deer-flow/backend/tests/test_migration_0037_project_document_summaries.py
hataa 47d8ff13b2
feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3) (#6566)
* feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3)

Vertical slice 1 of the user-lifecycle work: an operator can suspend an
account and every authentication surface rejects it, while the row —
credentials, role, OAuth linkage — is retained so re-enabling restores
exactly what was suspended.

- users.disabled (NOT NULL, server default 0) via migration
  0036_user_disabled; User/UserResponse carry and expose it.
- Enforcement at all four surfaces: password login (no credential
  comparison happens), JWT session resolution (401 ACCOUNT_DISABLED —
  sessions die at the next request), PAT resolution (the generic 401, no
  oracle), OAuth provisioning (403 with a contact-admin message; the
  link is kept so re-enable restores access).
- SQLiteUserRepository.set_disabled: single-column, serialized write
  (same idiom as update_system_role) with the last-ACTIVE-admin guard —
  disabled admins cannot authenticate, so they cannot restore management
  access; re-enabling is always allowed. Field-scoping completed both
  ways: the credential writer mirrors and never writes disabled, so
  a stale password-change snapshot cannot re-enable a suspended account.
- PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{id} becomes a partial account update
  (system_role and/or disabled), each field routed to its field-scoped
  writer; empty bodies 422.

Tests 11->18: route (disable/re-enable, last-active-admin 409, empty
422, combined update), real-repo (field isolation both directions,
disabled-admin-not-active, guard inside the serialized write, re-enable
always), login rejection with the CORRECT password (only the disabled
gate can reject) plus resolver-visible flag. Mutations verified red:
guard removed (M19), login gate removed (M20 — after hardening the test
with a real hash so the gate is load-bearing).

* fix(authz): portable boolean default, alternate-authenticator suspension, active-admin role guard

Review round 1 on #6566 — three P1s:

- [PG default] sa.text("0") is a raw integer expression PostgreSQL
  rejects as a BOOLEAN default, breaking startup migration and fresh
  create_all bootstraps alike. Both the migration and the ORM model now
  use sa.false()/false() — dialect-rendered, portable.
- [alternate authenticators] WebSockets bypass AuthMiddleware, so a
  disabled user's still-valid cookie could open a NEW browser/stream
  connection and drive the retained session; the standalone LangGraph
  authenticate callback accepted the same suspended JWT. Both now route
  through a shared post-lookup validator (validate_resolved_session_user
  in deps.py — token_version + disabled in one place) that the HTTP
  dependency also uses, so a lifecycle change lands everywhere at once.
- [active-admin role guard] update_system_role counted every admin row,
  so 'disable B, then demote self' — or a combined {system_role, disabled}
  self-update — could strand the deployment with zero administrators able
  to authenticate or re-enable anyone. The demotion guard now counts
  ACTIVE admins only (disabled admins cannot authenticate), under the same
  serialization boundary.

Tests 18->22: shared-validator verdicts, WS admission after suspension
(real token, real repo), LangGraph-callback admission after suspension,
disable-then-demote-self + combined self-update both rejected (fake-repo
route level and real-repo update_system_role level). Mutations verified
red: helper's disabled check removed (M21 — three admission tests fail),
active-admin predicate reverted to all-admins (M22 — repo-level strand
scenario fails). 366 tests green on the affected surface.

* fix(migrations): chain 0036_user_disabled after upstream 0037

The maintainer main-merge brought 0037_project_document_summaries,
which branched from 0035 independently of this PR's 0036 — alembic now
sees two heads and every engine bootstrap fails. Chain 0036 after 0037
(single head; revision numbers are labels, the graph is what matters).

* fix(migrations): renumber user_disabled to 0038 and follow the chain-test convention

Upstream landed its own 0036 (run_idempotency_request) with 0037 chained
after it while this PR was in review — my 0036_user_disabled collided on
the number and my interim chain-fix (0036 revises 0037) left the graph
in a state upstream's chain tests reject (heads == [0037] hardcoded).

- 0036_user_disabled -> 0038_user_disabled, revises
  0037_project_document_summaries: single head 0038.
- Chain tests follow the repo convention (each migration PR appends the
  new head): 0032/0035 gain the DOC_SUMMARIES link and CURRENT_HEAD =
  0038; 0037's single-head assertion moves to CURRENT_HEAD with its
  own-revision link check unchanged.

* fix(migrations): pin the remaining chain tests to the 0038_user_disabled head

The 0027/0028, 0029 and 0034 chain tests still pinned the single head to
0037_project_document_summaries (and 0034 asserted the head's parent was
0036_run_idempotency_request), so the renumbered lifecycle migration broke
two unit-test shards. Follow the chain-test convention: every pinned head
moves to 0038_user_disabled and 0034 walks the chain through 0037.

* fix(authz): enforce account suspension on the internal-auth dispatch surface

Round-3 review finding: the internal-auth principal is synthesized from
trusted headers without a users-row lookup, so a suspended user with an
active channel binding kept driving the agent, and scheduler-owned runs
(their fabricated in-process requests skip AuthMiddleware entirely) kept
launching. Two gates now enforce the lifecycle there:

- AuthMiddleware rejects owner-bound internal calls whose users row is
  disabled (401 account_disabled) at the single gate every internal HTTP
  call passes through. Auth-disabled mode is exempt (no suspendable
  accounts, and its owner header carries the synthetic identity), and
  owner ids without a users row stay allowed — a nonexistent account
  cannot be suspended.
- start_run re-asserts it at run admission after the owner is resolved
  for attribution: the scheduler records the rejection as the
  occurrence's launch error and no run record is created.

Also addresses the remaining round-3 nits: drop the inline token_version
check duplicated by validate_resolved_session_user, correct the
local_provider comment (login never surfaces ACCOUNT_DISABLED), refresh
the stale 0038 docstring header, and restore the deps module caches in
the two suspension tests instead of leaking a closed engine.

* fix(auth): carry the disabled field on the frontend synthetic users

UserResponse now always includes disabled, so the auth-disabled contract
e2e (gateway /auth/me deep-equals the frontend synthetic user) failed
without the field on AUTH_DISABLED_USER. Add disabled to both synthetic
users and declare it optional on the zod schema — absent still parses as
not disabled for pre-gap-3 backends.

* fix(authz): log when the internal-owner suspension check is skipped

The middleware gate's users-lookup failure path silently degraded to
allow; keep the fail-open behavior but leave a WARNING with the
exception, so a store that cannot be read is observable in production
logs instead of invisible.

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-10-10 16:43:04 +08:00

115 lines
5.2 KiB
Python

"""Migration 0037 adds the nullable project_documents.summary column and removes it again."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import uuid
import pytest
import sqlalchemy as sa
from alembic import command
from alembic.script import ScriptDirectory
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
from support.postgres import asyncpg_test_url
from deerflow.persistence import bootstrap
from deerflow.persistence.postgres_schema import build_asyncpg_connect_args
REVISION = "0037_project_document_summaries"
PREVIOUS = "0036_run_idempotency_request"
CHANNEL_BINDINGS = "0038_channel_thread_bindings"
CURRENT_HEAD = "0039_user_disabled"
pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_0037_chains_after_0036_and_is_single_head():
script = ScriptDirectory(str(bootstrap._MIGRATIONS_DIR))
assert script.get_heads() == [CURRENT_HEAD]
assert script.get_revision(CHANNEL_BINDINGS).down_revision == REVISION
assert script.get_revision(CURRENT_HEAD).down_revision == CHANNEL_BINDINGS
assert script.get_revision(REVISION).down_revision == PREVIOUS
# alembic_version.version_num is VARCHAR(32).
assert len(REVISION) <= 32
def _engine(tmp_path, backend):
if backend == "sqlite":
return create_async_engine(f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{tmp_path / 'migration.db'}"), None
uri = os.environ.get("TEST_POSTGRES_URI")
if not uri:
pytest.skip("requires TEST_POSTGRES_URI (real Postgres migration)")
# Translate libpq sslmode to asyncpg ssl rather than dropping it: a URI
# that requests verify-ca/verify-full must not silently fall back to an
# unverified connection (tests/AGENTS.md "PostgreSQL batch fixtures").
schema = f"doc_summaries_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
return create_async_engine(asyncpg_test_url(uri), connect_args=build_asyncpg_connect_args(schema)), schema
@pytest.mark.parametrize("backend", ["sqlite", "postgres"])
async def test_0037_upgrade_keeps_rows_and_downgrade_drops_summary(tmp_path, backend):
engine, schema = _engine(tmp_path, backend)
cfg = bootstrap._get_alembic_config(engine, postgres_schema=schema or "")
try:
if schema:
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.execute(sa.text(f'CREATE SCHEMA "{schema}"'))
await asyncio.to_thread(command.upgrade, cfg, PREVIOUS)
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.execute(
sa.text(
"INSERT INTO project_documents (id, project_id, user_id, name, stored_relpath, sha256, size_bytes, created_at, updated_at) "
"VALUES ('d1','p1','u1','notes.txt','u1/p1/d1-notes.txt','ab12',10,CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,CURRENT_TIMESTAMP)"
)
)
async def doc_columns():
async with engine.connect() as conn:
return await conn.run_sync(lambda sync: {col["name"]: col for col in sa.inspect(sync).get_columns("project_documents")})
await asyncio.to_thread(command.upgrade, cfg, REVISION)
columns = await doc_columns()
assert columns["summary"]["nullable"] and columns["summary"]["default"] is None
async with engine.connect() as conn:
row = (await conn.execute(sa.text("SELECT name, size_bytes, summary FROM project_documents WHERE id='d1'"))).one()
# No backfill: the pre-existing row keeps a NULL summary.
assert tuple(row) == ("notes.txt", 10, None)
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.execute(sa.text("UPDATE project_documents SET summary='one line' WHERE id='d1'"))
await asyncio.to_thread(command.downgrade, cfg, PREVIOUS)
assert "summary" not in await doc_columns()
async with engine.connect() as conn:
assert (await conn.execute(sa.text("SELECT name, size_bytes FROM project_documents WHERE id='d1'"))).one() == ("notes.txt", 10)
await asyncio.to_thread(command.upgrade, cfg, REVISION)
assert "summary" in await doc_columns()
finally:
if schema:
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.execute(sa.text(f'DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS "{schema}" CASCADE'))
await engine.dispose()
def test_postgres_uri_tls_policy_is_preserved(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""The fixture must translate, never drop, an explicit sslmode (tests/AGENTS.md)."""
monkeypatch.setenv("TEST_POSTGRES_URI", "postgresql://u:p@db:5432/deerflow?sslmode=verify-full&channel_binding=require")
captured = {}
def capture_engine(url, **kwargs):
captured["url"] = url
raise RuntimeError("stop before database acquisition")
monkeypatch.setitem(globals(), "create_async_engine", capture_engine)
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="stop before database acquisition"):
_engine(tmp_path, "postgres")
assert "ssl=verify-full" in captured["url"]
assert "sslmode" not in captured["url"]
assert "channel_binding" not in captured["url"]
def test_postgres_uri_conflicting_ssl_settings_rejected(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("TEST_POSTGRES_URI", "postgresql://u:p@db:5432/deerflow?sslmode=require&ssl=disable")
monkeypatch.setitem(globals(), "create_async_engine", lambda *a, **k: None)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Conflicting ssl and sslmode"):
_engine(tmp_path, "postgres")