Aari c11713c539
fix(sandbox): scrub MYSQL_PWD and REDISCLI_AUTH from the inherited skill env (#4018)
* fix(sandbox): scrub MYSQL_PWD and REDISCLI_AUTH from the inherited skill env

env_policy blocks the MySQL and Redis connection strings (MYSQL_URL, REDIS_URL)
because they embed a password, but not the password variables the same clients
read directly: mysql/libmysqlclient takes MYSQL_PWD and redis-cli takes
REDISCLI_AUTH with no further configuration. Both names carry no
KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASSWORD/PASSWD substring, so they were inherited by every
skill subprocess -- the leak surface this module exists to close (#3861).

They need exact entries rather than a pattern: *PWD* would also strip PWD and
OLDPWD. REDIS_AUTH is included as the common non-canonical variant.

* Apply suggestions from code review

- Distinguish REDIS_AUTH (defensive, non-canonical) from MYSQL_PWD and
  REDISCLI_AUTH (documented no-flag credential sources) in the comment.
- Pin that request-scoped injection still overrides the host value for the
  newly blocked names, keeping required-secrets a working escape hatch.
2026-07-10 07:40:19 +08:00
..