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* feat(memory): redact queued memory payloads (pii_redaction follow-up) Closes the remaining vector from #3190 (memory storage): request-scoped redaction leaves originals in thread state, and MemoryMiddleware queued that raw conversation into the durable extraction buffer — so the extraction model's input and the persisted facts carried raw PII even with pii_redaction.enabled. - MemoryMiddleware gains pii_redaction_config (same pattern as summarization / durable-context / title); the payload returned by _resolve_add_args() is redacted at the enqueue boundary before add()/aadd(), covering both after_agent and aafter_agent - Reuses the shared redact_text() seam from #5527 via active_pii_detectors/_Redactor/_redact_content; the buffered payload itself becomes clean, not just the extraction model's view - Wired at the lead-agent assembly site - Tests: queue-payload redaction enabled/disabled, detector toggles, message immutability, token stability across turns * fix(memory): reserve existing placeholder indices across the queued batch Review round 1 on #5577: thread state mixes raw user turns with already-redacted tool results and summaries, so a token in a later message must not collide with a new value in an earlier one. Pre-scan the whole queued batch with redactor.reserve() before allocating. Also extend the two MemoryMiddleware stubs in test_lead_agent_model_resolution.py to accept the new pii_redaction_config kwarg (CI backend-unit-tests red). * fix(memory): redact the compaction-triggered memory_flush_hook queue too Review round 2 on #5577: with memory + summarization enabled, memory_flush_hook() queues list(event.messages_to_summarize) directly into MemoryManager.add_nowait(), bypassing MemoryMiddleware entirely — and compaction removes those messages from state right after, so the after-agent redaction can never repair a raw batch queued there. Extract the batch redaction (reserve pre-scan + rebuild) into a shared redact_queued_messages() used by both MemoryMiddleware's enqueue boundary and the hook; the hook gains an optional pii_redaction_config wired via functools.partial at the summarization factory (subagents use skip_memory_flush=True and are unaffected). Regression covers the hook path enabled/disabled/absent. * test(summarization): unwrap the partial in the factory hook identity check edd916e wrapped memory_flush_hook in functools.partial to carry the pii_redaction config, but missed committing the matching update to test_factory_attaches_memory_flush_hook_by_default — a functools.partial is not equal to its wrapped function, so the identity assertion failed deterministically (caught by static review on #5577). * fix(memory): cover tool-call arguments and lenient text blocks in queued payloads Review round 4 on #5577 — two reproduced gaps still allowed raw PII into memory payloads with pii_redaction.enabled=true: - OpenViking retains the full message object, so parsed tool_calls args and provider-format arguments in additional_kwargs bypassed the content-only redaction; queued payloads now redact tool-call args recursively (and reserve them in the pre-scan). - DeerMem's format_conversation_for_update reads p.get("text") of any dict block, not only type=="text" — _redact_content now redacts every string-valued text field so a lenient consumer cannot bypass it. Both repro shapes are pinned as regressions. * fix(pii): value-derived placeholders for stable capture identity Review round 5 on #5577: sequential allocation is order-dependent — the same unchanged message re-redacted in a later batch can get a different token, which flips OpenViking's content-signature and replays already recorded turns into persistent memory sessions. Placeholders are now a pure function of the matched value (sha256-6 per category): identities stay stable across batches, enqueues, seams, and backends with no shared state and no stored mapping. - _Redactor becomes stateless; the reserve machinery (index pre-scans, _PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN) is removed along with its call sites - redact_texts keeps its signature, now a simple per-text redaction - reserve-semantics tests are superseded by cross-enqueue identity tests (two successive captures where the second batch carries higher existing placeholders); the compiled-graph echo regex matches the new format * fix(pii): 128-bit placeholder digests; redact tool-argument keys Review round 6 on #5577: - [P2] The 24-bit truncation collided distinct identities (reproduced: contact3513@ / contact3727@example.com both rendered [EMAIL_575dbb]). Retain 128 bits of the digest so separate people stay separate at any realistic volume; the compiled-graph echo regex and the AGENTS.md entry follow the new format. - [P2] _redact_strings redacted values but preserved mapping keys, so {"contacts": {"alice@example.com": "manager"}} kept the raw email as a key. Redact string keys along with values; deterministic 128-bit tokens make distinct-key collisions a hash-collision non-event, and a redacted key equal to another key merges the entries. Regression pins the email-keyed arguments shape. * docs(agents): trim PiiRedactionMiddleware entry; drop stale reserve wording The chain grew past the 98304-byte AG002 hard limit again (main growth plus the round-6 format example). Trim the entry to fit, and replace the stale reserve-indices wording with the value-derived semantics that replaced it. * docs(agents): shrink PiiRedactionMiddleware entry below the chain budget main moved (#5609) and the base comparison flipped the nearly-over chain back to an AG002 error (98441 > 98304). Trim the entry to the facts that are not documented elsewhere: seams, allowlist, order, enqueue boundary. * fix(pii): letters-only value-derived tokens; wire the factory SDK path Review round 7 on #5577: - [P2] Hex digests carry digit runs that later digit-anchored detectors re-scan, corrupting minted tokens into nested placeholders (reproduced: user280@example.com -> [EMAIL_…[PHONE_…]…], ~1/140 emails). The 128-bit digest is now encoded over a-z, so a minted token survives the full pinned detector order. - [P2] create_deerflow_agent (the SDK path) constructed MemoryMiddleware and DurableContextMiddleware without pii_redaction_config; the knob is now an explicit optional parameter threaded through _assemble_from_features (the factory reads no config files by design, so SDK callers pass it explicitly). - [Nit] hoist the Command rebuild comprehension out of the per-message loop in _redact_result. - [Nit] drop the dead _iter_tool_calls helper and Iterator import. * test(factory): pin pii_redaction_config wiring; document the parameter Review round 8 on #5577: - [P3] test_create_deerflow_agent.py had zero coverage of the pii_redaction_config parameter; two regressions now assert that create_deerflow_agent(pii_redaction_config=cfg) builds a MemoryMiddleware and a DurableContextMiddleware carrying cfg, and that the default is None (redaction off). - [Nit] document the parameter in the create_deerflow_agent docstring: None leaves redaction off; a middleware= takeover bypasses the assembly that would apply it. * fix(pii): HMAC-scoped placeholder tokens; install model-bound redaction in the SDK chain Review round 10 on #5577: - [P2] sha256(category||value) is an unkeyed, globally deterministic fingerprint: a provider or memory backend can confirm candidate values offline and link identical values across users and threads, contradicting the documented no-re-identification guarantee. Placeholders are now HMAC-derived over a deployment-scoped token_secret (new config field); the docstring documents the linkability scope for both modes. - [P2] _assemble_from_features() never appended PiiRedactionMiddleware, so the SDK knob enabled only the downstream seams while the primary model still received raw content. The middleware is now appended in the same relative position as the lead-agent base chain when the gate is on, with a model-call regression through the assembled SDK chain. * docs(pii): document token_secret; update the placeholder format examples Follow-up to the round-10 review on #5577: - config.example.yaml documents the new token_secret knob: a deployment-scoped secret makes placeholders HMAC-derived and only linkable within one deployment; leaving it unset keeps publicly computable fingerprints (documented trade). - the PiiRedactionConfig class docstring's placeholder example now matches the shipped format (128-bit HMAC digests over base-26 letters). * docs(pii): update the module docstring's placeholder format example The module docstring still showed the sequential [EMAIL_1] example; align it with the shipped value-derived format (128-bit HMAC digests over base-26 letters). * fix(pii): require a non-empty token_secret when redaction is enabled Review round 11 on #5577: with the secret optional, the default enabled configuration minted empty-key HMAC digests — publicly computable, globally linkable fingerprints of the raw values, confirmable by offline guessing for low-entropy identifiers such as phone numbers. - PiiRedactionConfig now rejects enabled=true without a non-empty token_secret (minimum 16 characters); the unkeyed mode is gone entirely. - The request-scoped redactor in _process_request now carries the configured key: it built its redactor without it, so user-message placeholders silently diverged from every other seam for the same value. The empty-key guard in _placeholder_token is the backstop that keeps every path keyed. - Module/config docstrings and config.example.yaml no longer describe the placeholders as irreversible or the secret as optional; the stale reserve-semantics wording and the "memory path not covered" note are corrected. - Regressions: validation errors for missing/blank/short secrets, and the user-message boundary minting the same keyed token as redact_text. * fix(memory): redact original_user_content on queued memory payloads Review round 12 on #5577: UploadsMiddleware preserves the raw user turn in additional_kwargs.original_user_content, but redact_queued_messages rewrote only content, tool_calls, and provider-format tool_calls — the queued copy still carried the raw value, so the memory queue and backend received raw PII with redaction enabled. The shared helper now redacts the provenance string field on the queued copy (same batch redactor, merged with the existing additional_kwargs rewrite, rebuilt via model_copy — thread-state messages stay untouched), covering both the enqueue boundary and the compaction flush hook. Regressions pin the redacted provenance field through both paths and the untouched original. * fix(memory): redact human_input_response on queued memory payloads Review round 13 on #5577: clarification replies keep the raw user answer in additional_kwargs.human_input_response.value (DeerMem reads that mapping via its read_human_input_response mirror), but redact_queued_messages rewrote only content, tool_calls, and original_user_content — the queued copy still carried the raw value into the memory queue and backend. The shared helper now rebuilds that mapping with value redacted (same batch redactor) while preserving the protocol fields (version/kind/source/ request_id/option_id/response_kind), merged with the existing additional_kwargs rewrite and rebuilt via model_copy so thread-state messages stay untouched. Regressions pin the redacted value, preserved protocol fields, the untouched original, and the flush-hook path. * chore(config): bump config_version to 47; generate token_secret on upgrade Review round 13 on #5577: existing deployments can legitimately sit at config_version 46 with pii_redaction.enabled: true and no token_secret; the mandatory-secret validator would fail their startup while config.example.yaml still said 46, so the upgrade checker considered them current and emitted no migration warning. - Bump config_version to 47 so the outdated-config warning fires for v46. - Add a v47 migration to scripts/config-upgrade.sh: when pii_redaction is enabled and token_secret is missing/blank, generate a random deployment- scoped secret (secrets.token_urlsafe) and persist it, so the upgraded deployment starts under the mandatory validation. - Regressions: a v46 enabled config is flagged outdated against the real example; the upgrade run generates a >= 16-char secret and the result passes AppConfig validation; a disabled config gets no secret. - Also switch the two v41 script tests from a hardcoded "bash" to SCRIPT_BASH/skipif, matching the documented Windows constraint and the neighboring tests (hardcoded bash resolves to the WSL stub there). * chore(helm): sync chart config_version to 47 Review round 14 on #5577: check_config_version.sh fails whenever the chart's embedded config_version lags config.example.yaml, and the chart workflow is triggered by config.example.yaml — so the v47 bump left this head failing that check. Update the values.yaml config block and the README example to 47; scripts/check_config_version.sh now passes. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
284 lines
13 KiB
Python
284 lines
13 KiB
Python
"""Memory-queue PII redaction (#3190 vector 5, follow-up to #5527)."""
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock
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from langchain_core.messages import AIMessage, HumanMessage
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from langgraph.runtime import Runtime
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from deerflow.agents.human_input import HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY
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from deerflow.agents.middlewares import memory_middleware as memory_middleware_module
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from deerflow.agents.middlewares.memory_middleware import MemoryMiddleware
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from deerflow.agents.middlewares.pii_redaction_middleware import redact_text
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from deerflow.config.memory_config import MemoryConfig
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from deerflow.config.pii_redaction_config import PiiRedactionConfig
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from deerflow.utils.messages import ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY
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_TOKEN_SECRET = "unit-test-deployment-secret-0123456789"
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EMAIL_TOKEN = redact_text("alice@example.com", PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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def _middleware(pii_config):
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manager = MagicMock()
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mw = MemoryMiddleware(
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agent_name="researcher",
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memory_config=MemoryConfig(enabled=True),
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pii_redaction_config=pii_config,
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)
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return mw, manager
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def _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, messages):
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monkeypatch.setattr(memory_middleware_module, "get_memory_manager", lambda: manager)
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runtime = Runtime(context={"thread_id": "thread-123", "user_id": "runtime-user"})
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mw.after_agent({"messages": messages}, runtime)
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return manager.add.call_args
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def test_queue_payload_redacted_when_enabled(monkeypatch):
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com"), AIMessage("noted")])
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queued = call.args[1]
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued[0].content and "alice@example.com" not in queued[0].content
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assert queued[1].content == "noted"
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def test_queue_payload_untouched_without_config(monkeypatch):
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mw, manager = _middleware(None)
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com")])
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assert "alice@example.com" in call.args[1][0].content
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def test_queue_payload_untouched_when_disabled(monkeypatch):
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=False))
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com")])
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assert "alice@example.com" in call.args[1][0].content
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def test_detector_toggles_respected(monkeypatch):
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, redact_email=False, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com")])
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assert "alice@example.com" in call.args[1][0].content
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def test_original_messages_not_mutated(monkeypatch):
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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original = HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com")
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_run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [original])
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assert original.content == "reach alice@example.com"
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def test_same_value_shares_token_across_turns(monkeypatch):
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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call = _run(
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mw,
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manager,
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monkeypatch,
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[HumanMessage("alice@example.com"), AIMessage("got alice@example.com")],
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)
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queued = call.args[1]
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assert queued[0].content == EMAIL_TOKEN
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued[1].content
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def test_existing_placeholder_in_later_message_keeps_identity_stable(monkeypatch):
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# Round-5 review on #5577: sequential numbering made an unchanged
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# message's token depend on batch contents (a higher existing placeholder
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# in a later batch would shift it, breaking OpenViking capture dedup).
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# Value-derived tokens keep the unchanged message's identity stable.
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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alice_token = redact_text("alice@example.com", PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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messages = [
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HumanMessage("Bob's email is bob@example.com"),
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AIMessage(f"Alice's email is {alice_token} and Bob's email is [EMAIL_2]"),
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]
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first = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, messages).args[1]
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second = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, messages).args[1]
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bob_token = redact_text("bob@example.com", PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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assert first[0].content == f"Bob's email is {bob_token}"
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assert second[0].content == first[0].content
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assert f"Alice's email is {alice_token}" in first[1].content
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def _flush_hook_call(monkeypatch, pii_config, messages):
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import deerflow.agents.memory.summarization_hook as hook_module
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from deerflow.agents.middlewares.summarization_middleware import SummarizationEvent
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manager = MagicMock()
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monkeypatch.setattr(hook_module, "get_memory_manager", lambda: manager)
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monkeypatch.setattr(hook_module, "resolve_runtime_user_id", lambda runtime: "u1")
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event = SummarizationEvent(
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messages_to_summarize=tuple(messages),
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preserved_messages=(),
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thread_id="thread-123",
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agent_name="researcher",
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runtime=None,
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)
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hook_module.memory_flush_hook(event, pii_redaction_config=pii_config)
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return manager.add_nowait.call_args.args[1]
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def test_compaction_flush_hook_redacts_queued_payload(monkeypatch):
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# Review round 2 on #5577: the compaction-triggered memory_flush_hook
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# queues messages that compaction is about to remove from state, so the
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# after-agent redaction can never repair a raw batch queued here.
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queued = _flush_hook_call(
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monkeypatch,
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PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET),
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[HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com"), AIMessage("noted")],
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)
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued[0].content and "alice@example.com" not in queued[0].content
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assert queued[1].content == "noted"
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def test_compaction_flush_hook_untouched_without_config(monkeypatch):
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queued = _flush_hook_call(monkeypatch, None, [HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com")])
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assert "alice@example.com" in queued[0].content
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def test_compaction_flush_hook_untouched_when_disabled(monkeypatch):
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queued = _flush_hook_call(monkeypatch, PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=False), [HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com")])
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assert "alice@example.com" in queued[0].content
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def test_tool_call_args_redacted(monkeypatch):
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# OpenViking-style retention keeps the full message object, including
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# parsed tool_calls and provider-format arguments in additional_kwargs.
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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ai = AIMessage(
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content="",
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tool_calls=[{"name": "memory_search", "args": {"query": "alice@example.com"}, "id": "call_1"}],
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additional_kwargs={
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"tool_calls": [
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{"function": {"name": "memory_search", "arguments": '{"query": "alice@example.com"}'}},
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],
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},
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)
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage("hi"), ai])
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queued = call.args[1][1]
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assert "alice@example.com" not in str(queued.tool_calls)
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in str(queued.tool_calls)
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assert "alice@example.com" not in str(queued.additional_kwargs.get("tool_calls"))
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in str(queued.additional_kwargs.get("tool_calls"))
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def test_non_text_block_text_field_redacted(monkeypatch):
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# DeerMem's format_conversation_for_update reads the "text" value of any
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# dict block, not only type=="text" — the helper must follow.
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage([{"type": "custom_card", "text": "alice@example.com"}])])
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block = call.args[1][0].content[0]
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assert block["text"] == EMAIL_TOKEN
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def test_tool_argument_keys_redacted(monkeypatch):
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# Review round 6: tool arguments can carry user data in mapping keys.
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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ai = AIMessage(
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content="",
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tool_calls=[
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{"name": "memory_search", "args": {"contacts": {"alice@example.com": "manager"}}, "id": "call_1"},
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],
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)
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call = _run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [HumanMessage("hi"), ai])
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args = call.args[1][1].tool_calls[0]["args"]
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assert args["contacts"] == {EMAIL_TOKEN: "manager"}
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assert "alice@example.com" not in str(args)
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def test_distinct_identities_keep_distinct_tokens():
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# Review round 6: a 24-bit truncation collided distinct identities; at
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# 128 bits the review's collision pair stays distinct, including when
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# both appear together in one message.
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cfg = PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET)
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a = redact_text("contact3513@example.com", cfg)
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b = redact_text("contact3727@example.com", cfg)
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assert a != b
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both = redact_text("contact3513@example.com and contact3727@example.com", cfg)
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assert a in both and b in both
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def test_original_user_content_provenance_redacted(monkeypatch):
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# Review round 12 on #5577: UploadsMiddleware preserves the raw user turn
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# in additional_kwargs.original_user_content, so a redacted content alone
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# still leaks the raw value to the memory backend. The queued copy must
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# redact the provenance field too, and the thread-state message must stay
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# untouched.
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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original = HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com", additional_kwargs={ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY: "reach alice@example.com"})
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_run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [original])
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queued = manager.add.call_args.args[1][0]
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued.content and "alice@example.com" not in queued.content
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued.additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY]
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assert "alice@example.com" not in queued.additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY]
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assert original.additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY] == "reach alice@example.com"
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assert original.content == "reach alice@example.com"
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def test_original_user_content_redacted_in_compaction_flush_hook(monkeypatch):
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# Same provenance leak through the compaction-triggered hook, which shares
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# redact_queued_messages: one fix must cover both enqueues.
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queued = _flush_hook_call(
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monkeypatch,
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PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET),
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[HumanMessage("reach alice@example.com", additional_kwargs={ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY: "reach alice@example.com"})],
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)
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued[0].additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY]
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assert "alice@example.com" not in queued[0].additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY]
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def _human_input_response(value: str) -> dict:
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return {
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"version": 1,
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"kind": "human_input_response",
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"source": "clarification",
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"request_id": "req-1",
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"response_kind": "text",
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"value": value,
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}
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def test_human_input_response_value_redacted(monkeypatch):
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# Review round 13 on #5577: clarification replies keep the raw user answer
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# in additional_kwargs.human_input_response.value (DeerMem reads that
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# mapping), so the queued copy must redact the value while preserving the
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# protocol fields. The same message also carries original_user_content —
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# both rewrites must survive in one merged additional_kwargs update.
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mw, manager = _middleware(PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET))
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original = HumanMessage(
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"my email is alice@example.com",
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additional_kwargs={
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HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY: _human_input_response("my email is alice@example.com"),
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ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY: "my email is alice@example.com",
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},
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)
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_run(mw, manager, monkeypatch, [original])
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queued = manager.add.call_args.args[1][0]
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued.content and "alice@example.com" not in queued.content
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queued_response = queued.additional_kwargs[HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY]
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued_response["value"] and "alice@example.com" not in queued_response["value"]
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assert queued_response["version"] == 1
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assert queued_response["kind"] == "human_input_response"
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assert queued_response["source"] == "clarification"
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assert queued_response["request_id"] == "req-1"
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assert queued_response["response_kind"] == "text"
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued.additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY]
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assert "alice@example.com" not in str(queued.additional_kwargs)
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assert original.additional_kwargs[HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY]["value"] == "my email is alice@example.com"
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assert original.additional_kwargs[ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY] == "my email is alice@example.com"
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assert original.content == "my email is alice@example.com"
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def test_human_input_response_redacted_in_compaction_flush_hook(monkeypatch):
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# Same leak through the compaction-triggered hook, which shares
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# redact_queued_messages: one fix must cover both enqueues.
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queued = _flush_hook_call(
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monkeypatch,
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PiiRedactionConfig(enabled=True, token_secret=_TOKEN_SECRET),
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[HumanMessage("my email is alice@example.com", additional_kwargs={HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY: _human_input_response("my email is alice@example.com")})],
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)
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assert EMAIL_TOKEN in queued[0].additional_kwargs[HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY]["value"]
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assert "alice@example.com" not in str(queued[0].additional_kwargs[HUMAN_INPUT_RESPONSE_KEY])
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