* ✨ Enforce idle and absolute session expiration
Sessions now expire on two server-side conditions: an idle window
(PENPOT_AUTH_TOKEN_COOKIE_MAX_AGE, default 7d) and an absolute cap
from creation (PENPOT_AUTH_TOKEN_COOKIE_MAX_AGE_ABSOLUTE, default
30d, enforced by the token :exp claim). The daily session-gc task
deletes rows that exceed either window, so idle sessions can no
longer be replayed and active sessions are not deleted at the idle
window.
Also remove the legacy v1 HTTP sessions: the http_session table and
the string-id / :ver 0 token code paths are gone. Any v1 cookie now
requires a fresh login.
Document the session expiration configuration in the technical guide
and add a backend memory describing the token, renewal and GC model.
Closes#11646
AI-assisted-by: deepseek-v4.1-flash
* 🐛 Address session-expiration review findings F1-F4
Fix the unreadable test (a stray paren broke whole-suite
discovery), enforce idle expiration on every request in
wrap-authz, fail boot fast when the absolute cap sits below
the idle window, and align config defaults with the memory
rule while fixing its migration number and stale reference.
Closes#11646
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 🐛 Restore rate-limit headers and add Retry-After
The account-lockout change replaced the header-forwarding 429 handler
with a body-only one, so existing RPC rate-limit responses lost their
x-rate-limit-remaining and x-rate-limit-reset headers. Account lockout
never sent Retry-After either.
Make handle-error :rate-limit preserve ::http/headers and add a
retry-after header when the exception carries a non-nil :ttl in
seconds, keeping the current JSON body. Add focused tests for both the
lockout and the RPC limiter paths.
Document activation, defaults, password/LDAP scope, Redis fail-open
behavior, and the lockout risk, and record the final HTTP contract in
the backend auth memory.
Refs #11397
AI-assisted-by: deepseek-v4.1-flash
* 🐛 Add Retry-After to RPC 429 and expose headers in CORS
Address review follow-ups on the account-lockout 429 contract:
- The RPC limiter now sets retry-after in its 429 headers (seconds
until the longest rejecting limit resets), so it matches the
account-lockout response and the HTTP standard.
- CORS exposes retry-after, x-rate-limit-remaining, and
x-rate-limit-reset so browser clients can read them.
- Use backticks for Retry-After and account-locked in the docs for
consistency with nearby sections.
Refs #11397
AI-assisted-by: deepseek-v4.1-flash
The session-renewal test called bare make-dummy-request, which
no longer resolves. Qualify it with the existing th alias for
backend-tests.helpers, matching every other call site.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
The management API shared-key-auth middleware was using the standard = operator for key comparison, which is vulnerable to timing attacks. The RPC middleware already uses constant-time comparison via MessageDigest/isEqual.
This change:
- Makes constant-time-eq? public in app.http.middleware
- Updates app.http.management/shared-key-auth to use mw/constant-time-eq?
- Fixes an inconsistency where the nil-key branch returned a 2-arg function
- Adds comprehensive tests for the management shared-key-auth middleware
Closes#11426
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
Session tokens now carry an :exp claim anchored to created-at (not
modified-at), so activity cannot extend the session beyond the
absolute maximum (default 30 days, configurable via
PENPOT_AUTH_TOKEN_COOKIE_MAX_AGE_ABSOLUTE). The existing token
verification already rejects expired tokens, so enforcement is
automatic. Also extends the GC task to purge expired
http_session_v2 rows, which were previously never cleaned up.
Closes#11444
AI-assisted-by: longcat-2.0
* 🚑 Remove internal error details from HTTP error responses
PostgreSQL exceptions, I/O exceptions, and unhandled errors were
leaking raw database messages (table names, constraint names,
SQLSTATE codes), filesystem paths, and internal exception details
to API clients via :hint, :state, and :path response fields.
Remove these fields from server-error responses while keeping
full error context in server-side logs for operators.
Closes#11287
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 🚑 Strip internal fields and map PG errors to safe messages
Complete the security fix for GHSA-r8wx-23q6-w3gf by addressing
the incomplete redaction found in code review.
Add strip-internal-fields helper to dissoc :hint, :state, :path,
and :context from error response data in three handlers that
previously passed raw ex-data through to clients:
- handle-error :internal
- handle-exception :default (else branch)
- handle-error :assertion (else branch)
Add pgsql-state->message to map PostgreSQL SQLSTATE codes to safe,
client-facing messages (e.g. 23505 → "A conflicting entry already
exists") instead of returning raw PG error text. Include :message
in all PSQLException response branches.
Add regression tests asserting :hint, :state, :path, :context are
absent from responses for :internal and unhandled ex-info errors.
Closes#11287
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 🚑 Keep :hint in error protocol, fix unsafe sources
Refine the security fix based on code review feedback.
Keep :hint as part of the error protocol — it is essential for
controlled error communication. Remove it from strip-internal-fields
(which now only strips :state, :path, :context).
Fix the actual sources of unsafe :hint values:
- http/middleware.clj: replace (ex-message cause) with safe static
strings for IllegalArgumentException, RequestTooBigException, and
EOFException. These :validation errors return ex-data verbatim
to clients, so raw exception messages were leaking internals.
- PSQLException handler: use :hint instead of :message for the
SQLSTATE-mapped messages, staying consistent with the error
protocol.
Update tests to assert :hint is present (with safe static values)
in :internal and unhandled ex-info responses, and absent only from
bare RuntimeException and IOException responses.
Closes#11287
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 📎 Update serena documentation about creating-prs workflow
* 🐛 Handle unrecognized JSON escape sequences as malformed-json
When clojure.data.json's read-escaped-char encounters an unrecognized
escape sequence (e.g. a backslash followed by '}', or other case
fall-throughs in the parser) in a JSON request body, it throws a bare
IllegalArgumentException. Previously this fell through to the generic
RuntimeException branch in wrap-parse-request's handle-error, which
unwrapped and recurred without matching, eventually reaching the
internal-error handler and producing HTTP 500 + an error report — even
though the root cause was malformed client input, not a server bug.
The fix converts any IllegalArgumentException raised in the JSON parse
path into a `:validation`/`:malformed-json` error by raising a new
ex-info (which is caught by the top-level error handler in
`app.http/router-handler`). The result is an HTTP 400 response with a
descriptive hint, and no error report is generated. This addresses
~10% of all error reports received.
The new IAE branch is placed before the RuntimeException branch in
the cond (since IllegalArgumentException IS-A RuntimeException) and
uses the throw-style (ex/raise) to match the existing
RequestTooBigException / EOFException branches. A comment above the
handle-error cond documents why raising is intentional and is caught
by the top-level app.http error handler, not by the per-route
wrap-errors middleware.
Test suite changes:
- Extend the existing `DummyRequest` defrecord in
`http_middleware_test.clj` from 2 fields to 12 fields, implementing
every IRequest method, and add a private `make-dummy-request`
constructor that accepts an options map with every key optional and
sensible `:or` defaults. Future fields added to DummyRequest won't
break existing call sites as long as the `:or` defaults are kept in
sync.
- Remove the now-redundant `JsonRequest` defrecord and migrate all 11
`->DummyRequest` call sites to `make-dummy-request`.
- Add 6 new deftest cases:
- parse-request-illegal-argument-exception: malformed JSON body
(containing `\}`) is converted to `:malformed-json`.
- parse-request-request-too-big-exception: RequestTooBigException
is converted to `:request-body-too-large`.
- parse-request-eof-exception: java.io.EOFException is converted
to `:malformed-json`.
- parse-request-runtime-exception-with-cause: a wrapped
RuntimeException recurses on ex-cause and dispatches to the
matching specific branch.
- parse-request-runtime-exception-without-cause: a bare
RuntimeException falls through to errors/handle, returning 500
with :type :server-error :code :unexpected.
- parse-request-non-runtime-throwable: java.io.IOException (a
non-RuntimeException Throwable) is handled by the dedicated
handle-exception method, returning 500 with :code :io-exception.
Together, the new tests cover all 6 branches of wrap-parse-request's
handle-error cond.
Refs #10804.
AI-assisted-by: minimax-m3
The audit event validation was failing when processing error reports that
contain string profile-id values. The error report storage converts
profile-id to string format, but the audit schema expects a UUID.
Changes:
- Modified prepare-rpc-event to convert string profile-id to UUID using
uuid/parse* (exception-safe parsing)
- Updated access token middleware to set ::id and ::type on request so
audit context includes token identification
- Added tests for profile-id conversion and token context population
Closes#10897
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
