deer-flow/backend/app/gateway/auth/local_provider.py
hataa 47d8ff13b2
feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3) (#6566)
* feat(authz): account disable/enable across every authentication surface (#4063 gap 3)

Vertical slice 1 of the user-lifecycle work: an operator can suspend an
account and every authentication surface rejects it, while the row —
credentials, role, OAuth linkage — is retained so re-enabling restores
exactly what was suspended.

- users.disabled (NOT NULL, server default 0) via migration
  0036_user_disabled; User/UserResponse carry and expose it.
- Enforcement at all four surfaces: password login (no credential
  comparison happens), JWT session resolution (401 ACCOUNT_DISABLED —
  sessions die at the next request), PAT resolution (the generic 401, no
  oracle), OAuth provisioning (403 with a contact-admin message; the
  link is kept so re-enable restores access).
- SQLiteUserRepository.set_disabled: single-column, serialized write
  (same idiom as update_system_role) with the last-ACTIVE-admin guard —
  disabled admins cannot authenticate, so they cannot restore management
  access; re-enabling is always allowed. Field-scoping completed both
  ways: the credential writer mirrors and never writes disabled, so
  a stale password-change snapshot cannot re-enable a suspended account.
- PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{id} becomes a partial account update
  (system_role and/or disabled), each field routed to its field-scoped
  writer; empty bodies 422.

Tests 11->18: route (disable/re-enable, last-active-admin 409, empty
422, combined update), real-repo (field isolation both directions,
disabled-admin-not-active, guard inside the serialized write, re-enable
always), login rejection with the CORRECT password (only the disabled
gate can reject) plus resolver-visible flag. Mutations verified red:
guard removed (M19), login gate removed (M20 — after hardening the test
with a real hash so the gate is load-bearing).

* fix(authz): portable boolean default, alternate-authenticator suspension, active-admin role guard

Review round 1 on #6566 — three P1s:

- [PG default] sa.text("0") is a raw integer expression PostgreSQL
  rejects as a BOOLEAN default, breaking startup migration and fresh
  create_all bootstraps alike. Both the migration and the ORM model now
  use sa.false()/false() — dialect-rendered, portable.
- [alternate authenticators] WebSockets bypass AuthMiddleware, so a
  disabled user's still-valid cookie could open a NEW browser/stream
  connection and drive the retained session; the standalone LangGraph
  authenticate callback accepted the same suspended JWT. Both now route
  through a shared post-lookup validator (validate_resolved_session_user
  in deps.py — token_version + disabled in one place) that the HTTP
  dependency also uses, so a lifecycle change lands everywhere at once.
- [active-admin role guard] update_system_role counted every admin row,
  so 'disable B, then demote self' — or a combined {system_role, disabled}
  self-update — could strand the deployment with zero administrators able
  to authenticate or re-enable anyone. The demotion guard now counts
  ACTIVE admins only (disabled admins cannot authenticate), under the same
  serialization boundary.

Tests 18->22: shared-validator verdicts, WS admission after suspension
(real token, real repo), LangGraph-callback admission after suspension,
disable-then-demote-self + combined self-update both rejected (fake-repo
route level and real-repo update_system_role level). Mutations verified
red: helper's disabled check removed (M21 — three admission tests fail),
active-admin predicate reverted to all-admins (M22 — repo-level strand
scenario fails). 366 tests green on the affected surface.

* fix(migrations): chain 0036_user_disabled after upstream 0037

The maintainer main-merge brought 0037_project_document_summaries,
which branched from 0035 independently of this PR's 0036 — alembic now
sees two heads and every engine bootstrap fails. Chain 0036 after 0037
(single head; revision numbers are labels, the graph is what matters).

* fix(migrations): renumber user_disabled to 0038 and follow the chain-test convention

Upstream landed its own 0036 (run_idempotency_request) with 0037 chained
after it while this PR was in review — my 0036_user_disabled collided on
the number and my interim chain-fix (0036 revises 0037) left the graph
in a state upstream's chain tests reject (heads == [0037] hardcoded).

- 0036_user_disabled -> 0038_user_disabled, revises
  0037_project_document_summaries: single head 0038.
- Chain tests follow the repo convention (each migration PR appends the
  new head): 0032/0035 gain the DOC_SUMMARIES link and CURRENT_HEAD =
  0038; 0037's single-head assertion moves to CURRENT_HEAD with its
  own-revision link check unchanged.

* fix(migrations): pin the remaining chain tests to the 0038_user_disabled head

The 0027/0028, 0029 and 0034 chain tests still pinned the single head to
0037_project_document_summaries (and 0034 asserted the head's parent was
0036_run_idempotency_request), so the renumbered lifecycle migration broke
two unit-test shards. Follow the chain-test convention: every pinned head
moves to 0038_user_disabled and 0034 walks the chain through 0037.

* fix(authz): enforce account suspension on the internal-auth dispatch surface

Round-3 review finding: the internal-auth principal is synthesized from
trusted headers without a users-row lookup, so a suspended user with an
active channel binding kept driving the agent, and scheduler-owned runs
(their fabricated in-process requests skip AuthMiddleware entirely) kept
launching. Two gates now enforce the lifecycle there:

- AuthMiddleware rejects owner-bound internal calls whose users row is
  disabled (401 account_disabled) at the single gate every internal HTTP
  call passes through. Auth-disabled mode is exempt (no suspendable
  accounts, and its owner header carries the synthetic identity), and
  owner ids without a users row stay allowed — a nonexistent account
  cannot be suspended.
- start_run re-asserts it at run admission after the owner is resolved
  for attribution: the scheduler records the rejection as the
  occurrence's launch error and no run record is created.

Also addresses the remaining round-3 nits: drop the inline token_version
check duplicated by validate_resolved_session_user, correct the
local_provider comment (login never surfaces ACCOUNT_DISABLED), refresh
the stale 0038 docstring header, and restore the deps module caches in
the two suspension tests instead of leaking a closed engine.

* fix(auth): carry the disabled field on the frontend synthetic users

UserResponse now always includes disabled, so the auth-disabled contract
e2e (gateway /auth/me deep-equals the frontend synthetic user) failed
without the field on AUTH_DISABLED_USER. Add disabled to both synthetic
users and declare it optional on the zod schema — absent still parses as
not disabled for pre-gap-3 backends.

* fix(authz): log when the internal-owner suspension check is skipped

The middleware gate's users-lookup failure path silently degraded to
allow; keep the fail-open behavior but leave a WARNING with the
exception, so a store that cannot be read is observable in production
logs instead of invisible.

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-10-10 16:43:04 +08:00

158 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Local email/password authentication provider."""
import logging
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async, needs_rehash, verify_password_async
from app.gateway.auth.providers import AuthProvider
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserRepository
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class LocalAuthProvider(AuthProvider):
"""Email/password authentication provider using local database."""
def __init__(self, repository: UserRepository):
"""Initialize with a UserRepository.
Args:
repository: UserRepository implementation (SQLite)
"""
self._repo = repository
async def authenticate(self, credentials: dict) -> User | None:
"""Authenticate with email and password.
Args:
credentials: dict with 'email' and 'password' keys
Returns:
User if authentication succeeds, None otherwise
"""
email = credentials.get("email")
password = credentials.get("password")
if not email or not password:
return None
user = await self._repo.get_user_by_email(email)
if user is None:
return None
# Operator-disabled account (#3462 gap 3): no password is even
# compared — the failure is indistinguishable from unknown-credentials
# to the caller, so nothing about the account state leaks through the
# login path (the distinct ACCOUNT_DISABLED code is surfaced only by
# the session dependency once a token exists).
if getattr(user, "disabled", False):
return None
if user.password_hash is None:
# OAuth user without local password
return None
if not await verify_password_async(password, user.password_hash):
return None
if needs_rehash(user.password_hash):
try:
user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
await self._repo.update_user(user)
except Exception:
# Rehash is an opportunistic upgrade; a transient DB error must not
# prevent an otherwise-valid login from succeeding.
logger.warning("Failed to rehash password for user %s; login will still succeed", user.email, exc_info=True)
return user
async def get_user(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
"""Get user by ID."""
return await self._repo.get_user_by_id(user_id)
async def create_user(self, email: str, password: str | None = None, system_role: str = "user", needs_setup: bool = False) -> User:
"""Create a new local user.
Args:
email: User email address
password: Plain text password (will be hashed)
system_role: Role to assign ("admin" or "user")
needs_setup: If True, user must complete setup on first login
Returns:
Created User instance
"""
password_hash = await hash_password_async(password) if password else None
user = User(
email=email,
password_hash=password_hash,
system_role=system_role,
needs_setup=needs_setup,
)
return await self._repo.create_user(user)
async def create_first_admin(self, email: str, password: str) -> User | None:
"""Create the first admin account, or return None if one already exists.
The check and the insert are one atomic claim in the repository, so
concurrent first-boot requests cannot both succeed.
Args:
email: Admin email address
password: Plain text password (will be hashed)
Returns:
Created admin User, or None if the system already has an admin
"""
password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
user = User(email=email, password_hash=password_hash, system_role="admin", needs_setup=False)
return await self._repo.create_first_admin(user)
async def get_user_by_oauth(self, provider: str, oauth_id: str) -> User | None:
"""Get user by OAuth provider and ID."""
return await self._repo.get_user_by_oauth(provider, oauth_id)
async def count_users(self) -> int:
"""Return total number of registered users."""
return await self._repo.count_users()
async def count_admin_users(self) -> int:
"""Return number of admin users."""
return await self._repo.count_admin_users()
async def update_user(self, user: User) -> User:
"""Update an existing user."""
return await self._repo.update_user(user)
async def get_user_by_email(self, email: str) -> User | None:
"""Get user by email."""
return await self._repo.get_user_by_email(email)
async def create_oauth_user(
self,
email: str,
oauth_provider: str,
oauth_id: str,
system_role: str = "user",
) -> User:
"""Create a new user from an OAuth/OIDC login.
Args:
email: Verified email from the OIDC provider
oauth_provider: Provider ID (e.g. 'keycloak', 'google')
oauth_id: User's subject claim from the ID token
system_role: Role to assign ("admin" or "user")
Returns:
Created User instance
"""
user = User(
email=email,
password_hash=None,
system_role=system_role,
needs_setup=False,
oauth_provider=oauth_provider,
oauth_id=oauth_id,
)
return await self._repo.create_user(user)