hataa 47d8ff13b2
feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3) (#6566)
* feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3)

Vertical slice 1 of the user-lifecycle work: an operator can suspend an
account and every authentication surface rejects it, while the row —
credentials, role, OAuth linkage — is retained so re-enabling restores
exactly what was suspended.

- users.disabled (NOT NULL, server default 0) via migration
  0036_user_disabled; User/UserResponse carry and expose it.
- Enforcement at all four surfaces: password login (no credential
  comparison happens), JWT session resolution (401 ACCOUNT_DISABLED —
  sessions die at the next request), PAT resolution (the generic 401, no
  oracle), OAuth provisioning (403 with a contact-admin message; the
  link is kept so re-enable restores access).
- SQLiteUserRepository.set_disabled: single-column, serialized write
  (same idiom as update_system_role) with the last-ACTIVE-admin guard —
  disabled admins cannot authenticate, so they cannot restore management
  access; re-enabling is always allowed. Field-scoping completed both
  ways: the credential writer mirrors and never writes disabled, so
  a stale password-change snapshot cannot re-enable a suspended account.
- PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{id} becomes a partial account update
  (system_role and/or disabled), each field routed to its field-scoped
  writer; empty bodies 422.

Tests 11->18: route (disable/re-enable, last-active-admin 409, empty
422, combined update), real-repo (field isolation both directions,
disabled-admin-not-active, guard inside the serialized write, re-enable
always), login rejection with the CORRECT password (only the disabled
gate can reject) plus resolver-visible flag. Mutations verified red:
guard removed (M19), login gate removed (M20 — after hardening the test
with a real hash so the gate is load-bearing).

* fix(authz): portable boolean default, alternate-authenticator suspension, active-admin role guard

Review round 1 on #6566 — three P1s:

- [PG default] sa.text("0") is a raw integer expression PostgreSQL
  rejects as a BOOLEAN default, breaking startup migration and fresh
  create_all bootstraps alike. Both the migration and the ORM model now
  use sa.false()/false() — dialect-rendered, portable.
- [alternate authenticators] WebSockets bypass AuthMiddleware, so a
  disabled user's still-valid cookie could open a NEW browser/stream
  connection and drive the retained session; the standalone LangGraph
  authenticate callback accepted the same suspended JWT. Both now route
  through a shared post-lookup validator (validate_resolved_session_user
  in deps.py — token_version + disabled in one place) that the HTTP
  dependency also uses, so a lifecycle change lands everywhere at once.
- [active-admin role guard] update_system_role counted every admin row,
  so 'disable B, then demote self' — or a combined {system_role, disabled}
  self-update — could strand the deployment with zero administrators able
  to authenticate or re-enable anyone. The demotion guard now counts
  ACTIVE admins only (disabled admins cannot authenticate), under the same
  serialization boundary.

Tests 18->22: shared-validator verdicts, WS admission after suspension
(real token, real repo), LangGraph-callback admission after suspension,
disable-then-demote-self + combined self-update both rejected (fake-repo
route level and real-repo update_system_role level). Mutations verified
red: helper's disabled check removed (M21 — three admission tests fail),
active-admin predicate reverted to all-admins (M22 — repo-level strand
scenario fails). 366 tests green on the affected surface.

* fix(migrations): chain 0036_user_disabled after upstream 0037

The maintainer main-merge brought 0037_project_document_summaries,
which branched from 0035 independently of this PR's 0036 — alembic now
sees two heads and every engine bootstrap fails. Chain 0036 after 0037
(single head; revision numbers are labels, the graph is what matters).

* fix(migrations): renumber user_disabled to 0038 and follow the chain-test convention

Upstream landed its own 0036 (run_idempotency_request) with 0037 chained
after it while this PR was in review — my 0036_user_disabled collided on
the number and my interim chain-fix (0036 revises 0037) left the graph
in a state upstream's chain tests reject (heads == [0037] hardcoded).

- 0036_user_disabled -> 0038_user_disabled, revises
  0037_project_document_summaries: single head 0038.
- Chain tests follow the repo convention (each migration PR appends the
  new head): 0032/0035 gain the DOC_SUMMARIES link and CURRENT_HEAD =
  0038; 0037's single-head assertion moves to CURRENT_HEAD with its
  own-revision link check unchanged.

* fix(migrations): pin the remaining chain tests to the 0038_user_disabled head

The 0027/0028, 0029 and 0034 chain tests still pinned the single head to
0037_project_document_summaries (and 0034 asserted the head's parent was
0036_run_idempotency_request), so the renumbered lifecycle migration broke
two unit-test shards. Follow the chain-test convention: every pinned head
moves to 0038_user_disabled and 0034 walks the chain through 0037.

* fix(authz): enforce account suspension on the internal-auth dispatch surface

Round-3 review finding: the internal-auth principal is synthesized from
trusted headers without a users-row lookup, so a suspended user with an
active channel binding kept driving the agent, and scheduler-owned runs
(their fabricated in-process requests skip AuthMiddleware entirely) kept
launching. Two gates now enforce the lifecycle there:

- AuthMiddleware rejects owner-bound internal calls whose users row is
  disabled (401 account_disabled) at the single gate every internal HTTP
  call passes through. Auth-disabled mode is exempt (no suspendable
  accounts, and its owner header carries the synthetic identity), and
  owner ids without a users row stay allowed — a nonexistent account
  cannot be suspended.
- start_run re-asserts it at run admission after the owner is resolved
  for attribution: the scheduler records the rejection as the
  occurrence's launch error and no run record is created.

Also addresses the remaining round-3 nits: drop the inline token_version
check duplicated by validate_resolved_session_user, correct the
local_provider comment (login never surfaces ACCOUNT_DISABLED), refresh
the stale 0038 docstring header, and restore the deps module caches in
the two suspension tests instead of leaking a closed engine.

* fix(auth): carry the disabled field on the frontend synthetic users

UserResponse now always includes disabled, so the auth-disabled contract
e2e (gateway /auth/me deep-equals the frontend synthetic user) failed
without the field on AUTH_DISABLED_USER. Add disabled to both synthetic
users and declare it optional on the zod schema — absent still parses as
not disabled for pre-gap-3 backends.

* fix(authz): log when the internal-owner suspension check is skipped

The middleware gate's users-lookup failure path silently degraded to
allow; keep the fail-open behavior but leave a WARNING with the
exception, so a store that cannot be read is observable in production
logs instead of invisible.

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-10-10 16:43:04 +08:00

210 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript

import {
afterEach,
beforeEach,
describe,
expect,
test,
rs,
} from "@rstest/core";
import { AUTH_DISABLED_USER } from "@/core/auth/auth-disabled-user";
import { STATIC_WEBSITE_USER } from "@/core/auth/static-user";
import { userSchema } from "@/core/auth/types";
rs.mock("next/headers", () => ({
cookies: rs.fn(() => {
throw new Error("cookies should not be read in static website mode");
}),
}));
const ENV_KEYS = [
"DEER_FLOW_AUTH_DISABLED",
"DEER_FLOW_ENV",
"ENVIRONMENT",
"NEXT_PUBLIC_STATIC_WEBSITE_ONLY",
] as const;
type EnvSnapshot = Partial<
Record<(typeof ENV_KEYS)[number], string | undefined>
>;
function snapshotEnv(): EnvSnapshot {
const snapshot: EnvSnapshot = {};
for (const key of ENV_KEYS) {
snapshot[key] = process.env[key];
}
return snapshot;
}
function setEnv(key: (typeof ENV_KEYS)[number], value: string | undefined) {
const env = process.env as Record<string, string | undefined>;
if (value === undefined) {
delete env[key];
} else {
env[key] = value;
}
}
function restoreEnv(snapshot: EnvSnapshot) {
for (const key of ENV_KEYS) {
setEnv(key, snapshot[key]);
}
}
async function loadFreshServerAuth() {
rs.resetModules();
return await import("@/core/auth/server");
}
describe("getServerSideUser", () => {
let saved: EnvSnapshot;
beforeEach(() => {
saved = snapshotEnv();
setEnv("DEER_FLOW_AUTH_DISABLED", undefined);
setEnv("DEER_FLOW_ENV", undefined);
setEnv("ENVIRONMENT", undefined);
setEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_STATIC_WEBSITE_ONLY", undefined);
});
afterEach(() => {
restoreEnv(saved);
rs.unstubAllGlobals();
});
test("bypasses gateway auth in static website mode", async () => {
setEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_STATIC_WEBSITE_ONLY", "true");
const fetchSpy = rs.fn(() => {
throw new Error("fetch should not be called in static website mode");
});
rs.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchSpy);
const { getServerSideUser } = await loadFreshServerAuth();
await expect(getServerSideUser()).resolves.toEqual({
tag: "authenticated",
user: STATIC_WEBSITE_USER,
});
expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test("bypasses gateway auth in auth-disabled mode", async () => {
setEnv("DEER_FLOW_AUTH_DISABLED", "1");
const fetchSpy = rs.fn(() => {
throw new Error("fetch should not be called in auth-disabled mode");
});
rs.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchSpy);
const { getServerSideUser } = await loadFreshServerAuth();
await expect(getServerSideUser()).resolves.toEqual({
tag: "authenticated",
user: AUTH_DISABLED_USER,
});
expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test("does not enable auth-disabled mode in explicit production environments", async () => {
setEnv("DEER_FLOW_AUTH_DISABLED", "1");
setEnv("DEER_FLOW_ENV", "production");
const { isAuthDisabledMode } =
await import("@/core/auth/auth-disabled-user");
expect(isAuthDisabledMode()).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("getServerSideUser — gateway_unavailable contract (issue #3493)", () => {
let saved: EnvSnapshot;
beforeEach(() => {
saved = snapshotEnv();
setEnv("DEER_FLOW_AUTH_DISABLED", undefined);
setEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_STATIC_WEBSITE_ONLY", undefined);
});
afterEach(() => {
restoreEnv(saved);
rs.unstubAllGlobals();
rs.doUnmock("next/headers");
});
test("returns gateway_unavailable when /auth/me fetch rejects (e.g. AbortError)", async () => {
rs.doMock("next/headers", () => ({
cookies: rs.fn(async () => ({
get: (name: string) =>
name === "access_token" ? { value: "stub-token" } : undefined,
})),
}));
const abortErr = new DOMException("Aborted", "AbortError");
rs.stubGlobal(
"fetch",
rs.fn(() => Promise.reject(abortErr)),
);
const { getServerSideUser } = await loadFreshServerAuth();
await expect(getServerSideUser()).resolves.toEqual({
tag: "gateway_unavailable",
});
});
test("returns gateway_unavailable when /auth/me responds with a 5xx", async () => {
rs.doMock("next/headers", () => ({
cookies: rs.fn(async () => ({
get: (name: string) =>
name === "access_token" ? { value: "stub-token" } : undefined,
})),
}));
rs.stubGlobal(
"fetch",
rs.fn(() =>
Promise.resolve(
new Response("upstream error", {
status: 503,
statusText: "Service Unavailable",
}),
),
),
);
const { getServerSideUser } = await loadFreshServerAuth();
await expect(getServerSideUser()).resolves.toEqual({
tag: "gateway_unavailable",
});
});
});
// ── system_role contract (RFC #4063 gap 2) ─────────────────────────
describe("userSchema system_role", () => {
test("accepts a provider-configured custom role verbatim", () => {
const parsed = userSchema.parse({
id: "1",
email: "g@example.com",
system_role: "guest",
needs_setup: false,
oauth_provider: null,
permissions: null,
});
expect(parsed.system_role).toBe("guest");
});
test("still rejects an empty role string", () => {
expect(() =>
userSchema.parse({
id: "1",
email: "g@example.com",
system_role: "",
needs_setup: false,
disabled: false,
oauth_provider: null,
permissions: null,
}),
).toThrow();
});
});