* 🐛 Build the SSO redirect target on the server
The organization SSO flow took the destination URL from the client and
redirected to it after the identity provider round-trip, so any
authenticated profile could point that redirect at another domain: the
server never checked where the URL came from.
The RPC now takes the route token of the client (?screen=...¶ms)
and the server builds the destination out of it: the public URI plus
the query string, parsed and rendered back. The destination can no
longer leave the public URI, and the callback checks it again before
redirecting, which covers the state tokens minted before the change.
The state token also carries the profile that started the flow, so
only that session is granted the organization SSO entry: a state
prepared by someone else cannot mark the session of the one that
completes it. Whenever the RPC receives an organization id (it always
comes from the client), it also checks that the profile is a member of
the organization or its owner, instead of letting any profile start a
flow for an organization it does not belong to.
Tests cover the destination builder, a callback that ignores a
destination outside the public URI, a state that does not grant the SSO
entry to another session, and the organization access check.
AI-assisted-by: minimax-m3.1-flash
* 🐛 Check the SSO redirect target against the public URI
The callback compared the destination with a string prefix, so the two
bypasses the advisory documents (a userinfo prefix and a look-alike
host) were closed only by the trailing slash of the public URI. The
check now compares the parsed origin (scheme, host case-insensitive,
port with the default made explicit) and requires the path to be under
the base path of the public URI, so neither bypass passes.
The client sent `location.search`, the history token, whose leading `?`
is URL syntax and no part of a query string. It sends the query string
proper now (`screen=…¶ms`) through `rt/get-current-query-string`,
and `rt/token->query-string` is the single bridge between the two
shapes: every other consumer concatenates the token over the base path.
The server puts the separator back when it joins the destination, and
trims one that still arrives, so a browser holding the previous bundle
keeps its destination while the new one rolls out.
Building the destination can no longer break the flow: it catches its
own errors and lands on the public URI, which matters in the
deployments where the browser origin differs from the configured one.
A value that is not a route is ignored with a warning, decided by the
keys it parses into (a URL becomes a single key holding the whole URL),
and a route with no `screen`, like the root params of the application
(`template=…`), stays a usable destination.
The organization membership lookup is now shared by the check that
gates the SSO flow and the one that raises, so the two cannot drift
apart, and the docstring of the RPC lists `:no-organization-access`
next to `:no-team-access`.
`rt/nav-raw` returns its `:href`/`:uri` through `@event`, as its
sibling `rt/navigate` already did. Nothing in the app listens to
`::rt/nav-raw`, so the callers behave the same; the SSO test now reads
the destination from the event instead of intercepting the helper.
Tests cover the two bypasses and the base-path rule, the RPC with an
unusable destination, the value that is not a route, the request that
carries both ids, an organization that does not exist, the query string
the frontend sends, and the two router helpers.
AI-assisted-by: minimax-m3.1-flash
* ♻️ Deduplicate SSO destination URL building
The backend had an unreachable blank check and a one-line wrapper around
the URI helper in build-dest-url. On the client, the SSO retry and error
flows each assembled the destination from public-uri and the route params.
Flatten build-dest-url with a cond and call u/query-string->map directly.
Add rt/token->url as the single client helper for absolute route URLs, with
tests for both token shapes and for a blank token. Update the routing memory
with the new helper contract.
AI-assisted-by: hy4-flash-free
The event was written twice per accepted organization invitation. The
backend submitted it, and the browser then re-submitted a copy of the
props that the backend had already put in the response under
`:organization-invitation-audit` (`handle-token :team-invitation` in
`verify-token.cljs`). Both rows carried the same name with different prop
vocabularies, and the browser copy only existed when the browser finished
the flow.
Emit the event from the backend only. It now also carries the three props
that lived in the browser copy: the organization member count before the
add, the add source, and whether the invitee also joined a team. The
origin moves to the event context as `:event-origin`. The response no
longer includes `:organization-invitation-audit`, so the browser stops
emitting the event and `verify-token.cljs` drops its
`app.main.data.event` require.
The `accept-*` events of this command now share one prop vocabulary:
`:profile-id` for the accepting profile, `:invited-by` for the inviter
and `:profile-email` for the email, replacing the mix of
`:user-id`/`:user-who-send-invitation` and `:email`.
Audit consumers of `accept-organization-invitation` now see one row per
acceptance instead of two, and must read the new prop names.
AI-assisted-by: space-bunny-free
* 🐛 Allow invitation-based registration when disable-registration is set (#5178)
Per documentation, disable-registration 'disables registration
(still enabled for invitations only)'. Two bugs prevented this:
1. verify_token.clj: when processing an invitation token for a
non-logged-in user with no member-id, the redirect included
registration-disabled? in its condition, sending invited users
to the login page instead of the register page.
2. auth.clj validate-register-attempt!: the registration-disabled
check fired unconditionally before the invitation-token check,
rejecting the actual register RPC even with a valid invitation.
Fix: in verify_token.clj remove registration-disabled? from the
redirect condition for new-user invitations. In auth.clj restructure
the check as an if/else: with an invitation token, validate the token
and allow registration; without one, enforce the flag as before.
* 🐛 Allow registration with disabled public registration
Allow valid team invitations to create new profiles when public
registration is disabled, while keeping password login and invitation
validation required.
Add backend regression coverage for flag combinations and verify-token
redirects, frontend route coverage, and configuration documentation.
Closes#5178
AI-assisted-by: space-bunny-free
* 🐛 Revalidate active invitation during registration
Require a live, unexpired team invitation before using the
registration exception, and recheck it before creating a profile.
Reuse the same lookup in invitation token verification.
Add regression tests for canceled and expired invitations, the
registration race, and explicit redirect contracts. Update docs
and backend auth guidance.
AI-assisted-by: Space Bunny Free
* 🐛 Lock and normalize invitation registration checks
Lock active invitation rows during transactional registration and
acceptance so cancellations cannot race with profile or membership
creation.
Normalize invitation emails before comparisons and database lookups.
Add concurrency, email casing, and final flag regression tests.
AI-assisted-by: Space Bunny Free
---------
Co-authored-by: Sumit Ridhal <sridhal@redhat.com>
* 🐛 Fix organization/team switcher issues from UX review
* 🐛 Let members leave an organization without SSO credentials
* 🐛 Fix style from previewed organization in the team switcher
* 🐛 Fix leave-organization modal test stubs
* ♻️ Build organization invitation audit event in frontend
* ♻️ Align invitation token profile-id with created-by
The invitation token carried the minter in :profile-id while the
invitation row tracks the creator in :created-by. Both mean the
inviter, so re-sends or re-requested links made them disagree and
forced a second response key, :user-who-send-invitation.
Mint :profile-id from :created-by in both token creators, backfill
it from the row on accept (covers stale in-flight tokens), and drop
the duplicate response key. The frontend maps :profile-id to the
unchanged :user-who-send-invitation audit prop.
AI-assisted-by: Muse Spark 1.3 Free
* ♻️ Reuse token ids in invitation accept response
Backfill :member-id with the accepting profile and drop the
:user-id duplicate from the verify-token response, mirroring the
:profile-id/:user-who-send-invitation cleanup. The frontend maps
:member-id to the unchanged :user-id audit prop.
AI-assisted-by: Muse Spark 1.3 Free
---------
Co-authored-by: Andrey Antukh <niwi@niwi.nz>
When the Stripe checkout fails to start, the subscription page now
shows an inline error in the Business Nitrate card under the CTA
instead of a toast. When the post-payment activation fails, the toast
message is updated to point users to support@penpot.app.
The nitrate-form modal also passed a URI object to
build-nitrate-callback-urls while the underlying append-query-param
relied on lambdaisland's u/parse, which only accepts strings. Switched
to the local u/uri helper so both strings and URI records work, so
failures opened from the modal land on the subscription page.