deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/skills/skillscan/orchestrator.py

"""Native deterministic scanning for DeerFlow skills.

``scan_archive_preflight()`` and ``scan_skill_dir()`` are synchronous pure
functions of their inputs; async callers must dispatch them off the event
loop. Policy is one code constant — ``CRITICAL`` blocks, everything else is a
warning — applied by ``enforce_static_scan()``, which also honours the
``skill_scan.enabled`` kill switch. Rule specs live next to the analyzers
that match them so a rule is authored, read, and tested in one place.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import ast
import io
import logging
import posixpath
import re
import stat
import zipfile
from collections.abc import Iterable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
from typing import Any

from deerflow.skills.package_paths import is_eval_fixture_skill_md
from deerflow.skills.skillscan.models import (
    FindingSeverity,
    RuleSpec,
    ScanResult,
    SecurityFinding,
    StaticScanBlockedError,
    StaticScannerError,
)

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

MAX_TOTAL_ARCHIVE_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024
MAX_FILE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024

_BLOCK_SEVERITY = "CRITICAL"
_NESTED_ZIP_PEEK_MEMBER_LIMIT = 256
_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS = 4096

_SPECS = [
    RuleSpec("package-path-traversal", "CRITICAL", "Archive member path traverses outside the skill root.", "Remove parent-directory traversal from the package path."),
    RuleSpec("package-absolute-path", "CRITICAL", "Archive member path is absolute.", "Use relative paths inside the skill archive."),
    RuleSpec(
        "package-ads-stream-name",
        "CRITICAL",
        "Archive member path contains a colon, which on Windows/NTFS addresses an alternate data stream hidden from directory listing.",
        "Remove colons from archive member paths.",
    ),
    RuleSpec("package-symlink", "HIGH", "Package contains a symlink entry.", "Remove symlinks from the skill package."),
    RuleSpec("package-nested-skill-md", "CRITICAL", "Package contains a nested SKILL.md file.", "Keep exactly one SKILL.md at the skill root."),
    RuleSpec("package-oversized-total", "CRITICAL", "Package total uncompressed size exceeds the limit.", "Remove large files or split assets out of the skill package."),
    RuleSpec("package-too-many-members", "CRITICAL", "Package contains more members than the allowed limit.", "Reduce the number of files in the skill package."),
    RuleSpec("package-oversized-file", "CRITICAL", "Package contains a file that exceeds the per-file size limit.", "Remove or shrink the oversized file."),
    RuleSpec("package-executable-binary", "CRITICAL", "Package contains an executable binary.", "Remove binary executables from the skill package."),
    RuleSpec("package-nested-archive", "HIGH", "Package contains a nested archive file.", "Unpack and review nested archives before packaging the skill."),
    RuleSpec("package-hidden-sensitive-file", "HIGH", "Package contains a hidden sensitive file.", "Remove hidden credential or package-manager config files."),
    RuleSpec("package-git-directory", "MEDIUM", "Package contains a .git directory.", "Package only source files needed by the skill, excluding repository metadata."),
    RuleSpec("secret-private-key", "CRITICAL", "Private key material is embedded in skill content.", "Move private keys to a managed secret store and remove them from the skill."),
    RuleSpec("secret-cloud-token", "CRITICAL", "High-confidence cloud or API token is embedded in skill content.", "Move tokens to environment variables or a secret store."),
    RuleSpec("secret-env-assignment", "HIGH", "Secret-like assignment contains a non-placeholder value.", "Replace hardcoded credentials with documented runtime configuration."),
    RuleSpec("declaration-prompt-override", "HIGH", "SKILL.md contains a prompt override phrase.", "Rephrase examples so they describe unsafe text instead of instructing the agent to follow it."),
    RuleSpec("declaration-sensitive-capability", "HIGH", "SKILL.md declares a sensitive capability.", "Make the capability explicit, narrow, and justified, or remove it."),
    RuleSpec("declaration-sensitive-path", "HIGH", "SKILL.md references sensitive host or credential paths.", "Remove references to sensitive host paths unless they are harmless documentation."),
    RuleSpec("declaration-external-endpoint", "MEDIUM", "SKILL.md declares an external network endpoint.", "Document why the endpoint is needed and prefer HTTPS."),
    RuleSpec("python-dynamic-exec", "CRITICAL", "Python dynamic code execution primitive is used in a skill file.", "Remove dynamic execution and replace it with explicit typed logic."),
    RuleSpec("python-shell-exec", "CRITICAL", "Python shell execution primitive is used in a skill file.", "Use subprocess with a fixed argument list and shell=False, or remove shell execution."),
    RuleSpec("python-sensitive-exfil", "CRITICAL", "Python code reads a sensitive path and uses an outbound network sink in the same file.", "Remove the sensitive read or network sink, and keep credential access outside skills."),
    RuleSpec("python-env-dump-exfil", "CRITICAL", "Python code reads the process environment in bulk and uses an outbound network sink in the same file.", "Avoid bulk environment reads and never send environment data over the network."),
    RuleSpec("python-reverse-shell", "CRITICAL", "Python code matches a reverse-shell shape.", "Remove reverse-shell behavior from the skill."),
    RuleSpec("python-dynamic-import", "HIGH", "Python dynamically imports a non-literal module.", "Use explicit imports or a constrained allowlist."),
    RuleSpec("python-subprocess", "HIGH", "Python invokes subprocess without shell=True.", "Review subprocess usage and keep arguments fixed and minimal."),
    RuleSpec("python-sensitive-path-read", "HIGH", "Python reads a sensitive path.", "Remove sensitive host-path access from the skill."),
    RuleSpec("python-unsafe-deserialization", "MEDIUM", "Python uses unsafe deserialization.", "Use safe loaders or trusted typed formats."),
    RuleSpec("shell-reverse-shell", "CRITICAL", "Shell script contains a reverse-shell idiom.", "Remove reverse-shell behavior from the skill."),
    RuleSpec("shell-reverse-shell-heuristic", "HIGH", "Shell script resembles a reverse-shell idiom.", "Confirm this is not reverse-shell behavior; unmistakable reverse-shell signals are blocked outright."),
    RuleSpec("shell-sensitive-exfil", "CRITICAL", "Shell script reads sensitive paths and sends data over the network.", "Remove sensitive reads or outbound transfer commands."),
    RuleSpec("shell-curl-pipe-shell", "HIGH", "Shell script pipes remote content into a shell.", "Download, verify, and execute reviewed code explicitly instead."),
    RuleSpec("shell-destructive-command", "HIGH", "Shell script contains an unmistakably destructive command.", "Remove destructive commands from skill scripts."),
    RuleSpec("shell-env-dump", "MEDIUM", "Shell script dumps the environment.", "Avoid bulk environment dumps in skills."),
    RuleSpec("network-cloud-metadata", "CRITICAL", "Skill content references a cloud metadata service.", "Remove cloud metadata access from the skill."),
    RuleSpec("resource-fork-bomb", "CRITICAL", "Skill content contains a fork-bomb pattern.", "Remove resource-exhaustion payloads."),
    RuleSpec("network-cleartext-http", "MEDIUM", "Skill content references a non-local cleartext HTTP endpoint.", "Use HTTPS or document why cleartext local development is required."),
    RuleSpec("network-local-http", "LOW", "Skill content references a local HTTP endpoint.", "Confirm the local endpoint is expected for this skill."),
]

RULES: dict[str, RuleSpec] = {spec.rule_id: spec for spec in _SPECS}

_ARCHIVE_SUFFIXES = (
    ".zip",
    ".tar",
    ".tar.gz",
    ".tgz",
    ".tar.bz2",
    ".tbz2",
    ".tar.xz",
    ".txz",
    ".7z",
    ".rar",
    ".whl",
)
_HIDDEN_SENSITIVE_FILES = {
    ".env",
    ".npmrc",
    ".pypirc",
    ".netrc",
    "credentials",
    "config",
}
_PLACEHOLDER_VALUES = {"", "x", "xx", "xxx", "xxxx", "changeme", "change-me", "example", "placeholder", "test", "dummy", "your-key", "<your-key>"}
_SENSITIVE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(~/.ssh|/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|/var/run/docker\.sock|docker\.sock|169\.254\.169\.254)")
_EXTERNAL_HTTP_RE = re.compile(r"http://([A-Za-z0-9.-]+)(?::\d+)?(?:/|\b)")
_URL_RE = re.compile(r"https?://[^\s)'\"<>]+")
_LOCAL_HTTP_HOSTS = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1"}
# `rm` with a recursive flag (any order/combination, optional --no-preserve-root)
# targeting the filesystem root, a wildcard, or a complete system-root directory.
# Subpaths like ``/tmp/scratch`` or ``/home/user/project`` stay unflagged.
_DESTRUCTIVE_RM_RE = (
    r"\brm\s+(?:-\S+\s+|--no-preserve-root\s+)*-\S*[rR]\S*\s+"
    r"(?:-\S+\s+|--no-preserve-root\s+)*"
    r"/(?:\*|\s|$|(?:bin|boot|dev|etc|home|lib|lib64|opt|proc|root|run|sbin|srv|sys|usr|var)(?:/\*?)?(?:\s|$))"
)


def skill_scan_enabled(app_config: Any | None = None) -> bool:
    if app_config is None:
        try:
            from deerflow.config import get_app_config

            app_config = get_app_config()
        except Exception:
            app_config = None
    skill_scan_config = getattr(app_config, "skill_scan", None)
    if skill_scan_config is not None and hasattr(skill_scan_config, "enabled"):
        return bool(skill_scan_config.enabled)
    return True


def format_static_findings(findings: list[SecurityFinding]) -> str:
    parts = []
    for finding in findings:
        location = finding["file"] or "<archive>"
        if finding["line"] is not None:
            location = f"{location}:{finding['line']}"
        parts.append(f"{finding['rule_id']} ({finding['severity']}) at {location}: {finding['message']} Remediation: {finding['remediation']}")
    return "; ".join(parts)


def enforce_static_scan(
    skill_dir: Path,
    *,
    skill_name: str | None = None,
    app_config: Any | None = None,
) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    if not skill_scan_enabled(app_config):
        return []

    result = scan_skill_dir(Path(skill_dir))
    blocked = [finding for finding in result["findings"] if finding["severity"] == _BLOCK_SEVERITY]
    if blocked:
        raise StaticScanBlockedError(
            blocked,
            skill_name=skill_name,
            message=f"Static security scan blocked skill '{skill_name}': {format_static_findings(blocked)}" if skill_name else f"Static security scan blocked skill content: {format_static_findings(blocked)}",
        )
    if result["scanner_errors"]:
        logger.warning("SkillScan analyzer errors for %s: %s", skill_name or skill_dir, "; ".join(result["scanner_errors"]))
    warnings = [finding for finding in result["findings"] if finding["severity"] != _BLOCK_SEVERITY]
    if warnings:
        logger.warning("SkillScan warning findings for %s: %s", skill_name or skill_dir, format_static_findings(warnings))
    return [dict(finding) for finding in result["findings"]]  # type: ignore[misc]


def scan_archive_preflight(archive_path: Path) -> ScanResult:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    scanner_errors: list[str] = []
    total_size = 0
    try:
        with zipfile.ZipFile(archive_path, "r") as zf:
            members = zf.infolist()
            if len(members) > _MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS:
                # Early-abort before the per-member reads below: a huge member
                # count is a bounded DoS vector even when the total size is small.
                finding = _finding("package-too-many-members", file=None, evidence=f"{len(members)} members")
                return _scan_result([finding], scanner_errors)
            for info in members:
                normalized = _normalize_archive_name(info.filename)
                findings.extend(_scan_archive_member_metadata(info, normalized))
                if info.is_dir():
                    continue
                total_size += max(info.file_size, 0)
                if info.file_size > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
                    findings.append(_finding("package-oversized-file", file=normalized, evidence=f"{info.file_size} bytes"))
                if _is_hidden_sensitive_path(normalized):
                    findings.append(_finding("package-hidden-sensitive-file", file=normalized, evidence=Path(normalized).name))
                if ".git" in PurePosixPath(normalized).parts:
                    findings.append(_finding("package-git-directory", file=normalized, evidence=".git"))
                if _is_symlink_member(info):
                    continue
                try:
                    with zf.open(info) as member:
                        prefix = member.read(8)
                except Exception as e:
                    scanner_errors.append(f"{normalized}: failed to read archive member prefix: {e}")
                    continue
                if _is_executable_binary(prefix):
                    findings.append(_finding("package-executable-binary", file=normalized, evidence=_binary_magic_evidence(prefix)))
                if _is_nested_archive_name(normalized) or _looks_like_archive(prefix):
                    findings.append(_nested_archive_finding(normalized, prefix, lambda: _read_archive_member(zf, info), scanner_errors))
            if total_size > MAX_TOTAL_ARCHIVE_BYTES:
                findings.append(_finding("package-oversized-total", file=None, evidence=f"{total_size} bytes"))
    except (zipfile.BadZipFile, OSError) as e:
        raise StaticScannerError(f"failed to read skill archive: {e}") from e

    return _scan_result(_dedupe(findings), scanner_errors)


def scan_skill_dir(skill_dir: Path) -> ScanResult:
    root = Path(skill_dir)
    if not root.is_dir():
        raise StaticScannerError(f"skill_dir is not a directory: {root}")

    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    scanner_errors: list[str] = []
    for path in sorted(candidate for candidate in root.rglob("*") if candidate.is_file()):
        rel_path = _relative_file(path, root)
        try:
            file_bytes = path.read_bytes()
        except OSError as e:
            scanner_errors.append(f"{rel_path}: failed to read file: {e}")
            continue

        findings.extend(_scan_file_package_properties(rel_path, file_bytes, path.stat().st_size))
        text = _decode_text_for_analysis(file_bytes)
        if text is None:
            continue

        try:
            findings.extend(_scan_text_file(rel_path, text))
        except Exception as e:
            scanner_errors.append(f"{rel_path}: analyzer failed: {e}")
            logger.warning("SkillScan analyzer failed for %s", rel_path, exc_info=True)

    return _scan_result(_dedupe(findings), scanner_errors)


def _scan_archive_member_metadata(info: zipfile.ZipInfo, normalized: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    if _archive_member_is_absolute(info.filename):
        findings.append(_finding("package-absolute-path", file=normalized, evidence=info.filename))
    elif _archive_member_traverses(info.filename):
        findings.append(_finding("package-path-traversal", file=normalized, evidence=info.filename))
    elif _archive_member_has_colon(info.filename):
        findings.append(_finding("package-ads-stream-name", file=normalized, evidence=info.filename))
    if _is_symlink_member(info):
        findings.append(_finding("package-symlink", file=normalized, evidence=info.filename))
    parts = PurePosixPath(normalized).parts
    if parts and parts[-1] == "SKILL.md" and len(parts) > 2 and not is_eval_fixture_skill_md(PurePosixPath(normalized)):
        findings.append(_finding("package-nested-skill-md", file=normalized, evidence=normalized))
    return findings


def _scan_file_package_properties(rel_path: str, file_bytes: bytes, file_size: int) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    path = PurePosixPath(rel_path)
    if path.name == "SKILL.md" and len(path.parts) > 1 and not is_eval_fixture_skill_md(path):
        findings.append(_finding("package-nested-skill-md", file=rel_path, evidence=rel_path))
    if file_size > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
        findings.append(_finding("package-oversized-file", file=rel_path, evidence=f"{file_size} bytes"))
    if _is_hidden_sensitive_path(rel_path):
        findings.append(_finding("package-hidden-sensitive-file", file=rel_path, evidence=path.name))
    if ".git" in path.parts:
        findings.append(_finding("package-git-directory", file=rel_path, evidence=".git"))
    if _is_nested_archive_name(rel_path) or _looks_like_archive(file_bytes):
        findings.append(_nested_archive_finding(rel_path, file_bytes[:8], lambda: file_bytes, []))
    if _is_executable_binary(file_bytes[:8]):
        findings.append(_finding("package-executable-binary", file=rel_path, evidence=_binary_magic_evidence(file_bytes[:8])))
    return findings


def _scan_text_file(rel_path: str, text: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    findings.extend(_scan_secrets(rel_path, text))
    if PurePosixPath(rel_path).name == "SKILL.md":
        findings.extend(_scan_declaration(rel_path, text))
    if _is_python_path(rel_path, text):
        findings.extend(_scan_python(rel_path, text))
    if _is_shell_path(rel_path, text):
        findings.extend(_scan_shell(rel_path, text))
    findings.extend(_scan_network_and_resource(rel_path, text))
    return findings


def _scan_secrets(rel_path: str, text: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    private_key = re.search(r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----", text)
    if private_key:
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("secret-private-key", rel_path, text, private_key))

    token_patterns = [
        r"\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b",
        r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b",
        r"\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}\b",
        r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b",
    ]
    for pattern in token_patterns:
        match = re.search(pattern, text)
        if match and not _looks_like_placeholder(match.group(0)):
            findings.append(_finding_from_match("secret-cloud-token", rel_path, text, match))
            break

    assignment_re = re.compile(r"(?im)\b(token|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|secret|credential)s?\b\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?([^\"'\s#]+)")
    for match in assignment_re.finditer(text):
        value = match.group(2).strip()
        if not _looks_like_placeholder(value):
            findings.append(_finding_from_match("secret-env-assignment", rel_path, text, match))
            break
    return findings


def _scan_declaration(rel_path: str, text: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    prompt_re = re.compile(r"(?i)\b(ignore|disregard)\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior)\s+instructions\b|\boverride\s+(the\s+)?(system|developer)\s+instructions\b")
    if match := prompt_re.search(text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("declaration-prompt-override", rel_path, text, match))

    capability_re = re.compile(r"(?i)(execute\s+(arbitrary\s+)?commands?|shell\s+commands?|credential\s+access|read\s+secrets?|arbitrary\s+network|network\s+egress)")
    if match := capability_re.search(text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("declaration-sensitive-capability", rel_path, text, match))

    if match := _SENSITIVE_PATH_RE.search(text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("declaration-sensitive-path", rel_path, text, match))

    for match in _URL_RE.finditer(text):
        if match.group(0).startswith("http://"):
            host = _http_host(match.group(0))
            if host and host not in _LOCAL_HTTP_HOSTS:
                findings.append(_finding_from_match("declaration-external-endpoint", rel_path, text, match))
                break
    return findings


def _scan_python(rel_path: str, text: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    try:
        tree = ast.parse(text)
    except SyntaxError:
        return findings

    aliases = _collect_python_aliases(tree)
    has_sensitive_read = False
    has_env_dump = False
    has_network_sink = False
    sensitive_node: ast.AST | None = None
    env_node: ast.AST | None = None
    network_node: ast.AST | None = None
    reverse_shell_parts: set[str] = set()
    reverse_shell_node: ast.AST | None = None

    for node in ast.walk(tree):
        if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str):
            if _SENSITIVE_PATH_RE.search(node.value):
                has_sensitive_read = True
                sensitive_node = sensitive_node or node
            if _is_outbound_url(node.value):
                has_network_sink = True
                network_node = network_node or node

        if isinstance(node, (ast.Attribute, ast.Name)) and _python_name(node, aliases) == "os.environ":
            has_env_dump = True
            env_node = env_node or node

        if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
            continue

        call_name = _python_call_name(node, aliases)
        if call_name in {"eval", "exec"} or (call_name == "compile" and _compile_mode_is_exec(node)):
            findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-dynamic-exec", rel_path, node, call_name))
        elif call_name in {"os.system", "os.popen"} or (call_name.startswith("subprocess.") and _call_has_shell_true(node)):
            findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-shell-exec", rel_path, node, call_name))
        elif call_name.startswith("subprocess."):
            findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-subprocess", rel_path, node, call_name))
        elif call_name == "__import__" or call_name == "importlib.import_module":
            if not node.args or not isinstance(node.args[0], ast.Constant):
                findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-dynamic-import", rel_path, node, call_name))
        elif call_name in {"pickle.load", "pickle.loads"} or (call_name == "yaml.load" and not _yaml_load_uses_safe_loader(node)):
            findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-unsafe-deserialization", rel_path, node, call_name))

        if _call_is_network_sink(call_name):
            has_network_sink = True
            network_node = network_node or node

        if call_name == "os.dup2":
            reverse_shell_parts.add("dup2")
            reverse_shell_node = reverse_shell_node or node
        elif call_name in {"socket.socket", "socket.create_connection"}:
            reverse_shell_parts.add("socket")
        elif call_name.startswith("subprocess.") or call_name in {"os.system", "os.popen"}:
            reverse_shell_parts.add("subprocess")

    if not has_network_sink:
        try:
            if handle_sink := _find_client_handle_sink(tree, rel_path):
                has_network_sink = True
                network_node = network_node or handle_sink
        except RecursionError:
            # The AST is untrusted. Preserve deterministic findings collected above when an
            # adversarially deep tree exceeds the recursive handle-analysis budget.
            logger.warning("SkillScan client-handle analysis hit recursion limit for %s", rel_path)

    if {"dup2", "socket", "subprocess"} <= reverse_shell_parts:
        findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-reverse-shell", rel_path, reverse_shell_node, "socket + dup2 + subprocess"))

    if has_sensitive_read and has_network_sink:
        findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-sensitive-exfil", rel_path, sensitive_node or network_node, "sensitive read + network sink"))
    elif has_sensitive_read:
        findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-sensitive-path-read", rel_path, sensitive_node, "sensitive path read"))
    if has_env_dump and has_network_sink:
        findings.append(_finding_for_node("python-env-dump-exfil", rel_path, env_node or network_node, "environment dump + network sink"))
    return findings


def _scan_shell(rel_path: str, text: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    # Unmistakable reverse-shell signals hard-block; weaker idioms (bash -i,
    # mkfifo) only warn->LLM because they appear in legitimate scripts.
    if match := re.search(r"(/dev/tcp/|nc\s+-e\b)", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("shell-reverse-shell", rel_path, text, match))
    if match := re.search(r"(bash\s+-i\b|mkfifo\s+)", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("shell-reverse-shell-heuristic", rel_path, text, match))
    if re.search(r"(/etc/shadow|/etc/passwd)", text) and re.search(r"\b(curl|wget|nc|scp)\b", text):
        findings.append(_finding_for_text("shell-sensitive-exfil", rel_path, text, "/etc"))
    if match := re.search(r"\b(curl|wget)\b[^\n|;]*\|\s*(?:sh|bash)\b", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("shell-curl-pipe-shell", rel_path, text, match))
    if match := re.search(_DESTRUCTIVE_RM_RE + r"|:\(\)\{\s*:\|:&\s*\};:|dd\s+[^#\n]*\bof=/dev/", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("shell-destructive-command", rel_path, text, match))
    if match := re.search(r"\b(env|printenv|export\s+-p)\b", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("shell-env-dump", rel_path, text, match))
    return findings


def _scan_network_and_resource(rel_path: str, text: str) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    findings: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    if match := re.search(r"(169\.254\.169\.254|metadata\.google\.internal)", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("network-cloud-metadata", rel_path, text, match))
    if match := re.search(r":\(\)\{\s*:\|:&\s*\};:", text):
        findings.append(_finding_from_match("resource-fork-bomb", rel_path, text, match))
    for match in _EXTERNAL_HTTP_RE.finditer(text):
        host = match.group(1)
        if host in _LOCAL_HTTP_HOSTS or host.startswith("10.") or host.startswith("192.168.") or re.match(r"172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.", host):
            findings.append(_finding_from_match("network-local-http", rel_path, text, match))
        else:
            findings.append(_finding_from_match("network-cleartext-http", rel_path, text, match))
        break
    return findings


def _finding(rule_id: str, *, file: str | None, evidence: str | None, line: int | None = None, severity: FindingSeverity | None = None) -> SecurityFinding:
    spec = RULES[rule_id]
    if evidence is not None and rule_id.startswith("secret-"):
        evidence = _redact_secret_evidence(evidence)
    return {
        "rule_id": rule_id,
        "severity": severity or spec.severity,
        "file": file,
        "line": line,
        "message": spec.message,
        "remediation": spec.remediation,
        "evidence": evidence,
    }


def _finding_from_match(rule_id: str, rel_path: str, text: str, match: re.Match[str]) -> SecurityFinding:
    return _finding(rule_id, file=rel_path, line=_line_number(text, match.start()), evidence=match.group(0))


def _finding_for_text(rule_id: str, rel_path: str, text: str, evidence: str) -> SecurityFinding:
    index = text.find(evidence)
    return _finding(rule_id, file=rel_path, line=_line_number(text, index if index >= 0 else 0), evidence=evidence)


def _finding_for_node(rule_id: str, rel_path: str, node: ast.AST | None, evidence: str) -> SecurityFinding:
    return _finding(rule_id, file=rel_path, line=getattr(node, "lineno", 1), evidence=evidence)


def _nested_archive_finding(rel_path: str, prefix: bytes, read_data, scanner_errors: list[str]) -> SecurityFinding:
    name = PurePosixPath(rel_path).name
    if prefix.startswith(b"PK\x03\x04"):
        try:
            data = read_data()
        except Exception as e:
            scanner_errors.append(f"{rel_path}: failed to read nested archive for inspection: {e}")
        else:
            if data is not None and _nested_zip_contains_executable(data):
                return _finding("package-nested-archive", file=rel_path, evidence=f"{name}: contains an executable binary member", severity="CRITICAL")
    return _finding("package-nested-archive", file=rel_path, evidence=name)


def _nested_zip_contains_executable(data: bytes) -> bool:
    try:
        with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(data)) as nested:
            for info in nested.infolist()[:_NESTED_ZIP_PEEK_MEMBER_LIMIT]:
                if info.is_dir():
                    continue
                try:
                    with nested.open(info) as member:
                        if _is_executable_binary(member.read(8)):
                            return True
                except Exception:
                    continue
    except (zipfile.BadZipFile, OSError):
        return False
    return False


def _read_archive_member(zf: zipfile.ZipFile, info: zipfile.ZipInfo) -> bytes | None:
    if info.file_size > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
        return None
    with zf.open(info) as member:
        return member.read(MAX_FILE_BYTES + 1)


def _redact_secret_evidence(value: str) -> str:
    # Drop the value entirely: the rule_id already names the secret category, and
    # any retained prefix (e.g. value[:6]) leaks real token bytes into findings
    # that flow to Gateway responses and LLM context.
    return "[redacted]"


def _scan_result(findings: list[SecurityFinding], scanner_errors: list[str]) -> ScanResult:
    blocked = any(finding["severity"] == _BLOCK_SEVERITY for finding in findings)
    return {"findings": findings, "blocked": blocked, "scanner_errors": scanner_errors}


def _dedupe(findings: Iterable[SecurityFinding]) -> list[SecurityFinding]:
    seen: set[tuple[str, str | None, int | None]] = set()
    deduped: list[SecurityFinding] = []
    for finding in findings:
        key = (finding["rule_id"], finding["file"], finding["line"])
        if key in seen:
            continue
        seen.add(key)
        deduped.append(finding)
    return deduped


def _line_number(text: str, index: int) -> int:
    return text[: max(index, 0)].count("\n") + 1


def _normalize_archive_name(name: str) -> str:
    return posixpath.normpath(name.replace("\\", "/")).removeprefix("./")


def _archive_member_is_absolute(name: str) -> bool:
    normalized = name.replace("\\", "/")
    return normalized.startswith("/") or PurePosixPath(normalized).is_absolute() or PureWindowsPath(name).is_absolute()


def _archive_member_traverses(name: str) -> bool:
    return ".." in PurePosixPath(name.replace("\\", "/")).parts


def _archive_member_has_colon(name: str) -> bool:
    # A colon has no legitimate use in a relative archive member path (zip
    # entries use ``/`` separators; a real Windows drive prefix is already
    # caught by ``_archive_member_is_absolute``). On Windows/NTFS a colon
    # elsewhere in the path addresses an Alternate Data Stream on the
    # preceding path component (e.g. ``scripts/run.sh:hidden.txt`` attaches
    # hidden content to ``run.sh`` instead of creating a sibling file), and
    # that stream is invisible to directory-listing-based scanning. Reject
    # outright rather than trying to allow-list "safe" colon positions.
    return ":" in name


def _is_symlink_member(info: zipfile.ZipInfo) -> bool:
    return stat.S_ISLNK(info.external_attr >> 16)


def _relative_file(path: Path, root: Path) -> str:
    return path.resolve().relative_to(root.resolve()).as_posix()


def _is_hidden_sensitive_path(rel_path: str) -> bool:
    parts = PurePosixPath(rel_path).parts
    if ".aws" in parts and parts[-1] == "credentials":
        return True
    if ".git" in parts and parts[-1] == "config":
        return True
    return parts[-1] in _HIDDEN_SENSITIVE_FILES and (parts[-1].startswith(".") or any(token in parts[-1].lower() for token in ("credential", "npmrc", "pypirc", "netrc")))


def _is_nested_archive_name(rel_path: str) -> bool:
    lower = rel_path.lower()
    return any(lower.endswith(suffix) for suffix in _ARCHIVE_SUFFIXES)


def _looks_like_archive(file_bytes: bytes) -> bool:
    return file_bytes.startswith(b"PK\x03\x04") or file_bytes.startswith(b"\x1f\x8b") or file_bytes.startswith(b"7z\xbc\xaf\x27\x1c")


def _is_executable_binary(prefix: bytes) -> bool:
    return prefix.startswith(b"\x7fELF") or prefix.startswith(b"MZ") or prefix.startswith((b"\xfe\xed\xfa", b"\xcf\xfa\xed\xfe", b"\xca\xfe\xba\xbe"))


def _binary_magic_evidence(prefix: bytes) -> str:
    if prefix.startswith(b"\x7fELF"):
        return "ELF"
    if prefix.startswith(b"MZ"):
        return "PE"
    return "Mach-O"


def _decode_text_for_analysis(file_bytes: bytes) -> str | None:
    # Binaries are rejected by the NUL probe and the decode failure below, so
    # every NUL-free, UTF-8-decodable file is analyzed regardless of extension.
    if b"\x00" in file_bytes[:4096]:
        return None
    try:
        return file_bytes.decode("utf-8")
    except UnicodeDecodeError:
        return None


def _is_python_path(rel_path: str, text: str) -> bool:
    return PurePosixPath(rel_path).suffix.lower() == ".py" or text.startswith("#!") and "python" in text.splitlines()[0].lower()


def _is_shell_path(rel_path: str, text: str) -> bool:
    suffix = PurePosixPath(rel_path).suffix.lower()
    return suffix in {".sh", ".bash"} or text.startswith("#!") and any(shell in text.splitlines()[0].lower() for shell in ("sh", "bash", "zsh"))


def _looks_like_placeholder(value: str) -> bool:
    normalized = value.strip().strip("\"'").lower()
    if normalized in _PLACEHOLDER_VALUES:
        return True
    return normalized.startswith("<") or normalized.startswith("${") or "your" in normalized or "example" in normalized


def _http_host(url: str) -> str | None:
    match = re.match(r"https?://\[?([^]/:]+)", url)
    return match.group(1) if match else None


def _is_outbound_url(value: str) -> bool:
    return bool(value.startswith(("http://", "https://")) and (_http_host(value) or "") not in _LOCAL_HTTP_HOSTS)


def _collect_python_aliases(tree: ast.AST) -> dict[str, str]:
    aliases: dict[str, str] = {}
    for node in ast.walk(tree):
        if isinstance(node, ast.Import):
            for alias in node.names:
                aliases[alias.asname or alias.name] = alias.name
        elif isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom) and node.module:
            for alias in node.names:
                aliases[alias.asname or alias.name] = f"{node.module}.{alias.name}"
    return aliases


def _python_name(node: ast.AST, aliases: dict[str, str]) -> str:
    if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
        return aliases.get(node.id, node.id)
    if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
        base = _python_name(node.value, aliases)
        return f"{base}.{node.attr}" if base else node.attr
    return ""


def _python_import_name(node: ast.AST, aliases: dict[str, str]) -> str:
    """Resolve only names proven by the scope-local import map."""
    if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
        return aliases.get(node.id, "")
    if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
        base = _python_import_name(node.value, aliases)
        return f"{base}.{node.attr}" if base else ""
    return ""


def _python_call_name(node: ast.Call, aliases: dict[str, str]) -> str:
    return _python_name(node.func, aliases)


def _compile_mode_is_exec(node: ast.Call) -> bool:
    if len(node.args) >= 3 and isinstance(node.args[2], ast.Constant):
        return node.args[2].value == "exec"
    return any(keyword.arg == "mode" and isinstance(keyword.value, ast.Constant) and keyword.value.value == "exec" for keyword in node.keywords)


def _call_has_shell_true(node: ast.Call) -> bool:
    return any(keyword.arg == "shell" and isinstance(keyword.value, ast.Constant) and keyword.value.value is True for keyword in node.keywords)


def _call_is_network_sink(call_name: str) -> bool:
    return call_name in {
        "requests.get",
        "requests.post",
        "requests.put",
        "requests.patch",
        "requests.delete",
        "requests.head",
        "requests.options",
        "requests.request",
        "httpx.get",
        "httpx.post",
        "httpx.put",
        "httpx.patch",
        "httpx.delete",
        "httpx.head",
        "httpx.options",
        "httpx.request",
        "httpx.stream",
        "urllib.request.urlopen",
        "urllib.request.urlretrieve",
        "socket.socket",
        "socket.create_connection",
    }


# Instance clients split construction from egress: the constructor does no I/O and the
# outbound call is an attribute call on a variable, so neither statement alone is a
# call-name sink. The signal therefore follows only the minimum high-confidence chain:
# known constructor -> simple name/alias -> constructor-supported direct method call in
# the same lexical scope. Nested scopes inherit only stable import aliases and never client
# handles. Comprehensions, walrus-bearing statements, annotations, and executable expressions
# in complex binding targets deliberately produce no finding from this signal; any names those
# skipped constructs may bind are invalidated so stale state cannot create a finding.
#
# Compound bodies are still walked from isolated entry-state copies so `if True:` is not a
# universal bypass, but ambiguous bindings are dropped rather than joined. Every AST visit
# and copied scope entry consumes a deterministic work budget, and the walk stops as soon
# as it finds one sink. This bounds the branch-copy cost on untrusted source.


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _ClientSpec:
    methods: frozenset[str]
    sync_context: bool = False
    async_context: bool = False


# Keep response-only operations such as `getresponse()` out: this signal needs outbound I/O.
_PYTHON_CLIENT_SPECS = {
    "http.client.HTTPConnection": _ClientSpec(frozenset({"request", "connect", "send"})),
    "http.client.HTTPSConnection": _ClientSpec(frozenset({"request", "connect", "send"})),
    "requests.Session": _ClientSpec(frozenset({"request", "get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete", "head", "options", "send"}), sync_context=True),
    "urllib3.PoolManager": _ClientSpec(frozenset({"request", "urlopen"}), sync_context=True),
    "aiohttp.ClientSession": _ClientSpec(frozenset({"request", "get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete", "head", "options"}), async_context=True),
}
_PYTHON_CLIENT_CONSTRUCTORS = frozenset(_PYTHON_CLIENT_SPECS)
_PYTHON_CLIENT_SINK_METHODS = frozenset().union(*(spec.methods for spec in _PYTHON_CLIENT_SPECS.values()))
_PYTHON_CLIENT_ANALYSIS_BUDGET = 100_000
_PYTHON_SCOPE_NODES = (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef, ast.Lambda, ast.ClassDef)
_PYTHON_COMPREHENSION_NODES = (ast.ListComp, ast.SetComp, ast.DictComp, ast.GeneratorExp)
_PYTHON_MATCH_CAPTURE_NODES = (ast.MatchAs, ast.MatchStar, ast.MatchMapping)
# Statements whose parts do not all run, or run an unknown number of times. Their bodies are
# analyzed from a copy and every name they bind is dropped afterwards.
_PYTHON_BRANCHING_NODES = (ast.If, ast.For, ast.AsyncFor, ast.While, ast.Try, ast.TryStar, ast.Match)


@dataclass
class _ClientScope:
    handles: dict[str, str]
    aliases: dict[str, str]
    unstable_aliases: frozenset[str] = frozenset()

    def copy_without(self, analysis: _ClientAnalysis, names: set[str] | None = None) -> _ClientScope:
        names = names or set()
        analysis.charge(len(self.handles) + len(self.aliases) + 1)
        return _ClientScope(
            handles={name: constructor for name, constructor in self.handles.items() if name not in names},
            aliases={name: target for name, target in self.aliases.items() if name not in names},
            unstable_aliases=self.unstable_aliases,
        )

    def aliases_only(self, analysis: _ClientAnalysis, names: set[str] | None = None, unstable_aliases: frozenset[str] = frozenset()) -> _ClientScope:
        names = names or set()
        analysis.charge(len(self.aliases) + 1)
        return _ClientScope(
            handles={},
            aliases={name: target for name, target in self.aliases.items() if name not in names and name not in self.unstable_aliases},
            unstable_aliases=unstable_aliases,
        )


class _ClientAnalysisBudgetExceeded(Exception):
    pass


@dataclass
class _ClientAnalysis:
    remaining: int
    found: ast.AST | None = None

    def charge(self, cost: int = 1) -> None:
        if cost > self.remaining:
            raise _ClientAnalysisBudgetExceeded
        self.remaining -= cost


def _find_client_handle_sink(tree: ast.AST, rel_path: str) -> ast.AST | None:
    analysis = _ClientAnalysis(remaining=_PYTHON_CLIENT_ANALYSIS_BUDGET)
    module = _ClientScope(handles={}, aliases={})
    try:
        if isinstance(tree, ast.Module):
            module.unstable_aliases = _client_unstable_aliases(tree.body, analysis)
        _walk_client_scope(tree, module, module, analysis)
    except _ClientAnalysisBudgetExceeded:
        logger.warning("SkillScan client-handle analysis exhausted work budget for %s", rel_path)
    return analysis.found


def _walk_client_statements(body: list[ast.AST], scope: _ClientScope, inherited: _ClientScope, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> None:
    """Walk ordinary statements; a walrus-bearing statement is an explicit false negative."""
    for statement in body:
        if analysis.found is not None:
            return
        walrus_names = set() if isinstance(statement, _PYTHON_SCOPE_NODES) else _walrus_target_names(statement, analysis)
        if walrus_names:
            bound_names: set[str] = set()
            declared_names: set[str] = set()
            _collect_client_scope_bindings(statement, bound_names, declared_names, analysis)
            _drop_client_bindings(scope, walrus_names | (bound_names - declared_names))
            continue
        _walk_client_scope(statement, scope, inherited, analysis)


def _walk_client_scope(node: ast.AST, scope: _ClientScope, inherited: _ClientScope, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> None:
    """Walk executable AST in statement order, carrying a one-level client-handle map."""
    if analysis.found is not None:
        return
    analysis.charge()
    if isinstance(node, ast.Module):
        _walk_client_statements(node.body, scope, inherited, analysis)
        return
    if isinstance(node, _PYTHON_SCOPE_NODES):
        _walk_client_nested_scope(node, scope, inherited, analysis)
        return
    if isinstance(node, _PYTHON_COMPREHENSION_NODES):
        return
    if isinstance(node, ast.NamedExpr):
        _drop_client_bindings(scope, set(_client_assignment_target_names(node.target)))
        return
    if isinstance(node, _PYTHON_BRANCHING_NODES):
        _walk_client_branching(node, scope, inherited, analysis)
        return
    if isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):
        _bind_client_import(node, scope)
        return
    if isinstance(node, (ast.Assign, ast.AnnAssign, ast.AugAssign)):
        if node.value is not None:
            _walk_client_scope(node.value, scope, inherited, analysis)
        if analysis.found is not None:
            return
        targets = node.targets if isinstance(node, ast.Assign) else [node.target]
        _rebind_client_scope(targets, node.value if isinstance(node, (ast.Assign, ast.AnnAssign)) else None, scope)
        return
    if isinstance(node, (ast.With, ast.AsyncWith)):
        bound_names = {name for item in node.items if item.optional_vars is not None for name in _client_assignment_target_names(item.optional_vars)}
        for item in node.items:
            _walk_client_scope(item.context_expr, scope, inherited, analysis)
            if analysis.found is not None:
                return
            constructor = _client_constructor_from_value(item.context_expr, scope)
            if item.optional_vars is not None:
                _drop_client_bindings(scope, set(_client_assignment_target_names(item.optional_vars)))
            if constructor:
                spec = _PYTHON_CLIENT_SPECS[constructor]
                supported = spec.async_context if isinstance(node, ast.AsyncWith) else spec.sync_context
                if not supported:
                    _drop_client_bindings(scope, bound_names)
                    return
                if isinstance(item.optional_vars, ast.Name):
                    scope.handles[item.optional_vars.id] = constructor
        _walk_client_statements(node.body, scope, inherited, analysis)
        return
    if isinstance(node, ast.Delete):
        _drop_client_bindings(scope, {name for target in node.targets for name in _client_assignment_target_names(target)})
        return
    if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
        if _call_is_client_handle_sink(node, scope.handles):
            analysis.found = node
            return
    for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
        _walk_client_scope(child, scope, inherited, analysis)
        if analysis.found is not None:
            return


def _walk_client_branching(node: ast.AST, scope: _ClientScope, inherited: _ClientScope, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> None:
    """Analyze a compound statement without deciding which of its parts run, or in what order.

    Every name the statement may bind is dropped *before* any body is walked, not after. Dropping
    afterwards would be wrong for the parts that run after a sibling has already rebound the name --
    a `finally` after a handler replaced the handle, a later `except*` clause, a second loop
    iteration -- and each of those disagreements is a benign file hard-blocked as `CRITICAL`.
    Ordering the parts instead of dropping is the control-flow interpreter this signal is not.

    Bodies are still walked, each from its own copy, so a construction inside one branch cannot leak
    into a sibling and a sink inside a branch is still seen. What is lost is a name that the same
    statement both calls and rebinds; that is the documented false negative.
    """
    _drop_client_bindings(scope, _branching_bound_names(node, analysis))
    for header in _branching_header_exprs(node):
        walrus_names = _walrus_target_names(header, analysis)
        if walrus_names:
            _drop_client_bindings(scope, walrus_names)
            continue
        _walk_client_scope(header, scope, inherited, analysis)
        if analysis.found is not None:
            return
    for body in _branching_bodies(node):
        branch_scope = scope.copy_without(analysis)
        _walk_client_statements(body, branch_scope, inherited, analysis)
        if analysis.found is not None:
            return


def _branching_header_exprs(node: ast.AST) -> list[ast.AST]:
    if isinstance(node, ast.If):
        return [node.test]
    if isinstance(node, (ast.For, ast.AsyncFor)):
        return [node.iter]
    if isinstance(node, ast.While):
        return [node.test]
    if isinstance(node, ast.Match):
        return [node.subject]
    return []  # `try` has no header; handler types run only when an exception was raised


def _branching_bodies(node: ast.AST) -> list[list[ast.AST]]:
    if isinstance(node, (ast.Try, ast.TryStar)):
        # A handler's `type` expression and its body run on the same path, so they share one copy.
        handlers = [[*([handler.type] if handler.type is not None else []), *handler.body] for handler in node.handlers]
        return [node.body, *handlers, node.orelse, node.finalbody]
    if isinstance(node, ast.Match):
        return [[*([case.guard] if case.guard is not None else []), *case.body] for case in node.cases]
    if isinstance(node, ast.If):
        return [node.body, node.orelse]
    if isinstance(node, (ast.For, ast.AsyncFor)):
        return [node.body, node.orelse]
    if isinstance(node, ast.While):
        return [node.body, node.orelse]
    return []


def _branching_bound_names(node: ast.AST, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> set[str]:
    """Every name the statement may bind, including the loop/handler/capture targets themselves."""
    names: set[str] = set()
    declared: set[str] = set()
    if isinstance(node, (ast.For, ast.AsyncFor)):
        names.update(_client_assignment_target_names(node.target))
    for body in _branching_bodies(node):
        for statement in body:
            _collect_client_scope_bindings(statement, names, declared, analysis)
    if isinstance(node, (ast.Try, ast.TryStar)):
        names.update(handler.name for handler in node.handlers if handler.name)
    if isinstance(node, ast.Match):
        for case in node.cases:
            _collect_client_scope_bindings(case.pattern, names, declared, analysis)
    return names - declared


def _walrus_target_names(node: ast.AST, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> set[str]:
    """Return walrus targets in this scope so the entire ambiguous statement can be skipped."""
    if isinstance(node, _PYTHON_SCOPE_NODES):
        return set()
    found: set[str] = set()
    stack = [node]
    while stack:
        current = stack.pop()
        analysis.charge()
        if isinstance(current, ast.NamedExpr):
            found.update(_client_assignment_target_names(current.target))
        for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(current):
            if isinstance(child, _PYTHON_SCOPE_NODES):
                continue
            stack.append(child)
    return found


def _walk_client_nested_scope(node: ast.AST, scope: _ClientScope, inherited: _ClientScope, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> None:
    annotation_bindings = {name for annotation in _client_scope_annotations(node) for name in _walrus_target_names(annotation, analysis)}
    _drop_client_bindings(scope, annotation_bindings)
    for expr in _client_scope_prelude(node):
        _walk_client_scope(expr, scope, inherited, analysis)
        if analysis.found is not None:
            return
    body = node.body if isinstance(node.body, list) else [node.body]
    unstable_aliases = _client_unstable_aliases(body, analysis)
    if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef):
        inner, nested = inherited.aliases_only(analysis, unstable_aliases=unstable_aliases), inherited
    else:
        inner = inherited.aliases_only(analysis, _client_scope_bindings(node, analysis), unstable_aliases)
        nested = inner
    _walk_client_statements(body, inner, nested, analysis)
    if not isinstance(node, ast.Lambda):
        _drop_client_bindings(scope, {node.name})


def _match_capture_names(node: ast.AST) -> list[str]:
    if isinstance(node, ast.MatchMapping):
        return [node.rest] if node.rest else []
    return [node.name] if node.name else []


def _client_scope_prelude(node: ast.AST) -> list[ast.AST]:
    """Expressions a scope-defining statement evaluates in its *enclosing* scope, not the new one:
    decorators, argument/keyword defaults, and class bases/keywords. Annotations are not walked for
    sinks -- whether the runtime evaluates one depends on the scope, on `from __future__ import
    annotations`, and on the Python version. Their possible binding effects are invalidated
    separately so skipping an annotation cannot leave a stale handle behind.
    """
    if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef):
        return [*node.decorator_list, *node.bases, *(keyword.value for keyword in node.keywords)]
    defaults = [default for default in [*node.args.defaults, *node.args.kw_defaults] if default is not None]
    if isinstance(node, ast.Lambda):
        return defaults
    return [*node.decorator_list, *defaults]


def _client_scope_annotations(node: ast.AST) -> list[ast.AST]:
    if not isinstance(node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)):
        return []
    args = node.args
    annotations = [arg.annotation for arg in [*args.posonlyargs, *args.args, *args.kwonlyargs] if arg.annotation is not None]
    for extra in (args.vararg, args.kwarg):
        if extra is not None and extra.annotation is not None:
            annotations.append(extra.annotation)
    if node.returns is not None:
        annotations.append(node.returns)
    return annotations


def _client_unstable_aliases(body: list[ast.AST], analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> frozenset[str]:
    """Names whose import-alias value is not stable for a nested scope.

    This is a binding-only prepass: it never interprets expression values or paths. Any ordinary
    binding makes a same-named import alias non-inheritable, as does a repeated/star import. Scope
    bodies are skipped, while walrus targets in their enclosing-scope preludes are invalidated.
    """
    imported: set[str] = set()
    unstable: set[str] = set()
    saw_star_import = False
    stack = list(reversed(body))
    while stack:
        current = stack.pop()
        analysis.charge()
        if isinstance(current, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):
            for alias in current.names:
                if alias.name == "*":
                    saw_star_import = True
                    continue
                name = alias.asname or alias.name.split(".")[0]
                if name in imported:
                    unstable.add(name)
                imported.add(name)
            continue
        if isinstance(current, _PYTHON_SCOPE_NODES):
            if not isinstance(current, ast.Lambda):
                unstable.add(current.name)
            for expr in [*_client_scope_prelude(current), *_client_scope_annotations(current)]:
                unstable.update(_walrus_target_names(expr, analysis))
            continue
        if isinstance(current, _PYTHON_COMPREHENSION_NODES):
            unstable.update(_walrus_target_names(current, analysis))
            continue
        if isinstance(current, ast.Global | ast.Nonlocal):
            continue
        if isinstance(current, ast.Name) and isinstance(current.ctx, (ast.Store, ast.Del)):
            unstable.add(current.id)
        elif isinstance(current, ast.ExceptHandler) and current.name:
            unstable.add(current.name)
        elif isinstance(current, _PYTHON_MATCH_CAPTURE_NODES):
            unstable.update(_match_capture_names(current))
        stack.extend(reversed(list(ast.iter_child_nodes(current))))
    if saw_star_import:
        unstable.update(imported)
    return frozenset(unstable)


def _client_scope_bindings(node: ast.AST, analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> set[str]:
    """Names that shadow inherited constructor aliases throughout a function scope."""
    args = node.args
    names = {arg.arg for arg in [*args.posonlyargs, *args.args, *args.kwonlyargs]}
    for extra in (args.vararg, args.kwarg):
        if extra is not None:
            names.add(extra.arg)
    declared: set[str] = set()
    for statement in node.body if isinstance(node.body, list) else [node.body]:
        _collect_client_scope_bindings(statement, names, declared, analysis)
    return names - declared


def _collect_client_scope_bindings(node: ast.AST, names: set[str], declared: set[str], analysis: _ClientAnalysis) -> None:
    analysis.charge()
    if isinstance(node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef, ast.ClassDef)):
        names.add(node.name)  # The statement binds its own name here; its body is a separate scope.
        return
    if isinstance(node, ast.Lambda):
        return
    if isinstance(node, (ast.Global, ast.Nonlocal)):
        declared.update(node.names)
        return
    if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and isinstance(node.ctx, (ast.Store, ast.Del)):
        names.add(node.id)
    elif isinstance(node, ast.ExceptHandler) and node.name:
        names.add(node.name)
    elif isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):
        for alias in node.names:
            names.add(alias.asname or alias.name.split(".")[0])
    elif isinstance(node, _PYTHON_MATCH_CAPTURE_NODES):
        names.update(_match_capture_names(node))
    if isinstance(node, _PYTHON_COMPREHENSION_NODES):
        # The expression is not analyzed for sinks, but a walrus target is local to the
        # containing function. Removing a same-named inherited constructor alias prevents a
        # definition-order false positive; whether the comprehension executes remains a false
        # negative by design.
        names.update(_walrus_target_names(node, analysis))
        return
    for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
        _collect_client_scope_bindings(child, names, declared, analysis)


def _client_constructor_from_value(value: ast.AST | None, scope: _ClientScope) -> str:
    if isinstance(value, ast.Call):
        called = _python_import_name(value.func, scope.aliases)
        return called if called in _PYTHON_CLIENT_CONSTRUCTORS else ""
    if isinstance(value, ast.Name):
        return scope.handles.get(value.id, "")
    return ""


def _rebind_client_scope(targets: list[ast.AST], value: ast.AST | None, scope: _ClientScope) -> None:
    """Apply one binding: drop the targets, then re-add them if the value is a client handle.

    The value is resolved before the targets are dropped, so `session = session` and `s = session`
    keep the handle. Name-to-name propagation is what stops a two-character rename from shedding it;
    it stays one level, so a handle reached through an attribute or an item is not tracked.
    """
    constructor = _client_constructor_from_value(value, scope)
    names = {name for target in targets for name in _client_assignment_target_names(target)}
    _drop_client_bindings(scope, names)
    if constructor:
        for target in targets:
            if isinstance(target, ast.Name):
                scope.handles[target.id] = constructor


def _client_assignment_target_names(target: ast.AST) -> list[str]:
    if isinstance(target, ast.Name):
        return [target.id]
    if isinstance(target, ast.Starred):
        return _client_assignment_target_names(target.value)
    if isinstance(target, (ast.List, ast.Tuple)):
        return [name for element in target.elts for name in _client_assignment_target_names(element)]
    return []


def _drop_client_bindings(scope: _ClientScope, names: set[str]) -> None:
    for name in names:
        scope.handles.pop(name, None)
        scope.aliases.pop(name, None)


def _bind_client_import(node: ast.Import | ast.ImportFrom, scope: _ClientScope) -> None:
    for alias in node.names:
        if alias.name == "*":
            continue
        name = alias.asname or alias.name.split(".")[0]
        _drop_client_bindings(scope, {name})
        if isinstance(node, ast.Import):
            scope.aliases[name] = alias.name if alias.asname else name
        elif node.module:
            scope.aliases[name] = f"{node.module}.{alias.name}"


def _call_is_client_handle_sink(node: ast.Call, handles: dict[str, str]) -> bool:
    func = node.func
    if not isinstance(func, ast.Attribute) or not isinstance(func.value, ast.Name):
        return False
    constructor = handles.get(func.value.id)
    return bool(constructor and func.attr in _PYTHON_CLIENT_SPECS[constructor].methods)


def _yaml_load_uses_safe_loader(node: ast.Call) -> bool:
    for keyword in node.keywords:
        if keyword.arg in {"Loader", "loader"}:
            name = _python_name(keyword.value, {})
            if "SafeLoader" in name:
                return True
    return False