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* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#4849) Backend-first implementation of the PAT contract from #4849: show-once dfp_ tokens bound to their owning user (AUTH_SOURCE_PAT, is_internal=false), digest-only storage (migration 0017), strict credential precedence (invalid Bearer is a 401, never cookie fallback), CSRF double-submit skipped only for Bearer requests while auth-endpoint origin checks still run, scopes intersecting the authz route permissions, session-auth-only PAT management and password changes, and throttled best-effort last_used_at stamps. * fix(auth): harden PAT scope boundary and schema parity from adversarial review Independent review of the initial draft found: (1) scopes only constrained the threads/runs permission axis while admin routes treated a PAT as its (possibly admin) owner — is_admin_user now rejects PAT callers outright since no scope grants admin capability; (2) the model declared a column UNIQUE constraint while migration 0017 created a named unique index, so downgrade failed on create_all-bootstrapped DBs — both now use the named unique index; (3) auth-disabled mode is an operator override and now stays ahead of the Bearer check so a stray Authorization header cannot 401 an E2E sandbox; plus wiring the previously-unused constants, bounding the last_used_at stamp cache, and four new tests (middleware-level expiry, expires_in_days, admin-capability rejection with session control, and the auth-disabled precedence). * docs(api): document personal access tokens for programmatic API access * fix(auth): close PAT security boundaries from review (default-deny routes, extension admin suppression) P1-1: scope intersection only constrains @require_permission routes, so undecorated mutation routes (DELETE /api/memory, POST /api/agents, Lark credential switching, channel config) accepted a PAT holding a single read scope. AuthMiddleware now enforces a default-deny route policy in auth/pat.py: PAT requests are admitted only to the thread/run lifecycle routes the v1 scopes govern; everything else answers 403 regardless of scopes. Session-cookie callers are unaffected. P1-2: the extension principal resolver projected is_admin/roles from the raw system_role, so an admin-owned PAT passed deerflow_extension_api.require_admin on contributed routes despite the documented no-admin guarantee. The projection is now PAT-aware and suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers, mirroring deps.is_admin_user. Both fixes carry regression tests (route outside policy 403 + session control; production resolver admin suppression), and API.md documents the default-deny boundary. * fix(auth): enforce PAT scopes on stateless run entry and harden decorator Follow-up hardening from an independent audit of the P1 fixes: - POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait were the only allowlisted run entrypoints without @require_permission, so a threads:read-only PAT could still start runs (same bug class as P1-1, now closed): both now carry @require_permission("runs", "create"). POST /api/threads and POST /api/threads/search gain threads:write / threads:read for the same reason. Authorization-disabled deployments see no change (the permission set resolves to all permissions). - require_permission now binds the wrapped signature to locate a positionally-passed request before injecting the test stub, fixing 'got multiple values for argument' on direct positional unit-test calls. - API.md: the intro PAT example used GET /api/models, which the new default-deny policy 403s — replaced with GET /api/threads; the default-deny route list now spells out method sets. Regression test: threads:read-only PAT is 403 on the decorated stateless entry while a runs:create PAT passes. * fix(auth): address review P2s (empty Authorization header, PAT name trimming, API example) - CSRFMiddleware treats an explicitly empty Authorization header as present (is None), so an invalid credential always reaches AuthMiddleware's uniform 401 instead of a CSRF 403 that varies by method/CSRF state. Regression: empty-header request dies at auth. - PATCreateRequest strips the name and rejects whitespace-only values before token generation; created names are stored trimmed. - API.md intro PAT example now uses the implemented POST /api/threads/search endpoint (GET /api/threads does not exist). - AGENTS.md trimmed back under the guidance soft budget after the upstream merge. * fix(auth): tighten PAT route policy to implemented methods only The allowlist admitted GET /api/threads, a method no router implements. Pre-authorizing a dead method weakens the default-deny boundary: a future GET collection route added without a permission decorator would become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. Restrict the rule to POST, fix the stale GET description in API.md's PAT constraints, and document the default-deny boundary accurately in the gateway AGENTS.md guidance (only the threads/runs allowlist is PAT-reachable; every other authenticated route 403s PAT callers). Audited every remaining rule against the mounted routers: all other method+path entries map to real routes. Regression: test_pat_policy_does_not_pre_authorize_unimplemented_methods. * test(auth): guarantee the negative digest test mutates the token token[:-1] + "X" is identical to the original whenever the generated token already ends in X (1/62), making the negative digest assertion fail intermittently. Choose the replacement character based on the existing tail so the mutated token always differs. * fix(auth): require runs:cancel for cancel-then-stream requests stream_existing_run is gated at runs:read so action-less stream joins work with read-only credentials, but its ?action=interrupt|rollback branch cancels the run — a separate permission. A runs:read-only PAT passed both the PAT route policy and the route decorator and could interrupt or roll back an active run, bypassing the runs:cancel scope. Decorators cannot express query-parameter-conditional permissions, so the check lives in require_cancel_permission_when_action(), applied at the top of the handler. Regression drives the real helper through the production middleware: runs:read-only PAT + action is 403, the same token joins action-less, runs:read+cancel passes, session control unaffected. * docs(changelog): add the PAT feature entry * docs(readme): add personal access tokens section Repo documentation-update policy requires user-facing features to update README.md in the same changeset; the PAT feature previously touched only backend/docs/API.md and the gateway AGENTS.md. * fix(auth): require runs:cancel for mutating multitask strategies All five run-creation entrypoints were gated only by runs:create, but RunCreateRequest.multitask_strategy accepts interrupt/rollback and start_run forwards it to create_or_reject, which terminates an already-active run. A runs:create-only PAT could therefore kill an existing run through a create request, bypassing runs:cancel. Decorators cannot express body-parameter-conditional permissions, and per-route checks leave the same hole for the next entrypoint, so the gate lives in start_run itself — the single choke point every run-creation path (HTTP routes and internal launchers) flows through. Regenerate launches pass multitask_strategy="reject" and are unaffected; requests without a stamped auth context (internal/test compositions) skip the gate. The check is the shared authz.require_cancel_permission_if primitive; require_cancel_permission_when_action now delegates to it, so every request dimension that carries cancel capability (query action, body strategy) flows through one gate. Regression drives the real middleware stack: runs:create-only PAT + interrupt/rollback is 403 with the exact detail, reject (explicit and default) stays available, runs:create+cancel passes, session control unaffected; a source anchor pins the gate inside start_run. * fix(runs): keep observer joins from applying creator cancel-on-disconnect sse_consumer's finally block applied the record's on_disconnect=cancel policy on ANY consumer's disconnect. The join surfaces (GET /join and the action-less GET/POST stream join) feed it the existing RunRecord, so anyone with thread read access — including a runs:read-only PAT — could cancel a locally-owned running run simply by closing the SSE connection, without runs:cancel. The policy expresses the creator's intent for their own connection; an observer's disconnect must never be read as that intent. sse_consumer gains apply_on_disconnect (default True). The two join surfaces pass False; the creating endpoints (thread-scoped and stateless create-and-stream) keep the creator semantics unchanged. wait_for_run_completion needs no change: its callers are creator-side or post-explicit-cancel paths only. Regression exercises a real generator close — the same machinery Starlette drives on client disconnect — against the production sse_consumer: creator stream disconnect cancels, observer join disconnect does not; a wiring anchor pins both join call sites and the creator defaults. API.md documents the cancel-capability constraint (this fix plus the action/strategy gates) in PAT Constraints. * test(auth): pin the multitask gate behaviorally; state wait invariant Independent adversarial review of the round-5 fixes found the P1-a regression only mirror-pinned: the source anchor could be satisfied by a comment, and deleting the gate from start_run would not fail the suite. This drives the production start_run directly — a create-only auth context gets 403 with the exact detail for interrupt, and a reject request with no cancel permission at all proceeds past the gate (never a permission 403). Also documents wait_for_run_completion's creator-side invariant (every caller is the creating endpoint or post-explicit-cancel) so a future observer wiring thinks twice before reusing it — the one-caller- away variant of the observer-disconnect P1. * docs(changelog): correct the PAT entry's digest and route-policy description The entry said HMAC digests (the implementation stores SHA-256 digests, as documented in API.md and pinned by the repository tests) and claimed the route policy admits 'implemented stateless endpoints' (it admits the thread/run lifecycle routes, narrowing further by scopes). Also notes the cancel-capability gate now covering action and multitask strategies. * fix(auth): enumerate the PAT runs route policy per implemented subroute The runs subtree rule was a GET|POST /runs(/.*)? wildcard — it pre-authorized every current and future subroute under /runs, including methods the router never implemented (e.g. GET /runs/stream), which is the same latent default-deny weakening the threads collection rule was tightened for: a future route added under /runs would become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. The wildcard is replaced with six segment-precise rules covering exactly the 14 implemented method+path combinations; the {run_id} slot necessarily matches any single segment, so the POST-only collection names (stream, wait, regenerate, edit-regenerate) are excluded from the GET run-id rule via negative lookahead — no dead method stays pre-authorized. Behavior for implemented routes is unchanged. test_pat_runs_policy_admits_exactly_the_mounted_routes derives the expected set from the mounted thread_runs router instead of a hand-maintained list: every implemented GET/POST route under /runs must be admitted, routes in this router outside the subtree stay denied, and representative unimplemented neighbors are denied — so adding a route under /runs now fails CI until it is explicitly allowlisted, and a removed route leaves a dead rule visible. API.md's PAT constraints list the enumerated routes and drops a feedback mention that belonged to the stateless /api/runs axis. * docs(migration): add the 0017 renumbering coordination note to 0017 The PR's migration-coordination comment states each migration file carries the note; the file did not. Adds it: numbering was generated against main head 0016 alongside #5078 and #4843; whoever merges first keeps the slot, the others renumber on rebase (revision/down_revision plus the bootstrap head assertions). * fix(auth): pad base62 tokens to a fixed 43-char width int.from_bytes discards leading zero bytes, so the unpadded encoder returned a variable-length body — empty for all-zero input, and shorter than 40 characters for any draw below 62**39 (~1 in 14.5M), leaving test_generate_pat_token_format probabilistically flaky and the token body without stable width (review round 6, P3). _base62 now left-pads with "0" to _base62_width(len(data)) — the exact integer digit count (62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42, so 43 for 32 bytes). The format test asserts the exact fixed width instead of a probabilistic floor, and a new unit test pins the all-zero, leading-zero-byte, and max-value edges deterministically.
210 lines
8.6 KiB
Python
210 lines
8.6 KiB
Python
"""Tests for PAT token utilities and the personal access token repository."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
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import pytest
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import pytest_asyncio
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from app.gateway.auth.pat import (
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PAT_ALLOWED_SCOPES,
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PAT_TOKEN_PREFIX,
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digest_matches,
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extract_bearer_token,
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generate_pat_token,
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pat_token_digest,
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validate_scopes,
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)
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from deerflow.config.database_config import DatabaseConfig
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from deerflow.persistence.engine import close_engine, get_session_factory, init_engine_from_config
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from deerflow.persistence.personal_access_tokens import PersonalAccessTokenRepository
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture(autouse=True)
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async def _close_persistence_engine():
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yield
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await close_engine()
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async def _make_repo(tmp_path) -> PersonalAccessTokenRepository:
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await init_engine_from_config(DatabaseConfig(backend="sqlite", sqlite_dir=str(tmp_path)))
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session_factory = get_session_factory()
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assert session_factory is not None
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return PersonalAccessTokenRepository(session_factory)
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# ── Token utilities ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_generate_pat_token_format():
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token = generate_pat_token()
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assert token.startswith(PAT_TOKEN_PREFIX)
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body = token[len(PAT_TOKEN_PREFIX) :]
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assert len(body) == 43 # fixed width: 62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42
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assert body.isalnum()
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# Two draws must differ: CSPRNG, not a counter.
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assert token != generate_pat_token()
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def test_base62_pads_to_fixed_width_for_leading_zero_and_all_zero_input():
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"""``int.from_bytes`` discards leading zero bytes; the fixed-width pad
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keeps the token body exactly 43 chars for every draw, including the
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all-zero and single-leading-byte edges (review round 6, P3)."""
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from app.gateway.auth.pat import PAT_RANDOM_BYTES, _base62
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assert _base62(b"\x00" * PAT_RANDOM_BYTES) == "0" * 43
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assert _base62(b"\x00" * (PAT_RANDOM_BYTES - 1) + b"\x01") == "0" * 42 + "1"
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assert len(_base62(b"\xff" * PAT_RANDOM_BYTES)) == 43
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def test_pat_token_digest_is_deterministic_and_constant_time_comparable():
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token = generate_pat_token()
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assert pat_token_digest(token) == pat_token_digest(token)
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assert len(pat_token_digest(token)) == 64
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assert digest_matches(pat_token_digest(token), token) is True
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# The mutated token must differ from the original even when the CSPRNG
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# tail already ends in "X" (1/62), or this assertion fails intermittently.
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mutated_tail = "X" if token[-1] != "X" else "Y"
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assert digest_matches(pat_token_digest(token), token[:-1] + mutated_tail) is False
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assert digest_matches(None, token) is False
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assert digest_matches("", token) is False
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def test_extract_bearer_token_classifies_absent_scheme_and_credential():
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assert extract_bearer_token(None) is None
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assert extract_bearer_token("Bearer dfp_abc") == "dfp_abc"
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assert extract_bearer_token("bearer dfp_abc") == "dfp_abc" # scheme is case-insensitive
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assert extract_bearer_token("Basic dXNlcg==") == "" # present but unusable
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assert extract_bearer_token("Bearer ") == ""
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assert extract_bearer_token("Bearer") == ""
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def test_validate_scopes_deduplicates_and_rejects_unknown():
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assert validate_scopes(["runs:read", "threads:read", "runs:read"]) == ["runs:read", "threads:read"]
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown PAT scopes"):
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validate_scopes(["runs:write"]) # not a route permission
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="at least one scope"):
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validate_scopes([])
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def test_pat_scopes_stay_aligned_with_route_permissions():
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"""PAT scopes are exactly the authz route permissions — fail on drift."""
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from app.gateway.authz import _ALL_PERMISSIONS
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assert PAT_ALLOWED_SCOPES == frozenset(_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
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# ── Repository ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_create_and_resolve_by_digest_roundtrip(tmp_path):
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repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
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token = generate_pat_token()
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record = await repo.create(
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user_id="user-1",
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name="ci-runner",
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scopes=["runs:read"],
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token_digest=pat_token_digest(token),
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)
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assert record["user_id"] == "user-1"
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assert record["scopes"] == ["runs:read"]
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assert record["revoked_at"] is None
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resolved = await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token))
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assert resolved is not None
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assert resolved["id"] == record["id"]
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assert resolved["token_digest"] == pat_token_digest(token)
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# Digest lookup never matches a different token.
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assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token())) is None
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_revoked_token_no_longer_resolves(tmp_path):
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repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
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token = generate_pat_token()
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record = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="temp", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(token))
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assert await repo.revoke(record["id"], "user-1") is True
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# Revoking twice is a no-op.
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assert await repo.revoke(record["id"], "user-1") is False
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assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token)) is None
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_revoke_is_scoped_to_the_owning_user(tmp_path):
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repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
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token = generate_pat_token()
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record = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="mine", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(token))
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assert await repo.revoke(record["id"], "user-2") is False # not the owner
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assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token)) is not None
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_expired_token_no_longer_resolves(tmp_path):
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repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
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token = generate_pat_token()
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await repo.create(
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user_id="user-1",
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name="short-lived",
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scopes=["runs:read"],
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token_digest=pat_token_digest(token),
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expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(seconds=1),
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)
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assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token)) is None
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_list_for_user_is_isolated_and_never_returns_raw_tokens(tmp_path):
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repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
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token = generate_pat_token()
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created = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="a", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(token))
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await repo.create(user_id="user-2", name="b", scopes=["threads:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token()))
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listed = await repo.list_for_user("user-1")
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assert [item["id"] for item in listed] == [created["id"]]
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assert listed[0]["token_digest"] == pat_token_digest(token) # digest only; raw token never persisted
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_token_digest_unique_constraint(tmp_path):
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repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
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digest = pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token())
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await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="a", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=digest)
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from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
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with pytest.raises(IntegrityError):
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await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="dup", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=digest)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_touch_last_used_is_throttled(tmp_path):
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await init_engine_from_config(DatabaseConfig(backend="sqlite", sqlite_dir=str(tmp_path)))
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session_factory = get_session_factory()
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repo = PersonalAccessTokenRepository(session_factory, last_used_write_interval_seconds=300.0)
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record = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="t", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token()))
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await repo.touch_last_used(record["id"])
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first = (await repo.list_for_user("user-1"))[0]["last_used_at"]
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assert first is not None
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# A second touch inside the throttle window must not produce a write.
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await repo.touch_last_used(record["id"])
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second = (await repo.list_for_user("user-1"))[0]["last_used_at"]
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assert second == first
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# After the window elapses the next touch writes again.
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repo._last_used_written_at.clear()
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await repo.touch_last_used(record["id"])
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third = (await repo.list_for_user("user-1"))[0]["last_used_at"]
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assert third != first
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_touch_last_used_never_raises_on_unknown_id(tmp_path):
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await init_engine_from_config(DatabaseConfig(backend="sqlite", sqlite_dir=str(tmp_path)))
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repo = PersonalAccessTokenRepository(get_session_factory())
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await repo.touch_last_used("no-such-pat") # update affects 0 rows; still a commit
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