break (branch ancestors, explicit resume targets, pending writes,
duration-only chain links), prove the two safe shapes (leaf sibling branches,
trailing duration leaves), record the full-vs-delta growth baseline in the
normalized bench shape, and add an item 4 probe showing the default
ToolOutputBudgetMiddleware already externalizes oversized tool results.

Refs #4189

* test(checkpoint): make the retention contract load-bearing per review

Review findings from willem-bd and Ricky-7-Yan:

- scenario D pins its own row: before/after stats delta plus a serde
  round-trip of the stored write, instead of an always-true > 0 check
- _delete_checkpoint now performs the joint delete the doc mandates
  (checkpoint row + writes rows + blobs unreachable from surviving
  checkpoints), so E1/E2 exercise the shape they prescribe
- E1 builds the real runtime duration shape via persist_run_durations
  (parent dict clone, fresh id/ts, real metadata), which surfaces the
  shared-version case: the leaf's blobs are the surviving parent's rows
- contract doc: blob reachability must be computed from surviving
  checkpoints in a whole-thread pass; shared-version/duration-only
  hazard called out explicitly; memory data model includes saver.blobs
- _stats counts memory blob rows and returns the full normalized shape
  (logical byte totals included)
- probe: drops the unused middleware/outputs_dir graph parameters and
  discloses the manual-harness scope limit in the module docstring
- E1/E2 assert default head resolution (protected set item 5); unused
  graph_for helper and DURATION_ONLY_METADATA stand-in removed

Signed-off-by: zengbohan1 <310902929+zengbohan1@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(checkpoint): scope probe cleanup to owned dirs, key report by backend

Second-round review findings on #5255:

- [P1] bench_tool_result_probe.py removed the whole user-supplied
  --outputs-dir (and the shared .probe-tmp) in its finally block, so
  pre-existing files were deleted on success and failure alike. The run
  now writes into (and removes) a fresh owned probe-run-* child beneath
  the requested directory, and SQLite databases live in a unique
  mkdtemp'd temp directory that is removed with the run. Regression
  tests pin that unrelated pre-existing files survive both a successful
  and a simulated failing run.
- [P2] the optional retention report keyed every backend's measurements
  under one shared name, so a multi-backend invocation kept only the
  last backend's numbers. _report() now takes the parameterized backend
  explicitly (saver_env.kind); regression pins that memory and sqlite
  entries coexist in one report file.

Signed-off-by: zengbohan1 <310902929+zengbohan1@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: zengbohan1 <310902929+zengbohan1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zengbohan1 <310902929+zengbohan1@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-08 19:21:57 +08:00
Otavio Rodrigues Santana
27cb73659d
fix(auth): correct OAuth conflict error message + validate multi-worker Postgres claim with real concurrency benchmark (#5026)
* fix(auth): correct OAuth uniqueness error and index parity on Postgres

create_user() caught any IntegrityError on commit and always reported it
as a duplicate email. The email pre-check already rules out a real email
collision in the common case, so any IntegrityError reaching that handler
is actually idx_users_oauth_identity firing instead -- confirmed against
both backends: SQLite reports "UNIQUE constraint failed:
users.oauth_provider, users.oauth_id", Postgres reports a
UniqueViolationError naming the same index. The caller saw "Email already
registered" for an OAuth account conflict, which is wrong and would send
API consumers debugging the wrong field.

Distinguish the two cases via a substring check on the driver error text
(both backends name the oauth columns) and raise an accurate message for
each.

Also add postgresql_where to the same index, alongside the existing
sqlite_where. This is not a correctness fix -- verified empirically that
Postgres already enforces the same practical uniqueness without it
(NULL is never equal to NULL in either backends unique index, so real
duplicate (provider, id) pairs are already rejected and NULL/NULL rows
are already unconstrained). postgresql_where makes the index genuinely
partial on Postgres too, matching the stated intent in the surrounding
comment and keeping the index smaller as the common case (plain-password
accounts, both columns NULL) accumulates.

* test(bench): add multi-process SQLite vs Postgres concurrency benchmark

CONFIGURATION.md documents that multi-worker deployments must use Postgres
because "SQLite silently ignores row-level locks", but nothing in the repo
exercised that claim against real separate worker processes -- the existing
checkpoint benchmarks (scripts/benchmark/checkpoint/) measure single-process
read/write latency, and the existing Postgres tests
(test_pg_schema_integration.py, test_multi_worker_postgres_gate.py) cover
schema placement and config validation, not throughput or lock behavior
under concurrent load.

run_concurrency_bench.py spawns N real OS processes (subprocess.Popen, not
asyncio tasks or threads within one process) against the shared users
table, mixing reads (get_user_by_email) and writes (create_user) at a
configurable ratio, and reports throughput, error counts by exception
type, and p50/p95/p99/max latency per run.

Measured locally (2/4/8/16 workers, 100 ops/worker, 70/30 read/write):
SQLite completed all operations with zero errors at every worker count
(busy_timeout absorbs contention rather than raising), but total
throughput stayed flat around 28-34 ops/s regardless of worker count, and
p99 latency grew from ~400ms at 2 workers to ~5.9s at 16, with a 22s max.
Postgres throughput scaled with worker count (41 to 66 ops/s) and p99
stayed under 500ms at every worker count tested. Raw JSON output from
both runs is available on request; exact numbers will vary by machine and
are not asserted in the test suite.

test_bench_concurrency.py unit-tests the pure aggregation logic
(percentile math, error grouping, crashed-worker handling) the same way
test_bench_checkpoint_channels.py does for the existing benchmarks --
fast, no DB required, not the full multi-process sweep in CI.

* fix(auth): inspect the driver exception for OAuth conflict detection

str(exc) embeds the full failed INSERT statement, whose column list
always names oauth_provider/oauth_id, so a substring check on it
misclassified every commit-time IntegrityError on the users table as
an OAuth conflict (reproduced on SQLite: a duplicate primary key with
a different email raised "OAuth account already linked: None/None").

_is_oauth_identity_violation now inspects exc.orig instead: constraint_name
on Postgres, both violated column names present (not a bare "oauth"
substring) on SQLite.

Also ships the alembic revision idx_users_oauth_identity's postgresql_where
predicate needed: 0001_baseline created it as a full index on Postgres,
and ORM metadata changes only affect fresh create_all databases, never an
already-versioned deployment.

Addresses review feedback from willem-bd.

* fix(bench): run the concurrency benchmark in an isolated schema and derive paths from the checkout

--pg-url accepted an arbitrary database URL while the code pinned
postgres_schema="public" and unconditionally ran DELETE FROM users --
against any non-disposable database that permanently destroyed every
auth account. Each run now generates a unique throwaway schema
(bench_<uuid>), points both the seeder and every worker subprocess at
it via postgres_schema, and drops only that schema (DROP SCHEMA ...
CASCADE) once the full worker-count sweep finishes.

Also stopped hard-coding /opt/deer-flow/backend as the checkout path
and .venv/bin/python3 as the interpreter: BACKEND_DIR is now derived
from Path(__file__), and workers are spawned with sys.executable (the
orchestrator's own interpreter) instead, so the documented
uv run python scripts/benchmark/concurrency/run_concurrency_bench.py
command works from any checkout.

Addresses review feedback from willem-bd.

* fix: shorten oauth-index revision id, repin migration-head assertions, fix bench read/write mix

- 0017_users_oauth_identity_partial_pg (36 chars) exceeded
  alembic_version.version_num's VARCHAR(32) limit, which would fail
  stamping/upgrading on both fresh and existing Postgres deployments.
  Renamed to 0017_oauth_identity_pg_partial (30 chars).
- Repinned every test asserting 0016_subagent_batches as the migration
  head (test_persistence_bootstrap[.py|_concurrency.py|_regression.py],
  test_migration_0004/0007/0015) to the new 0017 revision id.
- worker.py's `(i % 100) < int(read_ratio * 100)` assumed n_ops >= 100;
  at the documented default (50 ops/worker, 0.7 read ratio) it produced
  either all-reads or all-writes, never the claimed mixed workload.
  Replaced with read_count()/is_read_op(), which distribute an exact
  round(n_ops * read_ratio) reads evenly across the sequence via modular
  spacing, and added test_bench_worker.py covering the default values
  plus small op counts.

* fix(bench): establish a real physical connection before timing ops

async with sf(): pass entered an empty AsyncSession without checking out
a physical connection -- SQLAlchemy stays lazy until the first statement
executes. That pushed connection-establishment cost onto each worker's
first timed operation instead of conn_time_s, and at 16 workers those 16
cold first-ops (1% of a 1600-op sample) could skew the reported p99.
Execute a real `SELECT 1` before starting the timer instead.

Verified with a real end-to-end run (uv sync + sqlite backend, 2
workers/10 ops, 0 errors) plus the full auth/bench/migration-bootstrap
suites (135 tests) and ruff check/format, all clean.

* fix(bench): synchronize workers before timing, fix percentile off-by-one

Two remaining measurement issues from review:

- run_workers() started the wall clock before spawning any worker, so
  throughput/wall_time absorbed N processes' staggered Python-startup and
  connection-establishment cost, and early workers could run ahead of ones
  still starting. Workers now print READY right before their timed loop
  and block on stdin for a GO signal; the orchestrator waits for every
  READY, then starts the timer and releases all workers together.

- summarize()'s pct() used int(len(latencies) * p) directly as a
  zero-based index -- a one-based-rank-as-index bug that put p95 and p99
  at the same slot (the max) for any 20-or-fewer-sample run, and for the
  documented 100-sample default. Now delegates to
  checkpoint_bench_common.percentile(), the already-correct nearest-rank
  implementation used elsewhere in the same benchmark family, instead of
  a second, broken one.

Verified: 14/14 unit tests pass (2 new pinned-value regression tests for
the percentile bug, using the reviewer's own 20-sample repro), ruff
clean, and a real 2/4-worker SQLite multi-process smoke run completes
with distinct p95/p99/max latencies and no hang.

* fix(bench): absolute SQLite bench path, surface crash diagnostics, exit nonzero on failure; share OAuth index constant + cover Postgres branch

Three more findings from review at 5fd25a7:

- seed_baseline() cleaned an absolute .deer-flow/bench_data path but
  handed DatabaseConfig a relative one, which resolves against the
  CALLER's CWD -- not BACKEND_DIR. Invoking the documented command from
  anywhere other than backend/ silently pointed the seeder and the
  (cwd=BACKEND_DIR) workers at two different directories: workers crashed
  with 'unable to open database file' while the run still printed a
  well-formed summary and exited 0. Both seed_baseline() and worker.py's
  make_session_factory() now use the same absolute path.

- Crashed workers' stderr was captured then discarded, and main() always
  exited 0 -- an all-crashed sweep was indistinguishable from a real
  (uneventful) measurement to anything checking the exit code or
  --out. run_workers() now prints each crash immediately and tags it with
  the real worker_id (previously always None); summarize() exposes
  crashed_worker_errors alongside the existing crashed_workers count;
  main() exits 1 via the new summary_indicates_failure() whenever any
  sweep crashed or fell short of expected_total_ops.

- idx_users_oauth_identity was hardcoded separately in the ORM Index and
  in _is_oauth_identity_violation's Postgres branch, with no test to
  catch drift, and that branch had zero non-skipped coverage (its only
  guard needs a live Postgres CI never configures). Exported
  OAUTH_IDENTITY_INDEX_NAME from user/model.py as the shared source of
  truth (migrations intentionally keep their own frozen literal, matching
  every other revision in that package) and added stub-exception unit
  tests pinning both the asyncpg constraint_name path and the sqlite
  message-substring path, positive and negative.

Verified: 107 passed locally (auth + bench-unit suites), ruff clean, and
two real reproductions -- invoking run_concurrency_bench.py from a
scratch directory outside backend/ (the reviewer's exact repro) now
completes 8/8 ops with crashed_workers: 0 instead of crashing, and the
new crashed_worker_errors/exit-code logic is exercised directly by the
new unit tests against the real summarize()/summary_indicates_failure().

* fix(auth): attribute create_user IntegrityErrors to the right constraint

Two coupled review findings on the classification helpers:

P3 (fall-through) -- after ruling out the OAuth-identity index, create_user
raised "Email already registered: {email}" for every remaining
IntegrityError, including the duplicate-primary-key case the new
regression test exercises, whose address is not registered. Added
_is_email_violation() so the email message is used only for an actual
users.email collision that raced past the pre-check; anything else (in
practice a duplicate id) now raises a neutral
"User already exists (constraint: <name>)".

P2 (unreachable asyncpg branch) -- exc.orig is not the asyncpg error.
SQLAlchemy's asyncpg dialect re-raises its own DBAPI IntegrityError
(pgcode/sqlstate only) 'from' the real asyncpg error, so constraint_name
lives on exc.orig.__cause__. getattr(exc.orig, "constraint_name", None)
was always None on Postgres; the helpers only worked there by accident,
matching asyncpg's DETAIL line in the message fallback. Added
_driver_constraint_name() which walks orig then orig.__cause__, and the
stub tests now model that real shape (orig wrapper + __cause__) instead of
a constraint_name that no driver puts on orig directly.

Tests: 76 passed. New coverage for the email-race path, both new helpers
on each backend, the neutral fallback message, and the cause-chain walk.

* fix(bench): match app SQLite PRAGMAs in workers; fail a sweep on any op error

Two review follow-ups:

- worker.py opened its SQLite engine with only connect_args timeout=30.
  synchronous and foreign_keys are per-connection PRAGMAs, so workers ran
  at SQLite's synchronous=FULL / foreign_keys=OFF while a real Gateway
  worker runs synchronous=NORMAL (persistence/engine.py::_enable_sqlite_wal)
  -- an extra fsync per commit on the measured 30%-write path, overstating
  SQLite's cost in the direction that flatters the "use Postgres"
  conclusion. Added a connect listener applying the same four PRAGMAs, with
  a test asserting synchronous/foreign_keys/journal_mode on a real worker
  connection.

- summary_indicates_failure() only looked at crashes and the completed vs
  expected op counts, so a sweep where every op completed but raised
  (e.g. writes hitting OperationalError) passed as a clean measurement:
  completed_ops == expected, 0 crashes. Added an "errors > 0" clause; the
  error breakdown stays in the JSON, only the exit code changes. Test added.

test_bench_concurrency.py + test_bench_worker.py green (20), plus a real
2-worker sqlite smoke run (6/6 ops, 0 errors, exit 0).

* fix(auth): match the real email index name; only claim "exists" for uniqueness

Review follow-ups on the classification helpers:

- email is mapped_column(unique=True, index=True), which SQLAlchemy and
  0001_baseline realise as a single UNIQUE INDEX (ix_users_email), not a
  named UNIQUE constraint. _is_email_violation compared the driver
  constraint name against "users_email_key", which Postgres never emits,
  so that arm was dead on Postgres (SQLite matched via the message). Fixed
  to ix_users_email.

- the residual IntegrityError fallback raised "User already exists" for
  every remaining IntegrityError -- a NOT NULL / CHECK / foreign-key
  violation is not a "user already exists" condition and is not part of
  create_user's ValueError contract. Added _is_uniqueness_violation
  (sqlstate 23505, or the SQLite "UNIQUE/PRIMARY KEY constraint failed"
  message); only that raises the "already exists" ValueError, everything
  else propagates unchanged.

- documented scripts/benchmark/concurrency/ in backend/AGENTS.md alongside
  the other benchmark family.

Tests: 78 auth + 20 bench-unit pass, ruff clean. New coverage for
_is_uniqueness_violation on both backends and for a non-uniqueness
IntegrityError propagating out of create_user.

* fix(bench): don't pre-close worker stdin (breaks communicate); require --pg-url for postgres

* fix(bench): ruff format; time throughput on the op phase, not teardown

- lint-backend: ruff format the files touched in this PR.
- Throughput window (P2): the orchestrator sampled its wall clock after
  every worker's communicate() returned, so it also covered each worker's
  engine.dispose(), result serialization and stdout transfer. Each worker
  now times just its operation phase (GO -> last op) and reports
  ops_elapsed_s; summarize() uses max(ops_elapsed_s) over the workers -- all
  released by the same GO -- as the throughput window (ops_window_s).
- Exercise migration 0018 (P2): test_user_oauth_partial_index.py goes
  through bootstrap create_all(), which builds the partial index from ORM
  metadata and never runs 0018.upgrade(). New Postgres-gated
  test_migration_0018_oauth_identity_pg_partial.py alembic-upgrades to 0017
  (full index), then 0018 (asserts the predicate appears), then downgrades
  (asserts the full index is restored) and re-upgrades.

* docs(middlewares): tighten SandboxAudit and Clarification entries in AGENTS.md

PR #5134 grew agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md ~1.8 KB, pushing the effective
AGENTS.md chain for that directory over the 96 KiB hard limit once this
branch also documents scripts/benchmark/concurrency/ in backend/AGENTS.md.
Condense the two longest middleware entries (SandboxAuditMiddleware,
ClarificationMiddleware) without dropping any identifier, example, issue
reference, ordering constraint, or documented gap; chain back to ~96.8 KiB.

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-09-03 08:17:26 +08:00
Ricky-7-Yan
c56c7293f8
test(checkpoint): measure postgres storage growth (#5051) 2026-09-01 22:36:31 +08:00
qingbo1011
2eba65449f
eval(memory): add a reproducible hybrid eviction evaluation (#4810)
* eval(memory): scaffold reproducible eviction evaluation

* refactor(eval): align with benchmark layout

* eval(memory): add deterministic QA grading

Implement the disclosed deterministic-overlap-v1 grader as a pure offline
module. Grading is blind by construction: grade_answer() accepts only the
prediction and reference strings, never a policy identity.

The undisclosed stopword list is committed as a fixed part of this grader
version; yes/no/not are deliberately excluded because negation can be the
entire answer. Before freezing, the grader locally reproduced all 90
historical (prediction, grade) pairs disclosed in #4789 with zero
mismatches and no post-hoc tuning.

validate-contracts now rejects a config whose qa.grader_version does not
match the committed grader.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): add environment-configured QA runner

Add the exact answer-prompt renderer (retained facts sorted by ID, CURRENT
DATE line omitted when absent), an OpenAI-compatible provider adapter
configured only through the environment variable names pinned in the
config, and a resumable run-qa command that calls both policies with
identical versioned settings.

Each row persists as its own file on success, so a partial paid run
resumes without repeating completed calls; qa_run.json binds an output
directory to one config identity. Row files and errors carry predictions
and non-secret metadata only -- never questions, references, memory text,
credentials, or response headers. All tests are offline via mocked
transports; run-qa fails fast before touching the dataset when the
provider environment is missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): add blind QA grading report and paired statistics

Add grade-qa: it recomputes the deterministic selector output, rejects any
answer row whose kept facts, capacity, or policy disagree with it, grades
every prediction through the policy-blind grade_answer(prediction,
reference) call, and only then joins grades back through stable row IDs.

Published artifacts are qa.rows.jsonl (graded rows with non-secret
metadata), qa.summary.json (accuracy by source/scenario/policy; official
and synthetic suites never folded together), and qa.stats.json (exact
paired McNemar and seeded paired bootstrap difference for the official,
synthetic, and overall suites using the pinned statistics parameters).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): pin the official DeepSeek model ID

The historical protocol recorded the answer model with an aggregator-style
namespace (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash). The live run calls the same
underlying model (DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731, released before the historical
run) directly through DeepSeek's official OpenAI-compatible API, whose
canonical ID is deepseek-v4-flash. The served model is recorded from the
provider response in every answer row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): publish paired eviction QA results

Publish the equal-budget live QA artifacts for pr4789-reproduction-v1:
provenance, 90 graded rows, per-scenario summary, and paired statistics.
At capacity 7 with identical settings, confidence answers 24/45 and
hybrid-v1 40/45 (official 23/40 vs 35/40, exact McNemar p=0.0042; overall
p=0.0004). The noisy-signal control is the one scenario where hybrid-v1
scored below the baseline (10/10 vs 8/10) and is reported separately.

The offline suite now verifies the published statistics are recomputable
from the published rows and that the artifacts carry no dataset text or
credentials.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(eval): decompose the noisy-signal QA cell

Both policies retained the support fact in all ten noisy-signal cases, so
the two rows hybrid-v1 lost are grader phrasing boundaries (verbose
numeric answers rejected by the numeric-conflict rule), not eviction
failures. Documented from the published rows; the grader stays frozen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): address review hardening findings

- ignore the responses/ directory the runner actually writes instead of
  the stale provider-responses/ entry
- cover the official selection-rule recomputation with direct synthetic
  tests: matching manifests pass, rule-breaking IDs and missing eligible
  rows fail, and every published exclusion is load-bearing
- align the report docstring and README with the statistics contract:
  the summary never folds sources; the explicitly labeled overall suite
  is reported alongside the separate official and synthetic suites
- recompute the published bootstrap intervals (not only McNemar) in the
  published-results test
- wire required_policy_version to the production
  EVICTION_POLICY_HYBRID_V1 constant so validate-contracts rejects
  policy drift

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): restore historical evidence rendering and harden resume identity

Address both blocking findings from the #4789 artifact cross-check.

The evidence renderer now emits the historical SESSION {id} AT {date}
line instead of the divergent bracket format. The byte representation is
protocol-critical: the witness record 35a27287 renders at 697 characters
again, stays inside the 700-character distractor-bank bound, and 60d45044
leaves the bank, restoring row-level pool reproduction. Deterministic
capacity-7 retention is unchanged at 27/45 vs 45/45.

qa_run.json now binds a run directory to the SHA-256 of all five protocol
inputs (config, both manifests, answer prompt, dataset) and names the
changed artifact when it refuses to resume. Stored rows are reused only
when row identity, policy, capacity, kept facts, and the request
fingerprint recomputed from the current task all match; the disclosed
probe (changed message under the same config) is now a regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): republish QA results under the historical protocol

Replace the published artifacts with the fresh equal-budget run executed
at 497ff3d0 under the restored historical evidence rendering; the earlier
run under the divergent rendering is discarded entirely. At capacity 7
with identical settings, confidence answers 24/45 and hybrid-v1 38/45
(official 23/40 vs 33/40, exact McNemar p=0.0129; overall p=0.0013).
The confidence control is the one scenario below baseline for hybrid-v1
(8/10 vs 6/10); both lost rows retained the support fact and are grader
phrasing/abstention boundaries, documented from the published rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): adopt the historical fact IDs and prompt serialization

Pool facts now carry the historical protocol IDs (gold_{case} for the
support fact, d_{case}_{index}_{source} for distractors in bank-draw
order), and the rendered STORED MEMORY joins fact blocks with a blank
line. Sorting by these IDs reproduces the historical selection tie-break:
witness case 41698283 at capacity 7 again keeps the 58bf7951 distractor
and evicts 001be529 under both policies. Deterministic capacity-7
retention is unchanged at 27/45 vs 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): republish QA results under the historical serialization

Replace the published artifacts with the fresh equal-budget run executed
at 01f99d61 under the historical fact IDs and prompt serialization;
earlier runs under divergent serializations are discarded entirely. At
capacity 7 with identical settings, confidence answers 24/45 and
hybrid-v1 40/45 (official 23/40 vs 35/40, exact McNemar p=0.0018;
overall p=0.0001). The single row below baseline (1cea1afa,
confidence-control) retained its support fact; the model abstained.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* eval(memory): self-certify the publish path and pin offset coverage

grade-qa now verifies (read-only) that the run marker's five protocol
artifact hashes match the current inputs, rebuilds every answer task, and
rejects any stored row whose request fingerprint does not match the task
recomputed from the current protocol — the staleness class that
previously required an out-of-band cross-check to detect. Verified
end-to-end against the published run: all 90 rows pass and regrade to
byte-identical artifacts, while a tampered fingerprint is refused by row
ID.

The distractor offset derivation and wraparound selection are now pinned
by unit tests with hardcoded indices, including a wrapping offset, so a
digest-slice or modulus regression can no longer stay green offline.

Closes both non-blocking suggestions from the re-review.

* fix(bench): bind persisted answer rows to their expected case identity

Grading derived the reference case from the stored row's embedded case_id,
so reassigning a valid row to another valid case passed every integrity
check while silently changing the published grade. The resume path had the
same gap: _row_matches_task() never compared case_id, source, or scenario.

The recomputed task is now authoritative in both paths: grade_answer_rows()
resolves the reference case from the expected PolicyResult and rejects any
mismatch in the persisted row_id/case_id/source/scenario, and
_row_matches_task() checks the same identity fields so a reassigned row is
re-run instead of reused. Regressions tamper each field individually and
exercise both paths.

* docs(bench): document where to download the pinned LongMemEval file

The README named the dataset but never said it lives on Hugging Face or how
to fetch the pinned revision, so a reviewer could not run the offline
commands. Add the direct download URL, the expected SHA-256, and the mirror
and huggingface-cli alternatives; the CLI still never downloads anything.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 14:36:38 +08:00
Vanzeren
c8cf1bf2fb
feat(checkpoint): checkpoint history cache (#4638)
* feat(checkpoint-cache): delta-mode checkpoint history cache with recursive compose

Read-only, invalidation-free cache for LangGraph delta-channel history
({writes, seed}) at the get_delta_channel_history choke point:

- database.checkpoint_cache config (memory|redis; max_entries 0=disabled;
  redis bounded by TTL, Gateway/async only)
- memory LRU backend (copy-on-read, zero-serde hit path) and redis backend
  (lazy import, degrades to all-miss on outage)
- CachedHistorySaver: recursive composition from the nearest warm ancestor
  (depth budget 8), caching each level; depth-0 cold chains delegate one
  inner fast-path walk. Entries keyed by immutable
  (db, thread, ns, checkpoint_id, channel) — no invalidation, coherent
  across workers
- provider wiring: wraps in delta mode only (async + sync), full mode
  untouched; sync path is memory-only
- bench opt-in: DEERFLOW_CHECKPOINT_BENCH_HISTORY_CACHE=1

sqlite bench (500 updates, payload 2KB): write phase 2.28x at f=250,
1.32x at f=10; one delegated walk per thread cold start.

* chore(config): bump config_version to 32 for database.checkpoint_cache

The checkpoint history cache feature added the database.checkpoint_cache
section to config.example.yaml; bump the schema version so existing
deployments get the outdated-config warning and can run make config-upgrade.

* chore(helm): bump config_version to 32 in chart values and README

* fix(checkpoint-cache): purge thread history entries on delete paths

Addresses review on #4638: delete_thread/prune removed source-of-truth
checkpoints but left the thread's materialized history payloads in the
cache (memory: until LRU eviction; redis: until TTL, default 1 day) — a
data-lifecycle gap for tenant offboarding / GDPR-style erasure.

- Cache contract gains thread-scoped adelete_thread/delete_thread
  (lifecycle purge, not invalidation; entries remain immutable)
- Memory backend: stem scan over the LRU map; redis: SCAN MATCH + UNLINK,
  outage degrades to TTL-bounded retention without raising
- CachedHistorySaver purges on delete_thread/adelete_thread and
  prune/aprune (prune rewrites chains, so pre-prune histories must go);
  delete_for_runs stays delegation-only (run->thread mapping unavailable,
  no in-tree callers), documented in code
- ttl_seconds description documents the residual-retention window
- Tests: thread-scoped purge on both backends, saver-level delete/prune
  purge, prefix-safety (t1 vs t10), redis outage degradation, and the
  pinned no-purge behavior of delete_for_runs

* fix(checkpoint-cache): stable db identity, prefix-aware sync singleton, explicit zero TTL

Addresses Copilot review on #4638:

- checkpoint_cache_db_hash now hashes the credential-free postgres
  identity (host:port/database + schema): credential rotation no longer
  changes the cache namespace (cold cache + orphaned keys until TTL).
  Unparseable URLs fall back to the raw string.
- The sync-path memory cache singleton is also keyed by its key_prefix:
  a namespace change (db identity change or operator override) recreates
  the cache instead of leaving stale-prefix entries unreachable and
  unpurgeable.
- ttl_seconds=0 is now an explicit, documented opt-out of redis expiry
  (SET without EX; redis maxmemory policy only) instead of a silent
  'ttl_seconds or None' coercion.

Tests: credential-rotation hash stability, unparseable-URL fallback,
prefix-change singleton recreation, same-prefix singleton reuse, and
zero-TTL wire behavior (ex=None).

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-08-02 22:25:02 +08:00
Vanzeren
c48de5e70b
feat(checkpoint): make delta snapshot_frequency configurable (#4516)
* feat(checkpoint): make delta snapshot_frequency configurable

* fix(config): carry legacy checkpoint_delta_snapshot_frequency with warning

Addresses review on #4516: the rename from the flat
database.checkpoint_delta_snapshot_frequency key to nested
database.checkpoint_delta.snapshot_frequency silently dropped the old
value (pydantic extra="ignore"). Add a before-validator that maps the
legacy key onto the nested one with a deprecation warning (nested key
wins when both are set), plus a CHANGELOG breaking-change note covering
the rename and the 1000 -> 10 default change.

* fix(checkpoint): validate frozen snapshot frequency
2026-07-28 23:21:23 +08:00
Vanzeren
e01173d8b2
bench(checkpoint): production-shaped full/delta benchmark with configurable snapshot frequency (#4467)
* feat(checkpoint): production-shaped full/delta benchmark with configurable snapshot frequency

- Group benchmark scripts into per-family folders (checkpoint/, sandbox/)
- Extract shared benchmark infrastructure into checkpoint_bench_common.py
- Add checkpoint_delta_snapshot_frequency config (default 1000, process-frozen);
  freeze it in make_lead_agent and DeerFlowClient; key the state-schema
  adaptation cache by resolved frequency
- New bench_production.py: per-case child processes run N ainvoke turns through
  the real lead-agent graph (scripted deterministic model, real AsyncSqliteSaver),
  then measure GET /state + POST /history through the real Gateway route stack
  in one event loop (httpx ASGITransport), cold/warm accessor-cache split,
  cross-mode digest gates
- New summarize_production.py: delta/full ratios plus decision metrics
  (snapshot_write_spike, cache_effect_ms, checkpoint_write_share,
  auto-discovered history per-limit ratios)

* fix(checkpoint): address production benchmark review
2026-07-27 11:47:49 +08:00
Vanzeren
62dd8d2b67
bench(checkpoint): add channel mode benchmark (#4395)
* bench(checkpoint): add channel mode benchmark

* bench(checkpoint): harden benchmark reporting
2026-07-23 17:54:29 +08:00
Vanzeren
dc38d2d003
perf(boxlite): add benchmark-driven warm-pool reclaim tuning (#4001)
* bench: add provider-agnostic sandbox benchmark with BoxLite warm pool results

- scripts/bench_sandbox_provider.py: CLI for measuring acquire/run/release
  across providers, scenarios, workloads, and concurrency levels
- scripts/summarize_bench.py: JSONL aggregation with p50/p95/p99 tables
- bench_results.jsonl: 110 turns across 7 scenarios on real BoxLite 0.9.7

Key findings:
  cold acquire:  ~860ms
  warm reclaim:   ~14ms  (60x speedup)
  release:         ~0ms
  warm_hit_rate:  95%   (warm_same_thread)

* perf(boxlite): skip health check for recently-released warm pool boxes

Boxes released within health_check_skip_seconds (default 5.0s)
are promoted directly without the ~14ms echo-ok round-trip.
A VM alive seconds ago is overwhelmingly likely to still be alive.

Add sandbox.health_check_skip_seconds config option.
Set to 0 to always health-check (old behaviour).

Benchmark (warm_same_thread, noop, 20 iters):
  acquire p50: 14.9ms → 0.0ms
  total p50:   29.9ms → 14.0ms

* chore: move benchmark scripts into backend/scripts/benchmark/

* fix: address BoxLite benchmark review findings

* fix(boxlite): only skip warm reclaim checks for released boxes

* fix(benchmark): keep BoxLite shim workaround off the event loop

* fix(boxlite): invalidate dead boxes from command path

* test(boxlite): cover skip window and invalidation edge cases

* fix(boxlite): treat sandbox-has-been-closed as terminal in _exec

* fix(boxlite): harden warm-pool reclaim and benchmark accounting

* fix(boxlite): validate warm-pool reclaims by default

* fix(config): expose boxlite health-check skip setting

* fix(boxlite): tighten failure classification and benchmark workaround

* Update config_version to 21 in values.yaml

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-07-09 17:21:25 +08:00