Zeren Wang a06a6fed7e
feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2) (#5109)
* feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2)

PR4 of RFC #4651: check lead-supplied acceptance_criteria in code when a
subagent completes, so objectively checkable requirements can never be
silently passed by a self-report.

- subagents/acceptance_checks.py: deterministic leaf families —
  file:<path> exists|non-empty and file_written:<path> read through
  read_current_file_content scoped to the shared thread workspace; the
  read uses the sandbox-native virtual path form (the local read
  validator and provider mount tables resolve /mnt/user-data/... paths,
  not host paths); the scope decision canonicalizes with realpath on the
  local sandbox so workspace symlinks cannot escape into uploads; a
  remote provider's "Error: ..." return string is normalized to a
  failed check (provider-typed via is_local_sandbox); a
  UnicodeDecodeError marks a binary deliverable as existing and
  non-empty; out-of-scope paths degrade to UNVERIFIED.
  tests_passed:<command> anchors to a matching recorded bash execution
  with status=success and a test-summary shape; matching is
  shell-structure aware with control-flow attribution (span must end at
  the last segment with provable execution), negating-option values are
  ineligible evidence and a target negated anywhere in the command
  degrades the match, extra flags must be selection-preserving, extra
  positionals widen only after a path-scoped criterion, truncated
  commands degrade via command_truncated, the summary shape is read
  only from output attributable to the matched segment (preceding
  segments provably silent by invocation form), and pass shapes require
  a nonzero passed count. Criterion text is neutralized with
  neutralize_untrusted_tags before storage/rendering. Anything else
  renders UNVERIFIED, never silently passed.
- executor: accumulate bounded bash command/output evidence per streamed
  chunk (merged by tool_call_id, newest-capped) so subagent
  summarization compacting earlier messages cannot erase a recorded
  execution; the recorded status is the actual shell exit status parsed
  from the output's exit marker (signed codes included; the remote
  Command exited with code N form is accepted only as the whole trimmed
  output), falling back to deerflow_tool_meta only when no marker
  exists.
- sandbox providers: e2b/opensandbox/tenki/boxlite append the
  LocalSandbox-style "Exit Code: N" marker on nonzero exit even with
  non-empty output; aio propagates the SDK's structured exit_code on
  both exec paths the same way; local timeouts append Exit Code: 124;
  and _truncate_bash_output always preserves a trailing exit marker
  (signed included) inside its budget, with a 32-char floor raising any
  smaller configured limit, so the actual shell outcome always survives
  in the output text.
- task_tool: run the checklist offloaded (asyncio.to_thread) on the
  completed branch, failure-isolated; stamp the verdict into result
  metadata and render the per-criterion section into the model-visible
  result text.
- status contract: additive subagent_acceptance_verdict transport with
  read-side structural validation.
- delegation ledger: entry carries the verdict and renders a compact
  acceptance segment; gateway strips caller-forged verdicts from both
  ledger entries and message metadata, like the citation verdict.
- blocking-IO anchor pins the offload (teeth proven red->green); leaf
  read errors catch only OSError/SandboxError so unexpected errors reach
  the task-tool-level isolation instead of being mislabeled.

* fix(harness): close acceptance evidence gaps from review (RFC #4651 PR4)

- negating options: overlap with a matched criterion target is now
  checked by path/nodeid prefix, not exact token equality — excluding a
  sub-path of the criterion's selection (pytest tests --deselect
  tests/unit/test_auth.py) degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of holds
- output attribution: any redirection token in the matched final segment
  makes the recorded tail non-attributable (> / >> / 2> are word
  characters to the parser, so redirection was invisible to the matcher)
- silent-source allowlist narrowed from any *activate suffix to the
  */bin/activate shape
- status_contract docstring: restore the shared-fixture sentence and
  note subagent_acceptance_verdict is deliberately outside the fixture
- executor: update_bash_executions publishes [] (stream carried no
  bash-family calls) instead of collapsing it into None, mirroring
  update_tool_receipts

* fix(harness): close acceptance residual gaps from re-review (RFC #4651 PR4)

- tests_passed: add error outcomes to the fail shapes — "4 passed, 1 error"
  and pytest's "ERROR <nodeid>" short summary no longer satisfy the pass
  shape when the exit status is swallowed (|| true) or absent; zero-error
  counts stay clean.
- file leaves: bound the deliverable read — a "wc -c" shell size probe
  answers files above 50k bytes without loading ~2x their size, honoring
  the host-bash kill switch and falling back to the full read on any
  non-integer rendering, so verdicts never get less sound.
- executor: record the exit marker text as status_marker on harvested bash
  evidence; the leaf detail now reports the marker actually seen instead of
  asserting a failure indistinguishable from the command's own trailing text.
- extend the blocking-IO anchor to drive the probe branch inside the
  offload; teeth re-verified red->green.

* fix(harness): close acceptance forgery and bound gaps from P2 re-review (RFC #4651 PR4)

- file leaves: never read unbounded — size is established first (os.stat on
  the validated local host path, so the host-bash-disabled configuration
  needs no shell; a guarded wc -c on remote providers that renders
  missing/unreadable in its own words). Above the 50k cap the leaf answers
  from the size alone, at/below it the full read runs, and an
  unestablishable size degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of an unlimited
  fallback read.
- output attribution: source/. prefixes are never provably silent — a
  crafted */bin/activate path shape says nothing about what the script
  prints, so sourced segments can no longer lend a passing summary.
- executable identity: an explicitly path-spelled criterion now requires
  the same normalized executable path; the basename rule stays only for
  deliberately bare criterion commands.

* fix(harness): run acceptance size probe outside subagent-controlled state (RFC #4651 PR4)

- remote probe no longer runs in the sandbox's persistent shell: a fresh
  env -i /bin/sh with absolute-path stat/realpath (poisoned functions,
  aliases, PATH, exported functions, IFS, locale cannot steer it), plus a
  marker env routing AIO onto a fresh per-call bash.exec session.
- metadata-only: stat never opens content, so a FIFO deliverable cannot
  block the parent for the provider's idle timeout; non-regular files
  (fifo/dir/symlink) degrade to UNVERIFIED.
- containment canonicalized against the literal mount root: a
  final-component symlink or a swapped parent directory (root included)
  cannot redirect the check outside shared storage; unprovable layouts
  degrade to UNVERIFIED.

* fix(harness): canonicalize probe containment against the canonical mount root (RFC #4651 PR4)

Literal-root equality made every remote file leaf permanently UNVERIFIED
on e2b and Tenki, which realize /mnt/user-data as a symlink to the home
dir by default (e2b bootstrap 'sudo ln -sfn', Tenki best-effort symlink).
Containment now compares the file's realpath against the mount root's
realpath — exactly what the provider's own read path resolves, so probe
and read-back stay consistent; final-component symlinks stay rejected by
the non-dereferencing stat, and an intermediate dir-link escape under a
sane root still lands ESCAPED. The inner script is a module constant and
the suite now executes the composed probe for real against on-disk
layouts (real dir, symlinked prefix, final symlink, fifo, missing,
dir-link escape), which the canned-output stub could not see.

* fix(harness): close bare-criterion negation and CDPATH summary channels (RFC #4651 PR4)

- matching: a criterion with no positional selection target (bare pytest,
  make test) stands for the runner's default selection, so ANY negating
  option (--ignore/--deselect/...) makes the recorded run a different
  selection — unprovable. The overlap guard only sees consumed criterion
  tokens, which a bare criterion does not have; scoped criteria keep the
  unrelated-exclusion behavior.
- attribution: cd is no longer blanket-silent — CDPATH makes cd print the
  resolved (subagent-chosen) destination and the pass shapes match as
  substrings, so one mkdir 'all tests passed' plus an export minted a pass
  for any quiet command. A cd argument or CDPATH= value (export or leading
  assignment) carrying any summary shape makes the segment non-silent;
  shape-free cd dir wrappers keep matching.
- docs: _truncate_bash_output states the effective 32-char floor (the
  guarantee previously read as an unconditional max_chars bound).

* fix(harness): close env-assignment and expansion channels in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)

Self-audit in the shape of the last review rounds — channels the matcher
classified as accounted-for that can change what runs, narrow the
selection, or lend the summary text:

- env assignments are no longer blanket-stripped: only an allowlist of
  inert display/CI knobs (CI, NO_COLOR, PY_COLORS, ...) may prefix a
  matched span, and a non-allowlisted assignment in any preceding segment
  (pure-assignment or export NAME=) is state pollution — PATH redirects
  the executable, LD_PRELOAD/PYTHONPATH/NODE_OPTIONS inject code,
  PYTEST_ADDOPTS/GOFLAGS/MAKEFILES inject selection-changing inputs,
  BASH_ENV runs arbitrary shell startup. All degrade to unprovable.
- runtime expansions: any span token carrying /$( )/backticks, any
  negating-option value carrying an expansion or glob (unknown excluded
  set), and any extra executed token carrying glob metacharacters
  (crafted option-looking filenames narrow invisibly) are unprovable.
  Criterion-side globs stay self-consistent (literal match).
- cd: an argument carrying a runtime expansion or glob is non-silent
  (unknown destination, unknown print); CDPATH= assignments are now
  handled as state pollution at the match layer, subsuming the
  value-shape special case.

* fix(harness): persistent-shell evidence, exact env sets, option-arity scoping (RFC #4651 PR4)

- tests_passed: on a persistent-shell provider (new
  Sandbox.persistent_shell_sessions capability, set by AioSandbox) every
  leaf degrades to UNVERIFIED — any earlier call in the shared session
  could have mutated the state the clean-looking run executed in, and
  only a fresh controlled session (RFC section 6 verifier) can prove
  otherwise. The flag is read from the provider registry without
  acquiring a sandbox.
- env assignments: the allowlist is gone — no variable is provably inert
  across repositories (CI/DEBUG are routinely read by tests). The span's
  assignment prefix must equal the criterion's exactly (values included,
  order-insensitive); any assignment or export NAME= in a preceding
  segment is state pollution.
- scoping: positional targets are now read by option arity, so a path
  embedded in an option (--basetemp=/tmp/p, --junitxml=/tmp/r.xml) never
  counts as a selection target and an extra positional after such a
  criterion narrows the default selection it denotes.

* fix(harness): stamp shell provenance at harvest, close export/unset and arity gaps (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): split physical newlines as shell separators in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): scope cd wrappers to thread data roots, pin accepted boundaries (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): preserve criterion connectors, prove file_written readable, fail-closed shell capability (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): compare only the connector prefix, tolerate trailing criterion semicolons (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): preserve continuation-line operators, keep ./-spelled executable identity (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): render criteria single-line so a multiline criterion cannot inject a forged checklist line (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): reject parent-traversal executable tokens in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): reject parent-traversal negated values in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)
2026-09-01 16:13:41 +08:00

335 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""Backend↔frontend contract for structured subagent result metadata.
``task`` tool result text is model-visible display content. Runtime
consumers read the structured facts carried inside
``ToolMessage.additional_kwargs``:
- ``subagent_status``: one of ``SUBAGENT_STATUS_VALUES``.
- ``subagent_stop_reason`` (optional): when a guardrail cap ended the run
early, one of ``SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES`` (``token_capped`` /
``turn_capped`` / ``loop_capped``). Additive (#3875 Phase 2): a capped run
that still produced a final answer stays ``status=completed`` and carries
the cap here; a capped run with no usable output is ``status=failed`` +
``stop_reason``. Old frontends ignore the unknown field.
- ``subagent_error`` (optional): the human-readable error blob the
backend recorded.
- ``subagent_result_brief`` / ``subagent_result_sha256`` (optional):
bounded completed-result metadata plus a digest of the full result.
- ``subagent_model_name`` (optional): effective DeerFlow model identifier used
by this delegated run.
- ``subagent_token_usage`` (optional): final cumulative ``input_tokens`` /
``output_tokens`` / ``total_tokens`` snapshot when the provider reported it.
- ``subagent_tool_receipts`` (optional): the child's harvested tool receipts
(RFC #4651 PR2), transported in full; present on terminal statuses when
the run produced stamped receipts.
- ``subagent_receipt_verdict`` (optional, ``completed`` only): the
parent-side citation-check verdict — advisory execution evidence; the
``citation_resolved`` vocabulary never claims task acceptance.
- ``subagent_acceptance_verdict`` (optional, ``completed`` only, RFC #4651
PR4): the deterministic acceptance-checklist verdict — per-criterion
``checked``/``holds`` leaves; unchecked criteria render UNVERIFIED, never
silently passed.
The shared fixture at ``contracts/subagent_status_contract.json`` pins
the enum values (``valid_status_values`` / ``valid_stop_reason_values``)
across Python and TypeScript. ``subagent_acceptance_verdict`` is
deliberately outside that fixture: it is a validated JSON structure (see
``validate_acceptance_verdict``), not an enum vocabulary, and no
TypeScript consumer reads it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import re
from collections.abc import Mapping
from typing import Any, Literal, NotRequired, TypedDict
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.receipt_verification import ReceiptVerdict, validate_receipt_verdict
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.tool_receipt import is_valid_receipt
from deerflow.subagents.acceptance_checks import AcceptanceVerdict, validate_acceptance_verdict
SUBAGENT_STATUS_KEY = "subagent_status"
SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_KEY = "subagent_stop_reason"
SUBAGENT_ERROR_KEY = "subagent_error"
SUBAGENT_RESULT_BRIEF_KEY = "subagent_result_brief"
SUBAGENT_RESULT_SHA256_KEY = "subagent_result_sha256"
SUBAGENT_MODEL_NAME_KEY = "subagent_model_name"
SUBAGENT_TOKEN_USAGE_KEY = "subagent_token_usage"
SUBAGENT_TOOL_RECEIPTS_KEY = "subagent_tool_receipts"
SUBAGENT_RECEIPT_VERDICT_KEY = "subagent_receipt_verdict"
SUBAGENT_ACCEPTANCE_VERDICT_KEY = "subagent_acceptance_verdict"
SUBAGENT_METADATA_TEXT_MAX_CHARS = 2000
#: The producer always emits ``hashlib.sha256(...).hexdigest()`` — 64
#: lowercase hex chars. Readers enforce the same shape so a corrupted
#: relay value cannot masquerade as a digest.
_SHA256_HEX_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}")
SubagentStatusValue = Literal[
"completed",
"failed",
"cancelled",
"timed_out",
"polling_timed_out",
]
#: Enumeration of every value ``subagent_status`` may take. Mirrors the
#: ``valid_status_values`` array in the shared fixture; the contract test
#: pins them against each other. Capped runs do NOT get their own status
#: value (#3875 Phase 2): a cap that still produced output is ``completed``
#: and a cap with no output is ``failed``, with the reason carried on the
#: additive ``subagent_stop_reason`` field so old consumers keep working.
SUBAGENT_STATUS_VALUES: tuple[SubagentStatusValue, ...] = (
"completed",
"failed",
"cancelled",
"timed_out",
"polling_timed_out",
)
#: Why a guardrail cap ended a run early. Carried on the additive
#: ``subagent_stop_reason`` field, never as a status enum value.
SubagentStopReasonValue = Literal["token_capped", "turn_capped", "loop_capped"]
SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES: tuple[SubagentStopReasonValue, ...] = (
"token_capped",
"turn_capped",
"loop_capped",
)
#: Human-readable label folded into the model-visible result text when a cap
#: fired, e.g. ``Task Succeeded (capped: token budget). Result: ...``.
_STOP_REASON_LABELS: dict[SubagentStopReasonValue, str] = {
"token_capped": "token budget",
"turn_capped": "turn budget",
"loop_capped": "repeated tool-call loop",
}
#: Statuses that carry a recoverable result in ``subagent_result_brief`` /
#: ``subagent_result_sha256``. Only ``completed`` — and a capped run that
#: produced usable partial work surfaces as ``completed`` (+ ``stop_reason``),
#: so its work survives on the wire the same way a clean success does. Other
#: non-completed statuses carry only ``subagent_error``.
_RESULT_BEARING_STATUSES: frozenset[SubagentStatusValue] = frozenset({"completed"})
#: Read-side normalization for status values that previously appeared in
#: checkpointed thread history but are no longer produced. ``max_turns_reached``
#: was emitted by Phase 1 (#3949) and lives in persisted
#: ``ToolMessage.additional_kwargs``; #3980 removed it from the producer and the
#: contract fixture, but the reader still maps it to its Phase 2 cap equivalent
#: so historical data resolves terminally (with the cap on ``stop_reason``)
#: instead of stranding as ``in_progress`` in the delegation ledger. The frontend
#: ``subtask-result.ts`` keeps a parallel deprecated alias for the same reason.
_LEGACY_STATUS_NORMALIZATION: dict[str, SubagentStopReasonValue] = {
"max_turns_reached": "turn_capped",
}
class StructuredSubagentResult(TypedDict):
status: SubagentStatusValue
stop_reason: NotRequired[SubagentStopReasonValue]
result_brief: NotRequired[str]
result_sha256: NotRequired[str]
error: NotRequired[str]
tool_receipts: NotRequired[list[dict[str, Any]]]
receipt_verdict: NotRequired[ReceiptVerdict]
acceptance_verdict: NotRequired[AcceptanceVerdict]
def _bound_metadata_text(text: str, cap: int = SUBAGENT_METADATA_TEXT_MAX_CHARS) -> str:
cleaned = text.strip()
if len(cleaned) <= cap:
return cleaned
marker = "\n...\n"
if cap <= len(marker):
return cleaned[:cap]
head = cap * 2 // 3
tail = cap - head - len(marker)
if tail <= 0:
return cleaned[:cap]
return f"{cleaned[:head]}{marker}{cleaned[-tail:]}"
def make_subagent_additional_kwargs(
status: SubagentStatusValue,
*,
result: str | None = None,
error: str | None = None,
stop_reason: SubagentStopReasonValue | None = None,
model_name: str | None = None,
token_usage: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
tool_receipts: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
receipt_verdict: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
acceptance_verdict: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Build the ``additional_kwargs`` payload the middleware stamps.
Drops the error field when blank so the JSON wire format never carries
a misleading empty ``subagent_error: ""``. ``stop_reason`` is stamped
only when a guardrail cap ended the run (see :data:`SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES`).
Raises:
ValueError: when ``status`` is not in :data:`SUBAGENT_STATUS_VALUES`,
or ``stop_reason`` is not in :data:`SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES`.
We do not accept arbitrary strings: a typo would silently leak
through to consumers as missing metadata rather than failing
loudly at the producer boundary.
"""
if status not in SUBAGENT_STATUS_VALUES:
raise ValueError(f"invalid subagent status {status!r}; expected one of {SUBAGENT_STATUS_VALUES}")
if stop_reason is not None and stop_reason not in SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES:
raise ValueError(f"invalid subagent stop_reason {stop_reason!r}; expected one of {SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES}")
payload: dict[str, object] = {SUBAGENT_STATUS_KEY: status}
if status in _RESULT_BEARING_STATUSES and isinstance(result, str) and result.strip():
payload[SUBAGENT_RESULT_BRIEF_KEY] = _bound_metadata_text(result)
payload[SUBAGENT_RESULT_SHA256_KEY] = hashlib.sha256(result.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
# Only ``completed`` (a clean success, or a capped run whose partial work
# survived) suppresses the error blob; every other status carries it.
if status != "completed" and isinstance(error, str) and error.strip():
payload[SUBAGENT_ERROR_KEY] = _bound_metadata_text(error)
if stop_reason is not None:
payload[SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_KEY] = stop_reason
if isinstance(model_name, str) and model_name.strip():
payload[SUBAGENT_MODEL_NAME_KEY] = model_name.strip()
normalized_usage = normalize_token_usage(token_usage)
if normalized_usage is not None:
payload[SUBAGENT_TOKEN_USAGE_KEY] = normalized_usage
if isinstance(tool_receipts, list):
cleaned_receipts = [dict(receipt) for receipt in tool_receipts if is_valid_receipt(receipt)]
if cleaned_receipts:
payload[SUBAGENT_TOOL_RECEIPTS_KEY] = cleaned_receipts
validated_verdict = validate_receipt_verdict(receipt_verdict)
if validated_verdict is not None:
payload[SUBAGENT_RECEIPT_VERDICT_KEY] = validated_verdict
validated_acceptance = validate_acceptance_verdict(acceptance_verdict)
if validated_acceptance is not None:
payload[SUBAGENT_ACCEPTANCE_VERDICT_KEY] = validated_acceptance
return payload
def normalize_token_usage(value: Any) -> dict[str, int] | None:
"""Validate a cumulative token-usage mapping into the contract shape.
The single shared validator for both metadata surfaces — the terminal
``ToolMessage`` metadata (here) and the persisted ``subagent.step`` /
``subagent.end`` run events (``step_events.py``). Keeping one function
prevents the two from drifting (e.g. one later accepting an extra token
field the other rejects, silently dropping usage on one path). Requires
non-negative ``int`` values for all three keys — ``bool`` is rejected — and
returns ``None`` for any non-mapping or malformed input.
"""
if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
return None
normalized: dict[str, int] = {}
for key in ("input_tokens", "output_tokens", "total_tokens"):
amount = value.get(key)
if isinstance(amount, bool) or not isinstance(amount, int) or amount < 0:
return None
normalized[key] = amount
return normalized
def format_subagent_result_message(
status: SubagentStatusValue,
*,
result: str | None = None,
error: str | None = None,
stop_reason: SubagentStopReasonValue | None = None,
) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
"""Return model-visible task content plus normalized metadata error.
When ``stop_reason`` is set, a short ``(capped: ...)`` note is folded into
the text so the lead agent sees — without parsing metadata — that the run
was ended by a guardrail cap. A capped run that produced usable work is
``status=completed`` (+ the partial result); a capped run with no usable
output is ``status=failed``.
"""
result_text = "" if result is None else str(result)
error_text = str(error).strip() if isinstance(error, str) else ""
capped = _STOP_REASON_LABELS.get(stop_reason) if stop_reason is not None else None
if status == "completed":
if capped:
return f"Task Succeeded (capped: {capped}). Result: {result_text}", None
return f"Task Succeeded. Result: {result_text}", None
if status == "cancelled":
detail = error_text or "Task cancelled by user."
if detail == "Task cancelled by user.":
return detail, detail
return f"Task cancelled by user. Error: {detail}", detail
if status == "timed_out":
detail = error_text or "Task timed out."
if detail == "Task timed out.":
return detail, detail
return f"Task timed out. Error: {detail}", detail
if status == "polling_timed_out":
detail = error_text or "Task polling timed out."
return detail, detail
# ``failed`` — including a turn-capped run that produced no usable output
# (``stop_reason=turn_capped``): the cap note is folded in so the lead can
# tell a broken subagent from one that simply ran out of turn budget.
detail = error_text or "Task failed."
if capped:
if detail == "Task failed.":
return f"Task failed (capped: {capped}).", detail
return f"Task failed (capped: {capped}). Error: {detail}", detail
if detail == "Task failed.":
return detail, detail
return f"Task failed. Error: {detail}", detail
def read_subagent_result_metadata(
additional_kwargs: Mapping[str, object] | None,
) -> StructuredSubagentResult | None:
if not additional_kwargs:
return None
raw_status = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_STATUS_KEY)
# Legacy checkpointed values (#3949) are no longer produced (#3980) but
# survive in persisted history. Normalize them before the validity check so
# they resolve terminally instead of returning ``None`` (which would strand
# the delegation entry as ``in_progress``). A legacy ``max_turns_reached``
# carried a recovered partial, so a payload that still has ``result_brief``
# maps to the Phase 2 ``completed + turn_capped`` shape (partial survives on
# the wire); one with no result maps to ``failed + turn_capped``.
legacy_stop_reason = _LEGACY_STATUS_NORMALIZATION.get(raw_status) if isinstance(raw_status, str) else None
if legacy_stop_reason is not None:
raw_result_brief = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_RESULT_BRIEF_KEY)
status = "completed" if (isinstance(raw_result_brief, str) and raw_result_brief.strip()) else "failed"
elif raw_status in SUBAGENT_STATUS_VALUES:
status = raw_status
else:
return None
payload: StructuredSubagentResult = {"status": status}
raw_result = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_RESULT_BRIEF_KEY)
raw_hash = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_RESULT_SHA256_KEY)
raw_error = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_ERROR_KEY)
if status in _RESULT_BEARING_STATUSES and isinstance(raw_result, str) and raw_result.strip():
payload["result_brief"] = _bound_metadata_text(raw_result)
if isinstance(raw_hash, str) and _SHA256_HEX_RE.fullmatch(raw_hash):
payload["result_sha256"] = raw_hash
if status != "completed" and isinstance(raw_error, str) and raw_error.strip():
payload["error"] = _bound_metadata_text(raw_error)
# An explicit stop_reason on the wire wins; else the synthesized legacy reason.
raw_stop_reason = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_KEY)
if isinstance(raw_stop_reason, str) and raw_stop_reason in SUBAGENT_STOP_REASON_VALUES:
payload["stop_reason"] = raw_stop_reason
elif legacy_stop_reason is not None:
payload["stop_reason"] = legacy_stop_reason
raw_receipts = additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_TOOL_RECEIPTS_KEY)
if isinstance(raw_receipts, list):
cleaned_receipts = [dict(receipt) for receipt in raw_receipts if is_valid_receipt(receipt)]
if cleaned_receipts:
payload["tool_receipts"] = cleaned_receipts
validated_verdict = validate_receipt_verdict(additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_RECEIPT_VERDICT_KEY))
if validated_verdict is not None:
payload["receipt_verdict"] = validated_verdict
validated_acceptance = validate_acceptance_verdict(additional_kwargs.get(SUBAGENT_ACCEPTANCE_VERDICT_KEY))
if validated_acceptance is not None:
payload["acceptance_verdict"] = validated_acceptance
return payload