Zeren Wang a06a6fed7e
feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2) (#5109)
* feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2)

PR4 of RFC #4651: check lead-supplied acceptance_criteria in code when a
subagent completes, so objectively checkable requirements can never be
silently passed by a self-report.

- subagents/acceptance_checks.py: deterministic leaf families —
  file:<path> exists|non-empty and file_written:<path> read through
  read_current_file_content scoped to the shared thread workspace; the
  read uses the sandbox-native virtual path form (the local read
  validator and provider mount tables resolve /mnt/user-data/... paths,
  not host paths); the scope decision canonicalizes with realpath on the
  local sandbox so workspace symlinks cannot escape into uploads; a
  remote provider's "Error: ..." return string is normalized to a
  failed check (provider-typed via is_local_sandbox); a
  UnicodeDecodeError marks a binary deliverable as existing and
  non-empty; out-of-scope paths degrade to UNVERIFIED.
  tests_passed:<command> anchors to a matching recorded bash execution
  with status=success and a test-summary shape; matching is
  shell-structure aware with control-flow attribution (span must end at
  the last segment with provable execution), negating-option values are
  ineligible evidence and a target negated anywhere in the command
  degrades the match, extra flags must be selection-preserving, extra
  positionals widen only after a path-scoped criterion, truncated
  commands degrade via command_truncated, the summary shape is read
  only from output attributable to the matched segment (preceding
  segments provably silent by invocation form), and pass shapes require
  a nonzero passed count. Criterion text is neutralized with
  neutralize_untrusted_tags before storage/rendering. Anything else
  renders UNVERIFIED, never silently passed.
- executor: accumulate bounded bash command/output evidence per streamed
  chunk (merged by tool_call_id, newest-capped) so subagent
  summarization compacting earlier messages cannot erase a recorded
  execution; the recorded status is the actual shell exit status parsed
  from the output's exit marker (signed codes included; the remote
  Command exited with code N form is accepted only as the whole trimmed
  output), falling back to deerflow_tool_meta only when no marker
  exists.
- sandbox providers: e2b/opensandbox/tenki/boxlite append the
  LocalSandbox-style "Exit Code: N" marker on nonzero exit even with
  non-empty output; aio propagates the SDK's structured exit_code on
  both exec paths the same way; local timeouts append Exit Code: 124;
  and _truncate_bash_output always preserves a trailing exit marker
  (signed included) inside its budget, with a 32-char floor raising any
  smaller configured limit, so the actual shell outcome always survives
  in the output text.
- task_tool: run the checklist offloaded (asyncio.to_thread) on the
  completed branch, failure-isolated; stamp the verdict into result
  metadata and render the per-criterion section into the model-visible
  result text.
- status contract: additive subagent_acceptance_verdict transport with
  read-side structural validation.
- delegation ledger: entry carries the verdict and renders a compact
  acceptance segment; gateway strips caller-forged verdicts from both
  ledger entries and message metadata, like the citation verdict.
- blocking-IO anchor pins the offload (teeth proven red->green); leaf
  read errors catch only OSError/SandboxError so unexpected errors reach
  the task-tool-level isolation instead of being mislabeled.

* fix(harness): close acceptance evidence gaps from review (RFC #4651 PR4)

- negating options: overlap with a matched criterion target is now
  checked by path/nodeid prefix, not exact token equality — excluding a
  sub-path of the criterion's selection (pytest tests --deselect
  tests/unit/test_auth.py) degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of holds
- output attribution: any redirection token in the matched final segment
  makes the recorded tail non-attributable (> / >> / 2> are word
  characters to the parser, so redirection was invisible to the matcher)
- silent-source allowlist narrowed from any *activate suffix to the
  */bin/activate shape
- status_contract docstring: restore the shared-fixture sentence and
  note subagent_acceptance_verdict is deliberately outside the fixture
- executor: update_bash_executions publishes [] (stream carried no
  bash-family calls) instead of collapsing it into None, mirroring
  update_tool_receipts

* fix(harness): close acceptance residual gaps from re-review (RFC #4651 PR4)

- tests_passed: add error outcomes to the fail shapes — "4 passed, 1 error"
  and pytest's "ERROR <nodeid>" short summary no longer satisfy the pass
  shape when the exit status is swallowed (|| true) or absent; zero-error
  counts stay clean.
- file leaves: bound the deliverable read — a "wc -c" shell size probe
  answers files above 50k bytes without loading ~2x their size, honoring
  the host-bash kill switch and falling back to the full read on any
  non-integer rendering, so verdicts never get less sound.
- executor: record the exit marker text as status_marker on harvested bash
  evidence; the leaf detail now reports the marker actually seen instead of
  asserting a failure indistinguishable from the command's own trailing text.
- extend the blocking-IO anchor to drive the probe branch inside the
  offload; teeth re-verified red->green.

* fix(harness): close acceptance forgery and bound gaps from P2 re-review (RFC #4651 PR4)

- file leaves: never read unbounded — size is established first (os.stat on
  the validated local host path, so the host-bash-disabled configuration
  needs no shell; a guarded wc -c on remote providers that renders
  missing/unreadable in its own words). Above the 50k cap the leaf answers
  from the size alone, at/below it the full read runs, and an
  unestablishable size degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of an unlimited
  fallback read.
- output attribution: source/. prefixes are never provably silent — a
  crafted */bin/activate path shape says nothing about what the script
  prints, so sourced segments can no longer lend a passing summary.
- executable identity: an explicitly path-spelled criterion now requires
  the same normalized executable path; the basename rule stays only for
  deliberately bare criterion commands.

* fix(harness): run acceptance size probe outside subagent-controlled state (RFC #4651 PR4)

- remote probe no longer runs in the sandbox's persistent shell: a fresh
  env -i /bin/sh with absolute-path stat/realpath (poisoned functions,
  aliases, PATH, exported functions, IFS, locale cannot steer it), plus a
  marker env routing AIO onto a fresh per-call bash.exec session.
- metadata-only: stat never opens content, so a FIFO deliverable cannot
  block the parent for the provider's idle timeout; non-regular files
  (fifo/dir/symlink) degrade to UNVERIFIED.
- containment canonicalized against the literal mount root: a
  final-component symlink or a swapped parent directory (root included)
  cannot redirect the check outside shared storage; unprovable layouts
  degrade to UNVERIFIED.

* fix(harness): canonicalize probe containment against the canonical mount root (RFC #4651 PR4)

Literal-root equality made every remote file leaf permanently UNVERIFIED
on e2b and Tenki, which realize /mnt/user-data as a symlink to the home
dir by default (e2b bootstrap 'sudo ln -sfn', Tenki best-effort symlink).
Containment now compares the file's realpath against the mount root's
realpath — exactly what the provider's own read path resolves, so probe
and read-back stay consistent; final-component symlinks stay rejected by
the non-dereferencing stat, and an intermediate dir-link escape under a
sane root still lands ESCAPED. The inner script is a module constant and
the suite now executes the composed probe for real against on-disk
layouts (real dir, symlinked prefix, final symlink, fifo, missing,
dir-link escape), which the canned-output stub could not see.

* fix(harness): close bare-criterion negation and CDPATH summary channels (RFC #4651 PR4)

- matching: a criterion with no positional selection target (bare pytest,
  make test) stands for the runner's default selection, so ANY negating
  option (--ignore/--deselect/...) makes the recorded run a different
  selection — unprovable. The overlap guard only sees consumed criterion
  tokens, which a bare criterion does not have; scoped criteria keep the
  unrelated-exclusion behavior.
- attribution: cd is no longer blanket-silent — CDPATH makes cd print the
  resolved (subagent-chosen) destination and the pass shapes match as
  substrings, so one mkdir 'all tests passed' plus an export minted a pass
  for any quiet command. A cd argument or CDPATH= value (export or leading
  assignment) carrying any summary shape makes the segment non-silent;
  shape-free cd dir wrappers keep matching.
- docs: _truncate_bash_output states the effective 32-char floor (the
  guarantee previously read as an unconditional max_chars bound).

* fix(harness): close env-assignment and expansion channels in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)

Self-audit in the shape of the last review rounds — channels the matcher
classified as accounted-for that can change what runs, narrow the
selection, or lend the summary text:

- env assignments are no longer blanket-stripped: only an allowlist of
  inert display/CI knobs (CI, NO_COLOR, PY_COLORS, ...) may prefix a
  matched span, and a non-allowlisted assignment in any preceding segment
  (pure-assignment or export NAME=) is state pollution — PATH redirects
  the executable, LD_PRELOAD/PYTHONPATH/NODE_OPTIONS inject code,
  PYTEST_ADDOPTS/GOFLAGS/MAKEFILES inject selection-changing inputs,
  BASH_ENV runs arbitrary shell startup. All degrade to unprovable.
- runtime expansions: any span token carrying /$( )/backticks, any
  negating-option value carrying an expansion or glob (unknown excluded
  set), and any extra executed token carrying glob metacharacters
  (crafted option-looking filenames narrow invisibly) are unprovable.
  Criterion-side globs stay self-consistent (literal match).
- cd: an argument carrying a runtime expansion or glob is non-silent
  (unknown destination, unknown print); CDPATH= assignments are now
  handled as state pollution at the match layer, subsuming the
  value-shape special case.

* fix(harness): persistent-shell evidence, exact env sets, option-arity scoping (RFC #4651 PR4)

- tests_passed: on a persistent-shell provider (new
  Sandbox.persistent_shell_sessions capability, set by AioSandbox) every
  leaf degrades to UNVERIFIED — any earlier call in the shared session
  could have mutated the state the clean-looking run executed in, and
  only a fresh controlled session (RFC section 6 verifier) can prove
  otherwise. The flag is read from the provider registry without
  acquiring a sandbox.
- env assignments: the allowlist is gone — no variable is provably inert
  across repositories (CI/DEBUG are routinely read by tests). The span's
  assignment prefix must equal the criterion's exactly (values included,
  order-insensitive); any assignment or export NAME= in a preceding
  segment is state pollution.
- scoping: positional targets are now read by option arity, so a path
  embedded in an option (--basetemp=/tmp/p, --junitxml=/tmp/r.xml) never
  counts as a selection target and an extra positional after such a
  criterion narrows the default selection it denotes.

* fix(harness): stamp shell provenance at harvest, close export/unset and arity gaps (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): split physical newlines as shell separators in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): scope cd wrappers to thread data roots, pin accepted boundaries (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): preserve criterion connectors, prove file_written readable, fail-closed shell capability (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): compare only the connector prefix, tolerate trailing criterion semicolons (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): preserve continuation-line operators, keep ./-spelled executable identity (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): render criteria single-line so a multiline criterion cannot inject a forged checklist line (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): reject parent-traversal executable tokens in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)

* fix(harness): reject parent-traversal negated values in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)
2026-09-01 16:13:41 +08:00

378 lines
15 KiB
Python

"""``BoxliteBox`` — DeerFlow :class:`Sandbox` backed by a BoxLite micro-VM.
DeerFlow's ``Sandbox`` contract is synchronous; BoxLite's SDK is async-native and
its box handles are event-loop-affine. The provider (:mod:`.provider`) owns one
private asyncio loop on a daemon thread and injects a ``run`` callable that
marshals each coroutine onto it via ``run_coroutine_threadsafe`` — so every op
runs on the loop the box was started on, and stays safe no matter which
``asyncio.to_thread`` worker DeerFlow invokes us from.
Every operation is a shell command run inside the box (``cat`` / ``find`` /
``grep`` / chunked ``base64``), parsed with the shared ``deerflow.sandbox.search``
helpers — the same exec-driven approach as ``community/e2b_sandbox``. Commands
use only busybox-portable flags so any OCI image works.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import errno
import logging
import posixpath
import re
import shlex
import threading
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, TypeVar
from deerflow.config.paths import VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX
from deerflow.sandbox.sandbox import Sandbox, _validate_extra_env
from deerflow.sandbox.search import GrepMatch, path_matches, should_ignore_path, truncate_line
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
from boxlite import SimpleBox
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
T = TypeVar("T")
_MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024 # 100 MB
# One base64 chunk stays well under Linux MAX_ARG_STRLEN (128 KiB per argv entry),
# and 60000 is a multiple of 4 so each chunk is a self-contained base64 unit whose
# decoded bytes concatenate losslessly.
_B64_CHUNK = 60000
class BoxliteBox(Sandbox):
"""Adapter that delegates to a running BoxLite ``SimpleBox``.
Args:
id: DeerFlow-side sandbox id (the BoxLite box id).
box: A started async ``SimpleBox``. The provider owns its lifecycle; this
adapter stops it on :meth:`close`.
run: Runs a coroutine on the provider's private loop, returning its result
(blocking the caller thread).
default_env: Static environment merged into every command, overridden by
per-call ``env`` (request-scoped secrets).
"""
#: Every call is a fresh ``sh -lc`` exec in the box — no shell state
#: survives into the next command.
persistent_shell_sessions = False
TERMINAL_ERROR_MARKERS = (
"vsock",
"disconnected",
"broken pipe",
"connection reset",
"connection refused",
"no such box",
"box has been stopped",
"engine reported an error",
)
RETRYABLE_ERROR_MARKERS = (
"transport not ready",
"retry later",
"temporarily unavailable",
"resource busy",
)
def __init__(
self,
id: str,
box: SimpleBox,
run: Callable[..., T],
*,
default_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
on_terminal_failure: Callable[[str, str], None] | None = None,
) -> None:
super().__init__(id)
self._box = box
self._run = run
self._default_env = dict(default_env or {})
self._on_terminal_failure = on_terminal_failure
self._lock = threading.Lock()
self._closed = False
@classmethod
def _is_terminal_box_failure(cls, error: Exception) -> bool:
if isinstance(error, (BrokenPipeError, ConnectionError, EOFError)):
return True
if not isinstance(error, RuntimeError | OSError):
return False
msg = str(error).lower()
if any(marker in msg for marker in cls.RETRYABLE_ERROR_MARKERS):
return False
return any(marker in msg for marker in cls.TERMINAL_ERROR_MARKERS)
# ── bridge helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _exec(
self,
*argv: str,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
timeout: float | None = None,
):
try:
with self._lock:
if self._closed:
raise RuntimeError("sandbox has been closed")
box = self._box
return self._run(box.exec(*argv, env=env, timeout=timeout), timeout=timeout)
except Exception as e:
if self._on_terminal_failure is not None and self._is_terminal_box_failure(e):
try:
self._on_terminal_failure(self.id, str(e))
except Exception:
logger.exception("Terminal BoxLite failure callback errored for %s", self.id)
raise
def _sh(
self,
script: str,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
timeout: float | None = None,
):
return self._exec("sh", "-lc", script, env=env, timeout=timeout)
def close(self) -> None:
with self._lock:
if self._closed:
return
self._closed = True
try:
self._run(self._box.stop())
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error stopping BoxLite box %s: %s", self.id, e)
@property
def is_closed(self) -> bool:
with self._lock:
return self._closed
# ── path safety (mirrors community/e2b_sandbox) ─────────────────────
@staticmethod
def _guard_traversal(path: str) -> str:
if not path:
raise ValueError("path must be a non-empty string")
normalized = path.replace("\\", "/")
for segment in normalized.split("/"):
if segment == "..":
raise PermissionError(f"Access denied: path traversal detected in '{path}'")
return normalized
def _resolve_path(self, path: str) -> str:
# The provider materialises the /mnt/user-data prefix on the box rootfs,
# so DeerFlow's virtual paths are used as-is; we only reject traversal.
return self._guard_traversal(path)
# ── command execution ───────────────────────────────────────────────
def execute_command(
self,
command: str,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
timeout: float | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Run ``command`` through a shell in the box and return its output.
DeerFlow passes a bash command *string*; BoxLite's ``exec`` takes argv, so
it runs through ``sh -lc``. Per-call ``env`` is layered over the static
config environment and scoped to this command only.
*timeout* bounds both layers: BoxLite's SDK ``exec(timeout=...)`` handles
command timeout inside the VM, and the event-loop bridge receives the
same value so ``run_coroutine_threadsafe(...).result(timeout)`` cannot
block the caller forever if the SDK future itself never resolves.
"""
_validate_extra_env(env) # POSIX env-var key rule; raises ValueError on a bad key
if self.is_closed:
return "Error: sandbox has been closed"
merged_env = {**self._default_env, **(env or {})} or None
try:
result = self._exec("sh", "-lc", command, env=merged_env, timeout=timeout)
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Failed to execute command in BoxLite box %s: %s", self.id, e)
return f"Error: {e}"
stdout = result.stdout or ""
stderr = result.stderr or ""
if stdout and stderr:
output = f"{stdout}\n{stderr}"
else:
output = stdout or stderr
if result.exit_code not in (0, None):
# Mirror LocalSandbox: preserve a nonzero exit in the output text
# even when the command produced output (see e2b_sandbox).
output = f"{output}\nExit Code: {result.exit_code}" if output else f"Command exited with code {result.exit_code}"
return output if output else "(no output)"
# ── file operations ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def read_file(
self,
path: str,
start_line: int | None = None,
end_line: int | None = None,
) -> str:
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
try:
r = self._exec("cat", "--", resolved)
except Exception as e:
logger.error("read_file %s failed: %s", resolved, e)
return f"Error: {e}"
if r.exit_code not in (0, None):
return f"Error: {(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'cannot read file'}"
content = r.stdout or ""
if start_line is None and end_line is None:
return content
lines = content.splitlines()
start = start_line or 1
end = end_line if end_line is not None else len(lines)
return "\n".join(lines[start - 1 : end])
def write_file(self, path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> None:
self._write_bytes(self._resolve_path(path), content.encode("utf-8"), append=append)
def update_file(self, path: str, content: bytes) -> None:
self._write_bytes(self._resolve_path(path), content, append=False)
def _write_bytes(self, resolved: str, data: bytes, *, append: bool) -> None:
parent = posixpath.dirname(resolved)
if parent:
mk = self._sh(f"mkdir -p {shlex.quote(parent)}")
if mk.exit_code not in (0, None):
raise OSError(f"cannot create parent of '{resolved}': {(mk.stderr or '').strip()}")
b64 = base64.b64encode(data).decode("ascii")
if not b64: # empty file — create/truncate without piping
r = self._sh(f": {'>>' if append else '>'} {shlex.quote(resolved)}")
if r.exit_code not in (0, None):
raise OSError(f"write '{resolved}' failed: {(r.stderr or '').strip()}")
return
first = True
for i in range(0, len(b64), _B64_CHUNK):
chunk = b64[i : i + _B64_CHUNK]
redir = ">>" if (append or not first) else ">"
r = self._sh(f"printf %s {shlex.quote(chunk)} | base64 -d {redir} {shlex.quote(resolved)}")
if r.exit_code not in (0, None):
raise OSError(f"write '{resolved}' failed: {(r.stderr or '').strip()}")
first = False
def download_file(self, path: str) -> bytes:
normalized = self._guard_traversal(path)
stripped = normalized.lstrip("/")
allowed = VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX.lstrip("/")
if stripped != allowed and not stripped.startswith(f"{allowed}/"):
raise PermissionError(f"Access denied: path must be under '{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}': '{path}'")
# Enforce the size cap before buffering the whole payload.
size_r = self._sh(f"wc -c < {shlex.quote(normalized)}")
if size_r.exit_code not in (0, None):
raise OSError(f"cannot read '{path}' from box: {(size_r.stderr or '').strip() or 'not found'}")
try:
size = int((size_r.stdout or "0").strip() or "0")
except ValueError:
size = 0
if size > _MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE:
raise OSError(errno.EFBIG, f"File exceeds maximum download size of {_MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE} bytes", path)
r = self._sh(f"base64 {shlex.quote(normalized)}")
if r.exit_code not in (0, None):
raise OSError(f"cannot read '{path}' from box: {(r.stderr or '').strip()}")
try:
return base64.b64decode("".join((r.stdout or "").split()))
except Exception as e:
raise OSError(f"failed to decode '{path}' from box: {e}") from e
def list_dir(self, path: str, max_depth: int = 2) -> list[str]:
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
r = self._sh(f"find {shlex.quote(resolved)} -maxdepth {int(max_depth)} \\( -type f -o -type d \\) 2>/dev/null | head -500")
return [line.strip() for line in (r.stdout or "").splitlines() if line.strip()]
def glob(
self,
path: str,
pattern: str,
*,
include_dirs: bool = False,
max_results: int = 200,
) -> tuple[list[str], bool]:
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
types = ("f", "d") if include_dirs else ("f",)
type_expr = " -o ".join(f"-type {t}" for t in types)
hard_limit = max(max_results * 4, max_results + 50)
r = self._sh(f"find {shlex.quote(resolved)} \\( {type_expr} \\) -print 2>/dev/null | head -{hard_limit}")
matches: list[str] = []
root = resolved.rstrip("/") or "/"
root_prefix = root if root == "/" else f"{root}/"
for entry in (r.stdout or "").splitlines():
entry = entry.strip()
if not entry or (entry != root and not entry.startswith(root_prefix)):
continue
if should_ignore_path(entry):
continue
rel_path = entry[len(root) :].lstrip("/")
if not rel_path:
continue
if path_matches(pattern, rel_path):
matches.append(entry)
if len(matches) >= max_results:
return matches, True
return matches, False
def grep(
self,
path: str,
pattern: str,
*,
glob: str | None = None,
literal: bool = False,
case_sensitive: bool = False,
max_results: int = 100,
) -> tuple[list[GrepMatch], bool]:
# Sanity-check a regex pattern as a Python regex at the boundary (grep uses
# POSIX ERE, but this catches gross errors); a literal needs no validation.
# grep receives the RAW pattern: -F matches it literally, -E as a regex.
if not literal:
re.compile(pattern, 0 if case_sensitive else re.IGNORECASE)
resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
# busybox+GNU-portable flags: -r recursive, -H always print the filename
# (including when path is a single file), -n line numbers, -I skip
# binary, -E/-F regex vs fixed. --include and -m are omitted for busybox
# portability; glob-scoping and the result cap are applied in Python.
flags = ["-r", "-H", "-n", "-I"]
if not case_sensitive:
flags.append("-i")
flags.append("-F" if literal else "-E")
total_cap = max(max_results * 4, max_results + 50)
cmd = "grep " + " ".join(flags) + f" -e {shlex.quote(pattern)} {shlex.quote(resolved)} 2>/dev/null | head -{total_cap}"
r = self._sh(cmd)
include = glob.split("/")[-1] if glob else None
matches: list[GrepMatch] = []
truncated = False
for raw in (r.stdout or "").splitlines():
try:
file_path, line_no_str, line_text = raw.split(":", 2)
except ValueError:
continue
try:
line_number = int(line_no_str)
except ValueError:
continue
if should_ignore_path(file_path):
continue
if include and not path_matches(include, posixpath.basename(file_path)):
continue
matches.append(GrepMatch(path=file_path, line_number=line_number, line=truncate_line(line_text)))
if len(matches) >= max_results:
truncated = True
break
return matches, truncated