mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
synced 2026-09-29 07:56:18 +00:00
* feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2) PR4 of RFC #4651: check lead-supplied acceptance_criteria in code when a subagent completes, so objectively checkable requirements can never be silently passed by a self-report. - subagents/acceptance_checks.py: deterministic leaf families — file:<path> exists|non-empty and file_written:<path> read through read_current_file_content scoped to the shared thread workspace; the read uses the sandbox-native virtual path form (the local read validator and provider mount tables resolve /mnt/user-data/... paths, not host paths); the scope decision canonicalizes with realpath on the local sandbox so workspace symlinks cannot escape into uploads; a remote provider's "Error: ..." return string is normalized to a failed check (provider-typed via is_local_sandbox); a UnicodeDecodeError marks a binary deliverable as existing and non-empty; out-of-scope paths degrade to UNVERIFIED. tests_passed:<command> anchors to a matching recorded bash execution with status=success and a test-summary shape; matching is shell-structure aware with control-flow attribution (span must end at the last segment with provable execution), negating-option values are ineligible evidence and a target negated anywhere in the command degrades the match, extra flags must be selection-preserving, extra positionals widen only after a path-scoped criterion, truncated commands degrade via command_truncated, the summary shape is read only from output attributable to the matched segment (preceding segments provably silent by invocation form), and pass shapes require a nonzero passed count. Criterion text is neutralized with neutralize_untrusted_tags before storage/rendering. Anything else renders UNVERIFIED, never silently passed. - executor: accumulate bounded bash command/output evidence per streamed chunk (merged by tool_call_id, newest-capped) so subagent summarization compacting earlier messages cannot erase a recorded execution; the recorded status is the actual shell exit status parsed from the output's exit marker (signed codes included; the remote Command exited with code N form is accepted only as the whole trimmed output), falling back to deerflow_tool_meta only when no marker exists. - sandbox providers: e2b/opensandbox/tenki/boxlite append the LocalSandbox-style "Exit Code: N" marker on nonzero exit even with non-empty output; aio propagates the SDK's structured exit_code on both exec paths the same way; local timeouts append Exit Code: 124; and _truncate_bash_output always preserves a trailing exit marker (signed included) inside its budget, with a 32-char floor raising any smaller configured limit, so the actual shell outcome always survives in the output text. - task_tool: run the checklist offloaded (asyncio.to_thread) on the completed branch, failure-isolated; stamp the verdict into result metadata and render the per-criterion section into the model-visible result text. - status contract: additive subagent_acceptance_verdict transport with read-side structural validation. - delegation ledger: entry carries the verdict and renders a compact acceptance segment; gateway strips caller-forged verdicts from both ledger entries and message metadata, like the citation verdict. - blocking-IO anchor pins the offload (teeth proven red->green); leaf read errors catch only OSError/SandboxError so unexpected errors reach the task-tool-level isolation instead of being mislabeled. * fix(harness): close acceptance evidence gaps from review (RFC #4651 PR4) - negating options: overlap with a matched criterion target is now checked by path/nodeid prefix, not exact token equality — excluding a sub-path of the criterion's selection (pytest tests --deselect tests/unit/test_auth.py) degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of holds - output attribution: any redirection token in the matched final segment makes the recorded tail non-attributable (> / >> / 2> are word characters to the parser, so redirection was invisible to the matcher) - silent-source allowlist narrowed from any *activate suffix to the */bin/activate shape - status_contract docstring: restore the shared-fixture sentence and note subagent_acceptance_verdict is deliberately outside the fixture - executor: update_bash_executions publishes [] (stream carried no bash-family calls) instead of collapsing it into None, mirroring update_tool_receipts * fix(harness): close acceptance residual gaps from re-review (RFC #4651 PR4) - tests_passed: add error outcomes to the fail shapes — "4 passed, 1 error" and pytest's "ERROR <nodeid>" short summary no longer satisfy the pass shape when the exit status is swallowed (|| true) or absent; zero-error counts stay clean. - file leaves: bound the deliverable read — a "wc -c" shell size probe answers files above 50k bytes without loading ~2x their size, honoring the host-bash kill switch and falling back to the full read on any non-integer rendering, so verdicts never get less sound. - executor: record the exit marker text as status_marker on harvested bash evidence; the leaf detail now reports the marker actually seen instead of asserting a failure indistinguishable from the command's own trailing text. - extend the blocking-IO anchor to drive the probe branch inside the offload; teeth re-verified red->green. * fix(harness): close acceptance forgery and bound gaps from P2 re-review (RFC #4651 PR4) - file leaves: never read unbounded — size is established first (os.stat on the validated local host path, so the host-bash-disabled configuration needs no shell; a guarded wc -c on remote providers that renders missing/unreadable in its own words). Above the 50k cap the leaf answers from the size alone, at/below it the full read runs, and an unestablishable size degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of an unlimited fallback read. - output attribution: source/. prefixes are never provably silent — a crafted */bin/activate path shape says nothing about what the script prints, so sourced segments can no longer lend a passing summary. - executable identity: an explicitly path-spelled criterion now requires the same normalized executable path; the basename rule stays only for deliberately bare criterion commands. * fix(harness): run acceptance size probe outside subagent-controlled state (RFC #4651 PR4) - remote probe no longer runs in the sandbox's persistent shell: a fresh env -i /bin/sh with absolute-path stat/realpath (poisoned functions, aliases, PATH, exported functions, IFS, locale cannot steer it), plus a marker env routing AIO onto a fresh per-call bash.exec session. - metadata-only: stat never opens content, so a FIFO deliverable cannot block the parent for the provider's idle timeout; non-regular files (fifo/dir/symlink) degrade to UNVERIFIED. - containment canonicalized against the literal mount root: a final-component symlink or a swapped parent directory (root included) cannot redirect the check outside shared storage; unprovable layouts degrade to UNVERIFIED. * fix(harness): canonicalize probe containment against the canonical mount root (RFC #4651 PR4) Literal-root equality made every remote file leaf permanently UNVERIFIED on e2b and Tenki, which realize /mnt/user-data as a symlink to the home dir by default (e2b bootstrap 'sudo ln -sfn', Tenki best-effort symlink). Containment now compares the file's realpath against the mount root's realpath — exactly what the provider's own read path resolves, so probe and read-back stay consistent; final-component symlinks stay rejected by the non-dereferencing stat, and an intermediate dir-link escape under a sane root still lands ESCAPED. The inner script is a module constant and the suite now executes the composed probe for real against on-disk layouts (real dir, symlinked prefix, final symlink, fifo, missing, dir-link escape), which the canned-output stub could not see. * fix(harness): close bare-criterion negation and CDPATH summary channels (RFC #4651 PR4) - matching: a criterion with no positional selection target (bare pytest, make test) stands for the runner's default selection, so ANY negating option (--ignore/--deselect/...) makes the recorded run a different selection — unprovable. The overlap guard only sees consumed criterion tokens, which a bare criterion does not have; scoped criteria keep the unrelated-exclusion behavior. - attribution: cd is no longer blanket-silent — CDPATH makes cd print the resolved (subagent-chosen) destination and the pass shapes match as substrings, so one mkdir 'all tests passed' plus an export minted a pass for any quiet command. A cd argument or CDPATH= value (export or leading assignment) carrying any summary shape makes the segment non-silent; shape-free cd dir wrappers keep matching. - docs: _truncate_bash_output states the effective 32-char floor (the guarantee previously read as an unconditional max_chars bound). * fix(harness): close env-assignment and expansion channels in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4) Self-audit in the shape of the last review rounds — channels the matcher classified as accounted-for that can change what runs, narrow the selection, or lend the summary text: - env assignments are no longer blanket-stripped: only an allowlist of inert display/CI knobs (CI, NO_COLOR, PY_COLORS, ...) may prefix a matched span, and a non-allowlisted assignment in any preceding segment (pure-assignment or export NAME=) is state pollution — PATH redirects the executable, LD_PRELOAD/PYTHONPATH/NODE_OPTIONS inject code, PYTEST_ADDOPTS/GOFLAGS/MAKEFILES inject selection-changing inputs, BASH_ENV runs arbitrary shell startup. All degrade to unprovable. - runtime expansions: any span token carrying /$( )/backticks, any negating-option value carrying an expansion or glob (unknown excluded set), and any extra executed token carrying glob metacharacters (crafted option-looking filenames narrow invisibly) are unprovable. Criterion-side globs stay self-consistent (literal match). - cd: an argument carrying a runtime expansion or glob is non-silent (unknown destination, unknown print); CDPATH= assignments are now handled as state pollution at the match layer, subsuming the value-shape special case. * fix(harness): persistent-shell evidence, exact env sets, option-arity scoping (RFC #4651 PR4) - tests_passed: on a persistent-shell provider (new Sandbox.persistent_shell_sessions capability, set by AioSandbox) every leaf degrades to UNVERIFIED — any earlier call in the shared session could have mutated the state the clean-looking run executed in, and only a fresh controlled session (RFC section 6 verifier) can prove otherwise. The flag is read from the provider registry without acquiring a sandbox. - env assignments: the allowlist is gone — no variable is provably inert across repositories (CI/DEBUG are routinely read by tests). The span's assignment prefix must equal the criterion's exactly (values included, order-insensitive); any assignment or export NAME= in a preceding segment is state pollution. - scoping: positional targets are now read by option arity, so a path embedded in an option (--basetemp=/tmp/p, --junitxml=/tmp/r.xml) never counts as a selection target and an extra positional after such a criterion narrows the default selection it denotes. * fix(harness): stamp shell provenance at harvest, close export/unset and arity gaps (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): split physical newlines as shell separators in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): scope cd wrappers to thread data roots, pin accepted boundaries (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): preserve criterion connectors, prove file_written readable, fail-closed shell capability (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): compare only the connector prefix, tolerate trailing criterion semicolons (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): preserve continuation-line operators, keep ./-spelled executable identity (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): render criteria single-line so a multiline criterion cannot inject a forged checklist line (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): reject parent-traversal executable tokens in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): reject parent-traversal negated values in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)
424 lines
18 KiB
Python
424 lines
18 KiB
Python
"""DeerFlow :class:`Sandbox` adapter for an OpenSandbox sync client."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import errno
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import logging
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import posixpath
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import re
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import shlex
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import threading
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from datetime import timedelta
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
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from deerflow.config.paths import VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX
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from deerflow.sandbox.sandbox import Sandbox, _validate_extra_env
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from deerflow.sandbox.search import GrepMatch, path_matches, should_ignore_path, truncate_line
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from collections.abc import Callable
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from opensandbox.sync import SandboxSync
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_TERMINAL_ERROR_NAMES = frozenset({"SandboxUnhealthyException"})
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_COMMAND_TTL_GRACE = timedelta(seconds=30)
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_MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024
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def _exception_chain(error: BaseException):
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"""Yield an exception and its explicit causes without looping forever."""
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seen: set[int] = set()
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current: BaseException | None = error
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while current is not None and id(current) not in seen:
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seen.add(id(current))
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yield current
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current = current.__cause__
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def _is_terminal_failure(error: BaseException, *, api_not_found_is_terminal: bool = False) -> bool:
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"""Return whether an SDK failure means this remote sandbox is unusable."""
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for item in _exception_chain(error):
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if isinstance(item, (BrokenPipeError, ConnectionError, EOFError)):
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return True
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if type(item).__name__ in _TERMINAL_ERROR_NAMES:
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return True
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status_code = getattr(item, "status_code", None)
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if status_code == 410 or (api_not_found_is_terminal and status_code == 404):
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return True
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return False
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def _is_not_found(error: BaseException) -> bool:
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for item in _exception_chain(error):
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if isinstance(item, FileNotFoundError) or getattr(item, "status_code", None) == 404:
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return True
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return False
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def _join_event_text(chunks) -> str:
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"""Reconstruct the line-oriented text emitted by OpenSandbox SSE events."""
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return "\n".join(str(chunk).rstrip("\n") for chunk in chunks)
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def _append_output(output: str, value: str) -> str:
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if not value:
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return output
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if not output or output.endswith("\n"):
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return output + value
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return f"{output}\n{value}"
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def execution_stdout(execution: Any) -> str:
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return _join_event_text(message.text for message in getattr(getattr(execution, "logs", None), "stdout", []))
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def format_execution(execution: Any) -> str:
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"""Combine stdout, result text, and stderr using DeerFlow's string contract."""
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output = execution_stdout(execution)
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result = _join_event_text(item.text for item in getattr(execution, "result", []) if getattr(item, "text", None) is not None)
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output = _append_output(output, result)
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stderr = _join_event_text(message.text for message in getattr(getattr(execution, "logs", None), "stderr", []))
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output = _append_output(output, stderr)
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error = getattr(execution, "error", None)
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if error is not None:
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detail = f"{getattr(error, 'name', type(error).__name__)}: {getattr(error, 'value', error)}"
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output = _append_output(output, detail)
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return output
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class OpenSandboxSandbox(Sandbox):
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"""Wrap one live ``opensandbox.sync.SandboxSync`` instance."""
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#: Every call is a fresh ``run_command`` execution — no shell state
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#: survives into the next command.
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persistent_shell_sessions = False
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def __init__(
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self,
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id: str,
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sandbox: SandboxSync,
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*,
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run_command_opts_cls: Callable[..., Any],
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default_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
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sandbox_timeout: timedelta | None = None,
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default_command_timeout: float = 600,
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on_terminal_failure: Callable[[str, str], None] | None = None,
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) -> None:
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super().__init__(id)
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if sandbox_timeout is not None and sandbox_timeout.total_seconds() <= 0:
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raise ValueError("sandbox_timeout must be positive or None")
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if default_command_timeout <= 0:
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raise ValueError("default_command_timeout must be positive")
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self._sandbox = sandbox
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self._run_command_opts_cls = run_command_opts_cls
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self._default_env = dict(default_env or {})
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self._sandbox_timeout = sandbox_timeout
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self._default_command_timeout = float(default_command_timeout)
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self._on_terminal_failure = on_terminal_failure
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self._state_lock = threading.Lock()
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# renew() sets an absolute expiration instead of taking a maximum. Keep
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# each renewal and its operation under one lock so a later short file
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# operation cannot shorten the horizon of a long-running command.
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self._operation_lock = threading.Lock()
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self._append_lock = threading.Lock()
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self._closed = False
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@property
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def remote_id(self) -> str:
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return str(self._sandbox.id)
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@property
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def is_closed(self) -> bool:
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with self._state_lock:
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return self._closed
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def destroy(self) -> None:
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"""Terminate the remote sandbox and close its SDK resources."""
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with self._operation_lock:
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with self._state_lock:
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if self._closed:
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return
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error: Exception | None = None
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try:
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self._sandbox.destroy()
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except Exception as exc: # SDK errors are normalized below.
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error = exc
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finally:
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# SandboxSync.destroy() closes its transport even when kill fails,
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# so this client cannot safely be reused after either outcome.
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with self._state_lock:
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self._closed = True
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if error is not None and not _is_terminal_failure(error, api_not_found_is_terminal=True):
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raise error
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def _note_failure(self, error: Exception, *, api_not_found_is_terminal: bool = False) -> None:
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if self._on_terminal_failure is None or not _is_terminal_failure(error, api_not_found_is_terminal=api_not_found_is_terminal):
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return
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try:
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self._on_terminal_failure(self.id, str(error))
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("Terminal OpenSandbox failure callback errored for %s", self.id)
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def renew(self) -> None:
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"""Refresh this provider-owned remote's server-side lifetime."""
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if self._sandbox_timeout is None:
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return
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with self._operation_lock:
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with self._state_lock:
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if self._closed:
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raise RuntimeError("sandbox has been closed")
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try:
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self._sandbox.renew(self._sandbox_timeout)
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return
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except Exception as exc:
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failure = exc
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self._note_failure(failure, api_not_found_is_terminal=True)
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raise failure
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def _run(self, command: str, *, env: dict[str, str] | None = None, timeout: float | None = None) -> Any:
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command_timeout = self._default_command_timeout if timeout is None else float(timeout)
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if command_timeout <= 0:
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raise ValueError(f"timeout must be positive, got {timeout}")
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sdk_timeout = timedelta(seconds=command_timeout)
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renewal_timeout = self._sandbox_timeout
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if renewal_timeout is not None:
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renewal_timeout = max(renewal_timeout, sdk_timeout + _COMMAND_TTL_GRACE)
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opts = self._run_command_opts_cls(timeout=sdk_timeout, envs=env)
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with self._operation_lock:
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with self._state_lock:
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if self._closed:
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raise RuntimeError("sandbox has been closed")
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try:
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if renewal_timeout is not None:
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self._sandbox.renew(renewal_timeout)
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return self._sandbox.commands.run(command, opts=opts)
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except Exception as exc:
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failure = exc
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# A command-path 404 means the execd endpoint/sandbox is gone. File APIs
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# use 404 for an ordinary missing path, so only command operations opt in.
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self._note_failure(failure, api_not_found_is_terminal=True)
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raise failure
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def _file_op(self, operation):
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with self._operation_lock:
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with self._state_lock:
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if self._closed:
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raise RuntimeError("sandbox has been closed")
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try:
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if self._sandbox_timeout is not None:
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self._sandbox.renew(self._sandbox_timeout)
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except Exception as exc:
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failure = exc
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renewal_failed = True
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else:
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try:
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return operation(self._sandbox.files)
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except Exception as exc:
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failure = exc
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renewal_failed = False
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self._note_failure(failure, api_not_found_is_terminal=renewal_failed)
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raise failure
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@staticmethod
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def _resolve_path(path: str) -> str:
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if not isinstance(path, str) or not path:
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raise ValueError("path must be a non-empty string")
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normalized = path.replace("\\", "/")
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if not normalized.startswith("/"):
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raise ValueError(f"path must be absolute: '{path}'")
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if any(segment == ".." for segment in normalized.split("/")):
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raise PermissionError(f"Access denied: path traversal detected in '{path}'")
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return normalized
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@classmethod
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def _resolve_download_path(cls, path: str) -> str:
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normalized = cls._resolve_path(path)
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stripped = normalized.lstrip("/")
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allowed = VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX.lstrip("/")
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if stripped != allowed and not stripped.startswith(f"{allowed}/"):
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raise PermissionError(f"Access denied: path must be under '{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}': '{path}'")
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return normalized
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def execute_command(self, command: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None, timeout: float | None = None) -> str:
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_validate_extra_env(env)
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merged_env = {**self._default_env, **(env or {})} or None
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try:
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execution = self._run(command, env=merged_env, timeout=timeout)
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.error("Failed to execute command in OpenSandbox %s: %s", self.id, exc)
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return f"Error: {exc}"
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output = format_execution(execution)
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exit_code = getattr(execution, "exit_code", None)
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if exit_code is None:
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detail = output or "no completion or error event"
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return f"Error: OpenSandbox command completed without an exit code: {detail}"
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if exit_code != 0:
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# Mirror LocalSandbox: preserve a nonzero exit in the output text
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# even when the command produced output (see e2b_sandbox).
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output = f"{output}\nExit Code: {exit_code}" if output else f"Command exited with code {exit_code}"
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return output if output else "(no output)"
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def read_file(self, path: str, start_line: int | None = None, end_line: int | None = None) -> str:
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resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
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try:
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content = self._file_op(lambda files: files.read_file(resolved))
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.error("Failed to read OpenSandbox file %s: %s", resolved, exc)
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return f"Error: {exc}"
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if start_line is None and end_line is None:
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return content or ""
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lines = (content or "").splitlines()
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start = start_line or 1
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end = end_line if end_line is not None else len(lines)
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return "\n".join(lines[start - 1 : end])
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def write_file(self, path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> None:
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resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
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if not append:
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self._file_op(lambda files: files.write_file(resolved, content, mode=644))
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return
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with self._append_lock:
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try:
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previous = self._file_op(lambda files: files.read_bytes(resolved))
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except Exception as exc:
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if not _is_not_found(exc):
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raise
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previous = b""
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data = previous + content.encode("utf-8")
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self._file_op(lambda files: files.write_file(resolved, data, mode=644))
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def update_file(self, path: str, content: bytes) -> None:
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resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
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self._file_op(lambda files: files.write_file(resolved, content, mode=644))
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def download_file(self, path: str) -> bytes:
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resolved = self._resolve_download_path(path)
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def read_bounded(files) -> bytes:
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chunks: list[bytes] = []
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total = 0
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stream = files.read_bytes_stream(resolved)
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try:
|
|
for chunk in stream:
|
|
total += len(chunk)
|
|
if total > _MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE:
|
|
raise OSError(errno.EFBIG, f"File exceeds maximum download size of {_MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE} bytes", path)
|
|
chunks.append(chunk)
|
|
finally:
|
|
close = getattr(stream, "close", None)
|
|
if callable(close):
|
|
close()
|
|
return b"".join(chunks)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
return self._file_op(read_bounded)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
raise
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
raise OSError(f"cannot read '{path}' from OpenSandbox: {exc}") from exc
|
|
|
|
def list_dir(self, path: str, max_depth: int = 2) -> list[str]:
|
|
depth = int(max_depth)
|
|
if depth < 0:
|
|
raise ValueError("max_depth must be non-negative")
|
|
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
|
|
execution = self._run(f"find {shlex.quote(resolved)} -maxdepth {depth} \\( -type f -o -type d \\) 2>/dev/null | head -500")
|
|
return [line.strip() for line in execution_stdout(execution).splitlines() if line.strip()]
|
|
|
|
def glob(self, path: str, pattern: str, *, include_dirs: bool = False, max_results: int = 200) -> tuple[list[str], bool]:
|
|
if max_results <= 0:
|
|
raise ValueError("max_results must be positive")
|
|
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
|
|
types = ("f", "d") if include_dirs else ("f",)
|
|
type_expr = " -o ".join(f"-type {entry_type}" for entry_type in types)
|
|
hard_limit = max(max_results * 4, max_results + 50)
|
|
execution = self._run(f"find {shlex.quote(resolved)} \\( {type_expr} \\) -print 2>/dev/null | head -{hard_limit}")
|
|
|
|
matches: list[str] = []
|
|
root = resolved.rstrip("/") or "/"
|
|
root_prefix = root if root == "/" else f"{root}/"
|
|
for entry in execution_stdout(execution).splitlines():
|
|
entry = entry.strip()
|
|
if not entry or (entry != root and not entry.startswith(root_prefix)) or should_ignore_path(entry):
|
|
continue
|
|
relative = entry[len(root) :].lstrip("/")
|
|
if relative and path_matches(pattern, relative):
|
|
matches.append(entry)
|
|
if len(matches) >= max_results:
|
|
return matches, True
|
|
return matches, False
|
|
|
|
def grep(
|
|
self,
|
|
path: str,
|
|
pattern: str,
|
|
*,
|
|
glob: str | None = None,
|
|
literal: bool = False,
|
|
case_sensitive: bool = False,
|
|
max_results: int = 100,
|
|
) -> tuple[list[GrepMatch], bool]:
|
|
if max_results <= 0:
|
|
raise ValueError("max_results must be positive")
|
|
if not literal:
|
|
re.compile(pattern, 0 if case_sensitive else re.IGNORECASE)
|
|
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
|
|
flags = ["-r", "-H", "-n", "-I"]
|
|
if not case_sensitive:
|
|
flags.append("-i")
|
|
flags.append("-F" if literal else "-E")
|
|
portable_flags = list(flags)
|
|
if glob is not None:
|
|
include_pattern = glob.split("/")[-1] or glob
|
|
flags.append(shlex.quote(f"--include={include_pattern}"))
|
|
per_file_cap = max(max_results, 50)
|
|
flags.append(f"-m{per_file_cap}")
|
|
hard_limit = max(max_results * 4, max_results + 50)
|
|
arguments = f" -e {shlex.quote(pattern)} {shlex.quote(resolved)} 2>/dev/null"
|
|
primary = "grep " + " ".join(flags) + arguments
|
|
fallback = "grep " + " ".join(portable_flags) + arguments
|
|
command = f'{{ {primary}; status=$?; [ "$status" -eq 2 ] && {fallback}; }} | head -{hard_limit}'
|
|
execution = self._run(command)
|
|
|
|
root = resolved.rstrip("/") or "/"
|
|
root_prefix = root if root == "/" else f"{root}/"
|
|
matches: list[GrepMatch] = []
|
|
seen_positions: set[tuple[str, int]] = set()
|
|
for raw in execution_stdout(execution).splitlines():
|
|
try:
|
|
file_path, line_number_text, line = raw.split(":", 2)
|
|
line_number = int(line_number_text)
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
continue
|
|
if should_ignore_path(file_path):
|
|
continue
|
|
if glob is not None:
|
|
if file_path != root and not file_path.startswith(root_prefix):
|
|
continue
|
|
relative = posixpath.basename(file_path) if file_path == root else file_path[len(root) :].lstrip("/")
|
|
if not path_matches(glob, relative):
|
|
continue
|
|
position = (file_path, line_number)
|
|
if position in seen_positions:
|
|
continue
|
|
seen_positions.add(position)
|
|
matches.append(GrepMatch(path=file_path, line_number=line_number, line=truncate_line(line)))
|
|
if len(matches) >= max_results:
|
|
return matches, True
|
|
return matches, False
|
|
|
|
def ping(self, timeout: float = 10) -> bool:
|
|
if self.is_closed:
|
|
return False
|
|
try:
|
|
execution = self._run("true", timeout=timeout)
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.warning("OpenSandbox %s health check failed: %s", self.id, exc)
|
|
return False
|
|
return getattr(execution, "exit_code", None) == 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
__all__ = ["OpenSandboxSandbox"]
|