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* feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers `user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to register one MCP server entry per credential. Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets` carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block unmasked. Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key, because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"` opts out. Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context` and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning. Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from `langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the ambient-runtime fallback disabled. Closes #5005 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`. HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context` precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential. Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses. Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and the Gateway mirror. Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest` or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes `request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers. `_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context` instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`, not only a credential. The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`, which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names * fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
233 lines
10 KiB
Python
233 lines
10 KiB
Python
"""OAuth token support for MCP HTTP/SSE servers."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import logging
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import threading
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
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from typing import Any
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from deerflow.config.extensions_config import ExtensionsConfig, McpOAuthConfig
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from deerflow.mcp.headers import apply_header_overrides, header_spellings
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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@dataclass
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class _OAuthToken:
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"""Cached OAuth token."""
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access_token: str
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token_type: str
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expires_at: datetime
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class OAuthTokenManager:
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"""Acquire/cache/refresh OAuth tokens for MCP servers."""
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def __init__(self, oauth_by_server: dict[str, McpOAuthConfig]):
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self._oauth_by_server = oauth_by_server
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self._tokens: dict[str, _OAuthToken] = {}
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# A plain threading.Lock, not asyncio.Lock: the embedded/TUI sync tool-call
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# path (DeerFlowClient.stream() -> LangGraph ToolNode._func -> a
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# ThreadPoolExecutor -> deerflow.tools.sync.make_sync_tool_wrapper's
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# per-call asyncio.run()) invokes get_authorization_header from a fresh
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# event loop on a fresh OS thread for every concurrent tool call. An
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# asyncio.Lock binds to whichever loop first contends on it; a second
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# caller's release/wake-up crossing loops without call_soon_threadsafe
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# either deadlocks silently or raises "bound to a different event loop".
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# threading.Lock has no loop affinity, so it is safe to share across
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# however many event loops/threads call into the same server's lock.
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self._locks: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {name: threading.Lock() for name in oauth_by_server}
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@classmethod
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def from_extensions_config(cls, extensions_config: ExtensionsConfig) -> OAuthTokenManager:
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oauth_by_server: dict[str, McpOAuthConfig] = {}
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for server_name, server_config in extensions_config.get_enabled_mcp_servers().items():
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if server_config.oauth and server_config.oauth.enabled:
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oauth_by_server[server_name] = server_config.oauth
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return cls(oauth_by_server)
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def has_oauth_servers(self) -> bool:
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return bool(self._oauth_by_server)
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def oauth_server_names(self) -> list[str]:
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return list(self._oauth_by_server.keys())
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async def get_authorization_header(self, server_name: str) -> str | None:
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oauth = self._oauth_by_server.get(server_name)
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if not oauth:
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return None
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token = self._tokens.get(server_name)
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if token and not self._is_expiring(token, oauth):
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return f"{token.token_type} {token.access_token}"
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lock = self._locks[server_name]
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# Acquire the OS-level lock off-thread so a blocking wait never blocks this
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# event loop, then release it synchronously (release() never blocks). This
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# keeps the de-duplication behavior of the old `async with lock:` (only one
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# concurrent caller per server actually fetches a token) while remaining
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# safe when callers are on different event loops/threads.
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#
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# The acquisition itself runs as an explicit Task, shielded from this
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# coroutine's own cancellation. A bare `await asyncio.to_thread(lock.acquire)`
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# cannot be safely cancelled: once the executor thread has started running
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# lock.acquire(), Python has no way to stop it, so a cancellation delivered
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# at that await would still let the thread go on to acquire the lock later
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# (whenever the current holder releases it) with this coroutine already
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# gone and nobody left to call release() -- the lock would stay locked
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# forever and every later call for this server would block permanently at
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# this same line. Shielding the acquisition task means a cancelled caller
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# can instead wait for that (unstoppable) acquisition to actually land and
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# release the lock immediately, rather than leaking ownership of it.
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acquire_task = asyncio.create_task(asyncio.to_thread(lock.acquire), name=f"oauth-lock-acquire:{server_name}")
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try:
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await asyncio.shield(acquire_task)
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except asyncio.CancelledError:
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# Keep waiting -- shielded on every retry -- until the acquisition
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# actually finishes, even if this coroutine is cancelled again while
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# cleaning up: the underlying thread cannot be interrupted, so this is
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# the only way to learn when the lock becomes ours and release it
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# right away instead of leaving it locked forever.
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while not acquire_task.done():
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try:
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await asyncio.shield(acquire_task)
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except asyncio.CancelledError:
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continue
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lock.release()
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raise
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try:
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token = self._tokens.get(server_name)
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if token and not self._is_expiring(token, oauth):
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return f"{token.token_type} {token.access_token}"
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fresh = await self._fetch_token(oauth)
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self._tokens[server_name] = fresh
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logger.info(f"Refreshed OAuth access token for MCP server: {server_name}")
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return f"{fresh.token_type} {fresh.access_token}"
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finally:
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lock.release()
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@staticmethod
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def _is_expiring(token: _OAuthToken, oauth: McpOAuthConfig) -> bool:
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now = datetime.now(UTC)
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return token.expires_at <= now + timedelta(seconds=max(oauth.refresh_skew_seconds, 0))
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async def _fetch_token(self, oauth: McpOAuthConfig) -> _OAuthToken:
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import httpx # pyright: ignore[reportMissingImports]
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# extra_token_params is spread first so the reserved fields below
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# (grant_type, scope, audience, client_id, ...) cannot be silently
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# overridden by an operator-supplied key — otherwise the branch logic
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# below (which keys off oauth.grant_type) and the value actually sent
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# to the token endpoint would disagree.
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data: dict[str, str] = dict(oauth.extra_token_params)
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data["grant_type"] = oauth.grant_type
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if oauth.scope:
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data["scope"] = oauth.scope
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if oauth.audience:
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data["audience"] = oauth.audience
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if oauth.grant_type == "client_credentials":
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if not oauth.client_id or not oauth.client_secret:
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raise ValueError("OAuth client_credentials requires client_id and client_secret")
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data["client_id"] = oauth.client_id
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data["client_secret"] = oauth.client_secret
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elif oauth.grant_type == "refresh_token":
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if not oauth.refresh_token:
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raise ValueError("OAuth refresh_token grant requires refresh_token")
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data["refresh_token"] = oauth.refresh_token
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if oauth.client_id:
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data["client_id"] = oauth.client_id
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if oauth.client_secret:
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data["client_secret"] = oauth.client_secret
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else:
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raise ValueError(f"Unsupported OAuth grant type: {oauth.grant_type}")
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0) as client:
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response = await client.post(oauth.token_url, data=data)
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response.raise_for_status()
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payload = response.json()
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access_token = payload.get(oauth.token_field)
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if not access_token:
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raise ValueError(f"OAuth token response missing '{oauth.token_field}'")
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# Persist a rotated refresh_token so subsequent refreshes use the latest
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# value. This is an in-process update only — it is intentionally NOT
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# written back to extensions_config.json. Providers that rotate refresh
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# tokens (Auth0, Okta, Google, etc.) return a new refresh_token on each
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# refresh; discarding it makes the next refresh fail with invalid_grant.
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if oauth.grant_type == "refresh_token":
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rotated = payload.get("refresh_token")
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if isinstance(rotated, str) and rotated:
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oauth.refresh_token = rotated
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token_type = str(payload.get(oauth.token_type_field, oauth.default_token_type) or oauth.default_token_type)
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expires_in_raw = payload.get(oauth.expires_in_field, 3600)
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try:
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expires_in = int(expires_in_raw)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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expires_in = 3600
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expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=max(expires_in, 1))
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return _OAuthToken(access_token=access_token, token_type=token_type, expires_at=expires_at)
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def build_oauth_tool_interceptor(
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extensions_config: ExtensionsConfig,
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*,
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token_manager: OAuthTokenManager | None = None,
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) -> Any | None:
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"""Build a tool interceptor that injects OAuth Authorization headers."""
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token_manager = token_manager or OAuthTokenManager.from_extensions_config(extensions_config)
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if not token_manager.has_oauth_servers():
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return None
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# The servers' static header spellings, so the injected token replaces a
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# static header spelled 'authorization' at the adapter's case-sensitive
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# connection merge instead of riding alongside it (see ``mcp/headers.py``).
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spellings_by_server = {server_name: header_spellings(server_config.headers) for server_name, server_config in extensions_config.get_enabled_mcp_servers().items()}
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async def oauth_interceptor(request: Any, handler: Any) -> Any:
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header = await token_manager.get_authorization_header(request.server_name)
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if not header:
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return await handler(request)
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updated_headers = apply_header_overrides(
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request.headers,
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{"Authorization": header},
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spellings=spellings_by_server.get(request.server_name),
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)
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return await handler(request.override(headers=updated_headers))
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return oauth_interceptor
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async def get_initial_oauth_headers(extensions_config: ExtensionsConfig) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Get initial OAuth Authorization headers for MCP server connections."""
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token_manager = OAuthTokenManager.from_extensions_config(extensions_config)
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if not token_manager.has_oauth_servers():
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return {}
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headers: dict[str, str] = {}
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for server_name in token_manager.oauth_server_names():
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try:
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value = await token_manager.get_authorization_header(server_name)
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except Exception:
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logger.warning(
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"Skipping initial OAuth header for MCP server '%s' after token fetch failed",
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server_name,
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exc_info=True,
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)
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continue
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if value:
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headers[server_name] = value
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return {name: value for name, value in headers.items() if value}
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