JasonH 82cf57a9c3
fix(utils): return empty text for content-less messages (#5563)
* fix(utils): return empty text for content-less messages

message_content_to_text fell through to str(content), so a message whose
content is None yielded the truthy literal "None". Two call sites already
work around it with a local `or ""` and name the helper in the comment; the
subagent executor's `text if text else "No response generated"` fallback and
the archive's `if not text: continue` skip cannot work around it, so a
content-less terminal turn was reported as an answer of "None" and a
content-less LLM error fallback surfaced "None" instead of its error_detail.

* test(utils): cover non-None content compatibility and document fallbacks

* test(utils): cover contentless task history and refresh guard comments

---------

Co-authored-by: Lengshuang <90967079+Lesereingrape@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: JasonH <4430962+yang0228@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-09-19 10:56:21 +08:00

187 lines
7.9 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
from collections.abc import Mapping
from copy import deepcopy
from typing import Any
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage
ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY = "original_user_content"
SUMMARY_MESSAGE_NAME = "summary"
#: Server-owned mark the Gateway stamps on an untrusted caller's message when it
#: carries a framework marker (``hide_from_ui``, a ``summary`` name) that would
#: otherwise make the input guardrail skip it. The marker keeps doing its
#: presentation job — those messages stay hidden from the transcript — while this
#: tells :func:`requires_input_sanitization` the content still came from outside
#: the trust boundary. Stripping the marker instead would unhide three
#: legitimate frontend senders (quoted context, sidecar context, agent save).
UNTRUSTED_INPUT_KEY = "untrusted_input"
#: Suffix ``DynamicContextMiddleware``'s ID-swap gives the real user message; the
#: reminder SystemMessage takes the original id so ``add_messages`` can replace it
#: in place. It lives here rather than beside the middleware because the message
#: identity rule in ``deerflow.runtime.events.message_identity`` needs it too, and
#: importing the middleware from there closes a cycle
#: (middleware -> deerflow.runtime -> worker -> events -> middleware).
INJECTED_USER_MESSAGE_ID_SUFFIX = "__user"
def strip_injected_user_message_id_suffix(message_id: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Return the id *message_id* had before the reminder ID-swap.
Replaying a persisted user turn must feed the graph the id the client
originally sent: a ``{id}__user`` message is skipped as an injection target,
so replaying one into a state that has no reminder yet silently drops the
date and memory block for that turn.
"""
if isinstance(message_id, str) and message_id.endswith(INJECTED_USER_MESSAGE_ID_SUFFIX):
return message_id[: -len(INJECTED_USER_MESSAGE_ID_SUFFIX)] or message_id
return message_id
def message_content_to_text(content: Any) -> str:
"""Extract text from LangChain message content shapes."""
if content is None:
# ``str(None)`` is the truthy literal ``"None"``, so a content-less message
# would survive every downstream ``text if text else ...`` fallback and be
# reported as a real answer.
return ""
if isinstance(content, str):
return content
if isinstance(content, list):
parts: list[str] = []
for item in content:
if isinstance(item, str):
parts.append(item)
elif isinstance(item, dict):
text = item.get("text")
if isinstance(text, str):
parts.append(text)
return "\n".join(part for part in parts if part)
return str(content)
def message_to_text(message: Any, *, text_attribute_fallback: bool = False) -> str:
"""Extract display text from a whole message (``BaseMessage`` or dict-shaped).
Reads ``content`` from either an attribute (``BaseMessage``) or a mapping key
(``run_events`` rows are dicts), then walks the mixed ``content`` shapes:
plain string; a list of string / ``{"text": ...}`` / nested ``{"content": ...}``
blocks joined without a separator; or a mapping with a ``text``/``content`` key.
Set ``text_attribute_fallback=True`` to fall back to ``message.text`` when
content yields nothing (matches ``RunJournal._message_text``).
Unlike :func:`message_content_to_text` (which takes raw ``content`` and joins
list blocks with newlines), this keeps the no-separator join and the broader
shape handling that several call sites had each reimplemented.
"""
content = message.get("content") if isinstance(message, Mapping) else getattr(message, "content", None)
if isinstance(content, str):
return content
if isinstance(content, list):
parts: list[str] = []
for block in content:
if isinstance(block, str):
parts.append(block)
elif isinstance(block, Mapping):
text = block.get("text")
if isinstance(text, str):
parts.append(text)
else:
nested = block.get("content")
if isinstance(nested, str):
parts.append(nested)
return "".join(parts)
if isinstance(content, Mapping):
for key in ("text", "content"):
value = content.get(key)
if isinstance(value, str):
return value
if text_attribute_fallback:
text = getattr(message, "text", None)
if isinstance(text, str):
return text
return ""
def get_original_user_content_text(content: Any, additional_kwargs: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> str:
"""Return pre-middleware user text when available, otherwise content text."""
original_content = (additional_kwargs or {}).get(ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY)
if isinstance(original_content, str):
return original_content
return message_content_to_text(content)
def restore_original_human_message(message: HumanMessage) -> HumanMessage:
"""Build the UI-facing copy of a model-sanitized human message.
Input middleware intentionally keeps the original user text in
``additional_kwargs`` while replacing the model-facing text with transport
wrappers and other context. Run-event history must persist the original
text without mutating the message that is actually sent to the model.
Mixed content is already normalized by the sanitization middleware to a
single text block. For defensive compatibility, multiple current text
blocks are collapsed at the first text position while every non-text block
retains its value and relative order.
"""
original_content = message.additional_kwargs.get(ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY)
if not isinstance(original_content, str):
return message
additional_kwargs = dict(message.additional_kwargs)
additional_kwargs.pop(ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY, None)
content = message.content
if isinstance(content, str):
restored_content: str | list = original_content
elif isinstance(content, list):
restored_content = []
restored_text = False
for block in content:
is_string_text = isinstance(block, str)
is_mapping_text = isinstance(block, Mapping) and block.get("type") == "text" and isinstance(block.get("text"), str)
if not is_string_text and not is_mapping_text:
restored_content.append(block)
continue
if restored_text:
continue
if is_mapping_text:
restored_content.append({**block, "text": original_content})
else:
restored_content.append(original_content)
restored_text = True
if not restored_text:
restored_content.insert(0, {"type": "text", "text": original_content})
else:
restored_content = original_content
return message.model_copy(
update={
# Pydantic deep-copies the original model for ``deep=True``, but
# applies values supplied through ``update`` without copying them.
# Keep the persisted/UI copy fully isolated from the model-facing
# message, including nested image/file blocks and metadata.
"content": deepcopy(restored_content),
"additional_kwargs": deepcopy(additional_kwargs),
},
deep=True,
)
def is_real_user_message(message: object) -> bool:
"""Return whether ``message`` is a real user-authored HumanMessage.
Middleware-injected hidden HumanMessages and summarization markers should not
drive user-intent features such as slash-skill activation or MCP routing.
"""
if not isinstance(message, HumanMessage):
return False
if message.name == SUMMARY_MESSAGE_NAME:
return False
if message.additional_kwargs.get("hide_from_ui"):
return False
return True