* 🐛 Escape SVG values and sanitize every SVG upload
The SVG sanitizer removed dangerous elements and attributes by name and
then wrote the tree back with clojure.xml/emit, which escapes nothing.
A payload hidden in an attribute value or in a text node became live
markup again: an id of "x' onload='alert(1)'" was stored as a real
onload handler, and an entity encoded script tag was stored as a real
script element.
Write the filtered tree with a serializer that escapes text and
attribute values, and route every path that stores an uploaded SVG
through it. The thumbnail writers (create-file-object-thumbnail and
create-file-thumbnail) and the organization logo stored the upload
untouched, so they could plant live markup in a public bucket.
The filter only knows about SVG elements, so it also accepted
documents that are not SVG at all: a page with an iframe or a meta
refresh was stored as an image. The sanitizer now rejects any document
whose root is not an svg element in the SVG namespace, and it compares
the scheme of an url the way the browser does, so a scheme split with
a tab or a line break no longer slips through the javascript: filter.
The attributes are written sorted by name, because the parser hands
them over in the reverse order of the document and the output changed
on every sanitization.
The profile picture of an identity provider is not stored either when
it is an SVG: the avatar is always rendered as an image, so an SVG
would only add the risk of keeping live markup in the storage. The
dimensions of an SVG are now read from its local name, so an SVG with
a namespace prefix can be uploaded like any other.
The logo had no size limit and the sanitizer reads the whole file, so
it now honors the media max file size.
The output shape changes with it: no line breaks, double quotes, and
the single quote of an attribute value escaped as an entity. The hash
of every stored SVG object changes with it.
The media tests use cuerdas.core instead of clojure.string, as the rest
of the codebase does.
Relates to GHSA-qwhj-rchj-58mg
AI-assisted-by: minimax-m3.1-flash
* 🐛 Drop non-SVG namespace subtrees in the SVG sanitizer
The sanitizer only checked the namespace of the root, so a child could
rebind xmlns to XHTML and smuggle live HTML (iframe/srcdoc/meta) past the
blocklist. The serializer escapes attribute values, but the browser decodes
them again, so srcdoc stays live.
Track the namespace bindings through the recursion and drop any element
that is not in the SVG namespace, with its subtree. The root is validated
up front with the same model, so a document that is not an svg document is
rejected with an honest hint instead of a misleading one.
The default namespace is stored under a namespaced key, because a prefix
literally named `default` collided with the internal key and re-opened the
same hole through a prefixed binding. The attribute filter now keeps
`xmlns`/`xmlns:*` declarations, which are not event handlers, so a prefix
named like one does not end up undeclared in the output.
The blocklist also drops HTML-only elements written in the svg namespace
(iframe, meta, embed, link, base).
Add regression tests for the child rebinding, for the prefixed variants,
for the `default` prefix, for the root local name, for the
create-file-media-object-from-url path (mocked download), and for the
HTML-only tags. Assert double-quoted attributes in the clean content test.
Relates to GHSA-qwhj-rchj-58mg
AI-assisted-by: longcat-2.5-free
* 🐛 Sanitize SVG namespace-prefixed elements and attributes
The SVG sanitizer compared qualified tag and attribute names against
its blocklists. The XML parser keeps the namespace prefix in the
keyword name (❌script), so a script element written with a prefix
bound to the SVG namespace passed sanitization untouched and was
later served as image/svg+xml, executing in the Penpot origin.
Match tags and attributes on the local name (the part after the last
colon) instead, so dangerous elements and attributes are removed no
matter which prefix they use. Legitimately prefixed attributes such
as xlink:href keep working.
Closes#12071
AI-assisted-by: glm-5.3-flash
* ♻️ Cover prefixed SVG vectors and hoist sanitizer blocklist
Apply the code review findings on top of the sanitizer fix:
- Add a test for the javascript: href vector using a prefix bound to
the xlink namespace, the other payload variant the old exact-key
check missed.
- Add a test asserting that legitimately prefixed attributes such as
xml:space are preserved by the local-name matching.
- Hoist the dangerous-tags blocklist next to the other sanitizer
policy defs and bind the keyword name once in local-name.
Relates to #12071
AI-assisted-by: glm-5.3-flash
Add sanitize-svg function that removes dangerous elements and attributes:
- script tags
- foreignObject elements
- Event handler attributes (onload, onmouseover, etc.)
- javascript: URLs from href/xlink:href attributes
Apply sanitization in process-main-image before storing SVG files.
AI-assisted-by: mimo-v2.5-pro
When ImageMagick fails to process an uploaded image (e.g., corrupted PNG
with invalid IHDR data), the backend was raising :type :internal with
:code :imagemagick-error, which mapped to HTTP 500. The frontend treated
this as a server error and displayed the full error page.
Changed exec-magick! to raise :type :validation with :code :invalid-image
instead. This flows through the existing :invalid-image handler in
errors.clj which returns HTTP 400. The frontend's handle-media-error and
process-error now catch this code and show a notification banner.
AI-assisted-by: qwen3.7-plus
* 🐳 Add ImageMagick policy.xml resource limits to backend Docker image
Add a restrictive policy.xml to the backend Docker image that caps
ImageMagick resource usage: 256MiB memory, 512MiB map, 128MP area,
30s time limit, 16KP max dimensions. Blocks PS/EPS/PDF/XPS coders
to prevent Ghostscript attack surface.
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* ✨ Add timeout support to shell/exec!
Add optional :timeout parameter (in seconds) that uses
Process.waitFor(long, TimeUnit). On timeout, the process is
destroyed forcibly and an :internal/:process-timeout exception
is raised. Stdout/stderr readers handle IOException from closed
streams when the process is killed.
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* ♻️ Rename ::wrk/netty-executor to ::wrk/executor with cached pool
Replace DefaultEventExecutorGroup (fixed Netty thread pool) with a
cached thread pool (px/cached-executor) for general async task
offloading. The cached pool creates threads on demand and reuses
idle ones, which is more appropriate for blocking I/O workloads
(shell commands, message bus, rate limiting, etc.).
Changes:
- Rename ::wrk/netty-executor to ::wrk/executor in worker/executor.clj
- Switch implementation from DefaultEventExecutorGroup to px/cached-executor
- Update all ig/ref wiring in main.clj (msgbus, tmp cleaner, climit, rlimit, rpc)
- Remove ::wrk/netty-executor from redis.clj (let lettuce create its own
eventExecutorGroup instead of sharing a Netty executor)
- Assert executor is present in shell/exec! to prevent silent nil usage
- Remove executor-threads config (no longer needed for cached pool)
The ::wrk/netty-io-executor (NioEventLoopGroup) remains unchanged as it
handles actual non-blocking network I/O for Redis and S3.
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* 🔥 Remove im4java dependency and replace with direct ImageMagick CLI calls
- Replace im4java Java library with direct 'magick' CLI calls via shell/exec!
- Add PENPOT_IMAGEMAGICK_* config env vars for resource limits (thread, memory, map, area, disk, time, width, height)
- Use configurable ImageMagick environment with sensible defaults matching policy.xml
- Remove -Dim4java.useV7=true JVM flag from startup scripts
- Remove org.im4java/im4java from deps.edn
- All ImageMagick commands now use shell/exec! with 60s timeout and resource limits
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* 💄 Rename imagemagick env functions and optimize config reads
- Rename imagemagick-defaults -> imagemagick-default-env
- Rename imagemagick-env -> get-imagemagick-env
- Optimize to avoid double cf/get calls per config key
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* ✨ Add tests for shell/exec! timeout and media processing
- Add shell_test.clj: tests for exec! timeout, env vars, stdin, stderr
- Add media_test.clj: tests for info, generic-thumbnail, profile-thumbnail
- Fix generic-process to prefer explicit format over input mtype
- Fix shell/exec! to use cached executor when system has no executor
- Fix reduce-kv accumulator in set-env (must return penv)
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* ♻️ Refactor media/process to take system as first argument
- Change (defmulti process :cmd) -> (defmulti process (fn [_system params] (:cmd params)))
- Change (run params) -> (run system params)
- All process methods now receive [system params]
- Update all callers: rpc/commands/media, profile, auth, fonts
- Revert shell/exec! to require system with executor (no fallback)
- Fix lint warnings and formatting
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* 🔥 Remove unused app.svgo namespace
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* 🔥 Remove Node.js from backend Docker image
- Delete unused svgo-cli.js script
- Remove Node.js installation from Dockerfile.backend
- Remove svgo-cli.js copy from backend build script
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* 🔥 Remove unused process-error multimethod
- Remove process-error multimethod and its default handler
- Simplify media/run to directly call process
- Fix alignment in main.clj
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
* 📚 Add ImageMagick resource limits configuration to technical guide
Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>
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Co-authored-by: mimo-v2.5-pro <mimo-v2.5-pro@penpot.app>