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📎 Add minor improvements to opencode setup
This commit is contained in:
Andrey Antukh
parent
1f4b85209e
commit
33e18c72e2
@ -79,67 +79,44 @@ permission:
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## Role
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You are the Penpot commit assistant. You produce git commits that follow the
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repository's commit conventions exactly: an emoji-prefixed imperative
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subject, a body that explains the why, and the required trailers. You do
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not implement features, review code, or push branches — you commit.
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repository's commit conventions. You do not implement features, review code, or
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push branches — you commit.
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## Required Reading
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Before drafting any commit, read `.serena/memories/workflow/creating-commits.md`
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end-to-end. It is the canonical source for the emoji menu, subject/body
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limits, and trailer format. The summary in this file does not replace it.
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Before drafting any commit, **read `.serena/memories/workflow/creating-commits.md`
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end-to-end**. It is the authoritative source for the commit message format, the
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emoji menu, subject/body limits, and the `AI-assisted-by` trailer. Follow it
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exactly — do not improvise the format and do not restate its contents here.
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## Pre-commit Workflow
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1. Run `git status` to inspect the working tree. If there are unstaged or
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untracked changes that are unrelated to the user's request, STOP and ask
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the user how to handle them. Do not silently include unrelated work in
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the commit.
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2. Run `git diff --staged` (or `git diff` for unstaged changes) and review
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the content. If you see secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords, private
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keys, `.env` values), debug prints, or anything that does not match the
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user's stated intent, STOP and tell the user before committing.
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3. Pick the commit emoji from the menu in
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`mem:workflow/creating-commits`. If none of the listed emojis fit, use
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`:paperclip:` (other) and explain in the body why.
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4. Draft the commit message (see format below), then run
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`git commit -s -m "<subject>" -m "<body>"` (or pass the message via
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`git commit -s -F -` if the body has unusual characters).
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## Commit Message Format
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```
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:emoji: Subject line (imperative, capitalized, no period, <=70 chars)
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Body explaining what changed and why. Wrap at 80 chars. Use manual
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line breaks; do not rely on the terminal to wrap.
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Co-authored-by: <model-name> <model-name@penpot.app>
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```
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- Subject: imperative mood, capitalized, no trailing period, max 70 chars.
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- Body: wraps at 80 chars. Explain the *why*, not just the *what* — what
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was wrong before, what this change does about it, and any non-obvious
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trade-offs.
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- `Co-authored-by` trailer is mandatory. Replace `<model-name>` with your
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own model identifier (e.g. `claude-sonnet-4-6`).
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- `Signed-off-by` is added automatically by `git commit -s`, using the
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local `git config user.name` / `user.email`.
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untracked changes unrelated to the user's request, STOP and ask how to
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handle them. Do not silently include unrelated work in the commit.
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2. Run `git diff --staged` (or `git diff` for unstaged changes) and review the
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content. If you see secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys,
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`.env` values), debug prints, or anything that does not match the user's
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stated intent, STOP and tell the user before committing.
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3. Following the format in the doc, draft the message and run
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`git commit -m "<subject>" -m "<body>"` (or `git commit -F -` if the body has
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unusual characters). The `AI-assisted-by` trailer value is provided by the
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calling agent — use it verbatim.
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## Constraints
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- Do not push. Pushing is a separate workflow handled by the user (the
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agent's permission set also denies `git push*`).
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- Do not run `git reset*`, `git checkout*`, `git restore*`, `git clean*`,
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or `rm*` — the permission set denies these outright. If staged work
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needs to be discarded, ask the user to do it.
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- Do not pass `--author`. Author identity comes from the local git
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config. Never guess or hallucinate a name or email.
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- Do not amend a commit you did not create in this session, unless the
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user explicitly asks. `git commit --amend` rewrites history and is
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irreversible once pushed.
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- Do not bypass pre-commit hooks (`--no-verify`) unless the user
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explicitly asks, and call out the deviation in your response.
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- If the user asks for something that conflicts with these rules, follow
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the user's request and explain the deviation in your response. Do not
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silently override the format.
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permission set also denies `git push*`).
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- Do not run `git reset*`, `git checkout*`, `git restore*`, `git clean*`, or
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`rm*` — the permission set denies these outright. If staged work needs to be
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discarded, ask the user to do it.
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- Do not pass `--author`. Author identity comes from the local git config.
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Never guess or hallucinate a name or email.
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- Do not amend a commit you did not create in this session, unless the user
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explicitly asks. `git commit --amend` rewrites history and is irreversible
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once pushed.
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- Do not bypass pre-commit hooks (`--no-verify`) unless the user explicitly
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asks, and call out the deviation in your response.
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- If the user asks for something that conflicts with these rules, follow the
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user's request and explain the deviation in your response. Do not silently
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override the format.
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43
.opencode/commands/implement-plan.md
Normal file
43
.opencode/commands/implement-plan.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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---
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description: Execute a ready plan end-to-end — create a GitHub issue, branch issue-NNNN, implement the plan, then commit via the commiter subagent
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agent: build
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---
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# Implement Plan
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This command is run once a plan is ready (for example, from plan mode). Execute
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the plan already prepared in the current session context — it does not take
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extra arguments. Follow these steps in order.
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## 1. Create the issue
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Use the **`create-issue`** skill, following the *Creating Issues from Draft Body*
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flow in `mem:workflow/creating-issues`. Derive the issue title and body from the
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plan. Capture the new issue's number — call it **NNNN** (needed for the branch
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name and the commit reference).
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## 2. Create the branch
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Create and switch to a branch named after the issue:
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```
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git checkout -b issue-NNNN
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```
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(Replace NNNN with the issue number from step 1.)
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## 3. Execute the plan
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Implement the prepared plan from the session context. Work methodically, keeping
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changes focused on what the issue requires. Do not commit — the commit happens in
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step 4.
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## 4. Commit with the commiter subagent
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After the implementation is complete, delegate the commit to the **`commiter`**
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subagent. Give it a brief summary of what was implemented and why, the issue
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reference (`issue-NNNN`), and the model name you are running as so it sets the
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`AI-assisted-by` trailer correctly. The subagent owns the commit format and
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conventions.
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Do not push. Pushing is handled separately by the user.
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21
.opencode/commands/review.md
Normal file
21
.opencode/commands/review.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
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---
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description: Review a commit (defaults to the last commit) with the code-review-and-quality skill across all five axes
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agent: plan
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subtask: true
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---
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You are performing a code review of a git commit. You MUST conduct it using the **`code-review-and-quality`** skill (the five-axis review: correctness, readability, architecture, security, performance).
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The user may specify a commit or revision range as an argument ($ARGUMENTS). If no argument is given, default to reviewing the **last commit** (`HEAD`, i.e. the changes introduced by `HEAD` vs its parent).
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Workflow:
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1. Determine the target to review:
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- If the user provided a revision/range in $ARGUMENTS, use it.
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- Otherwise, default to the last commit: review `HEAD` (the diff of `HEAD` against `HEAD~1`).
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2. Inspect the change with `git show <target>` / `git diff <target>~1 <target>` and `git log -1 --stat <target>` to understand the intent and the files touched.
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3. Invoke the **`code-review-and-quality`** skill and review the commit across all five axes. Categorize every finding as Critical / Required / Optional / Nit / FYI, and lead with correctness and security.
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4. For each finding, state the axis it belongs to, the severity, and a concrete suggested fix (propose the structural remedy, not just the problem).
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5. Conclude with a clear verdict: **Approve** (ready to merge) or **Request changes** (issues that must be addressed), and summarize the highest-leverage items.
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Do not modify any code and do not create a commit — this command only reviews.
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397
.opencode/skills/code-review-and-quality/SKILL.md
Normal file
397
.opencode/skills/code-review-and-quality/SKILL.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
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---
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name: code-review-and-quality
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description: Conducts multi-axis code review. Use before merging any change. Use when reviewing code written by yourself, another agent, or a human. Use when you need to assess code quality across multiple dimensions before it enters the main branch.
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---
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# Code Review and Quality
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## Overview
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Multi-dimensional code review with quality gates. Every change gets reviewed before merge — no exceptions. Review covers five axes: correctness, readability, architecture, security, and performance.
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**The approval standard:** Approve a change when it definitely improves overall code health, even if it isn't perfect. Perfect code doesn't exist — the goal is continuous improvement. Don't block a change because it isn't exactly how you would have written it. If it improves the codebase and follows the project's conventions, approve it.
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## When to Use
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- Before merging any PR or change
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- After completing a feature implementation
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- When another agent or model produced code you need to evaluate
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- When refactoring existing code
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- After any bug fix (review both the fix and the regression test)
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## The Five-Axis Review
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Every review evaluates code across these dimensions:
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### 1. Correctness
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Does the code do what it claims to do?
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- Does it match the spec or task requirements?
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- Are edge cases handled (null, empty, boundary values)?
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- Are error paths handled (not just the happy path)?
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- Does it pass all tests? Are the tests actually testing the right things?
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- Are there off-by-one errors, race conditions, or state inconsistencies?
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### 2. Readability & Simplicity
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Can another engineer (or agent) understand this code without the author explaining it?
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- Are names descriptive and consistent with project conventions? (No `temp`, `data`, `result` without context)
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- Is the control flow straightforward (avoid nested ternaries, deep callbacks)?
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- Is the code organized logically (related code grouped, clear module boundaries)?
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- Are there any "clever" tricks that should be simplified?
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- **Could this be done in fewer lines?** (1000 lines where 100 suffice is a failure)
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- **Are abstractions earning their complexity?** (Don't generalize until the third use case)
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- Would comments help clarify non-obvious intent? (But don't comment obvious code.)
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- Are there dead code artifacts: no-op variables (`_unused`), backwards-compat shims, or `// removed` comments?
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- **Is a new conditional bolted onto an unrelated flow?** That's a design smell, not a nit — push the logic into its own helper, state, or policy instead of tangling an existing path.
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- **Do repeated conditionals on the same shape appear?** They signal a missing model or dispatcher. A "temporary" branch is usually permanent debt.
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### 3. Architecture
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Does the change fit the system's design?
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- Does it follow existing patterns or introduce a new one? If new, is it justified?
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- Does it maintain clean module boundaries?
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- Is there code duplication that should be shared?
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- Are dependencies flowing in the right direction (no circular dependencies)?
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- Is the abstraction level appropriate (not over-engineered, not too coupled)?
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- **Does this refactor reduce complexity or just relocate it?** Count the concepts a reader must hold to follow the change. If a "cleaner" version leaves that count unchanged, it isn't cleaner — prefer the restructuring that makes whole branches, modes, or layers disappear over one that re-centralizes the same logic. Prefer deleting an abstraction to polishing it.
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- **Is feature-specific logic leaking into a shared or general-purpose module?** Keep logic in its owning layer, reuse the existing canonical helper instead of a near-duplicate, and don't normalize architectural drift.
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- **Are type boundaries explicit?** Question gratuitous `any`/`unknown`/optional/casts and silent fallbacks that paper over an unclear invariant — making the boundary explicit often makes the surrounding control flow simpler.
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### 4. Security
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For detailed security guidance, see `security-and-hardening`. Does the change introduce vulnerabilities?
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- Is user input validated and sanitized?
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- Are secrets kept out of code, logs, and version control?
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- Is authentication/authorization checked where needed?
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- Are SQL queries parameterized (no string concatenation)?
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- Are outputs encoded to prevent XSS?
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- Are dependencies from trusted sources with no known vulnerabilities?
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- Is data from external sources (APIs, logs, user content, config files) treated as untrusted?
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- Are external data flows validated at system boundaries before use in logic or rendering?
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### 5. Performance
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Does the change introduce performance problems?
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- Any N+1 query patterns?
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- Any unbounded loops or unconstrained data fetching?
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- Any synchronous operations that should be async?
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- Any unnecessary re-renders in UI components?
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- Any missing pagination on list endpoints?
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- Any large objects created in hot paths?
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## Structural Remedies
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When you flag a structural problem, propose the move — not just the problem. A review that only says "this is complex" leaves the author guessing. Reach for a named restructuring:
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- **Replace a chain of conditionals** with a typed model or an explicit dispatcher.
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- **Collapse duplicate branches** into a single clearer flow.
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- **Separate orchestration from business logic** so each reads on its own.
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- **Move feature-specific logic** out of a shared module into the package that owns the concept.
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- **Reuse the canonical helper** instead of a bespoke near-duplicate.
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- **Make a type boundary explicit** so downstream branching disappears.
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- **Delete a pass-through wrapper** that adds indirection without clarifying the API.
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- **Extract a helper, or split a large file** into focused modules.
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Prefer the remedy that removes moving pieces over one that spreads the same complexity around.
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## Change Sizing
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Small, focused changes are easier to review, faster to merge, and safer to deploy. Target these sizes:
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```
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~100 lines changed → Good. Reviewable in one sitting.
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~300 lines changed → Acceptable if it's a single logical change.
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~1000 lines changed → Too large. Split it.
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```
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**Watch file size, not just diff size.** A small diff can still push a file past a healthy boundary — around 1000 *total* lines in a single file (distinct from the ~1000 *changed*-lines threshold above) is a common inspection signal, not a hard cap. When a change materially grows an already-large file, ask whether to extract helpers, subcomponents, or modules *first*, before piling more on. Decompose, then add.
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**What counts as "one change":** A single self-contained modification that addresses one thing, includes related tests, and keeps the system functional after submission. One part of a feature — not the whole feature.
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**Splitting strategies when a change is too large:**
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| Strategy | How | When |
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|----------|-----|------|
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| **Stack** | Submit a small change, start the next one based on it | Sequential dependencies |
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| **By file group** | Separate changes for groups needing different reviewers | Cross-cutting concerns |
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| **Horizontal** | Create shared code/stubs first, then consumers | Layered architecture |
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| **Vertical** | Break into smaller full-stack slices of the feature | Feature work |
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**When large changes are acceptable:** Complete file deletions and automated refactoring where the reviewer only needs to verify intent, not every line.
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**Separate refactoring from feature work.** A change that refactors existing code and adds new behavior is two changes — submit them separately. Small cleanups (variable renaming) can be included at reviewer discretion.
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## Change Descriptions
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Every change needs a description that stands alone in version control history.
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**First line:** Short, imperative, standalone. "Delete the FizzBuzz RPC" not "Deleting the FizzBuzz RPC." Must be informative enough that someone searching history can understand the change without reading the diff.
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**Body:** What is changing and why. Include context, decisions, and reasoning not visible in the code itself. Link to bug numbers, benchmark results, or design docs where relevant. Acknowledge approach shortcomings when they exist.
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**Anti-patterns:** "Fix bug," "Fix build," "Add patch," "Moving code from A to B," "Phase 1," "Add convenience functions."
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## Review Process
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### Step 1: Understand the Context
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Before looking at code, understand the intent:
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```
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- What is this change trying to accomplish?
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- What spec or task does it implement?
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- What is the expected behavior change?
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```
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||||
|
||||
### Step 2: Review the Tests First
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Tests reveal intent and coverage:
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||||
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||||
```
|
||||
- Do tests exist for the change?
|
||||
- Do they test behavior (not implementation details)?
|
||||
- Are edge cases covered?
|
||||
- Do tests have descriptive names?
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||||
- Would the tests catch a regression if the code changed?
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```
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||||
|
||||
### Step 3: Review the Implementation
|
||||
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||||
Walk through the code with the five axes in mind:
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||||
```
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For each file changed:
|
||||
1. Correctness: Does this code do what the test says it should?
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2. Readability: Can I understand this without help?
|
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3. Architecture: Does this fit the system?
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4. Security: Any vulnerabilities?
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5. Performance: Any bottlenecks?
|
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```
|
||||
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||||
### Step 4: Categorize Findings
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||||
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||||
Label every comment with its severity so the author knows what's required vs optional:
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||||
|
||||
| Prefix | Meaning | Author Action |
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||||
|--------|---------|---------------|
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||||
| *(no prefix)* | Required change | Must address before merge |
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||||
| **Critical:** | Blocks merge | Security vulnerability, data loss, broken functionality |
|
||||
| **Nit:** | Minor, optional | Author may ignore — formatting, style preferences |
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||||
| **Optional:** / **Consider:** | Suggestion | Worth considering but not required |
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| **FYI** | Informational only | No action needed — context for future reference |
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||||
|
||||
This prevents authors from treating all feedback as mandatory and wasting time on optional suggestions.
|
||||
|
||||
**Lead with what matters.** Order findings by leverage: correctness and security first, then structural regressions and missed simplifications, then everything else. Don't bury a real issue under cosmetic nits — a few high-conviction comments beat a long list. If you have one structural problem and ten nits, the structural problem *is* the review.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 5: Verify the Verification
|
||||
|
||||
Check the author's verification story:
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||||
```
|
||||
- What tests were run?
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||||
- Did the build pass?
|
||||
- Was the change tested manually?
|
||||
- Are there screenshots for UI changes?
|
||||
- Is there a before/after comparison?
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Multi-Model Review Pattern
|
||||
|
||||
Use different models for different review perspectives:
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||||
|
||||
```
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||||
Model A writes the code
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
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||||
Model B reviews for correctness and architecture
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
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||||
Model A addresses the feedback
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
Human makes the final call
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This catches issues that a single model might miss — different models have different blind spots.
|
||||
|
||||
**Example prompt for a review agent:**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Review this code change for correctness, security, and adherence to
|
||||
our project conventions. The spec says [X]. The change should [Y].
|
||||
Flag any issues as Critical, Required, Optional, or Nit.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Dead Code Hygiene
|
||||
|
||||
After any refactoring or implementation change, check for orphaned code:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Identify code that is now unreachable or unused
|
||||
2. List it explicitly
|
||||
3. **Ask before deleting:** "Should I remove these now-unused elements: [list]?"
|
||||
|
||||
Don't leave dead code lying around — it confuses future readers and agents. But don't silently delete things you're not sure about. When in doubt, ask.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
DEAD CODE IDENTIFIED:
|
||||
- formatLegacyDate() in src/utils/date.ts — replaced by formatDate()
|
||||
- OldTaskCard component in src/components/ — replaced by TaskCard
|
||||
- LEGACY_API_URL constant in src/config.ts — no remaining references
|
||||
→ Safe to remove these?
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Review Speed
|
||||
|
||||
Slow reviews block entire teams. The cost of context-switching to review is less than the waiting cost imposed on others.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Respond within one business day** — this is the maximum, not the target
|
||||
- **Ideal cadence:** Respond shortly after a review request arrives, unless deep in focused coding. A typical change should complete multiple review rounds in a single day
|
||||
- **Prioritize fast individual responses** over quick final approval. Quick feedback reduces frustration even if multiple rounds are needed
|
||||
- **Large changes:** Ask the author to split them rather than reviewing one massive changeset
|
||||
|
||||
## Handling Disagreements
|
||||
|
||||
When resolving review disputes, apply this hierarchy:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Technical facts and data** override opinions and preferences
|
||||
2. **Style guides** are the absolute authority on style matters
|
||||
3. **Software design** must be evaluated on engineering principles, not personal preference
|
||||
4. **Codebase consistency** is acceptable if it doesn't degrade overall health
|
||||
|
||||
**Don't accept "I'll clean it up later."** Experience shows deferred cleanup rarely happens. Require cleanup before submission unless it's a genuine emergency. If surrounding issues can't be addressed in this change, require filing a bug with self-assignment.
|
||||
|
||||
## Honesty in Review
|
||||
|
||||
When reviewing code — whether written by you, another agent, or a human:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Don't rubber-stamp.** "LGTM" without evidence of review helps no one.
|
||||
- **Don't soften real issues.** "This might be a minor concern" when it's a bug that will hit production is dishonest.
|
||||
- **Quantify problems when possible.** "This N+1 query will add ~50ms per item in the list" is better than "this could be slow."
|
||||
- **Push back on approaches with clear problems.** Sycophancy is a failure mode in reviews. If the implementation has issues, say so directly and propose alternatives.
|
||||
- **Accept override gracefully.** If the author has full context and disagrees, defer to their judgment. Comment on code, not people — reframe personal critiques to focus on the code itself.
|
||||
|
||||
## Dependency Discipline
|
||||
|
||||
Part of code review is dependency review:
|
||||
|
||||
**Before adding any dependency:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Does the existing stack solve this? (Often it does.)
|
||||
2. How large is the dependency? (Check bundle impact.)
|
||||
3. Is it actively maintained? (Check last commit, open issues.)
|
||||
4. Does it have known vulnerabilities? (`npm audit`)
|
||||
5. What's the license? (Must be compatible with the project.)
|
||||
|
||||
**Rule:** Prefer standard library and existing utilities over new dependencies. Every dependency is a liability.
|
||||
|
||||
**Upgrading an existing dependency** is a code change like any other, and the riskiest upgrades are the ones merged in bulk with a message like "bump deps." Review them with the same discipline:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Read the changelog, not just the version number.** Semver is a promise the maintainer may not have kept — a "patch" can carry a behavioral change. For a major bump, read the migration notes and find what breaks.
|
||||
2. **One dependency per change.** Upgrade and merge them individually (or in small related groups). When a bulk bump breaks the build, you've lost which package did it; a single-package change makes the cause obvious and the revert clean.
|
||||
3. **Let the tests decide.** The upgrade is verified by a green suite before *and* after, not by "it installed." If coverage around the dependency's behavior is thin, that gap is the real finding — add a test first.
|
||||
4. **Mind the transitive graph.** Most installed packages are ones nobody chose directly. Review the lockfile diff, not just `package.json`; a single direct bump can pull in dozens of indirect changes.
|
||||
5. **Keep the lockfile honest.** Commit it, review its diff, and never hand-edit it. The lockfile is the thing that actually pins what ships.
|
||||
|
||||
For triaging `npm audit` findings and supply-chain risk (typosquatting, compromised maintainers), follow the `security-and-hardening` skill — this section covers the upgrade *workflow*, that one covers the security verdict.
|
||||
|
||||
## The Review Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown
|
||||
## Review: [PR/Change title]
|
||||
|
||||
### Context
|
||||
- [ ] I understand what this change does and why
|
||||
|
||||
### Correctness
|
||||
- [ ] Change matches spec/task requirements
|
||||
- [ ] Edge cases handled
|
||||
- [ ] Error paths handled
|
||||
- [ ] Tests cover the change adequately
|
||||
|
||||
### Readability
|
||||
- [ ] Names are clear and consistent
|
||||
- [ ] Logic is straightforward
|
||||
- [ ] No unnecessary complexity
|
||||
|
||||
### Architecture
|
||||
- [ ] Follows existing patterns
|
||||
- [ ] No unnecessary coupling or dependencies
|
||||
- [ ] Appropriate abstraction level
|
||||
- [ ] Refactors reduce complexity rather than relocate it
|
||||
- [ ] No feature logic in shared modules; file stays within a healthy size
|
||||
|
||||
### Security
|
||||
- [ ] No secrets in code
|
||||
- [ ] Input validated at boundaries
|
||||
- [ ] No injection vulnerabilities
|
||||
- [ ] Auth checks in place
|
||||
- [ ] External data sources treated as untrusted
|
||||
|
||||
### Performance
|
||||
- [ ] No N+1 patterns
|
||||
- [ ] No unbounded operations
|
||||
- [ ] Pagination on list endpoints
|
||||
|
||||
### Verification
|
||||
- [ ] Tests pass
|
||||
- [ ] Build succeeds
|
||||
- [ ] Manual verification done (if applicable)
|
||||
|
||||
### Verdict
|
||||
- [ ] **Approve** — Ready to merge
|
||||
- [ ] **Request changes** — Issues must be addressed
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## See Also
|
||||
|
||||
- For detailed security review guidance, see `security-and-hardening`
|
||||
|
||||
## Common Rationalizations
|
||||
|
||||
| Rationalization | Reality |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| "It works, that's good enough" | Working code that's unreadable, insecure, or architecturally wrong creates debt that compounds. |
|
||||
| "I wrote it, so I know it's correct" | Authors are blind to their own assumptions. Every change benefits from another set of eyes. |
|
||||
| "We'll clean it up later" | Later never comes. The review is the quality gate — use it. Require cleanup before merge, not after. |
|
||||
| "AI-generated code is probably fine" | AI code needs more scrutiny, not less. It's confident and plausible, even when wrong. |
|
||||
| "The tests pass, so it's good" | Tests are necessary but not sufficient. They don't catch architecture problems, security issues, or readability concerns. |
|
||||
| "The refactor makes it cleaner" | Relocating complexity isn't reducing it. If the reader still holds the same number of concepts, the structure didn't improve — look for the version where branches disappear. |
|
||||
| "It's only a small addition to this file" | Small diffs still push files past a healthy size and bolt branches onto unrelated flows. Judge the resulting structure, not the diff size. |
|
||||
| "It's just a version bump" | A bump is a behavior change you didn't write. Read the changelog; semver doesn't guarantee no breakage. |
|
||||
| "I'll upgrade everything in one PR to save time" | A bulk bump that breaks the build hides which package did it. One dependency per change keeps the cause and the revert clean. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Red Flags
|
||||
|
||||
- PRs merged without any review
|
||||
- Review that only checks if tests pass (ignoring other axes)
|
||||
- "LGTM" without evidence of actual review
|
||||
- Security-sensitive changes without security-focused review
|
||||
- Large PRs that are "too big to review properly" (split them)
|
||||
- No regression tests with bug fix PRs
|
||||
- Review comments without severity labels — makes it unclear what's required vs optional
|
||||
- Accepting "I'll fix it later" — it never happens
|
||||
- A refactor that moves code around without reducing the number of concepts a reader must hold
|
||||
- A change that grows an already-large file instead of decomposing it
|
||||
- New conditionals scattered into unrelated code paths (a missing abstraction)
|
||||
- A bespoke helper that duplicates an existing canonical one, or feature logic placed in a shared module
|
||||
- A bulk "bump dependencies" PR with no changelog review and no per-package isolation
|
||||
- A lockfile change that's hand-edited, uncommitted, or merged without reviewing its diff
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
After review is complete:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] All Critical issues are resolved
|
||||
- [ ] All Required (no-prefix) changes are resolved or explicitly deferred with justification
|
||||
- [ ] Tests pass
|
||||
- [ ] Build succeeds
|
||||
- [ ] The verification story is documented (what changed, how it was verified)
|
||||
- [ ] Dependency upgrades were reviewed against their changelog, isolated per package, and verified by a green suite with the lockfile diff reviewed
|
||||
|
||||
**Presumptive blockers:** surface and propose the simpler design for each of these; escalate to Required only when the change actively makes structure worse: a refactor that relocates complexity instead of reducing it; a change that pushes a file past the size boundary with no decomposition; feature logic added to a shared module; a near-duplicate of an existing canonical helper; a silent fallback that hides an unclear invariant.
|
||||
457
.opencode/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md
Normal file
457
.opencode/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: security-and-hardening
|
||||
description: Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations. Use when building any feature that accepts untrusted data, manages user sessions, or interacts with third-party services.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Security and Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.
|
||||
|
||||
## When to Use
|
||||
|
||||
- Building anything that accepts user input
|
||||
- Implementing authentication or authorization
|
||||
- Storing or transmitting sensitive data
|
||||
- Integrating with external APIs or services
|
||||
- Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
|
||||
- Handling payment or PII data
|
||||
|
||||
## Process: Threat Model First
|
||||
|
||||
Controls bolted on without a threat model are guesses. Before hardening, spend five minutes thinking like an attacker:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Map the trust boundaries.** Where does untrusted data cross into your system? HTTP requests, form fields, file uploads, webhooks, third-party APIs, message queues, and **LLM output**. Every boundary is attack surface.
|
||||
2. **Name the assets.** What's worth stealing or breaking? Credentials, PII, payment data, admin actions, money movement.
|
||||
3. **Run STRIDE over each boundary** — a quick lens, not a ceremony:
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat | Ask | Typical mitigation |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **S**poofing | Can someone impersonate a user/service? | Authentication, signature verification |
|
||||
| **T**ampering | Can data be altered in transit or at rest? | Integrity checks, parameterized queries, HTTPS |
|
||||
| **R**epudiation | Can an action be denied later? | Audit logging of security events |
|
||||
| **I**nformation disclosure | Can data leak? | Encryption, field allowlists, generic errors |
|
||||
| **D**enial of service | Can it be overwhelmed? | Rate limiting, input size caps, timeouts |
|
||||
| **E**levation of privilege | Can a user gain rights they shouldn't? | Authorization checks, least privilege |
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Write abuse cases next to use cases.** For each feature, ask "how would I misuse this?" — then make that your first test.
|
||||
|
||||
If you can't name the trust boundaries for a feature, you're not ready to secure it. This is OWASP **A04: Insecure Design** — most breaches begin in design, not code.
|
||||
|
||||
## The Three-Tier Boundary System
|
||||
|
||||
### Always Do (No Exceptions)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Validate all external input** at the system boundary (API routes, form handlers)
|
||||
- **Parameterize all database queries** — never concatenate user input into SQL
|
||||
- **Encode output** to prevent XSS (use framework auto-escaping, don't bypass it)
|
||||
- **Use HTTPS** for all external communication
|
||||
- **Hash passwords** with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (never store plaintext)
|
||||
- **Set security headers** (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
|
||||
- **Use httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies** for sessions
|
||||
- **Run `npm audit`** (or equivalent) before every release
|
||||
|
||||
### Ask First (Requires Human Approval)
|
||||
|
||||
- Adding new authentication flows or changing auth logic
|
||||
- Storing new categories of sensitive data (PII, payment info)
|
||||
- Adding new external service integrations
|
||||
- Changing CORS configuration
|
||||
- Adding file upload handlers
|
||||
- Modifying rate limiting or throttling
|
||||
- Granting elevated permissions or roles
|
||||
|
||||
### Never Do
|
||||
|
||||
- **Never commit secrets** to version control (API keys, passwords, tokens)
|
||||
- **Never log sensitive data** (passwords, tokens, full credit card numbers)
|
||||
- **Never trust client-side validation** as a security boundary
|
||||
- **Never disable security headers** for convenience
|
||||
- **Never use `eval()` or `innerHTML`** with user-provided data
|
||||
- **Never store sessions in client-accessible storage** (localStorage for auth tokens)
|
||||
- **Never expose stack traces** or internal error details to users
|
||||
|
||||
## OWASP Top 10 Prevention Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
These are prevention patterns, not a ranking. For the 2021 ordering, see the quick-reference table in `references/security-checklist.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS Command)
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
|
||||
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD: Parameterized query
|
||||
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
|
||||
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Broken Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Password hashing
|
||||
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';
|
||||
|
||||
const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
|
||||
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
|
||||
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);
|
||||
|
||||
// Session management
|
||||
app.use(session({
|
||||
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET, // From environment, not code
|
||||
resave: false,
|
||||
saveUninitialized: false,
|
||||
cookie: {
|
||||
httpOnly: true, // Not accessible via JavaScript
|
||||
secure: true, // HTTPS only
|
||||
sameSite: 'lax', // CSRF protection
|
||||
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
|
||||
},
|
||||
}));
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
|
||||
element.innerHTML = userInput;
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
|
||||
return <div>{userInput}</div>;
|
||||
|
||||
// If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
|
||||
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
|
||||
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Broken Access Control
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Always check authorization, not just authentication
|
||||
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
|
||||
const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that the authenticated user owns this resource
|
||||
if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
|
||||
return res.status(403).json({
|
||||
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Proceed with update
|
||||
const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
|
||||
return res.json(updated);
|
||||
});
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Misconfiguration
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Security headers (use helmet for Express)
|
||||
import helmet from 'helmet';
|
||||
app.use(helmet());
|
||||
|
||||
// Content Security Policy
|
||||
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
|
||||
directives: {
|
||||
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
|
||||
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
|
||||
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Tighten if possible
|
||||
imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
|
||||
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
// CORS — restrict to known origins
|
||||
app.use(cors({
|
||||
origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
|
||||
credentials: true,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Sensitive Data Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Never return sensitive fields in API responses
|
||||
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
|
||||
const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
|
||||
return publicFields;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Use environment variables for secrets
|
||||
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
|
||||
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
|
||||
|
||||
Any time the server fetches a URL the user influenced — webhooks, "import from URL", image proxies, link previews — an attacker can aim it at internal services (cloud metadata, `localhost`, private IPs).
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// BAD: fetch whatever the user gives you
|
||||
await fetch(req.body.webhookUrl);
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD: allowlist scheme + host, reject if ANY resolved IP is private, forbid redirects
|
||||
import { lookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
|
||||
import ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['hooks.example.com']);
|
||||
|
||||
async function assertSafeUrl(raw: string): Promise<URL> {
|
||||
const url = new URL(raw);
|
||||
if (url.protocol !== 'https:') throw new Error('https only');
|
||||
if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(url.hostname)) throw new Error('host not allowed');
|
||||
// Resolve ALL records; a single private/reserved address fails the check.
|
||||
const addrs = await lookup(url.hostname, { all: true });
|
||||
if (addrs.some((a) => ipaddr.parse(a.address).range() !== 'unicast')) {
|
||||
throw new Error('private/reserved IP');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return url;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await fetch(await assertSafeUrl(req.body.webhookUrl), { redirect: 'error' });
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `range() !== 'unicast'` check covers loopback, link-local `169.254.169.254` (cloud metadata, the #1 SSRF target), private, and unique-local ranges across IPv4 and IPv6.
|
||||
|
||||
**Caveat — this still has a TOCTOU gap.** `fetch` resolves DNS again after the check, so an attacker using a short-TTL record can rebind to an internal IP between validation and connection. For high-risk surfaces, resolve once and connect to the pinned IP, or put a filtering agent in front (`request-filtering-agent` / `ssrf-req-filter`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Input Validation Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
### Schema Validation at Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
import { z } from 'zod';
|
||||
|
||||
const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
|
||||
title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
|
||||
description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
|
||||
priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
|
||||
dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate at the route handler
|
||||
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
|
||||
const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
|
||||
if (!result.success) {
|
||||
return res.status(422).json({
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
|
||||
message: 'Invalid input',
|
||||
details: result.error.flatten(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
// result.data is now typed and validated
|
||||
const task = await taskService.create(result.data);
|
||||
return res.status(201).json(task);
|
||||
});
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### File Upload Safety
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Restrict file types and sizes
|
||||
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
|
||||
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5MB
|
||||
|
||||
function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
|
||||
if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
|
||||
throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
|
||||
throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Triaging npm audit Results
|
||||
|
||||
Not all audit findings require immediate action. Use this decision tree:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
npm audit reports a vulnerability
|
||||
├── Severity: critical or high
|
||||
│ ├── Is the vulnerable code reachable in your app?
|
||||
│ │ ├── YES --> Fix immediately (update, patch, or replace the dependency)
|
||||
│ │ └── NO (dev-only dep, unused code path) --> Fix soon, but not a blocker
|
||||
│ └── Is a fix available?
|
||||
│ ├── YES --> Update to the patched version
|
||||
│ └── NO --> Check for workarounds, consider replacing the dependency, or add to allowlist with a review date
|
||||
├── Severity: moderate
|
||||
│ ├── Reachable in production? --> Fix in the next release cycle
|
||||
│ └── Dev-only? --> Fix when convenient, track in backlog
|
||||
└── Severity: low
|
||||
└── Track and fix during regular dependency updates
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Key questions:**
|
||||
- Is the vulnerable function actually called in your code path?
|
||||
- Is the dependency a runtime dependency or dev-only?
|
||||
- Is the vulnerability exploitable given your deployment context (e.g., a server-side vulnerability in a client-only app)?
|
||||
|
||||
When you defer a fix, document the reason and set a review date.
|
||||
|
||||
### Supply-Chain Hygiene
|
||||
|
||||
`npm audit` catches known CVEs; it won't catch a malicious or typosquatted package. Also:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Commit the lockfile** and install with `npm ci` (not `npm install`) in CI — reproducible builds, no silent version drift.
|
||||
- **Review new dependencies before adding them** — maintenance, download counts, and whether they truly earn their place. Every dependency is attack surface (OWASP **A06: Vulnerable Components**, **LLM03: Supply Chain**).
|
||||
- **Be wary of `postinstall` scripts** in unfamiliar packages — they run arbitrary code at install time.
|
||||
- **Watch for typosquats** — `cross-env` vs `crossenv`, `react-dom` vs `reactdom`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rate Limiting
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
|
||||
|
||||
// General API rate limit
|
||||
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
|
||||
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
|
||||
max: 100, // 100 requests per window
|
||||
standardHeaders: true,
|
||||
legacyHeaders: false,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
// Stricter limit for auth endpoints
|
||||
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
|
||||
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
|
||||
max: 10, // 10 attempts per 15 minutes
|
||||
}));
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Secrets Management
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
.env files:
|
||||
├── .env.example → Committed (template with placeholder values)
|
||||
├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
|
||||
└── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides)
|
||||
|
||||
.gitignore must include:
|
||||
.env
|
||||
.env.local
|
||||
.env.*.local
|
||||
*.pem
|
||||
*.key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Always check before committing:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Check for accidentally staged secrets
|
||||
git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**If a secret is ever committed, rotate it.** Deleting the line or rewriting history is not enough — assume it's compromised the moment it reaches a remote. Revoke and reissue the key first, then purge it from history.
|
||||
|
||||
## Securing AI / LLM Features
|
||||
|
||||
If your app calls an LLM — chatbots, summarizers, agents, RAG — it inherits a new attack surface. Map it to the [OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025)](https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/):
|
||||
|
||||
- **Treat all model output as untrusted input (LLM05: Improper Output Handling).** Never pass LLM output straight into `eval`, SQL, a shell, `innerHTML`, or a file path. Validate and encode it exactly as you would raw user input.
|
||||
- **Assume prompts can be hijacked (LLM01: Prompt Injection).** Untrusted text in the context window — a user message, a fetched web page, a PDF — can carry instructions. The system prompt is not a security boundary; enforce permissions in code, not in the prompt.
|
||||
- **Keep secrets and other users' data out of prompts (LLM02 / LLM07).** Anything in the context can be echoed back. Don't put API keys, cross-tenant data, or the full system prompt where the model can repeat it.
|
||||
- **Constrain tool and agent permissions (LLM06: Excessive Agency).** Scope tools to the minimum, require confirmation for destructive or irreversible actions, and validate every tool argument.
|
||||
- **Bound consumption (LLM10: Unbounded Consumption).** Cap tokens, request rate, and loop/recursion depth so a crafted input can't run up cost or hang the system.
|
||||
- **Isolate retrieval data (LLM08: Vector and Embedding Weaknesses).** In RAG, treat the vector store as a trust boundary: partition embeddings per tenant so one user can't retrieve another's data, and validate documents before indexing so poisoned content can't steer answers.
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// BAD: trusting model output as a command or as markup
|
||||
const sql = await llm.generate(`Write SQL for: ${userQuestion}`);
|
||||
await db.query(sql); // arbitrary query execution
|
||||
container.innerHTML = await llm.reply(userMessage); // stored XSS, via the model
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD: model output is data — parse defensively, then validate, then encode
|
||||
let intent;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
intent = CommandSchema.parse(JSON.parse(await llm.replyJson(userMessage)));
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new ValidationError('unexpected model output'); // JSON.parse or schema failed
|
||||
}
|
||||
await runAllowlistedAction(intent.action, intent.params);
|
||||
container.textContent = await llm.reply(userMessage);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Review Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown
|
||||
### Authentication
|
||||
- [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12)
|
||||
- [ ] Session tokens are httpOnly, secure, sameSite
|
||||
- [ ] Login has rate limiting
|
||||
- [ ] Password reset tokens expire
|
||||
|
||||
### Authorization
|
||||
- [ ] Every endpoint checks user permissions
|
||||
- [ ] Users can only access their own resources
|
||||
- [ ] Admin actions require admin role verification
|
||||
|
||||
### Input
|
||||
- [ ] All user input validated at the boundary
|
||||
- [ ] SQL queries are parameterized
|
||||
- [ ] HTML output is encoded/escaped
|
||||
- [ ] Server-side URL fetches are allowlisted (no SSRF to internal services)
|
||||
|
||||
### Data
|
||||
- [ ] No secrets in code or version control
|
||||
- [ ] Sensitive fields excluded from API responses
|
||||
- [ ] PII encrypted at rest (if applicable)
|
||||
|
||||
### Infrastructure
|
||||
- [ ] Security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, etc.)
|
||||
- [ ] CORS restricted to known origins
|
||||
- [ ] Dependencies audited for vulnerabilities
|
||||
- [ ] Error messages don't expose internals
|
||||
|
||||
### Supply Chain
|
||||
- [ ] Lockfile committed; CI installs with `npm ci`
|
||||
- [ ] New dependencies reviewed (maintenance, downloads, postinstall scripts)
|
||||
|
||||
### AI / LLM (if used)
|
||||
- [ ] Model output treated as untrusted (no eval/SQL/innerHTML/shell)
|
||||
- [ ] Secrets and other users' data kept out of prompts
|
||||
- [ ] Tool/agent permissions scoped; destructive actions require confirmation
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Common Rationalizations
|
||||
|
||||
| Rationalization | Reality |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| "This is an internal tool, security doesn't matter" | Internal tools get compromised. Attackers target the weakest link. |
|
||||
| "We'll add security later" | Security retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in. Add it now. |
|
||||
| "No one would try to exploit this" | Automated scanners will find it. Security by obscurity is not security. |
|
||||
| "The framework handles security" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. You still need to use them correctly. |
|
||||
| "It's just a prototype" | Prototypes become production. Security habits from day one. |
|
||||
| "Threat modeling is overkill here" | Five minutes of "how would I attack this?" prevents the design flaws no control can patch later. |
|
||||
| "It's just LLM output, it's only text" | That "text" can be a SQL statement, a script tag, or a shell command. Treat it like any untrusted input. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Red Flags
|
||||
|
||||
- User input passed directly to database queries, shell commands, or HTML rendering
|
||||
- Secrets in source code or commit history
|
||||
- API endpoints without authentication or authorization checks
|
||||
- Missing CORS configuration or wildcard (`*`) origins
|
||||
- No rate limiting on authentication endpoints
|
||||
- Stack traces or internal errors exposed to users
|
||||
- Dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities
|
||||
- Server fetches user-supplied URLs without an allowlist (SSRF)
|
||||
- LLM/model output passed into a query, the DOM, a shell, or `eval`
|
||||
- Secrets, PII, or the full system prompt placed inside an LLM context window
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
After implementing security-relevant code:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] `npm audit` shows no critical or high vulnerabilities
|
||||
- [ ] No secrets in source code or git history
|
||||
- [ ] All user input validated at system boundaries
|
||||
- [ ] Authentication and authorization checked on every protected endpoint
|
||||
- [ ] Security headers present in response (check with browser DevTools)
|
||||
- [ ] Error responses don't expose internal details
|
||||
- [ ] Rate limiting active on auth endpoints
|
||||
- [ ] Server-side URL fetches validated against an allowlist (no SSRF)
|
||||
- [ ] LLM/model output validated and encoded before use (if AI features present)
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user