Sunshine bf740ffa90
feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#5041)
* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#4849)

Backend-first implementation of the PAT contract from #4849: show-once
dfp_ tokens bound to their owning user (AUTH_SOURCE_PAT,
is_internal=false), digest-only storage (migration 0017), strict
credential precedence (invalid Bearer is a 401, never cookie fallback),
CSRF double-submit skipped only for Bearer requests while
auth-endpoint origin checks still run, scopes intersecting the authz
route permissions, session-auth-only PAT management and password
changes, and throttled best-effort last_used_at stamps.

* fix(auth): harden PAT scope boundary and schema parity from adversarial review

Independent review of the initial draft found: (1) scopes only constrained
the threads/runs permission axis while admin routes treated a PAT as its
(possibly admin) owner — is_admin_user now rejects PAT callers outright
since no scope grants admin capability; (2) the model declared a column
UNIQUE constraint while migration 0017 created a named unique index, so
downgrade failed on create_all-bootstrapped DBs — both now use the named
unique index; (3) auth-disabled mode is an operator override and now stays
ahead of the Bearer check so a stray Authorization header cannot 401 an
E2E sandbox; plus wiring the previously-unused constants, bounding the
last_used_at stamp cache, and four new tests (middleware-level expiry,
expires_in_days, admin-capability rejection with session control, and the
auth-disabled precedence).

* docs(api): document personal access tokens for programmatic API access

* fix(auth): close PAT security boundaries from review (default-deny routes, extension admin suppression)

P1-1: scope intersection only constrains @require_permission routes, so
undecorated mutation routes (DELETE /api/memory, POST /api/agents, Lark
credential switching, channel config) accepted a PAT holding a single read
scope. AuthMiddleware now enforces a default-deny route policy in
auth/pat.py: PAT requests are admitted only to the thread/run lifecycle
routes the v1 scopes govern; everything else answers 403 regardless of
scopes. Session-cookie callers are unaffected.

P1-2: the extension principal resolver projected is_admin/roles from the
raw system_role, so an admin-owned PAT passed
deerflow_extension_api.require_admin on contributed routes despite the
documented no-admin guarantee. The projection is now PAT-aware and
suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers, mirroring
deps.is_admin_user.

Both fixes carry regression tests (route outside policy 403 + session
control; production resolver admin suppression), and API.md documents the
default-deny boundary.

* fix(auth): enforce PAT scopes on stateless run entry and harden decorator

Follow-up hardening from an independent audit of the P1 fixes:

- POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait were the only allowlisted run
  entrypoints without @require_permission, so a threads:read-only PAT
  could still start runs (same bug class as P1-1, now closed): both now
  carry @require_permission("runs", "create"). POST /api/threads and
  POST /api/threads/search gain threads:write / threads:read for the
  same reason. Authorization-disabled deployments see no change (the
  permission set resolves to all permissions).
- require_permission now binds the wrapped signature to locate a
  positionally-passed request before injecting the test stub, fixing
  'got multiple values for argument' on direct positional unit-test
  calls.
- API.md: the intro PAT example used GET /api/models, which the new
  default-deny policy 403s — replaced with GET /api/threads; the
  default-deny route list now spells out method sets.

Regression test: threads:read-only PAT is 403 on the decorated stateless
entry while a runs:create PAT passes.

* fix(auth): address review P2s (empty Authorization header, PAT name trimming, API example)

- CSRFMiddleware treats an explicitly empty Authorization header as
  present (is None), so an invalid credential always reaches
  AuthMiddleware's uniform 401 instead of a CSRF 403 that varies by
  method/CSRF state. Regression: empty-header request dies at auth.
- PATCreateRequest strips the name and rejects whitespace-only values
  before token generation; created names are stored trimmed.
- API.md intro PAT example now uses the implemented
  POST /api/threads/search endpoint (GET /api/threads does not exist).
- AGENTS.md trimmed back under the guidance soft budget after the
  upstream merge.

* fix(auth): tighten PAT route policy to implemented methods only

The allowlist admitted GET /api/threads, a method no router implements.
Pre-authorizing a dead method weakens the default-deny boundary: a
future GET collection route added without a permission decorator would
become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. Restrict the
rule to POST, fix the stale GET description in API.md's PAT
constraints, and document the default-deny boundary accurately in the
gateway AGENTS.md guidance (only the threads/runs allowlist is
PAT-reachable; every other authenticated route 403s PAT callers).

Audited every remaining rule against the mounted routers: all other
method+path entries map to real routes. Regression:
test_pat_policy_does_not_pre_authorize_unimplemented_methods.

* test(auth): guarantee the negative digest test mutates the token

token[:-1] + "X" is identical to the original whenever the generated
token already ends in X (1/62), making the negative digest assertion
fail intermittently. Choose the replacement character based on the
existing tail so the mutated token always differs.

* fix(auth): require runs:cancel for cancel-then-stream requests

stream_existing_run is gated at runs:read so action-less stream joins
work with read-only credentials, but its ?action=interrupt|rollback
branch cancels the run — a separate permission. A runs:read-only PAT
passed both the PAT route policy and the route decorator and could
interrupt or roll back an active run, bypassing the runs:cancel scope.

Decorators cannot express query-parameter-conditional permissions, so
the check lives in require_cancel_permission_when_action(), applied at
the top of the handler. Regression drives the real helper through the
production middleware: runs:read-only PAT + action is 403, the same
token joins action-less, runs:read+cancel passes, session control
unaffected.

* docs(changelog): add the PAT feature entry

* docs(readme): add personal access tokens section

Repo documentation-update policy requires user-facing features to
update README.md in the same changeset; the PAT feature previously
touched only backend/docs/API.md and the gateway AGENTS.md.

* fix(auth): require runs:cancel for mutating multitask strategies

All five run-creation entrypoints were gated only by runs:create, but
RunCreateRequest.multitask_strategy accepts interrupt/rollback and
start_run forwards it to create_or_reject, which terminates an
already-active run. A runs:create-only PAT could therefore kill an
existing run through a create request, bypassing runs:cancel.

Decorators cannot express body-parameter-conditional permissions, and
per-route checks leave the same hole for the next entrypoint, so the
gate lives in start_run itself — the single choke point every
run-creation path (HTTP routes and internal launchers) flows through.
Regenerate launches pass multitask_strategy="reject" and are
unaffected; requests without a stamped auth context (internal/test
compositions) skip the gate.

The check is the shared authz.require_cancel_permission_if primitive;
require_cancel_permission_when_action now delegates to it, so every
request dimension that carries cancel capability (query action, body
strategy) flows through one gate.

Regression drives the real middleware stack: runs:create-only PAT +
interrupt/rollback is 403 with the exact detail, reject (explicit and
default) stays available, runs:create+cancel passes, session control
unaffected; a source anchor pins the gate inside start_run.

* fix(runs): keep observer joins from applying creator cancel-on-disconnect

sse_consumer's finally block applied the record's on_disconnect=cancel
policy on ANY consumer's disconnect. The join surfaces (GET /join and
the action-less GET/POST stream join) feed it the existing RunRecord,
so anyone with thread read access — including a runs:read-only PAT —
could cancel a locally-owned running run simply by closing the SSE
connection, without runs:cancel. The policy expresses the creator's
intent for their own connection; an observer's disconnect must never
be read as that intent.

sse_consumer gains apply_on_disconnect (default True). The two join
surfaces pass False; the creating endpoints (thread-scoped and
stateless create-and-stream) keep the creator semantics unchanged.
wait_for_run_completion needs no change: its callers are creator-side
or post-explicit-cancel paths only.

Regression exercises a real generator close — the same machinery
Starlette drives on client disconnect — against the production
sse_consumer: creator stream disconnect cancels, observer join
disconnect does not; a wiring anchor pins both join call sites and the
creator defaults. API.md documents the cancel-capability constraint
(this fix plus the action/strategy gates) in PAT Constraints.

* test(auth): pin the multitask gate behaviorally; state wait invariant

Independent adversarial review of the round-5 fixes found the P1-a
regression only mirror-pinned: the source anchor could be satisfied by
a comment, and deleting the gate from start_run would not fail the
suite. This drives the production start_run directly — a create-only
auth context gets 403 with the exact detail for interrupt, and a
reject request with no cancel permission at all proceeds past the gate
(never a permission 403).

Also documents wait_for_run_completion's creator-side invariant
(every caller is the creating endpoint or post-explicit-cancel) so a
future observer wiring thinks twice before reusing it — the one-caller-
away variant of the observer-disconnect P1.

* docs(changelog): correct the PAT entry's digest and route-policy description

The entry said HMAC digests (the implementation stores SHA-256 digests,
as documented in API.md and pinned by the repository tests) and claimed
the route policy admits 'implemented stateless endpoints' (it admits
the thread/run lifecycle routes, narrowing further by scopes). Also
notes the cancel-capability gate now covering action and multitask
strategies.

* fix(auth): enumerate the PAT runs route policy per implemented subroute

The runs subtree rule was a GET|POST /runs(/.*)? wildcard — it
pre-authorized every current and future subroute under /runs, including
methods the router never implemented (e.g. GET /runs/stream), which is
the same latent default-deny weakening the threads collection rule was
tightened for: a future route added under /runs would become
PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change.

The wildcard is replaced with six segment-precise rules covering exactly
the 14 implemented method+path combinations; the {run_id} slot
necessarily matches any single segment, so the POST-only collection
names (stream, wait, regenerate, edit-regenerate) are excluded from the
GET run-id rule via negative lookahead — no dead method stays
pre-authorized. Behavior for implemented routes is unchanged.

test_pat_runs_policy_admits_exactly_the_mounted_routes derives the
expected set from the mounted thread_runs router instead of a
hand-maintained list: every implemented GET/POST route under /runs must
be admitted, routes in this router outside the subtree stay denied, and
representative unimplemented neighbors are denied — so adding a route
under /runs now fails CI until it is explicitly allowlisted, and a
removed route leaves a dead rule visible. API.md's PAT constraints list
the enumerated routes and drops a feedback mention that belonged to the
stateless /api/runs axis.

* docs(migration): add the 0017 renumbering coordination note to 0017

The PR's migration-coordination comment states each migration file
carries the note; the file did not. Adds it: numbering was generated
against main head 0016 alongside #5078 and #4843; whoever merges first
keeps the slot, the others renumber on rebase (revision/down_revision
plus the bootstrap head assertions).

* fix(auth): pad base62 tokens to a fixed 43-char width

int.from_bytes discards leading zero bytes, so the unpadded encoder
returned a variable-length body — empty for all-zero input, and shorter
than 40 characters for any draw below 62**39 (~1 in 14.5M), leaving
test_generate_pat_token_format probabilistically flaky and the token
body without stable width (review round 6, P3).

_base62 now left-pads with "0" to _base62_width(len(data)) — the exact
integer digit count (62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42, so 43 for 32 bytes). The
format test asserts the exact fixed width instead of a probabilistic
floor, and a new unit test pins the all-zero, leading-zero-byte, and
max-value edges deterministically.
2026-08-29 23:50:45 +08:00

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"""Centralized accessors for singleton objects stored on ``app.state``.
**Getters** (used by routers): raise 503 when a required dependency is
missing, except ``get_store`` which returns ``None``.
``AppConfig`` is intentionally *not* cached on ``app.state``. Routers and the
run path resolve it through :func:`deerflow.config.app_config.get_app_config`,
which performs mtime-based hot reload, so edits to ``config.yaml`` take
effect on the next request without a process restart. The engines created in
:func:`langgraph_runtime` (stream bridge, persistence, checkpointer, store,
run-event store) accept a ``startup_config`` snapshot — they are
restart-required by design and stay bound to that snapshot to keep the live
process consistent with itself.
Initialization is handled directly in ``app.py`` via :class:`AsyncExitStack`.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import logging
import os
from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator, Callable
from contextlib import AsyncExitStack, asynccontextmanager
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, TypeVar, cast
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
from langgraph.types import Checkpointer
from deerflow.community.browser_automation.session import browser_multi_worker_error
from deerflow.config.app_config import AppConfig, get_app_config
from deerflow.persistence.feedback import FeedbackRepository
from deerflow.runtime import ORPHAN_RECOVERY_STOP_REASON, STARTUP_ORPHAN_RECOVERY_ERROR, RunContext, RunManager, StreamBridge
from deerflow.runtime.events.store.base import RunEventStore
from deerflow.runtime.runs.store.base import RunStore
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Upper bound (seconds) for draining in-flight runs during shutdown, before the
# AsyncExitStack tears down the checkpointer (and its connection pool). Kept
# local to avoid an app -> deps -> app import cycle. This is a *separate* budget
# from ``app.gateway.app._SHUTDOWN_HOOK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`` (currently also 5.0s,
# which bounds channel-service stop): the two govern independent teardown steps
# and may diverge, but both count toward the lifespan shutdown window — revisit
# them together if their sum must stay within the server's graceful-shutdown
# timeout.
_RUN_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
def _browser_tools_enabled_in_config(config: AppConfig) -> bool:
"""Return whether process-local agentic browser sessions are configured."""
get_tool_config = getattr(config, "get_tool_config", None)
if callable(get_tool_config):
return get_tool_config("browser_navigate") is not None
return any(getattr(tool, "name", None) == "browser_navigate" for tool in (getattr(config, "tools", None) or []))
def _enforce_postgres_for_multi_worker(config: AppConfig) -> None:
"""Refuse unsafe multi-process configurations before persistence starts.
Multi-instance scheduler recovery also needs the durable run ownership
contract even when each Pod runs a single Gateway worker.
1. The background scheduler must be disabled for ordinary multi-worker
mode. ``scheduler.multi_instance`` opts into the lease-aware path.
2. Process-local browser sessions must be disabled. Browser tools keep
Chromium and Playwright objects in one worker's memory, while ordinary
uvicorn dispatch provides no thread-id affinity.
3. The DB backend must be Postgres — SQLite write-locks cannot support
concurrent multi-process access.
4. ``run_events.backend`` must be ``db``. Memory and JSONL stores are
process-local, so workers cannot enforce a shared singleton receipt.
5. ``run_ownership.heartbeat_enabled`` must be True — without heartbeat,
every run has a NULL lease, so reconciliation treats all inflight
runs as orphans and Worker B would kill Worker A's live runs on
every rolling update or scale-up.
This gate runs once at startup before any persistence engine is
initialised so the error message is clear and the process exits
immediately.
"""
try:
workers = int(os.environ.get("GATEWAY_WORKERS", "1"))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
workers = 1
scheduler = getattr(config, "scheduler", None)
multi_instance_requested = bool(getattr(scheduler, "multi_instance", False))
multi_instance_scheduler = bool(getattr(scheduler, "enabled", False) and multi_instance_requested)
backend = getattr(config.database, "backend", None)
run_events_backend = getattr(getattr(config, "run_events", None), "backend", None)
run_ownership = getattr(config, "run_ownership", None)
if multi_instance_requested and backend != "postgres":
raise SystemExit(f"scheduler.multi_instance=true requires database.backend='postgres'. database.backend is '{backend}'. Set scheduler.multi_instance=false or configure Postgres.")
if multi_instance_requested and run_events_backend != "db":
raise SystemExit(f"scheduler.multi_instance=true requires run_events.backend='db'. run_events.backend is '{run_events_backend}'. Set scheduler.multi_instance=false or configure run_events.backend: db.")
if multi_instance_requested and (run_ownership is None or not run_ownership.heartbeat_enabled):
raise SystemExit("scheduler.multi_instance=true requires run_ownership.heartbeat_enabled=true so peer runs retain a valid lease. Set scheduler.multi_instance=false or enable run ownership heartbeats.")
if workers <= 1:
return
if config.scheduler.enabled and not multi_instance_scheduler:
raise SystemExit(f"GATEWAY_WORKERS={workers} cannot run with scheduler.enabled=true because each worker starts its own scheduler. Set GATEWAY_WORKERS=1, scheduler.multi_instance=true, or scheduler.enabled=false.")
if _browser_tools_enabled_in_config(config):
raise SystemExit(browser_multi_worker_error(workers))
if backend != "postgres":
raise SystemExit(f"GATEWAY_WORKERS={workers} requires database.backend='postgres', but database.backend is '{backend}'. SQLite cannot support concurrent multi-process access. Set GATEWAY_WORKERS=1 or switch to Postgres.")
if run_events_backend != "db":
raise SystemExit(
f"GATEWAY_WORKERS={workers} requires run_events.backend='db', but run_events.backend is '{run_events_backend}'. "
"Memory and JSONL event stores are process-local, so delivery receipt singleton guarantees cannot hold across workers. "
"Set GATEWAY_WORKERS=1 or configure run_events.backend: db."
)
if run_ownership is None or not run_ownership.heartbeat_enabled:
raise SystemExit(
f"GATEWAY_WORKERS={workers} requires run_ownership.heartbeat_enabled=true. "
"Without heartbeat, every run has a NULL lease, so reconciliation "
"treats all inflight runs as orphans — Worker B would kill Worker A's "
"live runs on every rolling update or scale-up. "
"Set run_ownership.heartbeat_enabled=true in config.yaml."
)
def _validate_agent_storage(config: AppConfig) -> None:
"""Fail fast on an agent-storage backend the database cannot support.
``agent_storage.backend: db`` needs a durable, shared SQL database — a
``memory`` database is per-process, so custom-agent and managed-subagent
definitions would silently diverge across nodes (and there is no SQL URL
to open). Mirrors deermem's create_storage fail-fast and the multi-worker
gate above.
Also warns when a multi-worker Postgres deployment leaves agent storage on
``file``: custom agents created on one node's local disk are invisible to
the others, exactly the divergence the db backend exists to fix.
"""
agent_storage = getattr(config, "agent_storage", None)
backend = getattr(agent_storage, "backend", "file")
db_backend = getattr(getattr(config, "database", None), "backend", None)
if backend == "db" and db_backend not in ("sqlite", "postgres"):
raise SystemExit(
f"agent_storage.backend='db' requires database.backend to be 'sqlite' or 'postgres', "
f"but database.backend is '{db_backend}'. A 'memory' database is per-process and cannot "
"share agent definitions across nodes. Set database.backend, or use agent_storage.backend='file'."
)
try:
workers = int(os.environ.get("GATEWAY_WORKERS", "1"))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
workers = 1
if workers > 1 and db_backend == "postgres" and backend == "file":
logger.warning(
"GATEWAY_WORKERS=%s with database.backend='postgres' but agent_storage.backend='file': "
"custom agents and managed subagents are stored per-node on local disk and are not visible "
"across workers/nodes. Set agent_storage.backend='db' to share them.",
workers,
)
async def _drain_inflight_runs(run_manager: RunManager) -> None:
"""Drain in-flight runs before the checkpointer is torn down (issue #3373).
Shields the (internally-bounded) drain so that even if the lifespan
coroutine is itself cancelled mid-shutdown — a second SIGINT or the server's
graceful-shutdown timeout, i.e. the same signal storm behind #3373 — the
checkpointer pool is not closed while run tasks are still writing
checkpoints. On such a cancellation we let the already-running drain finish
(it is bounded by ``RunManager.shutdown``'s own timeout) and then propagate
the cancellation.
"""
drain = asyncio.create_task(run_manager.shutdown(timeout=_RUN_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS))
try:
await asyncio.shield(drain)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
# Re-shield so this second wait does not abandon the in-flight drain;
# it is bounded, so this cannot hang. Then re-raise to honour shutdown.
try:
await asyncio.shield(drain)
except Exception:
logger.exception("In-flight run drain failed after shutdown cancellation")
raise
except Exception:
logger.exception("Failed to drain in-flight runs during shutdown")
async def _publish_recovered_run_stream_end(
bridge: StreamBridge,
recovered_runs: list[RunRecord],
*,
cleanup_delay: float = 60.0,
on_cleanup_scheduled: Callable[[str, asyncio.Task[None]], None] | None = None,
) -> list[tuple[str, asyncio.Task[None]]]:
"""Terminate retained streams for runs recovered as orphaned."""
cleanup_tasks: list[tuple[str, asyncio.Task[None]]] = []
for record in recovered_runs:
stream_exists = getattr(bridge, "stream_exists", None)
if stream_exists is not None:
try:
if not await stream_exists(record.run_id):
logger.debug("Skipping recovered stream end for %s: stream already expired", record.run_id)
continue
except Exception:
logger.debug("Failed to check recovered stream existence for %s", record.run_id, exc_info=True)
try:
await bridge.publish_end(record.run_id)
except Exception:
logger.warning(
"Failed to publish recovered run stream end for %s",
record.run_id,
exc_info=True,
)
continue
task = asyncio.create_task(bridge.cleanup(record.run_id, delay=cleanup_delay))
task.add_done_callback(lambda task, run_id=record.run_id: _log_recovered_stream_cleanup_result(task, run_id))
cleanup_tasks.append((record.run_id, task))
if on_cleanup_scheduled is not None:
on_cleanup_scheduled(record.run_id, task)
return cleanup_tasks
def _log_recovered_stream_cleanup_result(task: asyncio.Task[None], run_id: str) -> None:
if task.cancelled():
return
try:
task.result()
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to clean up recovered run stream for %s", run_id, exc_info=True)
async def _flush_recovered_stream_cleanups(
bridge: StreamBridge,
cleanup_tasks: dict[asyncio.Task[None], str],
*,
timeout: float = 1.0,
) -> None:
"""Cancel delayed cleanups and delete their streams before bridge shutdown."""
pending = [(task, run_id) for task, run_id in cleanup_tasks.items() if not task.done()]
if not pending:
return
for task, _run_id in pending:
task.cancel()
await asyncio.gather(*(task for task, _run_id in pending), return_exceptions=True)
run_ids = list(dict.fromkeys(run_id for _task, run_id in pending))
try:
results = await asyncio.wait_for(
asyncio.gather(
*(bridge.cleanup(run_id, delay=0) for run_id in run_ids),
return_exceptions=True,
),
timeout=max(0.0, timeout),
)
except TimeoutError:
logger.warning(
"Immediate recovered stream cleanup exceeded %.1fs for run_ids=%s; bridge TTL remains the final safety net",
timeout,
run_ids,
)
else:
for run_id, result in zip(run_ids, results):
if isinstance(result, BaseException):
logger.warning(
"Failed to immediately clean up recovered run stream for %s: %r",
run_id,
result,
)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
from deerflow.persistence.thread_meta.base import ThreadMetaStore
from deerflow.runtime import RunRecord
T = TypeVar("T")
async def _mark_latest_startup_recovered_threads_error(
run_manager: RunManager,
thread_store: ThreadMetaStore,
recovered_runs: list[RunRecord],
) -> None:
"""Project startup recovery before request-serving concurrency begins.
This helper must remain on the pre-``yield`` startup path. ``ThreadMetaStore``
has no ``latest_run_id`` column, so it cannot express an atomic conditional
update keyed by the recovered run. Periodic recovery deliberately skips this
projection; moving this helper after request serving starts would reintroduce
a read/update race with newer runs.
"""
recovered_by_thread: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
for record in recovered_runs:
recovered_by_thread.setdefault(record.thread_id, set()).add(record.run_id)
for thread_id, recovered_run_ids in recovered_by_thread.items():
try:
latest_runs = await run_manager.list_by_thread(thread_id, user_id=None, limit=1)
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to find latest run for thread %s during run reconciliation", thread_id, exc_info=True)
continue
if not latest_runs or latest_runs[0].run_id not in recovered_run_ids:
continue
try:
await thread_store.update_status(thread_id, "error", user_id=None)
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to mark thread %s as error during run reconciliation", thread_id, exc_info=True)
async def _terminalize_recovered_runs(
bridge: StreamBridge,
recovered_runs: list[RunRecord],
*,
cleanup_delay: float,
on_cleanup_scheduled: Callable[[str, asyncio.Task[None]], None] | None = None,
) -> list[tuple[str, asyncio.Task[None]]]:
"""Publish terminal markers and schedule retained-stream cleanup."""
return await _publish_recovered_run_stream_end(
bridge,
recovered_runs,
cleanup_delay=cleanup_delay,
on_cleanup_scheduled=on_cleanup_scheduled,
)
def get_config() -> AppConfig:
"""Return the freshest ``AppConfig`` for the current request.
Routes through :func:`deerflow.config.app_config.get_app_config`, which
honours runtime ``ContextVar`` overrides and reloads ``config.yaml`` from
disk when its mtime changes. ``AppConfig`` is not cached on ``app.state``
at all — the only startup-time snapshot lives as a local
``startup_config`` variable inside ``lifespan()`` and is passed
explicitly into :func:`langgraph_runtime` for the engines that are
restart-required by design. Routing every request through
:func:`get_app_config` closes the bytedance/deer-flow issue #3107 BUG-001
split-brain where the worker / lead-agent thread saw a stale startup
snapshot.
Hot-reload boundary: fields backed by startup-time singletons
(engines, sandbox provider, IM channels, logging handler) require a
process restart to change at runtime. The authoritative list lives in
:mod:`deerflow.config.reload_boundary` and is mirrored by the
standardised ``"startup-only:"`` prefix on the matching
``Field(description=...)`` in :class:`AppConfig` — IDE hover on those
fields will surface the boundary inline. See
``backend/CLAUDE.md`` "Config Hot-Reload Boundary" for the operator
summary.
Any failure to materialise the config (missing file, permission denied,
YAML parse error, validation error) is reported as 503 — semantically
"the gateway cannot serve requests without a usable configuration" — and
logged with the original exception so operators have something to debug.
"""
try:
return get_app_config()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - request boundary: log and degrade gracefully
logger.exception("Failed to load AppConfig at request time")
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Configuration not available") from exc
@asynccontextmanager
async def langgraph_runtime(app: FastAPI, startup_config: AppConfig) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
"""Bootstrap and tear down all LangGraph runtime singletons.
``startup_config`` is the ``AppConfig`` snapshot taken once during
``lifespan()`` for one-shot infrastructure bootstrap. The engines and
stores constructed here (stream bridge, persistence engine, checkpointer,
store, run-event store) are restart-required by design — they hold live
connections, file handles, or singleton providers — so they bind to this
snapshot and survive across `config.yaml` edits. Request-time consumers
must still go through :func:`get_config` for any field that should be
hot-reloadable. See ``backend/CLAUDE.md`` "Config Hot-Reload Boundary".
The matching ``run_events_config`` is frozen onto ``app.state`` so
:func:`get_run_context` pairs a freshly-loaded ``AppConfig`` with the
*startup-time* run-events configuration the underlying ``event_store``
was built from — otherwise the runtime could end up combining a live
new ``run_events_config`` with an event store still bound to the
previous backend.
Usage in ``app.py``::
async with langgraph_runtime(app, startup_config):
yield
"""
from deerflow.persistence.engine import close_engine, get_session_factory, init_engine_from_config
from deerflow.runtime import make_store, make_stream_bridge
from deerflow.runtime.checkpoint_mode import freeze_checkpoint_channel_mode, freeze_checkpoint_snapshot_frequency
from deerflow.runtime.checkpointer.async_provider import make_checkpointer
from deerflow.runtime.events.store import make_run_event_store
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Multi-worker safety gate: reject SQLite when GATEWAY_WORKERS > 1.
# SQLite write-locks cannot support concurrent multi-process access.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
_enforce_postgres_for_multi_worker(startup_config)
# Reject agent_storage.backend='db' on a non-durable database, and warn on
# node-divergent file storage under multi-worker Postgres.
_validate_agent_storage(startup_config)
async with AsyncExitStack() as stack:
# Lifecycle and system-model hooks can originate on isolated subagent
# loops. Bind them to the Gateway's serving loop before any runtime
# dependency starts, then reset the binding last through the exit
# stack. Registering the callback synchronously here also covers every
# startup-failure and cancellation path below.
try:
from deerflow.extensions.notify import (
reset_extension_notify_loop,
set_extension_notify_loop,
)
set_extension_notify_loop(asyncio.get_running_loop())
except Exception:
logger.exception("Failed to register the extension notify loop; sync observations will be dropped")
else:
def reset_notify_loop_safely() -> None:
try:
reset_extension_notify_loop()
except Exception:
logger.debug(
"Failed to reset the extension notify loop (non-fatal)",
exc_info=True,
)
stack.callback(reset_notify_loop_safely)
config = startup_config
app.state.checkpoint_channel_mode = freeze_checkpoint_channel_mode(config.database.checkpoint_channel_mode)
app.state.checkpoint_snapshot_frequency = freeze_checkpoint_snapshot_frequency(config.database.checkpoint_delta.snapshot_frequency)
app.state.stream_bridge = await stack.enter_async_context(make_stream_bridge(config))
# Initialize persistence engine BEFORE checkpointer so that
# auto-create-database logic runs first (postgres backend).
# Own cleanup before initialization so partial startup and host
# cancellation cannot strand an engine created along the way.
stack.push_async_callback(close_engine)
await init_engine_from_config(config.database)
app.state.checkpointer = await stack.enter_async_context(make_checkpointer(config))
app.state.store = await stack.enter_async_context(make_store(config))
# Initialize repositories — one get_session_factory() call for all.
sf = get_session_factory()
if sf is not None:
from deerflow.persistence.feedback import FeedbackRepository
from deerflow.persistence.personal_access_tokens import PersonalAccessTokenRepository
from deerflow.persistence.run import RunRepository
app.state.run_store = RunRepository(sf)
app.state.feedback_repo = FeedbackRepository(sf)
from app.gateway.auth.pat import PAT_LAST_USED_WRITE_INTERVAL_SECONDS
app.state.pat_repo = PersonalAccessTokenRepository(sf, last_used_write_interval_seconds=PAT_LAST_USED_WRITE_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
else:
from deerflow.runtime.runs.store.memory import MemoryRunStore
app.state.run_store = MemoryRunStore()
app.state.feedback_repo = None
# Memory backend has no durable PAT store, so Bearer credentials
# cannot be validated there and are rejected by the middleware.
app.state.pat_repo = None
# Services are app-scoped. Capture this app's immutable extension set
# once and close over the same object for teardown; the process-wide
# singleton may be replaced by another app/test before shutdown.
from deerflow.extensions import EMPTY_EXTENSIONS, record_runtime_diagnostics
from deerflow.extensions.gateway import start_services, stop_services
extensions = getattr(app.state, "extensions", EMPTY_EXTENSIONS)
attempted_services: list[tuple[str, Any]] = []
async def stop_extension_services() -> None:
record_runtime_diagnostics(
await stop_services(
extensions,
service_entries=attempted_services,
)
)
# Register cleanup before starting: start() can partially acquire
# resources and then fail or be cancelled.
stack.push_async_callback(stop_extension_services)
record_runtime_diagnostics(
await start_services(
extensions,
config,
sf,
attempted_services=attempted_services,
)
)
from deerflow.persistence.thread_meta import make_thread_store
app.state.thread_store = make_thread_store(sf, app.state.store)
if sf is not None:
from deerflow.persistence.mcp_tasks import McpTaskRepository
from deerflow.persistence.scheduled_task_runs import (
ScheduledTaskRunRepository,
)
from deerflow.persistence.scheduled_tasks import ScheduledTaskRepository
from deerflow.persistence.subagent_batches import SubagentBatchRepository
app.state.scheduled_task_repo = ScheduledTaskRepository(
sf,
run_repository=app.state.run_store,
)
app.state.scheduled_task_run_repo = ScheduledTaskRunRepository(
sf,
run_repository=app.state.run_store,
)
app.state.mcp_task_repo = McpTaskRepository(sf)
app.state.subagent_batch_repo = SubagentBatchRepository(sf)
else:
app.state.mcp_task_repo = None
app.state.subagent_batch_repo = None
app.state.scheduled_task_repo = None
app.state.scheduled_task_run_repo = None
# Run event store. The store and the matching ``run_events_config`` are
# both frozen at startup so ``get_run_context`` does not combine a
# freshly-reloaded ``AppConfig.run_events`` with a store still bound to
# the previous backend.
run_events_config = getattr(config, "run_events", None)
app.state.run_events_config = run_events_config
app.state.run_event_store = make_run_event_store(run_events_config)
# RunManager with store backing for persistence
run_ownership_config = getattr(config, "run_ownership", None)
sb_config = getattr(config, "stream_bridge", None)
cleanup_delay = getattr(sb_config, "recovered_stream_cleanup_delay_seconds", 60.0) if sb_config else 60.0
recovered_stream_cleanup_tasks: dict[asyncio.Task[None], str] = {}
def track_recovered_stream_cleanup(
run_id: str,
task: asyncio.Task[None],
) -> None:
recovered_stream_cleanup_tasks[task] = run_id
task.add_done_callback(lambda completed: recovered_stream_cleanup_tasks.pop(completed, None))
async def terminalize_recovered_runs(recovered_runs: list[RunRecord]) -> None:
await _terminalize_recovered_runs(
app.state.stream_bridge,
recovered_runs,
cleanup_delay=cleanup_delay,
on_cleanup_scheduled=track_recovered_stream_cleanup,
)
app.state.run_manager = RunManager(
store=app.state.run_store,
run_ownership_config=run_ownership_config,
event_store=app.state.run_event_store,
on_orphans_recovered=terminalize_recovered_runs,
)
# Startup recovery: mark inflight runs whose lease has expired as error.
# In single-worker mode (SQLite / backend=memory), no run has a lease, so
# all inflight rows are reclaimed (unchanged behaviour). In multi-worker
# mode (Postgres), only runs with an expired lease are reclaimed; runs
# owned by another live worker are skipped.
from deerflow.utils.time import now_iso
recovered_runs = await app.state.run_manager.reconcile_orphaned_inflight_runs(
error=STARTUP_ORPHAN_RECOVERY_ERROR,
before=now_iso(),
stop_reason=ORPHAN_RECOVERY_STOP_REASON,
)
await _terminalize_recovered_runs(
app.state.stream_bridge,
recovered_runs,
cleanup_delay=cleanup_delay,
on_cleanup_scheduled=track_recovered_stream_cleanup,
)
await _mark_latest_startup_recovered_threads_error(
app.state.run_manager,
app.state.thread_store,
recovered_runs,
)
# Start the lease heartbeat if enabled (multi-worker deployments).
await app.state.run_manager.start_heartbeat()
try:
yield
finally:
# Drain in-flight run tasks BEFORE the AsyncExitStack tears down the
# checkpointer (and its connection pool). A run still mid-graph would
# otherwise leak into asyncio.run() shutdown, where langgraph's
# _checkpointer_put_after_previous aput races the closed pool and
# raises PoolClosed (issue #3373).
run_manager = getattr(app.state, "run_manager", None)
if run_manager is not None:
shutdown_deadline = asyncio.get_running_loop().time() + _RUN_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
try:
await _drain_inflight_runs(run_manager)
finally:
await _flush_recovered_stream_cleanups(
app.state.stream_bridge,
recovered_stream_cleanup_tasks,
timeout=min(
1.0,
max(
0.0,
shutdown_deadline - asyncio.get_running_loop().time(),
),
),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Getters called by routers per-request
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _require(attr: str, label: str) -> Callable[[Request], T]:
"""Create a FastAPI dependency that returns ``app.state.<attr>`` or 503."""
def dep(request: Request) -> T:
val = getattr(request.app.state, attr, None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail=f"{label} not available")
return cast(T, val)
dep.__name__ = dep.__qualname__ = f"get_{attr}"
return dep
get_stream_bridge: Callable[[Request], StreamBridge] = _require("stream_bridge", "Stream bridge")
get_run_manager: Callable[[Request], RunManager] = _require("run_manager", "Run manager")
get_checkpointer: Callable[[Request], Checkpointer] = _require("checkpointer", "Checkpointer")
get_run_event_store: Callable[[Request], RunEventStore] = _require("run_event_store", "Run event store")
get_feedback_repo: Callable[[Request], FeedbackRepository] = _require("feedback_repo", "Feedback")
get_run_store: Callable[[Request], RunStore] = _require("run_store", "Run store")
def get_store(request: Request):
"""Return the global store (may be ``None`` if not configured)."""
return getattr(request.app.state, "store", None)
def get_thread_store(request: Request) -> ThreadMetaStore:
"""Return the thread metadata store (SQL or memory-backed)."""
val = getattr(request.app.state, "thread_store", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Thread metadata store not available")
return val
def get_scheduled_task_repo(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "scheduled_task_repo", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Scheduled task repo not available")
return val
def get_scheduled_task_run_repo(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "scheduled_task_run_repo", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Scheduled task run repo not available")
return val
def get_scheduled_task_service(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "scheduled_task_service", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Scheduled task service not available")
return val
def get_mcp_task_repo(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "mcp_task_repo", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="MCP task repo not available")
return val
def get_mcp_task_service(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "mcp_task_service", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="MCP task service not available")
return val
def get_subagent_batch_repo(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "subagent_batch_repo", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Subagent batch repository not available")
return val
def get_subagent_batch_service(request: Request):
val = getattr(request.app.state, "subagent_batch_service", None)
if val is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Subagent batch service not available")
return val
def get_run_context(request: Request) -> RunContext:
"""Build a :class:`RunContext` from ``app.state`` singletons.
Returns a *base* context with infrastructure dependencies. The
``app_config`` field is resolved live so per-run fields (e.g.
``models[*].max_tokens``) follow ``config.yaml`` edits; the
``event_store`` / ``run_events_config`` pair stays frozen to the snapshot
captured in :func:`langgraph_runtime` so callers never see a store bound
to one backend paired with a config pointing at another.
"""
return RunContext(
checkpointer=get_checkpointer(request),
store=get_store(request),
event_store=get_run_event_store(request),
run_events_config=getattr(request.app.state, "run_events_config", None),
checkpoint_channel_mode=getattr(request.app.state, "checkpoint_channel_mode", "full"),
checkpoint_snapshot_frequency=getattr(request.app.state, "checkpoint_snapshot_frequency", None),
thread_store=get_thread_store(request),
mcp_task_repo=getattr(request.app.state, "mcp_task_repo", None),
app_config=get_config(),
extensions=getattr(request.app.state, "extensions", None),
on_run_completed=getattr(request.app.state, "scheduled_task_service", None).handle_run_completion if getattr(request.app.state, "scheduled_task_service", None) is not None else None,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth helpers (used by authz.py and auth middleware)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cached singletons to avoid repeated instantiation per request
_cached_local_provider: LocalAuthProvider | None = None
_cached_repo: SQLiteUserRepository | None = None
def get_local_provider() -> LocalAuthProvider:
"""Get or create the cached LocalAuthProvider singleton.
Must be called after ``init_engine_from_config()`` — the shared
session factory is required to construct the user repository.
"""
global _cached_local_provider, _cached_repo
if _cached_repo is None:
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
from deerflow.persistence.engine import get_session_factory
sf = get_session_factory()
if sf is None:
raise RuntimeError("get_local_provider() called before init_engine_from_config(); cannot access users table")
_cached_repo = SQLiteUserRepository(sf)
if _cached_local_provider is None:
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
_cached_local_provider = LocalAuthProvider(repository=_cached_repo)
return _cached_local_provider
def get_pat_repo(request: Request):
"""Return the personal-access-token repository from app state.
Raises 503 when the process runs on the memory backend (no durable PAT
storage), so PAT management routes fail explicitly instead of silently
accepting tokens nobody can validate.
"""
pat_repo = getattr(request.app.state, "pat_repo", None)
if pat_repo is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Personal access tokens require a configured database")
return pat_repo
async def get_current_user_from_request(request: Request):
"""Get the current authenticated user from the request cookie.
Raises HTTPException 401 if not authenticated.
"""
state = getattr(request, "state", None)
state_user = getattr(state, "user", None)
from app.gateway.auth_disabled import AUTH_SOURCE_AUTH_DISABLED, AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL, AUTH_SOURCE_PAT, AUTH_SOURCE_SESSION
if state_user is not None and getattr(state, "auth_source", None) in {
AUTH_SOURCE_SESSION,
AUTH_SOURCE_AUTH_DISABLED,
AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL,
AUTH_SOURCE_PAT,
}:
return state_user
from app.gateway.auth import decode_token
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse, TokenError, token_error_to_code
access_token = request.cookies.get("access_token")
if not access_token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=401,
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.NOT_AUTHENTICATED, message="Not authenticated").model_dump(),
)
payload = decode_token(access_token)
if isinstance(payload, TokenError):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=401,
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=token_error_to_code(payload), message=f"Token error: {payload.value}").model_dump(),
)
provider = get_local_provider()
user = await provider.get_user(payload.sub)
if user is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=401,
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.USER_NOT_FOUND, message="User not found").model_dump(),
)
# Token version mismatch → password was changed, token is stale
if user.token_version != payload.ver:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=401,
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.TOKEN_INVALID, message="Token revoked (password changed)").model_dump(),
)
return user
async def is_admin_user(request: Request) -> bool:
"""Return whether the authenticated caller is an admin user.
``AuthMiddleware`` normally stamps ``request.state.user`` before the request
reaches a router. Falling back to the strict dependency keeps the route safe
in tests or alternative ASGI compositions that mount a router without the
global middleware.
Centralising this here means a future change to the admin definition (e.g.
allowing an internal system role, adding audit logging, or switching to a
permission-based check) lands in one place instead of drifting across the
per-router copies that previously existed in ``mcp``, ``channel_connections``
and ``channels``.
"""
# PAT credentials never carry admin capability: no scope in the PAT
# universe grants it, so an admin's automation token must not unlock
# admin-only routes (skill installs, integration credentials, MCP config).
from app.gateway.auth_disabled import AUTH_SOURCE_PAT
if getattr(request.state, "auth_source", None) == AUTH_SOURCE_PAT:
return False
user = getattr(request.state, "user", None)
if user is None:
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
return getattr(user, "system_role", None) == "admin"
async def require_admin_user(request: Request, *, detail: str) -> None:
"""Require the authenticated caller to be an admin user.
``detail`` is the route-specific 403 message. The shared predicate keeps
read-side redaction and write authorization on the same admin definition.
"""
if not await is_admin_user(request):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=detail)
async def get_optional_user_from_request(request: Request):
"""Get optional authenticated user from request.
Returns None if not authenticated.
"""
try:
return await get_current_user_from_request(request)
except HTTPException:
return None
async def get_current_user(request: Request) -> str | None:
"""Extract user_id from request cookie, or None if not authenticated.
Thin adapter that returns the string id for callers that only need
identification (e.g., ``feedback.py``). Full-user callers should use
``get_current_user_from_request`` or ``get_optional_user_from_request``.
"""
user = await get_optional_user_from_request(request)
return str(user.id) if user else None