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* feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers `user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to register one MCP server entry per credential. Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets` carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block unmasked. Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key, because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"` opts out. Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context` and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning. Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from `langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the ambient-runtime fallback disabled. Closes #5005 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`. HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context` precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential. Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses. Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and the Gateway mirror. Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest` or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes `request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers. `_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context` instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`, not only a credential. The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`, which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names * fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
260 lines
10 KiB
Python
260 lines
10 KiB
Python
"""Exact-name MCP calls used by the durable ordinary-task driver."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import logging
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from collections.abc import Mapping
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from datetime import timedelta
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from typing import Any
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from deerflow.config.extensions_config import ExtensionsConfig
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from deerflow.config.paths import get_paths
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from deerflow.constants import MCP_TMP_SUBDIR
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from deerflow.mcp.client import build_server_params
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from deerflow.mcp.context_headers import build_context_headers_interceptor
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from deerflow.mcp.headers import apply_header_overrides
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from deerflow.mcp.interceptors import build_mcp_tool_interceptors
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from deerflow.mcp.oauth import OAuthTokenManager, build_oauth_tool_interceptor
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from deerflow.mcp.session_pool import get_session_pool
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def mcp_task_session_scope_key(*, user_id: str, thread_id: str) -> str:
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"""Keep background calls in the same per-user/per-thread session scope."""
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return f"{user_id}:{thread_id}"
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def _prepare_stdio_connection(
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connection: dict[str, Any],
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*,
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user_id: str,
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thread_id: str,
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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paths = get_paths()
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paths.ensure_thread_dirs(thread_id, user_id=user_id)
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work_dir = paths.sandbox_work_dir(thread_id, user_id=user_id)
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tmp_dir = work_dir / MCP_TMP_SUBDIR
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tmp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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tmp_dir.chmod(0o700)
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prepared = dict(connection)
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prepared.setdefault("cwd", str(work_dir))
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env = dict(prepared.get("env") or {})
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env.setdefault("TMPDIR", str(tmp_dir))
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env.setdefault("TMP", str(tmp_dir))
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env.setdefault("TEMP", str(tmp_dir))
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prepared["env"] = env
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return prepared
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class McpTaskToolCaller:
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"""Call configured raw MCP tools without exposing them back to the Agent."""
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def __init__(
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self,
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extensions_config: ExtensionsConfig,
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*,
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oauth_token_manager: OAuthTokenManager | None = None,
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) -> None:
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self._extensions_config = extensions_config
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self._oauth_token_manager = oauth_token_manager or OAuthTokenManager.from_extensions_config(extensions_config)
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context_headers_interceptor = build_context_headers_interceptor(extensions_config)
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# Built once so the two chains keep an identical interceptor order and a
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# custom ``mcpInterceptors`` builder is invoked exactly once.
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self._submit_interceptors = build_mcp_tool_interceptors(
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extensions_config,
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oauth_builder=lambda config: build_oauth_tool_interceptor(
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config,
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token_manager=self._oauth_token_manager,
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),
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context_headers_builder=lambda _config: context_headers_interceptor,
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)
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# Submitting a durable task is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool
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# call, so ``config.context.secrets`` is still reachable through the
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# ambient LangGraph runtime and the submit goes out under the caller's
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# own credential. The later status/cancel polls are driven by the task
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# runtime long after that run ended: there is no run context to read, so
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# the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those keep using
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# server-level credentials (see docs/MCP_SERVER.md), which is what
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# ``build_context_headers_interceptor`` warns about at startup.
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if context_headers_interceptor is None:
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self._interceptors = self._submit_interceptors
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else:
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self._interceptors = [interceptor for interceptor in self._submit_interceptors if interceptor is not context_headers_interceptor]
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async def call_tool(
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self,
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*,
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server_name: str,
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tool_name: str,
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arguments: dict[str, Any],
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user_id: str,
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thread_id: str,
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request_scoped_headers: bool = False,
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) -> Any:
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"""Call a raw MCP tool.
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``request_scoped_headers`` opts this call into the ``headers_from_context``
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interceptor. Only the durable *submit* may set it: submit is awaited
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inside the Agent run that carries the secrets, while status and cancel
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run after that run ended.
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"""
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interceptors = self._submit_interceptors if request_scoped_headers else self._interceptors
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server_config = self._extensions_config.get_enabled_mcp_servers().get(server_name)
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if server_config is None:
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raise LookupError(f"MCP task server {server_name!r} is missing or disabled in the startup configuration")
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connection = build_server_params(server_name, server_config)
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transport = connection.get("transport", "stdio")
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scope_key = mcp_task_session_scope_key(user_id=user_id, thread_id=thread_id)
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if transport == "stdio":
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connection = await asyncio.to_thread(
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_prepare_stdio_connection,
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connection,
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user_id=user_id,
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thread_id=thread_id,
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)
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pool = get_session_pool()
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session_init_timeout = server_config.session_init_timeout
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if session_init_timeout is not None:
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try:
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session = await asyncio.wait_for(
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pool.get_session(server_name, scope_key, connection),
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timeout=session_init_timeout,
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)
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except TimeoutError:
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logger.warning(
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"MCP task session initialization for server '%s' timed out after %.1fs",
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server_name,
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session_init_timeout,
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)
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raise
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else:
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session = await pool.get_session(server_name, scope_key, connection)
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try:
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return await self._invoke(
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session=session,
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connection=connection,
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server_name=server_name,
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tool_name=tool_name,
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arguments=arguments,
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timeout_seconds=server_config.tool_call_timeout,
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session_init_timeout_seconds=None,
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persistent_session=True,
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interceptors=interceptors,
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)
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except Exception:
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# A dead pooled subprocess must not poison every later status
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# poll. The next retry recreates this exact scoped session.
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await pool.close_session(server_name, scope_key)
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raise
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authorization = await self._oauth_token_manager.get_authorization_header(server_name)
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if authorization:
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connection["headers"] = apply_header_overrides(
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connection.get("headers") or {},
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{"Authorization": authorization},
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)
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return await self._invoke(
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session=None,
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connection=connection,
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server_name=server_name,
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tool_name=tool_name,
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arguments=arguments,
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timeout_seconds=server_config.tool_call_timeout,
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session_init_timeout_seconds=server_config.session_init_timeout,
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persistent_session=False,
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interceptors=interceptors,
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)
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async def _invoke(
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self,
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*,
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session: Any | None,
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connection: dict[str, Any],
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server_name: str,
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tool_name: str,
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arguments: dict[str, Any],
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timeout_seconds: float | None,
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session_init_timeout_seconds: float | None,
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persistent_session: bool,
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interceptors: list[Any],
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) -> Any:
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from langchain_mcp_adapters.interceptors import MCPToolCallRequest
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from langchain_mcp_adapters.sessions import create_session
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async def execute(request: MCPToolCallRequest) -> Any:
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call_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
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if timeout_seconds:
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call_kwargs["read_timeout_seconds"] = timedelta(seconds=timeout_seconds)
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if persistent_session:
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assert session is not None
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if request.headers:
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if isinstance(request.headers, Mapping):
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call_kwargs["meta"] = {"headers": dict(request.headers)}
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else:
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logger.warning(
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"Ignoring MCP interceptor headers with unsupported type: %s",
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type(request.headers).__name__,
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)
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return await session.call_tool(request.name, request.args, **call_kwargs)
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effective_connection = dict(connection)
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if request.headers:
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effective_connection["headers"] = apply_header_overrides(
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effective_connection.get("headers") or {},
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dict(request.headers),
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)
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captured: BaseException | None = None
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call_result: Any | None = None
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async with create_session(effective_connection) as remote_session:
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initialize = remote_session.initialize()
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if session_init_timeout_seconds is not None:
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await asyncio.wait_for(
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initialize,
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timeout=session_init_timeout_seconds,
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)
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else:
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await initialize
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try:
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call = remote_session.call_tool(
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request.name,
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request.args,
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**call_kwargs,
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)
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if timeout_seconds:
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call_result = await asyncio.wait_for(
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call,
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timeout=timeout_seconds,
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)
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else:
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call_result = await call
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except BaseException as exc: # preserve adapter disconnect semantics
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captured = exc
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if captured is not None:
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raise captured
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if call_result is None:
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raise RuntimeError(f"MCP task tool {request.name!r} returned no result")
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return call_result
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handler = execute
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for interceptor in reversed(interceptors):
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inner = handler
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async def wrapped(request: Any, _interceptor: Any = interceptor, _inner: Any = inner) -> Any:
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return await _interceptor(request, _inner)
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handler = wrapped
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return await handler(
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MCPToolCallRequest(
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name=tool_name,
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args=arguments,
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server_name=server_name,
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runtime=None,
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)
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)
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