georgelichen 641a4147e7
fix(skills): parse Responses API content blocks in moderation scanner (#4936)
* Fix skill moderation parsing for Responses API content blocks

Normalize LangChain Responses API text blocks before parsing the security moderation decision, while preserving the existing fail-closed behavior for unavailable or invalid moderation results. Add regression coverage for mixed content blocks and document the compatibility boundary.

Constraint: Responses API AIMessage content is list-shaped while Chat Completions content is string-shaped
Rejected: Disable security scanning | would weaken the skill write safety boundary
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep moderation parsing provider-format tolerant without including reasoning or tool blocks in the decision payload
Tested: 27 security scanner tests; ruff check; ruff format check
Not-tested: Live moderation request against the configured external endpoint

* Reuse shared LLM response text normalization

Route skill moderation responses through the existing provider-format normalizer so only text and output_text blocks participate in JSON parsing. Strengthen regression coverage with reasoning and tool blocks that contain misleading text fields.\n\nConstraint: Responses API content is shared across multiple harness consumers\nRejected: Keep a private normalizer | duplicated provider-shape policy diverges and can reintroduce reasoning-block contamination\nConfidence: high\nScope-risk: narrow\nReversibility: clean\nDirective: Extend the shared normalizer when a new provider content shape is verified; do not add divergent local parsers\nTested: 118 related backend tests; regression test red against the previous parser; Ruff check and format check\nNot-tested: Live GitHub CLA status refresh

* Restore trusted external skill package loading

Skill discovery follows one-level package-directory symlinks, but activation path validation rejected the resolved external path. Restore that compatibility for configured custom-skill category roots while keeping file-level symlinks and deeper escapes blocked. Add regression coverage for local and user-scoped storage plus slash activation, and document the boundary.

Constraint: Existing skill discovery follows directory symlinks and operator-managed external packages must remain loadable

Rejected: Allow arbitrary resolved paths | would weaken the skill path trust boundary

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Keep the final SKILL.md file symlink-free and preserve one-level category-root validation

Tested: 79 targeted skill storage, loader, slash activation, and user-scoped tests passed; Ruff check and format check passed; GitNexus staged change detection reported low risk

Not-tested: Real symlink activation on this Windows host lacks SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege and is skipped

Related: Skill projection copies sources into sandbox-visible views

* Exercise real filesystem symlink boundaries in skill storage tests

Replace global Path.resolve/is_symlink mocks with real directory and file symlinks, preserving the Windows privilege skip. Add regression coverage for deeper custom-root escapes and symlinks under non-custom categories so the one-level allowance remains explicit.

Constraint: Symlink creation requires SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege on some Windows runners
Rejected: Keep global path-method mocks | they validate the mock behavior rather than filesystem semantics
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep security-boundary tests on real filesystem primitives; skip only when the runner lacks symlink privilege
Tested: 76 targeted loader/storage/slash tests; Ruff check; Ruff format check
Not-tested: Windows symlink-enabled execution on this host
Related: #4936

* Pin the actual nested symlink escape boundary

Place the second symlink below a real custom package directory so the test reaches the one-level relative-parent guard instead of returning early on a non-symlink parent. Keep the public-category rejection coverage unchanged.

Constraint: The security boundary depends on both symlink depth and category root
Rejected: Link the outer package directory directly | the parent is not a symlink at validation time, so the depth guard is never evaluated
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep this regression tied to the exact relative_parent.parts depth check
Tested: Targeted storage, loader, and slash suites; GitNexus staged detection
Not-tested: Symlink-enabled execution on this Windows host
Related: #4936

* Make the nested symlink regression reach the depth guard

The test now validates the SKILL.md directly through the nested symlink, so the symlink is the immediate parent and the relative-parent depth check is executed.

Constraint: Windows test execution may skip when symlink privilege is unavailable
Rejected: Keep the extra nested path segment | it bypasses the symlink-depth guard through an early return
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Mutation tests must fail when the depth restriction is removed
Tested: Targeted test (skipped on this Windows host without symlink privilege); Ruff check and format check
Not-tested: Real symlink execution on Windows; Linux CI will exercise the case
Related: #4936

* Keep sandbox projections fresh for linked external skill packages

The storage layer intentionally accepts one-level custom package-directory symlinks, but projection freshness previously hashed only the link inode. Follow the permitted target tree during custom and legacy source-signature scans so edits to SKILL.md, scripts, references, or assets trigger a rebuild before sandbox use.

Constraint: Preserve the existing one-level custom/legacy symlink boundary and do not follow public, integration, nested, or file symlinks

Rejected: Invalidate projections only from /api/skills/reload | sandbox acquisition must also detect edits made directly in external targets

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Reversibility: clean

Directive: Keep target-tree traversal limited to the storage paths that explicitly permit external package-directory links

Tested: 77 projection, user-scoped storage, and lifecycle tests passed; Ruff check and format check passed; git diff --check passed; GitNexus staged detection reported low risk

Not-tested: Real external symlink execution on this Windows host without SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege; existing tests skip that platform limitation
2026-08-24 21:27:43 +08:00
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