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* Add phase 1 skill static scanning * Rework SkillScan phase 1 as native scanner * refactor(skillscan): align phase 1 with trimmed RFC contract - SecurityFinding: 7 fields (rule_id, severity, file, line, message, remediation, evidence); category/analyzer derive from the rule_id prefix, confidence/column/fingerprint/metadata removed - scan_archive_preflight()/scan_skill_dir() are pure functions: no ScanContext, no policy schema; CRITICAL-blocks is a code constant and skill_scan.enabled is applied by enforce_static_scan()/callers - secret-* evidence is redacted before findings leave the scanner - de-dup keys on (rule_id, file, line) so repeated occurrences keep distinct locations for agent self-correction - cloud-metadata detection consolidated into network-cloud-metadata - nested zip members get a one-level stdlib magic-byte peek; an executable member escalates package-nested-archive to CRITICAL - install metadata sidecar removed (Phase 7 decides if it is needed) - rule specs moved next to their analyzers; skillscan/rules/ removed - tests updated + new anchors: redaction, dedup lines, nested-zip escalation, single cloud-metadata rule, bundled-skill zero-CRITICAL * fix(skillscan): tighten reverse-shell/secret/archive scan rules from review Address PR #3033 review feedback on the native SkillScan analyzers: - Reverse-shell false positives: split shell detection by signal strength (/dev/tcp/, nc -e stay CRITICAL; bash -i, mkfifo -> new HIGH shell-reverse-shell-heuristic, warn->LLM). The Python check is now AST-anchored on real socket.socket/os.dup2/subprocess call sites instead of raw-text substring matching, so prose/docstrings no longer hard-block. - Secret evidence: _redact_secret_evidence returns [redacted] with no secret bytes (was value[:6], which leaked 2 real token bytes past the prefix). - Archive DoS: cap outer archive member count (_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS=4096); scan_archive_preflight early-aborts with a package-too-many-members CRITICAL finding (routes through the existing blocked->400 fail-closed path). - shell-destructive-command: broaden the rm -rf matcher to sensitive system roots (/home, /usr, /*, --no-preserve-root /) while leaving safe subpaths unflagged. - Dead code: collapse _decode_text_for_analysis to a single decode path and drop the unused _TEXT_SUFFIXES set and _has_text_shebang helper. - local_skill_storage: document why the host_path branch keeps app_config possibly-None (lazy kill-switch resolution; avoids eager get_app_config in config-free environments such as CI). Tests: new negative/positive coverage in test_skillscan_native.py. Full backend suite 6616 passed, 26 skipped.
322 lines
12 KiB
Python
322 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""Shared skill archive installation logic.
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Pure business logic — no FastAPI/HTTP dependencies.
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Both Gateway and Client delegate to these functions.
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"""
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import asyncio
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import concurrent.futures
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import logging
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import posixpath
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import shutil
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import stat
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import zipfile
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from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
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from deerflow.skills.permissions import make_skill_tree_sandbox_readable
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from deerflow.skills.security_scanner import scan_skill_content
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from deerflow.skills.security_static_scanner import (
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StaticFinding,
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StaticScanBlockedError,
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StaticScannerError,
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enforce_static_scan,
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scan_archive_preflight,
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skill_scan_enabled,
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)
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_PROMPT_INPUT_DIRS = {"references", "templates"}
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_PROMPT_INPUT_SUFFIXES = frozenset({".json", ".markdown", ".md", ".rst", ".txt", ".yaml", ".yml"})
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_CODE_SUFFIXES = frozenset({".bash", ".cjs", ".js", ".mjs", ".php", ".pl", ".ps1", ".py", ".rb", ".sh", ".ts", ".zsh"})
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# Full magics per variant — a shorter shared prefix would also match
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# non-executable data files.
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_EXECUTABLE_MAGIC_PREFIXES = (
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b"\x7fELF", # ELF
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b"MZ", # PE/DOS
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b"\xfe\xed\xfa\xce", # Mach-O 32-bit big-endian
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b"\xfe\xed\xfa\xcf", # Mach-O 64-bit big-endian
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b"\xce\xfa\xed\xfe", # Mach-O 32-bit little-endian
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b"\xcf\xfa\xed\xfe", # Mach-O 64-bit little-endian
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b"\xca\xfe\xba\xbe", # Mach-O fat binary big-endian
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b"\xbe\xba\xfe\xca", # Mach-O fat binary little-endian
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b"\xca\xfe\xba\xbf", # Mach-O fat64 binary big-endian
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b"\xbf\xba\xfe\xca", # Mach-O fat64 binary little-endian
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)
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class SkillAlreadyExistsError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a skill with the same name is already installed."""
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class SkillSecurityScanError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a skill archive fails security scanning."""
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findings: list[StaticFinding]
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skill_name: str | None
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def __init__(self, message: str, *, findings: list[StaticFinding] | None = None, skill_name: str | None = None) -> None:
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super().__init__(message)
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self.findings = [dict(finding) for finding in (findings or [])]
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self.skill_name = skill_name
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def is_unsafe_zip_member(info: zipfile.ZipInfo) -> bool:
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"""Return True if the zip member path is absolute or attempts directory traversal."""
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name = info.filename
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if not name:
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return False
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normalized = name.replace("\\", "/")
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if normalized.startswith("/"):
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return True
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path = PurePosixPath(normalized)
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if path.is_absolute():
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return True
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if PureWindowsPath(name).is_absolute():
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return True
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if ".." in path.parts:
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return True
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return False
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def is_symlink_member(info: zipfile.ZipInfo) -> bool:
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"""Detect symlinks based on the external attributes stored in the ZipInfo."""
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mode = info.external_attr >> 16
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return stat.S_ISLNK(mode)
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def is_executable_binary_prefix(prefix: bytes) -> bool:
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"""Detect ELF, PE, and Mach-O executables by magic bytes."""
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return prefix.startswith(_EXECUTABLE_MAGIC_PREFIXES)
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def should_ignore_archive_entry(path: Path) -> bool:
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"""Return True for macOS metadata dirs and dotfiles."""
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return path.name.startswith(".") or path.name == "__MACOSX"
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def resolve_skill_dir_from_archive(temp_path: Path) -> Path:
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"""Locate the skill root directory from extracted archive contents.
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Filters out macOS metadata (__MACOSX) and dotfiles (.DS_Store).
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Returns:
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Path to the skill directory.
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Raises:
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ValueError: If the archive is empty after filtering.
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"""
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items = [p for p in temp_path.iterdir() if not should_ignore_archive_entry(p)]
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if not items:
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raise ValueError("Skill archive is empty")
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if len(items) == 1 and items[0].is_dir():
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return items[0]
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return temp_path
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def safe_extract_skill_archive(
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zip_ref: zipfile.ZipFile,
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dest_path: Path,
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max_total_size: int = 512 * 1024 * 1024,
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) -> None:
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"""Safely extract a skill archive with security protections.
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Protections:
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- Reject absolute paths and directory traversal (..).
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- Skip symlink entries instead of materialising them.
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- Enforce a hard limit on total uncompressed size (zip bomb defence).
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- Reject executable binaries (ELF/PE/Mach-O) by magic bytes.
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Raises:
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ValueError: If unsafe members, executable binaries, or size limit exceeded.
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"""
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dest_root = dest_path.resolve()
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total_written = 0
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for info in zip_ref.infolist():
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if is_unsafe_zip_member(info):
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raise ValueError(f"Archive contains unsafe member path: {info.filename!r}")
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if is_symlink_member(info):
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logger.warning("Skipping symlink entry in skill archive: %s", info.filename)
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continue
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normalized_name = posixpath.normpath(info.filename.replace("\\", "/"))
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member_path = dest_root.joinpath(*PurePosixPath(normalized_name).parts)
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if not member_path.resolve().is_relative_to(dest_root):
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raise ValueError(f"Zip entry escapes destination: {info.filename!r}")
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member_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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if info.is_dir():
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member_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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continue
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with zip_ref.open(info) as src, member_path.open("wb") as dst:
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first_chunk = True
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while chunk := src.read(65536):
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if first_chunk and is_executable_binary_prefix(chunk):
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raise ValueError(f"Archive contains executable binary member: {info.filename!r}")
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first_chunk = False
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total_written += len(chunk)
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if total_written > max_total_size:
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raise ValueError("Skill archive is too large or appears highly compressed.")
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dst.write(chunk)
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def _is_script_support_file(rel_path: Path) -> bool:
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return bool(rel_path.parts) and rel_path.parts[0] == "scripts"
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def _should_scan_support_file(rel_path: Path) -> bool:
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if _is_script_support_file(rel_path):
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return True
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return bool(rel_path.parts) and rel_path.parts[0] in _PROMPT_INPUT_DIRS and rel_path.suffix.lower() in _PROMPT_INPUT_SUFFIXES
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def _has_shebang(path: Path) -> bool:
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try:
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with path.open("rb") as f:
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return f.read(2) == b"#!"
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except OSError:
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return False
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def _is_code_file_by_name(rel_path: Path) -> bool:
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"""Pure name-based code classification: scripts/ members and code suffixes."""
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if _is_script_support_file(rel_path):
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return True
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return rel_path.suffix.lower() in _CODE_SUFFIXES
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async def _is_code_file(path: Path, rel_path: Path) -> bool:
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"""Classify code files anywhere in the tree for the executable scan policy.
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Name checks are pure and stay on the event loop; only the shebang
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sniff for extensionless files reads the file and is offloaded.
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"""
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if _is_code_file_by_name(rel_path):
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return True
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return not rel_path.suffix and await asyncio.to_thread(_has_shebang, path)
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def _move_staged_skill_into_reserved_target(staging_target: Path, target: Path) -> None:
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installed = False
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reserved = False
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try:
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target.mkdir(mode=0o700)
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reserved = True
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for child in staging_target.iterdir():
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shutil.move(str(child), target / child.name)
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make_skill_tree_sandbox_readable(target)
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installed = True
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except FileExistsError as e:
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raise SkillAlreadyExistsError(f"Skill '{target.name}' already exists") from e
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finally:
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if reserved and not installed and target.exists():
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shutil.rmtree(target)
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def _findings_for_file(findings: list[StaticFinding], rel_path: str) -> list[StaticFinding]:
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return [finding for finding in findings if finding.get("file") in {rel_path, None}]
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async def _scan_skill_file_or_raise(skill_dir: Path, path: Path, skill_name: str, *, executable: bool, static_findings: list[StaticFinding] | None = None) -> None:
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rel_path = path.relative_to(skill_dir).as_posix()
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location = f"{skill_name}/{rel_path}"
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try:
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content = await asyncio.to_thread(path.read_text, encoding="utf-8")
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except UnicodeDecodeError as e:
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan failed for skill '{skill_name}': {location} must be valid UTF-8") from e
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try:
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result = await scan_skill_content(content, executable=executable, location=location, static_findings=static_findings or [])
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except Exception as e:
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan failed for {location}: {e}") from e
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decision = getattr(result, "decision", None)
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reason = str(getattr(result, "reason", "") or "No reason provided.")
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if decision == "block":
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if rel_path == "SKILL.md":
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan blocked skill '{skill_name}': {reason}")
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan blocked {location}: {reason}")
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if executable and decision != "allow":
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan rejected executable {location}: {reason}")
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if decision not in {"allow", "warn"}:
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan failed for {location}: invalid scanner decision {decision!r}")
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def scan_archive_preflight_or_raise(archive_path: Path, *, app_config=None) -> None:
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if not skill_scan_enabled(app_config):
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return
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result = scan_archive_preflight(archive_path)
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if result["blocked"]:
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critical = [finding for finding in result["findings"] if finding["severity"] == "CRITICAL"]
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(
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f"Static security scan blocked unsafe skill archive: {format_static_archive_findings(critical)}",
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findings=critical,
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skill_name=None,
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)
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def format_static_archive_findings(findings: list[StaticFinding]) -> str:
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return "; ".join(f"{finding['rule_id']} ({finding['severity']}) at {finding.get('file') or '<archive>'}: {finding['message']}" for finding in findings)
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async def _scan_static_skill_archive_or_raise(skill_dir: Path, skill_name: str, *, app_config=None) -> list[StaticFinding]:
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try:
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return await asyncio.to_thread(enforce_static_scan, skill_dir, skill_name=skill_name, app_config=app_config)
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except StaticScanBlockedError as e:
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(str(e), findings=e.findings, skill_name=e.skill_name) from e
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except StaticScannerError as e:
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Static security scan failed for skill '{skill_name}': {e}", skill_name=skill_name) from e
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def _collect_scannable_files(skill_dir: Path) -> list[Path]:
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"""Enumerate archive files for scanning (blocking; run off the event loop)."""
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return [candidate for candidate in sorted(skill_dir.rglob("*")) if candidate.is_file()]
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async def _scan_skill_archive_contents_or_raise(skill_dir: Path, skill_name: str, *, app_config=None) -> list[StaticFinding]:
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"""Run the skill security scanner against all installable text and script files."""
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static_findings = await _scan_static_skill_archive_or_raise(skill_dir, skill_name, app_config=app_config)
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skill_md = skill_dir / "SKILL.md"
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await _scan_skill_file_or_raise(skill_dir, skill_md, skill_name, executable=False, static_findings=_findings_for_file(static_findings, "SKILL.md"))
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for path in await asyncio.to_thread(_collect_scannable_files, skill_dir):
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rel_path = path.relative_to(skill_dir)
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if rel_path == Path("SKILL.md"):
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continue
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if path.name == "SKILL.md":
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raise SkillSecurityScanError(f"Security scan failed for skill '{skill_name}': nested SKILL.md is not allowed at {skill_name}/{rel_path.as_posix()}")
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rel_path_posix = rel_path.as_posix()
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if await _is_code_file(path, rel_path):
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await _scan_skill_file_or_raise(
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skill_dir,
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path,
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skill_name,
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executable=True,
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static_findings=_findings_for_file(static_findings, rel_path_posix),
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)
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elif _should_scan_support_file(rel_path):
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await _scan_skill_file_or_raise(
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skill_dir,
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path,
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skill_name,
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executable=False,
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static_findings=_findings_for_file(static_findings, rel_path_posix),
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)
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return static_findings
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def _run_async_install(coro):
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try:
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loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
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except RuntimeError:
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loop = None
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if loop is not None and loop.is_running():
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with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as executor:
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return executor.submit(asyncio.run, coro).result()
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return asyncio.run(coro)
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