Nan Gao c542185a7f
feat(extensions): add gateway contribution points and packaged extension management (#4780)
* feat(extensions): add gateway services and routers

* feat(extensions): add standalone reference extension

* fix(extensions): harden contributed gateway routes

* docs(extensions): document gateway contribution points

* feat(extensions): add operator CLI for packaged extension management

Add `deerflow extensions install/list/enable/disable/remove` plus the root
`make extension-*` wrappers, backed by an `ExtensionManager` that owns one
transaction over backend/pyproject.toml, backend/uv.lock, the managed source
snapshot, the uv environment, and the `plugins:` block in config.yaml.

Install accepts a package requirement, a public HTTPS Git URL, or a local
directory. Local directories are copied to backend/extensions/sources/ as
deployable snapshots rather than editable installs, and the root .dockerignore
re-includes that tree so snapshots reach the backend builder. Remote sources are
HTTPS-only; SSH Git, file:// and local wheels are rejected because the stock
Docker builder cannot reproduce them.

Because environment configuration can still resolve a plain package name to a
local wheel (a UV_FIND_LINKS wheelhouse, say), every uv add/remove is followed
by an audit of the new lock: any local reference the stock image build cannot
reproduce rolls back the whole transaction. A config carrying duplicate
top-level `plugins:` keys is rejected outright rather than managed against one
block while the Gateway reads another.

Dependency synchronization now has one lock authority. The `extensions`
dependency group joins [tool.uv].default-groups, every startup path syncs the
same lock with --locked and launches with --no-sync, and the Docker images move
to uv 0.11.1 for the --no-workspace boundary the manager needs.

Loader gains `enabled`, `name` and `package` fields so a disabled extension is
skipped before resolution and import.

Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>

* fix(extensions): stop the managed plugins rewrite from destroying config

Two data-safety defects in the managed `plugins:` block writer.

The "next top-level key" boundary was a regex matching only
`[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*` or a quoted key. `AppConfig` is `extra="allow"`, so a
config may legally carry any top-level key, and a key the pattern cannot
recognize did not fail loudly — it read as "no next section", and the rewrite
replaced that neighbour and its entire subtree with the managed block. `my.key`,
`2fa`, `$schema`, `my key` and non-ASCII keys were all silently deleted by a
plain `extension-enable`/`disable`. Both boundaries now come from the YAML
parser's node marks, so key shape is irrelevant.

The file-final branch never consulted the trailing-comment scan the has-next-key
branch used, so any comment below the block was dropped. Since the manager
appends `plugins:` at end of file, that is the steady-state shape for most
installs: an operator note below the block was destroyed on the next toggle.

Separately, every managed install wrote `required: true` while the loader
defaults to false. That turned any later load failure — broken wheel, missing
native library, deleted snapshot — into a Gateway startup abort recoverable only
with shell access. New records are now written `required: false`, with an
explicit `install --required` opt-in; adopting an existing hand-written record
still preserves the operator's own choice.

* fix(extensions): harden the manager transaction and correct its docs

Follow-up hardening on the extension package manager.

Security posture, which the docs already claimed:
- Scrub `UV_PYTHON`, `UV_INSECURE_HOST`, `UV_CONSTRAINT` and
  `UV_NO_BUILD_ISOLATION` from the controlled uv environment. `UV_PYTHON` swaps
  the interpreter that the entry-point probe then imports and calls, and every
  later `uv run --no-sync` startup uses; `UV_INSECURE_HOST` removes the TLS
  validation the HTTPS-only source rule depends on. Neither is an index, proxy,
  cache or credential-provider setting, so neither was covered by the carve-out.
- Recognize run-together and all-caps secret query parameters (`accesstoken`,
  `ACCESSTOKEN`, `key`, `pw`, `sas`, `code`). The camel-case splitter only fires
  on case transitions, so only the separated spellings were caught. Short
  generic words stay boundary-anchored, so `?keyword=` remains installable.
- Validate the config before running any uv command. `uv add`/`uv sync` execute
  the package's build backend, so a config the manager could never write to must
  fail before that code runs rather than afterwards through rollback.

Transaction integrity:
- Run the second dependency-file restore from a `finally`. The recovery sync
  runs without `--locked` when the checkout had no lock, so uv writes one while
  resolving; if that sync then failed, the restore was skipped and the operator
  kept a lock file they never had. A failing recovery sync now also reports the
  original failure instead of replacing it.
- Skip the recovery sync on cancellation. Answering Ctrl-C with a full
  dependency resolve invites a second interrupt that escapes the handler and
  strands the checkout mid-transaction; the declarations are already restored
  and the next locked startup sync reconciles the environment.
- Retry a non-blocking lock on Windows instead of using `msvcrt.LK_LOCK`, which
  gives up after ~10s — far shorter than a real `uv add` plus `uv sync`, so
  contention surfaced as `Permission denied` rather than serializing.
- Locate the entry-point probe's JSON payload instead of parsing stdout's first
  line, so a `sitecustomize`/`.pth` banner cannot roll back a good install.
- Warn when the lock records a loopback source. `127.0.0.1` inside the image
  builder is a different machine, but unlike an environment-driven wheelhouse
  resolution this is a source the operator typed deliberately, so it is reported
  rather than rolled back. Private-network indexes are untouched: a builder on
  that network can reach them.

Docs: the blanket claim that failed operations restore the config file was
wrong — the conflict branches deliberately preserve a concurrent external edit
and leave `remove` deactivated. Document that, the `required: false` default,
the config preflight, the interrupt behaviour, and where the plugins-block
boundaries come from.

* test(gateway): pin the request-path projection agreement

`get_request_route_path()` imports the private
`starlette._utils.get_route_path` so the auth and CSRF predicates classify
the exact string Starlette's router matches on. Its requirement is not
"strip root_path correctly" but "return what the dispatcher is matching",
so delegating to the router's own implementation keeps the two in lockstep
by construction. Keep the private import rather than vendoring a copy: an
import that disappears fails loudly at startup, while a stale copy diverges
silently at a security boundary.

Cover the property directly instead of the mechanism, so the tests survive
a future reimplementation:

- projection edge cases, including the segment-boundary guard that keeps
  root_path="/api" from slicing "/apifoo/models" into a string the router
  would never match
- agreement with the router under nested mounts
- the two bypasses these predicates exist to prevent: a protected route
  mounted under the "/health" public prefix must still 401, and a POST
  mounted under "/api/webhooks" must still require a CSRF token

Both are verified to fail when the projection is reverted to
`request.url.path` (9/13 red) and when a plausible vendored copy omits the
boundary guard (the 2 boundary cases red).

Declare starlette as a bounded direct dependency so a bump — which is
security-relevant here — shows up in review rather than arriving silently
through FastAPI.

* ci: pin uv to the version production ships

ExtensionManager is not a consumer of uv the build tool -- it is a program
whose whole job is driving `uv` as a subprocess, depending on its CLI
behavior (`--no-workspace`, `--no-sync`, what `uv add` writes into
`[dependency-groups] extensions`) and on the `uv.lock` serialization format.
uv is closer to a runtime dependency with a contract than to incidental
tooling.

backend/Dockerfile pins that binary to 0.11.1, but all eight
astral-sh/setup-uv steps installed whatever was latest at run time, so CI
exercised the manager against a uv that is not the uv production runs. The
sharpest failure that allows: a newer uv bumps uv.lock's `revision`, CI
stays green because the same uv reads back what it wrote, and the pinned uv
in the production image cannot read the committed lock. `uv lock --check`
is version-sensitive for the same reason -- it verifies the lock is what
*this* uv would produce, and two versions can emit equivalent but
non-identical output.

Pin every step to 0.11.1 and lift the one lingering setup-uv@v3 to v7 so
the steps share input and caching behavior.

Pinning alone drifts apart again on the next bump, so add a constraint test
in the style of test_compose_default_bind_host.py: the Dockerfile's
UV_IMAGE tag is the single source of truth, and both compose defaults plus
every setup-uv step must match it. Verified to fail when a pin drifts, when
a step omits `version`, and -- the real scenario -- when the Dockerfile is
bumped alone, which lights up the workflows and both compose files at once.

* fix(gateway): state the extension route auth limit and abort a failed dev sync

Two scoped review follow-ups.

README: contributed routers cannot enter the host's reserved public prefixes,
which makes every extension endpoint session-authenticated -- there is no way
to expose an unauthenticated route. The rejection rule was documented but its
consequence was not, so inbound provider webhooks and public status endpoints
read as merely undocumented rather than out of scope for this release.

docker/dev-entrypoint.sh: the self-heal retry reuses `--locked`, so it repairs
a corrupt .venv but never a lock that disagrees with pyproject.toml. `set -e`
already stopped the script there -- uvicorn was not being started against a
stale environment -- but it exited on a bare uv exit code with no indication of
what to do. Abort explicitly with the cause and the fix.

Tests slice the sync block out of the real script and run it against a stub uv,
so they exercise the shipped code rather than a copy of it (/app/backend only
exists inside the container). They cover the success path, the retry that
recovers, the abort, and the guidance. Verified against the pre-fix script:
only the guidance case goes red, confirming the abort itself was already
correct.

* fix(extensions): point Git SSH shorthand at the HTTPS correction

Git's SCP-like shorthand carries no URL scheme, so `git+git@host:org/repo.git`
reached the scheme rules looking like a bare path and was rejected with
"local path references are not deployable; pass a local directory so DeerFlow
can snapshot it". The operator asked for a remote source, so that guidance
points at the wrong fix. Detect the shorthand ahead of the scheme rules and
report the public-HTTPS correction instead.

The bare `git@host:org/repo.git` spelling took a different wrong turn: packaging
parses it as a direct reference named `git`, leaving `host:org/repo.git`, whose
`host` reads as a URL scheme and produced the generic HTTPS message. Both
spellings now share one message, as does the PEP 508 named form.

* docs: keep the root extension summary within its new budget

#4799 split the depth out of the module guides and added a size gate; the root
file's job is now orientation, and this branch had pushed it 192 bytes past the
soft limit. The manager transaction, source rules, and lock discipline are
already stated in full in the extensions guide, so the root keeps the one-line
orientation and points there instead of restating them.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
2026-08-13 23:55:30 +08:00

167 lines
6.1 KiB
Python

"""Registration-phase registry and its immutable runtime product.
Extensions only ever see the write-only public ``ExtensionRegistry`` contract.
The concrete host type additionally owns attribution, rollback, and immutable
runtime projection.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from collections.abc import Iterator, Sequence
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
from deerflow_extension_api import (
ExtensionData,
ExtensionService,
MiddlewareContributor,
SystemModelCallObserver,
TaskLifecycleContributor,
)
from deerflow_extension_api import ExtensionRegistry as ExtensionRegistryContract
_Entry = tuple[str, Any]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LoadedExtensions:
"""Immutable view consumed at runtime.
Every entry carries its source string so diagnostics, provenance and
ordering errors can name the extension responsible.
"""
app_store: ExtensionData
middleware_contributors: tuple[tuple[str, MiddlewareContributor], ...] = ()
task_lifecycle: tuple[tuple[str, TaskLifecycleContributor], ...] = ()
system_model_observers: tuple[tuple[str, SystemModelCallObserver], ...] = ()
services: tuple[tuple[str, ExtensionService], ...] = ()
routers: tuple[tuple[str, Any], ...] = ()
# Precomputed attributes, not methods: hook sites read one attribute to
# short-circuit, so the zero-extension path constructs nothing.
has_middleware_contributors: bool = False
has_task_lifecycle: bool = False
has_system_model_observers: bool = False
needs_task_store: bool = False
class ExtensionRegistry(ExtensionRegistryContract):
"""Mutable, registration-phase only.
Subclasses the public contract Protocol so the host implementation is
type-checked against what extensions annotate; the host-only machinery
below (attribution, discard, mark/rollback_to, build) stays out of the
contract on purpose.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._middlewares: list[_Entry] = []
self._task_lifecycle: list[_Entry] = []
self._system_model_observers: list[_Entry] = []
self._services: list[_Entry] = []
self._routers: list[_Entry] = []
self._current_source: str | None = None
@contextmanager
def attributed_to(self, source: str) -> Iterator[None]:
"""Attribute everything registered inside the block to ``source``."""
previous = self._current_source
self._current_source = source
try:
yield
finally:
self._current_source = previous
def _source(self) -> str:
if self._current_source is None:
raise RuntimeError("registration must happen inside ExtensionRegistry.attributed_to(...)")
return self._current_source
def middlewares(self, contributor: MiddlewareContributor) -> None:
self._middlewares.append((self._source(), contributor))
def task_lifecycle(self, contributor: TaskLifecycleContributor) -> None:
self._task_lifecycle.append((self._source(), contributor))
def system_model_observer(self, observer: SystemModelCallObserver) -> None:
self._system_model_observers.append((self._source(), observer))
def service(self, service: ExtensionService) -> None:
self._services.append((self._source(), service))
def routers(self, routers: Sequence[Any]) -> None:
source = self._source()
self._routers.extend((source, router) for router in routers)
def discard(self, source: str) -> None:
"""Remove every entry registered by ``source``.
Called when install() raises partway through. A half-registered
extension is more dangerous than an absent one because the data it
produces looks complete.
Note: this matches by source string, so it is unsafe when two specs
share the same ``use`` with different config — it would remove a
different, successfully-installed instance's entries too. Callers
that process one install() at a time should prefer
``mark()``/``rollback_to()`` instead.
"""
for bucket in (
self._middlewares,
self._task_lifecycle,
self._system_model_observers,
self._services,
self._routers,
):
bucket[:] = [entry for entry in bucket if entry[0] != source]
def mark(self) -> tuple[int, int, int, int, int]:
"""Snapshot bucket lengths so one install() can be undone positionally."""
return (
len(self._middlewares),
len(self._task_lifecycle),
len(self._system_model_observers),
len(self._services),
len(self._routers),
)
def rollback_to(self, mark: tuple[int, int, int, int, int]) -> None:
"""Undo every registration made since ``mark``.
Positional rather than source-keyed: two specs may legitimately share
a ``use`` string with different config, and deleting by source would
take the other instance's successful registrations with it.
"""
for bucket, size in zip(
(
self._middlewares,
self._task_lifecycle,
self._system_model_observers,
self._services,
self._routers,
),
mark,
strict=True,
):
del bucket[size:]
def build(self) -> LoadedExtensions:
return LoadedExtensions(
app_store=ExtensionData("app"),
middleware_contributors=tuple(self._middlewares),
task_lifecycle=tuple(self._task_lifecycle),
system_model_observers=tuple(self._system_model_observers),
services=tuple(self._services),
routers=tuple(self._routers),
has_middleware_contributors=bool(self._middlewares),
has_task_lifecycle=bool(self._task_lifecycle),
has_system_model_observers=bool(self._system_model_observers),
needs_task_store=bool(self._middlewares or self._task_lifecycle or self._system_model_observers),
)
#: Shared empty instance for hosts that load no extensions.
EMPTY_EXTENSIONS = ExtensionRegistry().build()