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* feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3) Vertical slice 1 of the user-lifecycle work: an operator can suspend an account and every authentication surface rejects it, while the row — credentials, role, OAuth linkage — is retained so re-enabling restores exactly what was suspended. - users.disabled (NOT NULL, server default 0) via migration 0036_user_disabled; User/UserResponse carry and expose it. - Enforcement at all four surfaces: password login (no credential comparison happens), JWT session resolution (401 ACCOUNT_DISABLED — sessions die at the next request), PAT resolution (the generic 401, no oracle), OAuth provisioning (403 with a contact-admin message; the link is kept so re-enable restores access). - SQLiteUserRepository.set_disabled: single-column, serialized write (same idiom as update_system_role) with the last-ACTIVE-admin guard — disabled admins cannot authenticate, so they cannot restore management access; re-enabling is always allowed. Field-scoping completed both ways: the credential writer mirrors and never writes disabled, so a stale password-change snapshot cannot re-enable a suspended account. - PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{id} becomes a partial account update (system_role and/or disabled), each field routed to its field-scoped writer; empty bodies 422. Tests 11->18: route (disable/re-enable, last-active-admin 409, empty 422, combined update), real-repo (field isolation both directions, disabled-admin-not-active, guard inside the serialized write, re-enable always), login rejection with the CORRECT password (only the disabled gate can reject) plus resolver-visible flag. Mutations verified red: guard removed (M19), login gate removed (M20 — after hardening the test with a real hash so the gate is load-bearing). * fix(authz): portable boolean default, alternate-authenticator suspension, active-admin role guard Review round 1 on #6566 — three P1s: - [PG default] sa.text("0") is a raw integer expression PostgreSQL rejects as a BOOLEAN default, breaking startup migration and fresh create_all bootstraps alike. Both the migration and the ORM model now use sa.false()/false() — dialect-rendered, portable. - [alternate authenticators] WebSockets bypass AuthMiddleware, so a disabled user's still-valid cookie could open a NEW browser/stream connection and drive the retained session; the standalone LangGraph authenticate callback accepted the same suspended JWT. Both now route through a shared post-lookup validator (validate_resolved_session_user in deps.py — token_version + disabled in one place) that the HTTP dependency also uses, so a lifecycle change lands everywhere at once. - [active-admin role guard] update_system_role counted every admin row, so 'disable B, then demote self' — or a combined {system_role, disabled} self-update — could strand the deployment with zero administrators able to authenticate or re-enable anyone. The demotion guard now counts ACTIVE admins only (disabled admins cannot authenticate), under the same serialization boundary. Tests 18->22: shared-validator verdicts, WS admission after suspension (real token, real repo), LangGraph-callback admission after suspension, disable-then-demote-self + combined self-update both rejected (fake-repo route level and real-repo update_system_role level). Mutations verified red: helper's disabled check removed (M21 — three admission tests fail), active-admin predicate reverted to all-admins (M22 — repo-level strand scenario fails). 366 tests green on the affected surface. * fix(migrations): chain 0036_user_disabled after upstream 0037 The maintainer main-merge brought 0037_project_document_summaries, which branched from 0035 independently of this PR's 0036 — alembic now sees two heads and every engine bootstrap fails. Chain 0036 after 0037 (single head; revision numbers are labels, the graph is what matters). * fix(migrations): renumber user_disabled to 0038 and follow the chain-test convention Upstream landed its own 0036 (run_idempotency_request) with 0037 chained after it while this PR was in review — my 0036_user_disabled collided on the number and my interim chain-fix (0036 revises 0037) left the graph in a state upstream's chain tests reject (heads == [0037] hardcoded). - 0036_user_disabled -> 0038_user_disabled, revises 0037_project_document_summaries: single head 0038. - Chain tests follow the repo convention (each migration PR appends the new head): 0032/0035 gain the DOC_SUMMARIES link and CURRENT_HEAD = 0038; 0037's single-head assertion moves to CURRENT_HEAD with its own-revision link check unchanged. * fix(migrations): pin the remaining chain tests to the 0038_user_disabled head The 0027/0028, 0029 and 0034 chain tests still pinned the single head to 0037_project_document_summaries (and 0034 asserted the head's parent was 0036_run_idempotency_request), so the renumbered lifecycle migration broke two unit-test shards. Follow the chain-test convention: every pinned head moves to 0038_user_disabled and 0034 walks the chain through 0037. * fix(authz): enforce account suspension on the internal-auth dispatch surface Round-3 review finding: the internal-auth principal is synthesized from trusted headers without a users-row lookup, so a suspended user with an active channel binding kept driving the agent, and scheduler-owned runs (their fabricated in-process requests skip AuthMiddleware entirely) kept launching. Two gates now enforce the lifecycle there: - AuthMiddleware rejects owner-bound internal calls whose users row is disabled (401 account_disabled) at the single gate every internal HTTP call passes through. Auth-disabled mode is exempt (no suspendable accounts, and its owner header carries the synthetic identity), and owner ids without a users row stay allowed — a nonexistent account cannot be suspended. - start_run re-asserts it at run admission after the owner is resolved for attribution: the scheduler records the rejection as the occurrence's launch error and no run record is created. Also addresses the remaining round-3 nits: drop the inline token_version check duplicated by validate_resolved_session_user, correct the local_provider comment (login never surfaces ACCOUNT_DISABLED), refresh the stale 0038 docstring header, and restore the deps module caches in the two suspension tests instead of leaking a closed engine. * fix(auth): carry the disabled field on the frontend synthetic users UserResponse now always includes disabled, so the auth-disabled contract e2e (gateway /auth/me deep-equals the frontend synthetic user) failed without the field on AUTH_DISABLED_USER. Add disabled to both synthetic users and declare it optional on the zod schema — absent still parses as not disabled for pre-gap-3 backends. * fix(authz): log when the internal-owner suspension check is skipped The middleware gate's users-lookup failure path silently degraded to allow; keep the fail-open behavior but leave a WARNING with the exception, so a store that cannot be read is observable in production logs instead of invisible. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
158 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
158 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
"""Local email/password authentication provider."""
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import logging
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from app.gateway.auth.models import User
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from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async, needs_rehash, verify_password_async
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from app.gateway.auth.providers import AuthProvider
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from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserRepository
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class LocalAuthProvider(AuthProvider):
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"""Email/password authentication provider using local database."""
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def __init__(self, repository: UserRepository):
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"""Initialize with a UserRepository.
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Args:
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repository: UserRepository implementation (SQLite)
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"""
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self._repo = repository
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async def authenticate(self, credentials: dict) -> User | None:
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"""Authenticate with email and password.
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Args:
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credentials: dict with 'email' and 'password' keys
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Returns:
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User if authentication succeeds, None otherwise
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"""
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email = credentials.get("email")
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password = credentials.get("password")
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if not email or not password:
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return None
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user = await self._repo.get_user_by_email(email)
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if user is None:
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return None
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# Operator-disabled account (#3462 gap 3): no password is even
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# compared — the failure is indistinguishable from unknown-credentials
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# to the caller, so nothing about the account state leaks through the
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# login path (the distinct ACCOUNT_DISABLED code is surfaced only by
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# the session dependency once a token exists).
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if getattr(user, "disabled", False):
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return None
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if user.password_hash is None:
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# OAuth user without local password
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return None
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if not await verify_password_async(password, user.password_hash):
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return None
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if needs_rehash(user.password_hash):
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try:
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user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
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await self._repo.update_user(user)
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except Exception:
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# Rehash is an opportunistic upgrade; a transient DB error must not
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# prevent an otherwise-valid login from succeeding.
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logger.warning("Failed to rehash password for user %s; login will still succeed", user.email, exc_info=True)
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return user
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async def get_user(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
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"""Get user by ID."""
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return await self._repo.get_user_by_id(user_id)
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async def create_user(self, email: str, password: str | None = None, system_role: str = "user", needs_setup: bool = False) -> User:
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"""Create a new local user.
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Args:
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email: User email address
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password: Plain text password (will be hashed)
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system_role: Role to assign ("admin" or "user")
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needs_setup: If True, user must complete setup on first login
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Returns:
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Created User instance
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"""
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password_hash = await hash_password_async(password) if password else None
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user = User(
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email=email,
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password_hash=password_hash,
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system_role=system_role,
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needs_setup=needs_setup,
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)
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return await self._repo.create_user(user)
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async def create_first_admin(self, email: str, password: str) -> User | None:
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"""Create the first admin account, or return None if one already exists.
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The check and the insert are one atomic claim in the repository, so
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concurrent first-boot requests cannot both succeed.
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Args:
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email: Admin email address
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password: Plain text password (will be hashed)
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Returns:
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Created admin User, or None if the system already has an admin
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"""
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password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
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user = User(email=email, password_hash=password_hash, system_role="admin", needs_setup=False)
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return await self._repo.create_first_admin(user)
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async def get_user_by_oauth(self, provider: str, oauth_id: str) -> User | None:
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"""Get user by OAuth provider and ID."""
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return await self._repo.get_user_by_oauth(provider, oauth_id)
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async def count_users(self) -> int:
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"""Return total number of registered users."""
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return await self._repo.count_users()
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async def count_admin_users(self) -> int:
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"""Return number of admin users."""
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return await self._repo.count_admin_users()
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async def update_user(self, user: User) -> User:
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"""Update an existing user."""
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return await self._repo.update_user(user)
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async def get_user_by_email(self, email: str) -> User | None:
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"""Get user by email."""
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return await self._repo.get_user_by_email(email)
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async def create_oauth_user(
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self,
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email: str,
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oauth_provider: str,
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oauth_id: str,
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system_role: str = "user",
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) -> User:
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"""Create a new user from an OAuth/OIDC login.
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Args:
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email: Verified email from the OIDC provider
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oauth_provider: Provider ID (e.g. 'keycloak', 'google')
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oauth_id: User's subject claim from the ID token
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system_role: Role to assign ("admin" or "user")
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Returns:
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Created User instance
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"""
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user = User(
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email=email,
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password_hash=None,
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system_role=system_role,
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needs_setup=False,
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oauth_provider=oauth_provider,
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oauth_id=oauth_id,
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)
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return await self._repo.create_user(user)
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