mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
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13f0a7f263
* feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did
DeerFlow's extension system can contribute middleware, services and routes,
but an extension cannot answer basic questions about a run without reaching
into host internals. Several of the facts it would need are destroyed by the
operations that produce them:
* The middleware chain injects and rewrites a lot of context — date
reminders, recalled memory, compaction summaries, durable-context data,
image payloads, activated skill bodies. Downstream, none of it is
attributable: at the model-call boundary an injected HumanMessage is
indistinguishable from the user's own, and anything wanting to tell them
apart has to pattern-match prompt wording, which breaks on the next copy
edit.
* Two runs of "the same agent" are only comparable if the chain enforced the
same limits, prompts and thresholds. Recovering that from outside means
reading private attributes and guessing which of them change behaviour — a
guess that rots silently as middlewares gain fields.
* The lead-agent factory resolves a model after runtime overrides, renders a
prompt, filters tools through authorization and composes a stack, all
inside one synchronous call, and none of it survives: a middleware sees its
neighbours but not the prompt, the run worker sees a graph but not what
went into it.
* Summarization is destructive by design. N messages leave the context and
one summary enters it; afterwards only the summary exists, so "which
messages became this?" is not reconstructible.
This adds seven neutral facilities so those facts are recorded where they are
still true, and releases the contract package as 0.2.0.
Message provenance
Producers stamp `deerflow_content_kind` / `deerflow_producer_kind` onto the
messages they inject or rewrite. Stamping is unconditional — a fact whose
presence depends on whether an observer is installed is not a fact — and the
keys are server-owned, so provenance cannot be forged from a request.
Middleware self-description
Twelve middlewares declare their own behaviour-affecting parameters through
a duck-typed `release_policy_parameters()`. Long text is hashed rather than
embedded: a declaration is an identity, not a copy of the prompt.
Agent assembly descriptor
`assemble_lead_agent()` returns the graph plus a descriptor whose fingerprint
answers "did anything about this agent change between these two runs?".
`make_lead_agent()` keeps its graph-only signature — it is the LangGraph
Server ABI declared in langgraph.json. Tools and skills are sorted before
hashing because their assembly order is incidental; middlewares are not,
because stack order decides what wraps what. Host build identity is reported
but excluded from the fingerprint, so a redeploy does not invalidate every
agent's identity.
Context compaction observation
Summarization emits the content hashes of the messages it is about to remove
joined to the summary that replaced them. Content is the only identity
available at that seam: the summary does not become a message, and what later
projects it into a request renders it bounded and escaped rather than
verbatim.
Neutral policy, transform and MCP-source facts
Guardrail decisions are published to runtime context under a `__`-prefixed
key; result-rewriting middlewares append a declared, ordered transform trail;
MCP tools carry their credential-free logical origin.
Extension route identity
Contributed routes are session-authenticated and cannot opt out, but
"logged in" and "administrator" are different questions. Extensions get a
neutral projection of the caller rather than the host's auth context, and
`require_admin` fails closed when identity cannot be determined.
Extension-owned tables
An extension that persists data owns its own MetaData and migration chain, so
its tables are absent from Base.metadata and `alembic revision --autogenerate`
proposes dropping them. Extensions declare a table prefix, which is rejected
at registration if it would shadow a host table.
The contract package stays dependency-free and imports no host code; every new
Protocol method has a default so later additions remain additive. The loader's
pre-1.0 rule requires an exact major.minor match, so extensions written against
0.1 are now refused at startup with an actionable install hint rather than
loading into a host that implements a different surface.
uv.lock records the contract package's new version, so `uv sync --locked` still
resolves on a fresh checkout.
* fix(backend): sort gateway service imports
812 lines
31 KiB
Python
812 lines
31 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the guardrail middleware and built-in providers."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock
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import pytest
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from langgraph.errors import GraphBubbleUp
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from deerflow.authz.outcome import pop_authorization_outcome
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from deerflow.guardrails.builtin import AllowlistProvider
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from deerflow.guardrails.middleware import GuardrailMiddleware
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from deerflow.guardrails.provider import GuardrailDecision, GuardrailReason, GuardrailRequest
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# --- Helpers ---
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class _FakeRuntime:
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def __init__(self, context: dict | None = None):
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self.context = context or {}
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class _FakeJournal:
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def __init__(self, *, fail: bool = False):
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self.fail = fail
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self.calls: list[dict] = []
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def record_middleware(self, **kwargs):
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if self.fail:
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raise RuntimeError("journal unavailable")
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self.calls.append(kwargs)
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def _make_tool_call_request(
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name: str = "bash",
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args: dict | None = None,
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call_id: str = "call_1",
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*,
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context: dict | None = None,
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):
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"""Create a mock ToolCallRequest."""
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req = MagicMock()
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req.tool_call = {"name": name, "args": args or {}, "id": call_id}
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req.runtime = _FakeRuntime(context)
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return req
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class _AllowAllProvider:
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name = "allow-all"
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def evaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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return GuardrailDecision(allow=True, reasons=[GuardrailReason(code="oap.allowed")])
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async def aevaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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return self.evaluate(request)
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class _DenyAllProvider:
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name = "deny-all"
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def evaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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return GuardrailDecision(
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allow=False,
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reasons=[GuardrailReason(code="oap.denied", message="all tools blocked")],
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policy_id="test.deny.v1",
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)
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async def aevaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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return self.evaluate(request)
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class _ExplodingProvider:
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name = "exploding"
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def evaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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raise RuntimeError("provider crashed")
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async def aevaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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raise RuntimeError("provider crashed")
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# --- AllowlistProvider tests ---
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class TestAllowlistProvider:
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def test_release_policy_contract_has_stable_identity_and_effective_rules(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(
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allowed_tools=["web_search", "read_file"],
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denied_tools=["bash"],
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)
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middleware = GuardrailMiddleware(provider, fail_closed=True, passport="ops-policy")
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policy = middleware.release_policy_parameters()
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assert policy == {
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"fail_closed": True,
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"passport": "ops-policy",
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"policy": {
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"id": "deerflow.guardrails.allowlist",
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"version": "1.0.0",
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},
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"provider_parameters": {
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"allowed_tools": ["read_file", "web_search"],
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"denied_tools": ["bash"],
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},
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}
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def test_no_restrictions_allows_all(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider()
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="bash", tool_input={})
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decision = provider.evaluate(req)
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assert decision.allow is True
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def test_denied_tools(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(denied_tools=["bash", "write_file"])
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="bash", tool_input={})
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decision = provider.evaluate(req)
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assert decision.allow is False
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assert decision.reasons[0].code == "oap.tool_not_allowed"
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def test_denied_tools_allows_unlisted(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(denied_tools=["bash"])
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="web_search", tool_input={})
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decision = provider.evaluate(req)
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assert decision.allow is True
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def test_allowed_tools_blocks_unlisted(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(allowed_tools=["web_search", "read_file"])
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="bash", tool_input={})
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decision = provider.evaluate(req)
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assert decision.allow is False
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def test_allowed_tools_allows_listed(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(allowed_tools=["web_search"])
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="web_search", tool_input={})
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decision = provider.evaluate(req)
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assert decision.allow is True
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def test_empty_allowlist_blocks_all(self):
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"""An explicitly empty allowlist means "permit no tools" and must fail closed.
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Regression test: a truthiness check would collapse ``[]`` into the
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``None`` sentinel ("no allowlist -> allow all"), silently letting every
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tool through when the operator intended to permit none.
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"""
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provider = AllowlistProvider(allowed_tools=[])
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for tool in ("bash", "web_search", "read_file"):
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decision = provider.evaluate(GuardrailRequest(tool_name=tool, tool_input={}))
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assert decision.allow is False, f"empty allowlist should block {tool!r}"
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assert decision.reasons[0].code == "oap.tool_not_allowed"
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def test_both_allowed_and_denied(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(allowed_tools=["bash", "web_search"], denied_tools=["bash"])
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# bash is in both: allowlist passes, denylist blocks
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="bash", tool_input={})
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decision = provider.evaluate(req)
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assert decision.allow is False
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def test_async_delegates_to_sync(self):
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provider = AllowlistProvider(denied_tools=["bash"])
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req = GuardrailRequest(tool_name="bash", tool_input={})
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decision = asyncio.run(provider.aevaluate(req))
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assert decision.allow is False
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# --- GuardrailMiddleware tests ---
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class TestGuardrailMiddleware:
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def test_allowed_tool_passes_through(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("web_search")
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expected = MagicMock()
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handler = MagicMock(return_value=expected)
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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handler.assert_called_once_with(req)
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assert result is expected
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def test_denied_tool_returns_error_message(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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handler = MagicMock()
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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handler.assert_not_called()
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assert result.status == "error"
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assert "oap.denied" in result.content
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assert result.name == "bash"
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def test_fail_closed_on_provider_error(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=True)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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handler = MagicMock()
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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handler.assert_not_called()
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assert result.status == "error"
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assert "oap.evaluator_error" in result.content
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def test_fail_open_on_provider_error(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=False)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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expected = MagicMock()
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handler = MagicMock(return_value=expected)
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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handler.assert_called_once_with(req)
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assert result is expected
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def test_passport_passed_as_agent_id(self):
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captured = {}
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class CapturingProvider:
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name = "capture"
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def evaluate(self, request):
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captured["agent_id"] = request.agent_id
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return GuardrailDecision(allow=True)
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async def aevaluate(self, request):
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return self.evaluate(request)
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(CapturingProvider(), passport="./guardrails/passport.json")
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
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assert captured["agent_id"] == "./guardrails/passport.json"
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def test_decision_contains_oap_reason_codes(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
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assert "oap.denied" in result.content
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assert "all tools blocked" in result.content
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def test_deny_with_empty_reasons_uses_fallback(self):
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"""Provider returns deny with empty reasons list -- middleware uses fallback text."""
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class EmptyReasonProvider:
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name = "empty-reason"
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def evaluate(self, request):
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return GuardrailDecision(allow=False, reasons=[])
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async def aevaluate(self, request):
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return self.evaluate(request)
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(EmptyReasonProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
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assert result.status == "error"
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assert "blocked by guardrail policy" in result.content
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def test_empty_tool_name(self):
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"""Tool call with empty name is handled gracefully."""
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("")
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expected = MagicMock()
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handler = MagicMock(return_value=expected)
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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assert result is expected
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def test_protocol_isinstance_check(self):
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"""AllowlistProvider satisfies GuardrailProvider protocol at runtime."""
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from deerflow.guardrails.provider import GuardrailProvider
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assert isinstance(AllowlistProvider(), GuardrailProvider)
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def test_async_allowed(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("web_search")
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expected = MagicMock()
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async def handler(r):
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return expected
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async def run():
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return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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result = asyncio.run(run())
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assert result is expected
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def test_async_denied(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider())
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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async def handler(r):
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return MagicMock()
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async def run():
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return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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result = asyncio.run(run())
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assert result.status == "error"
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def test_async_fail_closed(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=True)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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async def handler(r):
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return MagicMock()
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async def run():
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return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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result = asyncio.run(run())
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assert result.status == "error"
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def test_async_fail_open(self):
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=False)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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expected = MagicMock()
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async def handler(r):
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return expected
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async def run():
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return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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result = asyncio.run(run())
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assert result is expected
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def test_graph_bubble_up_not_swallowed(self):
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"""GraphBubbleUp (LangGraph interrupt/pause) must propagate, not be caught."""
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class BubbleProvider:
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name = "bubble"
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def evaluate(self, request):
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raise GraphBubbleUp()
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async def aevaluate(self, request):
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raise GraphBubbleUp()
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(BubbleProvider(), fail_closed=True)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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with pytest.raises(GraphBubbleUp):
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mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
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def test_async_graph_bubble_up_not_swallowed(self):
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"""Async: GraphBubbleUp must propagate."""
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class BubbleProvider:
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name = "bubble"
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def evaluate(self, request):
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raise GraphBubbleUp()
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async def aevaluate(self, request):
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raise GraphBubbleUp()
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(BubbleProvider(), fail_closed=True)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash")
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async def handler(r):
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return MagicMock()
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async def run():
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return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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with pytest.raises(GraphBubbleUp):
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asyncio.run(run())
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# Journal: a denied tool call records the complete guardrail audit event.
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def test_denied_tool_records_guardrail_event(self):
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journal = _FakeJournal()
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider(), passport="agent_id")
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req = _make_tool_call_request(
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"bash",
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args={"command": "cat secret.txt"},
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call_id="tool_call_1",
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context={
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"__run_journal": journal,
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"user_role": "user",
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},
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)
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
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assert result.status == "error"
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assert len(journal.calls) == 1
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event = journal.calls[0]
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assert event["tag"] == "guardrail"
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assert event["name"] == "GuardrailMiddleware"
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assert event["hook"] == "wrap_tool_call"
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assert event["action"] == "deny_tool_call"
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changes = event["changes"]
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assert changes["tool_name"] == "bash"
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assert changes["tool_call_id"] == "tool_call_1"
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assert changes["agent_id"] == "agent_id"
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assert changes["is_subagent"] is False
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assert changes["user_role"] == "user"
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assert changes["allow"] is False
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assert changes["policy_id"] == "test.deny.v1"
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assert changes["reason_codes"] == ["oap.denied"]
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assert changes["reason_messages"] == ["all tools blocked"]
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assert changes["fail_closed"] is True
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assert changes["provider_error"] is False
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assert "tool_input" not in changes
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assert "args" not in changes
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assert "command" not in changes
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assert "user_id" not in changes
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assert "oauth_provider" not in changes
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assert "oauth_id" not in changes
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# Journal: a fail-closed provider error is recorded as a denied tool call.
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def test_fail_closed_provider_error_records_guardrail_event(self):
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journal = _FakeJournal()
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=True)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash", context={"__run_journal": journal})
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handler = MagicMock()
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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handler.assert_not_called()
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assert result.status == "error"
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assert len(journal.calls) == 1
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event = journal.calls[0]
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assert event["action"] == "deny_tool_call"
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changes = event["changes"]
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assert changes["allow"] is False
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assert changes["reason_codes"] == ["oap.evaluator_error"]
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assert changes["provider_error"] is True
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assert changes["fail_closed"] is True
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# Journal: a fail-open provider error is recorded without blocking the tool.
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def test_fail_open_provider_error_records_guardrail_event_and_allows_handler(self):
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journal = _FakeJournal()
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mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=False)
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req = _make_tool_call_request("bash", context={"__run_journal": journal})
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expected = MagicMock()
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handler = MagicMock(return_value=expected)
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result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
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handler.assert_called_once_with(req)
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assert result is expected
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assert len(journal.calls) == 1
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event = journal.calls[0]
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assert event["action"] == "allow_tool_call_after_provider_error"
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changes = event["changes"]
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assert changes["allow"] is True
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assert changes["reason_codes"] == ["oap.evaluator_error"]
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assert changes["provider_error"] is True
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assert changes["fail_closed"] is False
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# Journal: ordinary allowed decisions do not create guardrail audit events.
|
|
def test_allowed_tool_does_not_record_guardrail_event(self):
|
|
journal = _FakeJournal()
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request("web_search", context={"__run_journal": journal})
|
|
expected = MagicMock()
|
|
handler = MagicMock(return_value=expected)
|
|
|
|
result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
|
|
|
|
assert result is expected
|
|
assert journal.calls == []
|
|
|
|
# Journal: a recording failure must not alter the guardrail denial outcome.
|
|
def test_guardrail_event_recording_failure_warns_without_changing_denial(self, caplog):
|
|
journal = _FakeJournal(fail=True)
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider())
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request("bash", context={"__run_journal": journal})
|
|
handler = MagicMock()
|
|
|
|
with caplog.at_level("WARNING"):
|
|
result = mw.wrap_tool_call(req, handler)
|
|
|
|
handler.assert_not_called()
|
|
assert result.status == "error"
|
|
assert "oap.denied" in result.content
|
|
assert "Failed to record middleware:guardrail event" in caplog.text
|
|
|
|
# Journal: the async denial path records the same guardrail audit event.
|
|
def test_async_denied_tool_records_guardrail_event(self):
|
|
journal = _FakeJournal()
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider(), passport="agent_id")
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(
|
|
"bash",
|
|
call_id="async_call_1",
|
|
context={"__run_journal": journal},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def handler(r):
|
|
return MagicMock()
|
|
|
|
async def run():
|
|
return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
|
|
|
|
result = asyncio.run(run())
|
|
|
|
assert result.status == "error"
|
|
assert len(journal.calls) == 1
|
|
event = journal.calls[0]
|
|
assert event["tag"] == "guardrail"
|
|
assert event["hook"] == "wrap_tool_call"
|
|
assert event["action"] == "deny_tool_call"
|
|
changes = event["changes"]
|
|
assert changes["tool_name"] == "bash"
|
|
assert changes["tool_call_id"] == "async_call_1"
|
|
assert changes["agent_id"] == "agent_id"
|
|
assert changes["is_subagent"] is False
|
|
assert changes["allow"] is False
|
|
assert changes["provider_error"] is False
|
|
|
|
# Journal: the async fail-open path records the error and still runs the tool.
|
|
def test_async_fail_open_provider_error_records_guardrail_event_and_allows_handler(self):
|
|
journal = _FakeJournal()
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=False)
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request("bash", context={"__run_journal": journal})
|
|
expected = MagicMock()
|
|
|
|
async def handler(r):
|
|
return expected
|
|
|
|
async def run():
|
|
return await mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler)
|
|
|
|
result = asyncio.run(run())
|
|
|
|
assert result is expected
|
|
assert len(journal.calls) == 1
|
|
event = journal.calls[0]
|
|
assert event["action"] == "allow_tool_call_after_provider_error"
|
|
changes = event["changes"]
|
|
assert changes["allow"] is True
|
|
assert changes["provider_error"] is True
|
|
assert changes["fail_closed"] is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGuardrailRequestAttribution:
|
|
"""Tests for GuardrailRequest runtime attribution fields."""
|
|
|
|
def _make_runtime_mock(self, context: dict | None = None):
|
|
runtime = MagicMock()
|
|
runtime.context = context
|
|
return runtime
|
|
|
|
def _make_request(self, runtime=None, tool_call: dict | None = None):
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.runtime = runtime
|
|
req.tool_call = tool_call or {"name": "bash", "args": {}}
|
|
req.tool = None
|
|
req.state = {}
|
|
return req
|
|
|
|
def _capture_guardrail_request(self, req):
|
|
captured = {}
|
|
|
|
class CaptureProvider:
|
|
name = "capture"
|
|
|
|
def evaluate(self, request):
|
|
captured["request"] = request
|
|
return GuardrailDecision(allow=True)
|
|
|
|
async def aevaluate(self, request):
|
|
return self.evaluate(request)
|
|
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(CaptureProvider())
|
|
mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
|
|
return captured["request"]
|
|
|
|
def test_no_attribution_fields_are_none(self):
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=None, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_role is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_provider is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.channel_user_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.is_internal is False
|
|
assert guardrail_request.authz_attributes == {}
|
|
|
|
def test_only_user_id_present(self):
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(context={"user_id": "user_abc"})
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id == "user_abc"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_role is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_provider is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id is None
|
|
|
|
def test_authenticated_user_context_present(self):
|
|
attributes = {"department": "engineering"}
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(
|
|
context={
|
|
"user_id": "user_abc",
|
|
"user_role": "admin",
|
|
"oauth_provider": "github",
|
|
"oauth_id": "gh_123",
|
|
"channel_user_id": "channel_123",
|
|
"is_internal": True,
|
|
"authz_attributes": attributes,
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id == "user_abc"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_role == "admin"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_provider == "github"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_id == "gh_123"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.channel_user_id == "channel_123"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.is_internal is True
|
|
assert guardrail_request.authz_attributes == {"department": "engineering"}
|
|
|
|
attributes["department"] = "changed"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.authz_attributes == {"department": "engineering"}
|
|
|
|
def test_non_mapping_authz_attributes_raise_type_error(self):
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(context={"authz_attributes": ["not", "a", "mapping"]})
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}})
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(TypeError, match="authz_attributes must be a Mapping"):
|
|
self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
def test_only_run_id_present(self):
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(context={"run_id": "run_xyz"})
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id == "run_xyz"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id is None
|
|
|
|
def test_only_tool_call_id_present(self):
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=None, tool_call={"name": "web_search", "args": {"query": "test"}, "id": "call_42"})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id == "call_42"
|
|
|
|
def test_all_attribution_fields_present(self):
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(
|
|
context={
|
|
"user_id": "user_abc",
|
|
"user_role": "user",
|
|
"oauth_provider": "google",
|
|
"oauth_id": "google_123",
|
|
"run_id": "run_xyz",
|
|
"is_subagent": True,
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}, "id": "call_all"})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id == "user_abc"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_role == "user"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_provider == "google"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.oauth_id == "google_123"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id == "run_xyz"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id == "call_all"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.is_subagent is True
|
|
|
|
def test_partial_attribution_fields_present(self):
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(context={"user_id": "user_partial"})
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}, "id": "call_partial"})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id == "user_partial"
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id == "call_partial"
|
|
|
|
def test_empty_context_with_tool_call(self):
|
|
runtime = self._make_runtime_mock(context={})
|
|
req = self._make_request(runtime=runtime, tool_call={"name": "bash", "args": {}, "id": "call_empty_context"})
|
|
|
|
guardrail_request = self._capture_guardrail_request(req)
|
|
|
|
assert guardrail_request.user_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.run_id is None
|
|
assert guardrail_request.tool_call_id == "call_empty_context"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- Config tests ---
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGuardrailsConfig:
|
|
def test_config_defaults(self):
|
|
from deerflow.config.guardrails_config import GuardrailsConfig
|
|
|
|
config = GuardrailsConfig()
|
|
assert config.enabled is False
|
|
assert config.fail_closed is True
|
|
assert config.passport is None
|
|
assert config.provider is None
|
|
|
|
def test_config_from_dict(self):
|
|
from deerflow.config.guardrails_config import GuardrailsConfig
|
|
|
|
config = GuardrailsConfig.model_validate(
|
|
{
|
|
"enabled": True,
|
|
"fail_closed": False,
|
|
"passport": "./guardrails/passport.json",
|
|
"provider": {
|
|
"use": "deerflow.guardrails.builtin:AllowlistProvider",
|
|
"config": {"denied_tools": ["bash"]},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
assert config.enabled is True
|
|
assert config.fail_closed is False
|
|
assert config.passport == "./guardrails/passport.json"
|
|
assert config.provider.use == "deerflow.guardrails.builtin:AllowlistProvider"
|
|
assert config.provider.config == {"denied_tools": ["bash"]}
|
|
|
|
def test_singleton_load_and_get(self):
|
|
from deerflow.config.guardrails_config import get_guardrails_config, load_guardrails_config_from_dict, reset_guardrails_config
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
load_guardrails_config_from_dict({"enabled": True, "provider": {"use": "test:Foo"}})
|
|
config = get_guardrails_config()
|
|
assert config.enabled is True
|
|
finally:
|
|
reset_guardrails_config()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGuardrailWritesAuthorizationOutcome:
|
|
def test_allow_writes_allowed_outcome_with_policy_identity(self):
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(call_id="c1")
|
|
mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
|
|
outcome = pop_authorization_outcome(req.runtime.context, "c1")
|
|
assert outcome is not None
|
|
assert outcome.decision == "allowed"
|
|
assert outcome.reason_codes == ("oap.allowed",)
|
|
assert outcome.policy_id # non-empty resolved identity
|
|
|
|
def test_deny_writes_denied_outcome_with_real_policy_id(self):
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_DenyAllProvider())
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(call_id="c2")
|
|
mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
|
|
outcome = pop_authorization_outcome(req.runtime.context, "c2")
|
|
assert outcome is not None
|
|
assert outcome.decision == "denied"
|
|
assert outcome.policy_id == "test.deny.v1"
|
|
assert "oap.denied" in outcome.reason_codes
|
|
|
|
def test_fail_closed_provider_error_writes_denied_outcome(self):
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_ExplodingProvider(), fail_closed=True)
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(call_id="c3")
|
|
mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
|
|
outcome = pop_authorization_outcome(req.runtime.context, "c3")
|
|
assert outcome is not None and outcome.decision == "denied"
|
|
assert "oap.evaluator_error" in outcome.reason_codes
|
|
|
|
def test_async_allow_writes_allowed_outcome(self):
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(call_id="c4")
|
|
|
|
async def handler(_req):
|
|
return MagicMock()
|
|
|
|
asyncio.run(mw.awrap_tool_call(req, handler))
|
|
outcome = pop_authorization_outcome(req.runtime.context, "c4")
|
|
assert outcome is not None and outcome.decision == "allowed"
|
|
|
|
def test_recording_the_outcome_does_not_recompute_the_providers_full_declaration(self):
|
|
"""Per-tool-call bookkeeping must not pay for provider_parameters.
|
|
|
|
``release_policy_parameters()`` (the middleware's own public method) is
|
|
the expensive path: for AllowlistProvider it sorts the allow/deny sets.
|
|
Building an AuthorizationOutcome only needs policy id/version, so it
|
|
must resolve those directly rather than going through the provider's
|
|
full declaration and discarding everything else.
|
|
"""
|
|
calls = 0
|
|
|
|
class _CountingProvider(AllowlistProvider):
|
|
def release_policy_parameters(self) -> dict[str, object]:
|
|
nonlocal calls
|
|
calls += 1
|
|
return super().release_policy_parameters()
|
|
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_CountingProvider(allowed_tools=["bash"]))
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(call_id="c5", name="bash")
|
|
mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
|
|
assert calls == 0
|
|
|
|
assert mw.release_policy_parameters()["provider_parameters"] == {"allowed_tools": ["bash"], "denied_tools": []}
|
|
assert calls == 1
|
|
|
|
def test_the_outcome_store_is_bounded_so_an_unpopped_run_cannot_grow_forever(self):
|
|
"""No production caller pops outcomes today, so the store must self-limit."""
|
|
from deerflow.authz.outcome import _MAX_TRACKED_OUTCOMES
|
|
|
|
mw = GuardrailMiddleware(_AllowAllProvider())
|
|
# Seeded non-empty: _FakeRuntime's ``context or {}`` fallback would
|
|
# otherwise hand each call an unrelated fresh dict instead of this one.
|
|
context: dict = {"seed": True}
|
|
for i in range(_MAX_TRACKED_OUTCOMES + 10):
|
|
req = _make_tool_call_request(call_id=f"call-{i}", context=context)
|
|
mw.wrap_tool_call(req, MagicMock())
|
|
|
|
store = context["__authorization_outcome"]
|
|
assert len(store) == _MAX_TRACKED_OUTCOMES
|
|
assert "call-0" not in store
|
|
assert f"call-{_MAX_TRACKED_OUTCOMES + 9}" in store
|