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Address the review findings on the DOMPurify SVG sanitization. F1: sanitizeSvg was synchronous and blocked the service's only event loop: a ~30 MiB SVG (the old cap) froze media-processor for ~20 s and peaked at ~3.4 GiB. The sanitizer now runs in a worker_threads pool (sanitizeSvgSync is the CPU-bound core), each worker has a resourceLimits heap cap so an OOM kills the worker and not the process, and a stuck job is terminated by a timeout and respawned. The default SVG cap drops to 2 MiB and is enforced in both modes (the backend validates the declared and the real size on upload, and the real bytes on import), so a file is accepted or rejected the same way with and without media-processor. F2: an unexpected sanitizer failure is logged and reported as 503 svg-sanitization-failed instead of 400 invalid-svg-file, so a service fault is not blamed on the user's file and no internal detail leaks in the hint. F4: the remote backend rejects a 2xx response that is not an SVG instead of storing it. Also pin the backend/service wire contract with a test that posts the exact multipart the JVM builds, and pin the data: URI behavior. AI-assisted-by: deepseek-v4.1-flash
390 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
390 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, afterEach } from "vitest";
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import request from "supertest";
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import express from "express";
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import { sanitizeSvg, sanitizeSvgSync, configureSvgLimits } from "../src/services/svg.js";
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import { createSvgRoutes } from "../src/routes/svg.js";
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import { errorHandler, ProcessingError } from "../src/middleware/error-handler.js";
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import { timeoutMiddleware } from "../src/middleware/timeout.js";
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import { sharedKeyAuth } from "../src/middleware/auth.js";
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import { createQueueMiddleware } from "../src/middleware/queue.js";
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import { configureUploadLimits } from "../src/upload.js";
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const SVG_NS = "http://www.w3.org/2000/svg";
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const DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
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function svg(inner: string, attrs = `xmlns="${SVG_NS}" width="100" height="100"`): string {
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return `<svg ${attrs}>${inner}</svg>`;
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}
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// Outputs must never carry an event handler, a javascript: URL or a script
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// element, whatever the input was.
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function expectNoDangerousOutput(out: string): void {
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expect(out).not.toMatch(/\son\w+\s*=/i);
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expect(out).not.toMatch(/<script/i);
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expect(out).not.toContain("javascript:");
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}
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function captureError(fn: () => unknown): unknown {
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try {
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fn();
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return undefined;
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} catch (err) {
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return err;
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}
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}
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function expectProcessingError(fn: () => unknown, status: number, code: string): void {
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const err = captureError(fn);
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expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ProcessingError);
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const processingError = err as ProcessingError;
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expect(processingError.statusCode).toBe(status);
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expect(processingError.errorBody.code).toBe(code);
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// sanitizeSvg: malicious corpus
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const MALICIOUS: Array<{ name: string; svg: string; forbidden: RegExp }> = [
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{
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name: "script element",
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svg: svg(`<script>alert("xss")</script><rect width="50" height="50"/>`),
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forbidden: /<script/i,
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},
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{
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name: "namespace-prefixed script",
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svg: `<svg xmlns="${SVG_NS}" xmlns:x="${SVG_NS}"><x:script>alert("xss")</x:script><rect width="50" height="50"/></svg>`,
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forbidden: /<x:script/i,
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},
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{
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name: "arbitrary-prefixed script",
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svg: `<svg xmlns="${SVG_NS}" xmlns:p="${SVG_NS}"><p:script>alert("xss")</p:script><rect width="50" height="50"/></svg>`,
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forbidden: /<p:script/i,
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},
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{
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name: "javascript href",
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svg: svg(`<a href="javascript:alert('xss')"><rect width="50" height="50"/></a>`),
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forbidden: /javascript:/i,
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},
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{
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name: "javascript xlink href",
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svg: `<svg xmlns="${SVG_NS}" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><a xlink:href="javascript:alert('xss')"><rect width="50" height="50"/></a></svg>`,
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forbidden: /javascript:/i,
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},
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{
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name: "onload attribute",
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svg: svg(`<rect onload="alert('xss')" width="50" height="50"/>`),
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forbidden: /onload/i,
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},
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{
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name: "onclick attribute",
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svg: svg(`<rect onclick="alert('xss')" width="50" height="50"/>`),
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forbidden: /onclick/i,
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},
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{
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name: "foreignObject",
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svg: svg(`<foreignObject width="100" height="100"><body><script>alert("xss")</script></body></foreignObject>`),
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forbidden: /foreignObject/i,
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},
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{
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name: "set element",
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svg: svg(`<set attributeName="onload" to="alert('xss')"/><rect width="50" height="50"/>`),
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forbidden: /<set[\s/>]/i,
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},
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{
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name: "animate element",
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svg: svg(`<animate attributeName="onload" to="alert('xss')"/><rect width="50" height="50"/>`),
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forbidden: /<animate[\s/>]/i,
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},
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{
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name: "use element",
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svg: svg(`<use href="#evil"/><rect width="50" height="50"/>`),
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forbidden: /<use[\s/>]/i,
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},
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];
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describe("sanitizeSvg: removes dangerous content", () => {
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it.each(MALICIOUS)("removes $name", ({ svg: dirty, forbidden }) => {
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(dirty);
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expect(clean).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expect(clean).not.toMatch(forbidden);
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expectNoDangerousOutput(clean);
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// sanitizeSvg: legitimate content survives
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe("sanitizeSvg: keeps legitimate SVG", () => {
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it("keeps gradients, filters, clipPath, mask, style and text", () => {
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const dirty = svg(
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`<defs>` +
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`<linearGradient id="g"><stop offset="0" stop-color="red"/></linearGradient>` +
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`<clipPath id="c"><rect width="5" height="5"/></clipPath>` +
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`<filter id="f"><feGaussianBlur stdDeviation="1"/></filter>` +
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`<mask id="m"><rect width="5" height="5"/></mask>` +
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`</defs>` +
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`<style>.a{fill:red}</style>` +
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`<rect class="a" width="5" height="5" fill="url(#g)" clip-path="url(#c)" mask="url(#m)" filter="url(#f)"/>` +
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`<text x="1" y="9"><tspan>hi</tspan></text>`,
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`xmlns="${SVG_NS}" viewBox="0 0 10 10"`
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);
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(dirty);
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expect(clean).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expect(clean).toContain("<linearGradient");
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expect(clean).toContain("<stop");
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expect(clean).toContain("<clipPath");
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expect(clean).toContain("<feGaussianBlur");
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expect(clean).toContain("<mask");
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expect(clean).toContain("<style>");
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expect(clean).toContain("<tspan");
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expect(clean).toContain('viewBox="0 0 10 10"');
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});
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it("keeps a safe relative/absolute href", () => {
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(svg(`<image href="https://example.com/a.png" width="5" height="5"/>`));
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expect(clean).toContain('href="https://example.com/a.png"');
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});
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it("accepts a document with a leading UTF-8 BOM", () => {
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(`\uFEFF${svg(`<rect width="5" height="5"/>`)}`);
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expect(clean).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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});
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it("accepts a document with an XML declaration and leading whitespace", () => {
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(
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`<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n<svg xmlns="${SVG_NS}"><rect width="5" height="5"/></svg>`
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);
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expect(clean).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expect(clean).toContain("<rect");
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});
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it("accepts a document with a DOCTYPE", () => {
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const dirty = `<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">${svg(`<rect width="5" height="5"/>`)}`;
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(dirty);
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expect(clean).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expect(clean).toContain("<rect");
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});
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it("does not resolve entities declared in a DOCTYPE internal subset", () => {
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const dirty = `<!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>${svg(`<rect width="5" height="5"/>`)}`;
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(dirty);
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expect(clean).not.toContain("passwd");
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expect(clean).not.toContain("&xxe;");
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// sanitizeSvg: rejects what is not a well-formed SVG document
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe("sanitizeSvg: rejects invalid input", () => {
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const INVALID: Array<{ name: string; svg: string }> = [
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{ name: "empty input", svg: "" },
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{ name: "plain text", svg: "this is not an svg" },
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{ name: "malformed xml", svg: "<svg><g></svg>" },
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{ name: "html document", svg: "<html><body>hi</body></html>" },
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{ name: "text before the root", svg: `hello${svg(`<rect/>`)}` },
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{ name: "undefined entity", svg: svg(`<text>&xxe;</text>`) },
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];
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it.each(INVALID)("rejects $name with invalid-svg-file", ({ svg: dirty }) => {
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expectProcessingError(() => sanitizeSvgSync(dirty), 400, "invalid-svg-file");
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// sanitizeSvg: resource limits and stability
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe("sanitizeSvg: limits and stability", () => {
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afterEach(() => configureSvgLimits({ maxSize: DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE }));
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it("rejects an input larger than the configured maximum", () => {
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configureSvgLimits({ maxSize: 100 });
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const big = svg(`<rect width="5" height="5"/>${"<!-- pad -->".repeat(20)}`);
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expectProcessingError(() => sanitizeSvgSync(big), 413, "svg-too-large");
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});
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it("stays stable over many consecutive calls", () => {
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const dirty = svg(`<rect width="5" height="5"/>`);
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for (let i = 0; i < 150; i++) {
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expect(sanitizeSvgSync(dirty)).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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}
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// sanitizeSvg: async wrapper and internal failures
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe("sanitizeSvg: async wrapper", () => {
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it("runs inline when no pool is configured", async () => {
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const clean = await sanitizeSvg(svg(`<script>alert("xss")</script><rect width="5" height="5"/>`));
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expect(clean).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expect(clean).not.toMatch(/<script/i);
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});
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});
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describe("sanitizeSvgSync: internal failures", () => {
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it("maps an unexpected failure to 503 svg-sanitization-failed", () => {
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// A Uint8Array passes the byte-length check and then breaks `stripProlog`
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// (it has no `.replace`), which is not a ProcessingError.
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const err = captureError(() => sanitizeSvgSync(new Uint8Array([60, 115]) as unknown as string));
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expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ProcessingError);
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const processingError = err as ProcessingError;
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expect(processingError.statusCode).toBe(503);
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expect(processingError.errorBody.code).toBe("svg-sanitization-failed");
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expect(processingError.errorBody.hint ?? "").not.toContain("replace");
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// sanitizeSvg: cross-mode corpus
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe("sanitizeSvgSync: corpus decisions", () => {
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it("keeps a data: URI in an image href (pins the cross-mode behavior)", () => {
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const dirty = svg(`<image href="" width="5" height="5"/>`);
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const clean = sanitizeSvgSync(dirty);
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// Observed with DOMPurify 3.4.x and the svg profile: data: URIs survive.
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expect(clean).toContain("data:image/png;base64");
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// POST /api/svg/sanitize
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Build the multipart body exactly like the JVM backend does in
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// `app.media.remote/build-multipart-stream`: field `file`, filename `file`,
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// the part content type as the declared mtype, and the `----PenpotBoundary<ms>`
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// boundary. This pins the wire contract from the service side.
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function backendMultipartBody(boundary: string, svgText: string): string {
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return (
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`--${boundary}\r\n` +
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`Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="file"\r\n` +
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`Content-Type: image/svg+xml\r\n` +
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`\r\n` +
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svgText +
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`\r\n--${boundary}--\r\n`
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);
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}
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function createTestApp() {
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const app = express();
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// Low threshold to exercise the disk-storage path of the upload.
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configureUploadLimits({ maxFileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, memoryThreshold: 10 });
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const queueMiddleware = createQueueMiddleware(10);
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app.use(timeoutMiddleware(5000));
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app.use("/api/svg", sharedKeyAuth("test-key"), queueMiddleware, createSvgRoutes());
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app.use(errorHandler);
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return app;
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}
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describe("POST /api/svg/sanitize", () => {
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let app: ReturnType<typeof createTestApp>;
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beforeAll(() => {
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app = createTestApp();
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});
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afterAll(() => {
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configureSvgLimits({ maxSize: DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE });
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});
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it("returns 200 with the sanitized SVG", async () => {
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const dirty = svg(`<script>alert("xss")</script><rect width="5" height="5"/>`);
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const res = await request(app)
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.post("/api/svg/sanitize")
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.set("x-shared-key", "test-key")
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.attach("file", Buffer.from(dirty, "utf8"), { filename: "x.svg", contentType: "image/svg+xml" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.headers["content-type"]).toContain("image/svg+xml");
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const body = Buffer.isBuffer(res.body) ? res.body.toString("utf8") : res.text;
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expect(body).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expectNoDangerousOutput(body);
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expect(body).toContain("<rect");
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});
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it("returns 403 without the shared key", async () => {
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const res = await request(app)
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.post("/api/svg/sanitize")
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.attach("file", Buffer.from(svg(`<rect/>`), "utf8"), { filename: "x.svg", contentType: "image/svg+xml" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("returns 400 without a file", async () => {
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const res = await request(app).post("/api/svg/sanitize").set("x-shared-key", "test-key");
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe("invalid-svg-file");
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});
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it("returns 400 when the svg is malformed", async () => {
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const res = await request(app)
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.post("/api/svg/sanitize")
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.set("x-shared-key", "test-key")
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.attach("file", Buffer.from("this is not an svg", "utf8"), {
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filename: "x.svg",
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contentType: "image/svg+xml",
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe("invalid-svg-file");
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});
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it("returns 413 when the svg is larger than the configured maximum", async () => {
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configureSvgLimits({ maxSize: 10 });
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try {
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const res = await request(app)
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.post("/api/svg/sanitize")
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.set("x-shared-key", "test-key")
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.attach("file", Buffer.from(svg(`<rect width="5" height="5"/>`), "utf8"), {
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filename: "x.svg",
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contentType: "image/svg+xml",
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(413);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe("svg-too-large");
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} finally {
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configureSvgLimits({ maxSize: DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE });
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}
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});
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it("accepts the multipart body the JVM backend builds", async () => {
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const boundary = `----PenpotBoundary${Date.now()}`;
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const body = backendMultipartBody(boundary, svg(`<script>alert("xss")</script><rect width="5" height="5"/>`));
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const res = await request(app)
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.post("/api/svg/sanitize")
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.set("x-shared-key", "test-key")
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.set("Content-Type", `multipart/form-data; boundary=${boundary}`)
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.send(Buffer.from(body, "utf8"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.headers["content-type"]).toContain("image/svg+xml");
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const out = Buffer.isBuffer(res.body) ? res.body.toString("utf8") : res.text;
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expect(out).toMatch(/^<svg[\s/>]/i);
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expect(out).not.toMatch(/<script/i);
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});
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it("returns the JSON error shape the JVM backend translates", async () => {
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const boundary = `----PenpotBoundary${Date.now()}`;
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const body = backendMultipartBody(boundary, "this is not an svg");
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const res = await request(app)
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.post("/api/svg/sanitize")
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.set("x-shared-key", "test-key")
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.set("Content-Type", `multipart/form-data; boundary=${boundary}`)
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.send(Buffer.from(body, "utf8"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ type: "validation", code: "invalid-svg-file" }));
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});
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});
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