mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
synced 2026-09-25 14:06:18 +00:00
* fix(authz): cover create/run/memory/agent routes with permission checks; scope USER.md per user
Route permissions: the AuthorizationProvider model only applied to routes
carrying @require_permission, so POST /api/threads, /api/threads/search,
POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait (runs:create), every /api/memory
route and the custom-agent routes ran with authentication only — a
provider configured to deny threads:write/runs:create/... could not
enforce those decisions. Add the missing decorators (threads:write,
threads:read, runs:create, memory:read/write, agents:read/write) and
register the new permission names in authz.Permissions. No owner checks
are added: per-user data scoping stays in the repository layer.
User profile: GET/PUT /api/user-profile read and wrote a single global
{base_dir}/USER.md, so in a multi-user deployment any authenticated user
could overwrite the prompt context injected for everyone else (and read
it). Scope the file to the caller's bucket
({base_dir}/users/{user_id}/USER.md) like user-scoped skills; no other
consumer of the old global path exists in the tree (verified by grep and
the updated tests). test_put_user_profile asserted the wrong effective
user under the autouse conftest user fixture; fixed to test-user-autouse.
* fix(authz): bind positional args in require_permission; migrate legacy USER.md
Review follow-up on #4989 (willem-bd):
- require_permission's wrapper only looked for request in keyword
arguments, so direct positional calls like
create_thread(body, request) made the injected keyword stub collide
with the positional request (TypeError: multiple values). The wrapper
now binds the wrapped signature via inspect.signature().bind() and
honors a positionally-passed request (and thread_id) instead of
assuming kwargs; the test-stub injection only fires when request is
absent everywhere. The two positional callers in
tests/test_threads_router.py pass again (8/8 channel tests).
- migrate_user_isolation.py now claims the legacy global USER.md for
--user-id (default 'default') like the other unowned legacy
artifacts; without it, upgrading installs with an existing profile
would read content: null and later strand the old file beside the
new per-user one. Conflict handling mirrors migrate_memory (rename to
USER.legacy.md).
* style(scripts): keep migrate_user_isolation help within the line budget
* test(authz): give internal-request stubs realistic auth fields
The create_thread permission wrapper added in this PR authenticates
the direct calls in the internal-owner tests; their SimpleNamespace
requests had state.user but no auth_source and no cookies, so
get_current_user_from_request fell through to request.cookies.get and
raised AttributeError (verified introduced by this branch: both tests
pass on the base commit).
The stubs now carry cookies={} and
state.auth_source=AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL, which is exactly what
AuthMiddleware stamps on real internal requests, so state.user is
honored without the JWT path. All 80 tests in the file pass.
* fix(pat): keep memory/agent permissions out of PAT scopes by design
The route permissions exist (they guard the memory/agent routers) but PATs
govern the thread/run lifecycle only: _PAT_ROUTE_RULES default-denies those
routers for PAT callers regardless of scopes. The alignment invariant
becomes a subset check plus a pinned exclusion, and pat.py documents that
opening these scopes is a product decision requiring three synchronized
changes.
* test/docs: cover migrate_user_profile; drop the unclaimed USER.md injection wording
Five-scenario test class mirroring the sibling migration steps (move,
conflict-rename, noop, both under dry-run). The GET/PUT descriptions no
longer say USER.md is 'injected into agents' — nothing at this head consumes
it for prompts; the routes are storage/retrieval only. The memory AGENTS.md
migration pointer now enumerates skills/ and the global USER.md.
* docs(paths): align the USER.md layout comment with the injection disclaimer
* test(authz): align effective permission contracts
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
216 lines
9.0 KiB
Python
216 lines
9.0 KiB
Python
"""Tests for PAT token utilities and the personal access token repository."""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
import pytest_asyncio
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.pat import (
|
|
PAT_ALLOWED_SCOPES,
|
|
PAT_TOKEN_PREFIX,
|
|
digest_matches,
|
|
extract_bearer_token,
|
|
generate_pat_token,
|
|
pat_token_digest,
|
|
validate_scopes,
|
|
)
|
|
from deerflow.config.database_config import DatabaseConfig
|
|
from deerflow.persistence.engine import close_engine, get_session_factory, init_engine_from_config
|
|
from deerflow.persistence.personal_access_tokens import PersonalAccessTokenRepository
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest_asyncio.fixture(autouse=True)
|
|
async def _close_persistence_engine():
|
|
yield
|
|
await close_engine()
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _make_repo(tmp_path) -> PersonalAccessTokenRepository:
|
|
await init_engine_from_config(DatabaseConfig(backend="sqlite", sqlite_dir=str(tmp_path)))
|
|
session_factory = get_session_factory()
|
|
assert session_factory is not None
|
|
return PersonalAccessTokenRepository(session_factory)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Token utilities ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_generate_pat_token_format():
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
assert token.startswith(PAT_TOKEN_PREFIX)
|
|
body = token[len(PAT_TOKEN_PREFIX) :]
|
|
assert len(body) == 43 # fixed width: 62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42
|
|
assert body.isalnum()
|
|
# Two draws must differ: CSPRNG, not a counter.
|
|
assert token != generate_pat_token()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_base62_pads_to_fixed_width_for_leading_zero_and_all_zero_input():
|
|
"""``int.from_bytes`` discards leading zero bytes; the fixed-width pad
|
|
keeps the token body exactly 43 chars for every draw, including the
|
|
all-zero and single-leading-byte edges (review round 6, P3)."""
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.pat import PAT_RANDOM_BYTES, _base62
|
|
|
|
assert _base62(b"\x00" * PAT_RANDOM_BYTES) == "0" * 43
|
|
assert _base62(b"\x00" * (PAT_RANDOM_BYTES - 1) + b"\x01") == "0" * 42 + "1"
|
|
assert len(_base62(b"\xff" * PAT_RANDOM_BYTES)) == 43
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_pat_token_digest_is_deterministic_and_constant_time_comparable():
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
assert pat_token_digest(token) == pat_token_digest(token)
|
|
assert len(pat_token_digest(token)) == 64
|
|
assert digest_matches(pat_token_digest(token), token) is True
|
|
# The mutated token must differ from the original even when the CSPRNG
|
|
# tail already ends in "X" (1/62), or this assertion fails intermittently.
|
|
mutated_tail = "X" if token[-1] != "X" else "Y"
|
|
assert digest_matches(pat_token_digest(token), token[:-1] + mutated_tail) is False
|
|
assert digest_matches(None, token) is False
|
|
assert digest_matches("", token) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_extract_bearer_token_classifies_absent_scheme_and_credential():
|
|
assert extract_bearer_token(None) is None
|
|
assert extract_bearer_token("Bearer dfp_abc") == "dfp_abc"
|
|
assert extract_bearer_token("bearer dfp_abc") == "dfp_abc" # scheme is case-insensitive
|
|
assert extract_bearer_token("Basic dXNlcg==") == "" # present but unusable
|
|
assert extract_bearer_token("Bearer ") == ""
|
|
assert extract_bearer_token("Bearer") == ""
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_scopes_deduplicates_and_rejects_unknown():
|
|
assert validate_scopes(["runs:read", "threads:read", "runs:read"]) == ["runs:read", "threads:read"]
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown PAT scopes"):
|
|
validate_scopes(["runs:write"]) # not a route permission
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="at least one scope"):
|
|
validate_scopes([])
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_pat_scopes_stay_aligned_with_route_permissions():
|
|
"""Every PAT scope must be a real route permission, and the memory/agent
|
|
permissions are deliberately excluded: PATs govern the thread/run
|
|
lifecycle only (_PAT_ROUTE_RULES default-denies those routers for PAT
|
|
callers regardless of scopes). Fail on drift in either direction."""
|
|
from app.gateway.authz import _ALL_PERMISSIONS
|
|
|
|
route_permissions = frozenset(_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
|
|
assert PAT_ALLOWED_SCOPES <= route_permissions
|
|
# The deliberate exclusions, pinned so they cannot drift silently.
|
|
assert not (PAT_ALLOWED_SCOPES & {"memory:read", "memory:write", "agents:read", "agents:write"})
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Repository ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_create_and_resolve_by_digest_roundtrip(tmp_path):
|
|
repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
record = await repo.create(
|
|
user_id="user-1",
|
|
name="ci-runner",
|
|
scopes=["runs:read"],
|
|
token_digest=pat_token_digest(token),
|
|
)
|
|
assert record["user_id"] == "user-1"
|
|
assert record["scopes"] == ["runs:read"]
|
|
assert record["revoked_at"] is None
|
|
|
|
resolved = await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token))
|
|
assert resolved is not None
|
|
assert resolved["id"] == record["id"]
|
|
assert resolved["token_digest"] == pat_token_digest(token)
|
|
# Digest lookup never matches a different token.
|
|
assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token())) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_revoked_token_no_longer_resolves(tmp_path):
|
|
repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
record = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="temp", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(token))
|
|
|
|
assert await repo.revoke(record["id"], "user-1") is True
|
|
# Revoking twice is a no-op.
|
|
assert await repo.revoke(record["id"], "user-1") is False
|
|
assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token)) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_revoke_is_scoped_to_the_owning_user(tmp_path):
|
|
repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
record = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="mine", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(token))
|
|
|
|
assert await repo.revoke(record["id"], "user-2") is False # not the owner
|
|
assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token)) is not None
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_expired_token_no_longer_resolves(tmp_path):
|
|
repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
await repo.create(
|
|
user_id="user-1",
|
|
name="short-lived",
|
|
scopes=["runs:read"],
|
|
token_digest=pat_token_digest(token),
|
|
expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(seconds=1),
|
|
)
|
|
assert await repo.get_active_by_digest(pat_token_digest(token)) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_list_for_user_is_isolated_and_never_returns_raw_tokens(tmp_path):
|
|
repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
|
|
token = generate_pat_token()
|
|
created = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="a", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(token))
|
|
await repo.create(user_id="user-2", name="b", scopes=["threads:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token()))
|
|
|
|
listed = await repo.list_for_user("user-1")
|
|
assert [item["id"] for item in listed] == [created["id"]]
|
|
assert listed[0]["token_digest"] == pat_token_digest(token) # digest only; raw token never persisted
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_token_digest_unique_constraint(tmp_path):
|
|
repo = await _make_repo(tmp_path)
|
|
digest = pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token())
|
|
await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="a", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=digest)
|
|
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(IntegrityError):
|
|
await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="dup", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=digest)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_touch_last_used_is_throttled(tmp_path):
|
|
await init_engine_from_config(DatabaseConfig(backend="sqlite", sqlite_dir=str(tmp_path)))
|
|
session_factory = get_session_factory()
|
|
repo = PersonalAccessTokenRepository(session_factory, last_used_write_interval_seconds=300.0)
|
|
record = await repo.create(user_id="user-1", name="t", scopes=["runs:read"], token_digest=pat_token_digest(generate_pat_token()))
|
|
|
|
await repo.touch_last_used(record["id"])
|
|
first = (await repo.list_for_user("user-1"))[0]["last_used_at"]
|
|
assert first is not None
|
|
|
|
# A second touch inside the throttle window must not produce a write.
|
|
await repo.touch_last_used(record["id"])
|
|
second = (await repo.list_for_user("user-1"))[0]["last_used_at"]
|
|
assert second == first
|
|
|
|
# After the window elapses the next touch writes again.
|
|
repo._last_used_written_at.clear()
|
|
await repo.touch_last_used(record["id"])
|
|
third = (await repo.list_for_user("user-1"))[0]["last_used_at"]
|
|
assert third != first
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
|
async def test_touch_last_used_never_raises_on_unknown_id(tmp_path):
|
|
await init_engine_from_config(DatabaseConfig(backend="sqlite", sqlite_dir=str(tmp_path)))
|
|
repo = PersonalAccessTokenRepository(get_session_factory())
|
|
await repo.touch_last_used("no-such-pat") # update affects 0 rows; still a commit
|