* ✨ Extend backend histogram buckets beyond 7.5s
Give every backend timing histogram a tail past the shared 7500ms cap
so slow RPC calls, CLIMIT waits and background tasks report real
quantiles instead of clipping at the top bucket.
Request and wait metrics grow to 60s, background tasks to 300s and
Redis eval to 10s; the sub-7.5s buckets stay untouched to keep the
history comparable.
Closes#12408
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 🐛 Fix flaky assertion in climit republish test
Read the last published waiting value instead of the exact
publication list. The sampler thread started with the component
runs its first tick asynchronously, and when it lands inside the
recording window it publishes the same count twice, which made
the full-suite CI run fail while focused runs stayed green.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* ✨ Add file_data blob to JSON decode helper
Allow decoding file_data blobs (app.util.blob) to JSON
for investigations with jq, offline from a blob file or
from nREPL with the backend running.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* ✨ Add validation step timings to update-file logs and metrics
Measure the six phases inside process-changes-and-validate
(resolve-libs, process-changes, soft and hard affected and
schema validations) with tpoint and try/finally, so timings
are recorded even when a hard validation throws.
Publish each phase to a new histogram
penpot_rpc_update_file_validation_timing with a fixed step
label using the request buckets (up to 60000 ms), and extend
the update-file debug log with the same *-ms fields plus
file, project and team ids. The deferred log only runs on
success, so failures get an inline error log with partial
timings.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 💄 Translate decode-file-data comments to English
Translate the Spanish docstrings, section headers and test
messages of the file_data decode helper to English, keeping
code untouched. The repo convention is English in code and
comments; the helper was first written in Spanish.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
Restoring a file only un-marked the database rows (`file`,
`file_media_object`, `file_change`, `file_data`, `file_thumbnail`,
`file_tagged_object_thumbnail`), not the storage objects those rows
reference. An object that was already marked for deletion stayed
marked while a live row pointed at it, and those foreign keys are `NO
ACTION`: the storage GC cannot delete it and skips it forever (and
before the GC learned to skip, it cost the whole nightly run).
Restoring a team had the same gap with its font variants.
Both restores now unmark the storage objects of the rows they bring
back: the media and the thumbnail of the file media objects, the media
of the file and object thumbnails, the `storage-ref-id` of the file
data, and the four files of a font variant. Objects referenced by other
rows are left alone.
AI-assisted-by: deepseek-v4.1-flash
The command declared its limit as a plain keyword next to
`::climit/key-fn`, metadata that `climit/wrap` does not read: it
takes the key only from the positional `key-fn` of the vector form.
The limit was a single shared one, so when one call got stuck it
held the only permit and every audit batch of that instance was
rejected with 429 from then on.
The test builds the limiter from the command metadata and checks
that two profiles end up with different limiters.
AI-assisted-by: deepseek-v4.1-flash
Delete the team-scoped file, project and pin relations on leave-team
and delete-team-member, require a live team membership in the file,
project, search and listing permission queries, and clean
pre-existing orphan rows with a migration. Former members now get
not-found on file actions instead of keeping read and rename access
(GHSA-v9r9-h77c-55m2).
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
The event was written twice per accepted organization invitation. The
backend submitted it, and the browser then re-submitted a copy of the
props that the backend had already put in the response under
`:organization-invitation-audit` (`handle-token :team-invitation` in
`verify-token.cljs`). Both rows carried the same name with different prop
vocabularies, and the browser copy only existed when the browser finished
the flow.
Emit the event from the backend only. It now also carries the three props
that lived in the browser copy: the organization member count before the
add, the add source, and whether the invitee also joined a team. The
origin moves to the event context as `:event-origin`. The response no
longer includes `:organization-invitation-audit`, so the browser stops
emitting the event and `verify-token.cljs` drops its
`app.main.data.event` require.
The `accept-*` events of this command now share one prop vocabulary:
`:profile-id` for the accepting profile, `:invited-by` for the inviter
and `:profile-email` for the email, replacing the mix of
`:user-id`/`:user-who-send-invitation` and `:email`.
Audit consumers of `accept-organization-invitation` now see one row per
acceptance instead of two, and must read the new prop names.
AI-assisted-by: space-bunny-free
* 🐛 Attribute audit events to the caller, not the response
prepare-rpc-event took the event profile-id from the result map
whenever it carried one, before falling back to the caller. Any
command returning a response with a :profile-id key silently
credited the action to somebody else.
get-error-report returns the report with its decoded content
merged in, and that content holds the profile that owned the
report, so privileged reads were logged against the users whose
crashes were being inspected. verify-token on a team invitation
returns the inviter's profile-id, so accepting an invitation was
logged against the inviter.
Resolution is now ::audit/profile-id metadata, then
::rpc/profile-id, then the zero uuid; the response is never
consulted. The two verify-token branches that relied on it now
declare the profile in the result metadata. Every other command
either already declared it or returns no :profile-id; all 30
registered command namespaces were checked.
The tests that pinned the old behavior are replaced by ones
covering the new contract.
AI-assisted-by: space-bunny-free
* 🐛 Coerce the audit profile-id override to a uuid
The only sanctioned way for a command to override the profile of an
audit event is the ::audit/profile-id metadata, and the value is set
by hand in a dozen commands, some of them reading it from token
claims or other sources we do not type.
schema:event requires a uuid and submit* swallows the validation
error, so a string did not fail loudly: the row was dropped silently.
Values that cannot become a uuid are now discarded with a warning
and the event falls back to the caller, which is always a valid uuid.
A uuid, the common case, exits on the first check.
AI-assisted-by: space-bunny-free
* ✨ Restrict optional RPC ids to user-provided UUIDs
Add ::sm/user-provided-uuid, backed by a version and variant
aware regex that only accepts v4, v7 and v8 instances. Use it
for the optional :id of the creation RPC commands so reserved
versions such as v3 are rejected at validation time. Reads
such as get-team keep the lax ::sm/uuid. Cover the predicate
and the schema on both JVM and JS runtimes.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* ✨ Cover id version restriction at the RPC boundary
Add backend regression tests proving the seven creation commands
reject reserved-version ids (v3) with :params-validation and
accept v4 ids (plus v7/v8 on create-team) through the real
decode and validate path. Also drop two duplicated assertions
and document the version and variant of every fixture UUID in
user-provided-test.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
Drop the onboarding-03 experiment consulted through
external-feature-flag, keeping the false-branch behavior: registration
never requests a welcome file and the workspace never shows the
onboarding modals. Remove the now-unused welcome-file machinery on the
backend (RPC wiring, welcome_file namespace, welcome-file-id prop and
the post-login redirect). Keep the external-feature-flag helper as the
seam for future experiments and note it in mem:frontend/core.
Closes#11705
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* ✨ Add expires-in option to create-demo-profile
Allow passing an optional expires-in duration when creating a demo profile so its purge is scheduled sooner than the global deletion delay. Values below 5 minutes or above the global delay are rejected with an invalid-expires-in validation error, resolved before any profile is created.
Closes#11573
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 🐛 Make duration schema decoding total instead of throwing
parse-duration returned by the duration schema decoder threw DateTimeParseException on invalid strings, escaping params validation as a raw error. It now returns the input unchanged so invalid values fail the duration predicate with a clean params-validation error. Closes#11573 AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 📎 Fix doc version for expires-in change entry
The expires-in change entry was documented under 2.20 but the current version is 2.18.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 🐛 Reject duplicate chunk index in chunked uploads
Repeat uploads of the same chunk index each stored a new
object because upload-chunk only checked index bounds. Run the
handler in a transaction, lock the session row and reject an
already-stored index with :duplicate-chunk-index.
Also harden assemble-chunks to require exactly indices 0..n-1
so gaps or duplicates fail instead of assembling a corrupt
file. Covers media, fonts and binfile through the shared
helper.
Closes#11634
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* ✨ Cap upload chunk size at 30 MiB by default
Chunks were only bounded by the 350 MiB HTTP body limit while the
30 MiB caps applied to the assembled file. Add :upload-max-chunk-size
(default 30 MiB, tunable via env) and reject oversize chunks in
upload-chunk with :validation/:chunk-too-large before anything is
stored. App clients slice at 25/10 MiB, so no frontend change needed.
AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
* 🐛 Fix tx-run! call and storage resolve in upload-chunk
Pass cfg as first arg to db/tx-run!, which expects [system f & params; without it every chunk upload raised invalid system/cfg provided and no chunk was stored, breaking assemble with missing-chunks. Also resolve storage without reuse-conn: put-object! writes to the backend outside any transaction, so reusing the tx connection gives no atomicity. Media, font and storage suites green, lint and format clean. AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
Rewrite sql:file-comment-users to join comment with
comment_thread and union the requesting profile id, then
join the resulting small id set against profile.
The previous "id IN (subquery) OR id = ?" forced a
sequential scan over the whole profile table with a hashed
subplan filter, taking ~1.9s on large instances. The
semi-join lets the planner use profile_pkey, dropping the
query to sub-millisecond time. UNION (not UNION ALL) keeps
the previous dedup semantics when the requesting profile is
also a commenter.
AI-assisted-by: deepseek-flash
Add optional skip-onboarding param to create-demo-profile. When true, the demo profile is created with onboarding-viewed and release-notes-viewed set, so it skips the onboarding flow. Default keeps the current behavior. Cover both cases with RPC tests. AI-assisted-by: muse-spark-1.3-contributor
Fix two security vulnerabilities in comment RPCs when accessed
via share-links:
- GHSA-4p97-v4wg-jxfx: Share-link holders with who-comment=team
could bypass the restriction and comment. The check-comment-permissions!
function treated can-read as sufficient, but share-links always set
can-read=true.
- GHSA-fwm4-hm9f-rmcp: Comment query RPCs returned threads from all
pages, ignoring the share-link's :pages restriction.
Changes:
- files.clj: Differentiate :membership vs :share-link in
check-comment-permissions!. For share-links, require
has-comment-permissions? only (who-comment=all).
- comments.clj: Filter threads by (:pages perms) for share-link
access in get-comment-threads, get-comment-thread, and get-comments.
Closes#11370
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
Add owner protection to ::delete-team-member RPC command.
Previously, a team admin could remove the team owner, permanently
locking them out of their team and all resources.
Changes:
- Fetch target member data before deletion
- Validate member exists (return :not-found if not)
- Reject removal if target is owner and caller is not owner
This mirrors the existing protection in update-team-member-role.
Closes#11367
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* 🐛 Filter share-link tokens in get-view-only-bundle response
The get-view-only-bundle RPC command returned all share-link tokens for a file, allowing an anonymous holder of a restrictive share-link to enumerate and use more permissive tokens.
When authenticating via a share-link, the response now only includes the share-link used for authentication, preventing token disclosure and scope escalation.
Implemented using TDD:
- RED: Test demonstrates vulnerability (all tokens visible)
- GREEN: Filter share-links when (:type perms) = :share-link
- Verified all existing tests still pass
Closes#11285
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* 🐛 Add membership-side test for share-link token visibility
Add test coverage for the allow side of the share-link token filtering:
team members and file owners should still see all share-links, while
anonymous share-link holders only see their own token.
This protects the (:type perms) = :share-link guard from accidental
regression that could break the owner's share-link management dialog.
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* ⚡ Optimize demo user setup for performance tests
Use UUID-based demo emails to prevent concurrent profile collisions.\nUse fast PBKDF2 hashing for demo profiles while keeping regular user hashing unchanged.\nAdd focused coverage for hashing, email uniqueness, and the feature flag.\n\nAI-assisted-by: gpt-5.6-luna
* 🐛 Harden font upload test setup
Report upload-session errors before chunk validation.
Skip chunk uploads when the session ID is invalid.
Remove unnecessary Mockery state from the foreign-font test.
AI-assisted-by: gpt-5.6-luna
* ✨ Add demo profile purge task
Schedule delayed deletion for demo profiles through the worker system.
Restore normal profile filtering and cover the purge handler with tests.
AI-assisted-by: gpt-5.6-luna
* 🐛 Add configurable limits for ZIP entry count and object size in v3 import
Add binfile-import-max-zip-entries (default 500,000) and
binfile-import-max-object-size (default 100 MiB) config entries.
Both are configurable via PENPOT_BINFILE_IMPORT_MAX_ZIP_ENTRIES and
PENPOT_BINFILE_IMPORT_MAX_OBJECT_SIZE env vars.
Entry count is checked before processing begins. Per-object size is
checked after each storage object content is resolved.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 🐛 Enforce actual decompressed byte limits on v3 import
The previous object-size check trusted the ZIP entry header's declared
size (ZipEntry.getSize()), which a malicious zip-bomb can forge. The
check would pass, then the full decompressed payload would be read
anyway during hashing and storage persistence.
Add size-limiting-stream, a FilterInputStream wrapper that counts
actual bytes read and raises :validation :max-file-size-reached when
the configured limit is exceeded. Wire it into zip-entry-storage-content
so both the hash calculation and storage write paths are bounded by
real decompressed bytes, not declared header size.
Also wire import limits into management.clj (clone-template) and
debug.clj (import-handler + clone path) for defense-in-depth, and
add a test that exercises the object-size limit with a real storage
object in the exported ZIP.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
The handler previously allowed any team member (including viewers) to
generate invitation tokens. Now requires at least edition-level
permissions (can-edit, admin, or owner).
Closes#11358
AI-assisted-by: longcat-2.0
* 🐛 Enforce ownership check on tempfile bucket access
The upload-tempfile RPC stores profile-id with tempfile objects, but
objects-handler never verified the requester was the owner. Any
authenticated user who knew the UUID could access the tempfile.
Add ownership check: tempfile bucket now requires the request's
profile-id to match the stored profile-id. Returns 404 on mismatch
(not 403) to avoid leaking object existence.
Legacy tempfiles without stored profile-id remain accessible to any
authenticated user for backward compatibility.
Closes#11269
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* ♻️ Extract tempfile-bucket constant and fix docstring indentation
Extract the 'tempfile' bucket string literal into a named constant
(sto/tempfile-bucket) to prevent typos and make future bucket renames
trivial. Updated 9 occurrences across 7 files.
Also fixed minor docstring indentation inconsistency in authenticated?
function.
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* ♻️ Refactor process-bucket! and authenticated? helpers
Replace case with cond in process-bucket! to properly resolve
sto/tempfile-bucket var from another namespace (case does not
evaluate qualified vars at compile time).
Redefine authenticated? in terms of request-profile-id to remove
duplicated lookup logic.
Closes#11269
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 🐛 Add accumulated storage byte quota for media uploads
Add media-storage-bytes-per-team quote to prevent persistent DoS via
repeated uploads. The quota sums storage_object sizes from both
file_media_object (media + thumbnails) and team_font_variant
(otf/ttf/woff1/woff2). Default limit is 20 GiB per team, configurable
via PENPOT_QUOTES_MEDIA_STORAGE_BYTES_PER_TEAM.
The check is invoked in upload-file-media-object before processing,
looking up the team-id via file -> project -> team_id join.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 🐛 Fix deduplicated storage overcounting in media-storage-bytes-per-team quote
The SQL query sql:get-media-storage-bytes-per-team used UNION ALL
across six SELECT branches that each produce a so_id reference.
When deduplication causes multiple file_media_object or
team_font_variant rows to point at the same storage_object, UNION ALL
counts that objects size once per reference — inflating "used bytes"
and causing false :max-quote-reached rejections.
Change all five UNION ALL to UNION so that duplicate so_id values are
collapsed before the JOIN storage_object / SUM(so.size).
Add a test (media-storage-bytes-quote-deduped) that creates one
storage_object referenced by two file_media_object rows and asserts
the computed usage reflects the deduplicated physical size, not 2x.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
The get-page RPC command did not validate that the requested page-id was within the share-link's authorized :pages set, allowing share-link holders to read out-of-scope pages. The get-file-fragment command had the same issue.
This fix adds page scope validation to get-page, rejecting requests for pages not in the share-link's :pages set with a :not-found error. For get-file-fragment, share-link access is denied entirely as fragments lack direct page-id mapping.
The fix aligns these commands with the existing correct behavior in get-view-only-bundle, which already filters pages based on share-link scope.
Closes#11281
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* 🐛 Add ownership check to share-link deletion
The delete-share-link RPC command only verified file-level edit
permission but did not check if the caller owned the share-link.
This allowed any file editor to delete share-links created by
other users, disrupting collaborative workflows.
The fix adds an ownership check that allows deletion only by:
- The share-link creator (owner-id matches profile-id)
- File admins (is-admin permission)
- File owners (is-owner permission)
Implemented using TDD:
- RED: Test demonstrates IDOR vulnerability (editor can delete)
- GREEN: Ownership check prevents unauthorized deletion
- All existing tests continue to pass
Closes#11289
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* 🐛 Add test coverage for share-link deletion escape hatches
Address code review feedback for PR #11290:
- Add test for editor deleting their own share-link
- Add test for admin deleting editor's share-link
- Add test for owner deleting editor's share-link
- Remove redundant :is-owner check (already included in :is-admin)
- Add clarifying comment about :is-admin including :is-owner
Closes#11289
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
Restrict version parameter to supported values (1 or 3) via schema
validation instead of accepting any integer. Add content-based format
detection when version is not provided, using bfc/parse-file-format
to inspect file magic bytes.
Closes#11105
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
The create-upload-session RPC method accepted total-chunks values of 0
or negative numbers without validation, creating inconsistent session
state. Add {:min 1} constraint to the schema to reject invalid values
at input validation.
Closes#11103
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
The clone-file-media-object RPC command only checked edit permissions
on the destination file. The source media object was fetched directly
by UUID without verifying the caller had access to the file that owns
it.
This fix adds a read permission check on the source file before
cloning. If the caller lacks read access to the source file, the
operation fails with :not-found to avoid leaking information about
the existence of files/media the caller cannot access.
Closes#11087
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
Prevent BOLA in chunked upload assembly by verifying session
ownership. The assemble-chunks function now requires a profile-id
parameter and scopes the upload_session lookup accordingly, matching
the pattern already used by upload-chunk.
All three callers (assemble-file-media-object, create-font-variant,
import-binfile) updated to pass the authenticated profile-id.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
Omit nil optional profile fields before frontend schema validation and RPC persistence. Preserve omitted language and theme values in backend updates, and add regression coverage for partial profile saves.
AI-assisted-by: gpt-5.6-luna
Add role-ceiling check to create-team-invitations and
update-team-invitation-role methods. These RPC methods allowed
team admins to grant or elevate invitations to :owner role,
bypassing the protection that exists in update-team-member-role.
The fix replicates the existing check from update-team-member-role:
reject promotion to :owner when the caller is not an owner.
Closes#11098
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
Apply climit with 4 global permits and 1 per-profile permit (queue 2)
to prevent connection pool exhaustion from concurrent imports. Each
import holds a DB connection for its entire duration with idle
transaction timeout disabled, so unbounded concurrency could exhaust
the pool (default 60 connections).
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
When a profile is deleted, only the current session was being
invalidated. Other active sessions on different devices remained
functional until the background cleanup task completed.
Add session/invalidate-all helper that deletes all sessions for
a profile by profile_id, and call it from delete-profile before
the response transform. This ensures immediate access revocation
across all devices when an account is deleted.
Closes#11114
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
Share link IDs function as capability secrets — anyone possessing
the ID can read a file without authentication. The previous UUIDv8
scheme is predictable (56 bits fixed per process + 48-bit timestamp).
Changed to uuid/random (UUIDv4) for genuine unpredictability.
Closes#11116
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
`create-font-variant` destructures `uploads` and never reads it: the
handler passes the whole `params` map to `prepare-font-data-from-uploads`.
`clj-kondo` reports it as an unused binding and exits 2, which fails the
Lint step of the Backend workflow, and the Lint step runs before the
tests, so no branch based on `develop` can run the backend suite at all.
AI-assisted-by: mixed models
Replace the inline organization map in schema:create-organization-invitation with cto/schema:organization-with-avatar, eliminating schema duplication and fixing mismatched validation rules for :logo and :sso-active fields.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5
Prevent cross-team font injection by checking that when a font-id
already has variants, they belong to the same team. This closes a
BOLA gap where a user with team edit permissions could create a
font variant referencing a font-id from another team.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* 🐛 Add backend password validation with complexity rules and dictionary check
Enforce minimum 8-character password length, require at least 1 lowercase
letter, 1 uppercase letter, 1 digit, and 1 special character, and reject
common passwords using Passay library with a 10k-entry wordlist from
SecLists during registration and password change flows.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
* ✨ Improve user feedback
When the password is invalid, the user now gets extra indications to make it stronger, so it can be valid.
* 🐛 Fix remove unneeded common password check
The dictionary check is only relevant for passwords that meet all other requirements, but all 10,000 common passwords would fail the character requirements, so this check is not needed
---------
Co-authored-by: Luis de Dios <luis.dedios@kaleidos.net>
Add sanitize-svg function that removes dangerous elements and attributes:
- script tags
- foreignObject elements
- Event handler attributes (onload, onmouseover, etc.)
- javascript: URLs from href/xlink:href attributes
Apply sanitization in process-main-image before storing SVG files.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro