deer-flow/backend/tests/test_authorization_enforcement.py
hataa 1cd3eb742b
feat(authz): enforce skill authorization at assembly and slash-activation (#4063 Phase 3) (#4541)
* feat(authz): enforce skill authorization at assembly and slash-activation (#4063 Phase 3)

Phase 3 / Skills — the second of three resource-type PRs (Models, Skills,
Sandbox). The RBAC provider already maps "skill" → config key "skills"
(rbac.py _RESOURCE_POLICY_KEYS), so no schema change is needed.

Layer 1 (assembly-time, mirrors Phase 1B):
- filter_available_skills_by_authorization() in skill_filter.py filters the
  skill-name allowlist (set[str] | None) by the provider's "skill" policy.
  In lead agent, runs after _available_skill_names() so the catalog
  (describe_skill) and SkillActivationMiddleware share one filtered set.
  In subagent executor _load_skills(), filters config.skills before disk load.
- filter_resources_by_authorization() in enforcement.py — generic version of
  filter_tools_by_authorization for any resource with a name attribute.

Layer 2 (slash-activation):
- No new middleware code needed. SkillActivationMiddleware._resolve_activation
  already checks "reference.name not in self._available_skills". Since Layer 1
  filters the allowlist, denied skills cannot be slash-activated.

authorization.enabled: false is a complete no-op. available_skills=None (no
agent allowlist) + enabled: resolves all skill names from config and filters.
12 new tests + 243 existing authz/skills tests pass.

* test(subagents): wait on the chained future instead of polling done() in caller-loop teardown test

* feat(authz): enforce action-scoped skill:activate at runtime and reuse the catalog loader for filter candidates

* feat(authz): arm skill:activate on the subagent chain, unify the client skill-surface user, and record the Layer 2 reversal in the design notes

* chore(authz): align the subagent filter's fallback user with the chain's bucket convention

* feat(authz): gate autonomous skill loading on skill:activate, close the bootstrap assembly leak, and reuse one provider per subagent assembly

Review round 4 (willem-bd, CHANGES_REQUESTED):

- [P1] Autonomous load path: describe_skill filters its match set on the
  action-scoped skill:activate decision (all-denied is indistinguishable
  from "no match"), and ToolErrorHandlingMiddleware stamps skill_context
  entries only when the action allows it — a denied SKILL.md read gets a
  skill_context_denied marker instead, so durable context, allowed-tools
  policy, and autonomous secret bindings never activate a denied skill.
  File visibility itself stays Layer 1 (sandbox-projection semantics).
- [P1] Bootstrap assembly: build_middlewares/apply_prompt_template now
  receive the authorization-filtered set instead of the raw
  _BOOTSTRAP_SKILL_NAMES, and an empty skill_names index is preserved
  when deferred discovery is on rather than round-tripping through None
  into the legacy full-metadata prompt that re-advertises a denied
  skill (deferred-off keeps the legacy rendering; the filtered empty
  allowlist blanks it on denial).
- [P2] SubagentExecutor resolves ResolvedSkillAuthorization once per
  assembly (_resolve_skill_authorization, memoized per executor) and
  shares it across the Layer 1 filter (authorization=), the activation
  middleware, and both new gates — uncached provider factories can no
  longer hand the layers different instances/policy snapshots.

All gates share one helper (skill_filter.skill_activation_allowed) so
slash, describe, and skill-file-load cannot drift; provider errors keep
the configured fail-closed/fail-open policy. skill_authorization is
threaded through _build_runtime_middlewares into both runtime builders.

Tests: describe gating (deny/fail-closed/fail-open/disabled), read
stamping (denied marker vs entry) + extract_skills skip without warning,
bootstrap three-way param (allow/deny x deferred on/off), lead + subagent
chain wiring for the stamp gate, and the distinct-instance provider
factory repro. Each fix is mutation-verified (reverting it fails its
test). Full A/B suite run: no new failures vs HEAD.

* feat(authz): re-authorize persisted skill_context before reuse and route async paths through aauthorize

Review round 5 (willem-bd):

- [P1] Persisted entries: skill_context survives across runs, so both
  consumers now re-check the action-scoped skill:activate decision before
  reuse. SkillToolPolicyMiddleware._active_skills_for_paths skips a
  denied skill (same skip as a disabled/unallowlisted one; all-denied
  keeps the existing fail-closed-to-builtins semantics) and
  _in_context_secret_sources binds no secrets for a denied entry.
  skill_authorization is threaded into SkillToolPolicyMiddleware on both
  chains.
- [P2] Async provider API: skill_activation_allowed_async mirrors the sync
  helper through await provider.aauthorize() (same pattern as
  authorize_sandbox_execution_async). Async hooks precompute an
  activation_decisions map on the event loop (slash target + persisted
  entry names, one batch of awaits) and hand it to the worker-thread
  handler, which consults the map instead of the sync API:
  SkillActivationMiddleware.awrap_model_call (activation + secret
  binding), ToolErrorHandlingMiddleware.awrap_tool_call (_amaybe_stamp
  awaits the decision before stamping), and SkillToolPolicyMiddleware's
  awrap_model_call/awrap_tool_call (entry names + slash source name).
  describe_skill becomes a StructuredTool with both a sync function
  (invoke -> authorize) and a coroutine (ainvoke -> aauthorize), so async
  agent execution never routes a loop-affine provider through the sync
  API while sync callers keep their semantics.

Tests: allow-read-then-deny-next-run regressions for secret binding and
allowed-tools (partial deny does not poison, all-denied fails closed to
builtins), and an _AsyncOnlyProvider (sync authorize always fails,
aauthorize works) driving four async-path assertions (activation, stamp
allow/deny, describe, tool policy). All six fixes are mutation-verified;
full A/B suite run against HEAD shows no new failures.

* fix(authz): authorize skill activation by declared Skill.name, not directory basename

ShenAC-SAC's P2: bundled skills may declare a name that differs from their
directory (skills/public/vercel-deploy-claimable declares name: vercel-deploy),
but the runtime gates derived authorization targets from the container path.

- New deerflow/skills/container_registry.py: build_container_path_registry()
  + canonical_skill_name() — the one path-to-Skill.name resolution shared by
  the activation, tool-policy, and read-stamping middlewares.
- ToolErrorHandlingMiddleware resolves the read path through the (user-scoped,
  via new user_id kwarg threaded from both runtime builders) registry before
  the skill:activate decision, sync and async (registry lookup in a worker
  thread, aauthorize() on the loop). RBAC allow by the declared name now
  activates; allow by the directory name does not.
- SkillToolPolicyMiddleware async hooks canonicalize the policy paths first
  (three-phase: thread registry -> loop aauthorize -> thread filter reusing
  the registry; the cached per-model-step decision still short-circuits),
  so the decision map is keyed by the names _active_skills_for_paths checks —
  no more map miss falling back to the sync provider API from the thread.
  _entry_names removed: persisted entry["name"] is path-derived by
  construction; entries are resolved by path instead.
- SkillActivationMiddleware collects slash names (already canonical) plus
  persisted entry *paths*, canonicalized off-loop via
  _canonical_names_for_paths().

Regressions (test_skills_authorization.py 45->50): sync stamp target, RBAC
allow declared-name/deny directory-name both directions, async stamp via
_AsyncOnlyProvider, composed async slash -> tool-policy keeps the skill's
tools with zero sync fallback, persisted-entry secret binding survives the
name mismatch. All three mutations (stamp target, policy map key, entry
canonicalization) fail their tests.

* fix(authz): close the sync-fallback class on skill activation paths

willem-bd's two P2s on the canonical-name fix, plus a fourth instance of
the same class found while sweeping the membership:

- SkillToolPolicyMiddleware: a transient prepass registry failure is now
  preserved (_REGISTRY_LOAD_FAILED marker) — the worker-side filter applies
  its own fail-closed treatment instead of silently retrying storage,
  which recovered skills absent from the decision map and fell back to
  the synchronous provider API from the thread (fail-open retaining a
  denied skill's allowed-tools).
- SkillActivationMiddleware: an empty entry-path list no longer pays a
  full skill-tree scan on ordinary authorization-enabled async model
  steps (previously a passive path with zero registry I/O).
- 4th instance (reproduced with the PR fixtures, then fixed): the entry
  prepass failure on the secret-binding path let the consumer-side
  _load_skill_registry_by_path silently recover and resolve entry names
  outside the decision map — the same sync fallback, fail-open binding
  the aauthorize-denied skill's declared secret. The fix goes one step
  further than failure propagation: the prepass hands down the registry
  *snapshot* the decision map was keyed by, and entry sources resolve
  against that snapshot, so a map miss is impossible by construction
  (this also closes the narrower window where both loads succeed but
  disagree because storage changed mid-step). The slash source is
  deliberately unaffected: it does not consult the decision map
  (validated once at activation) and keeps its fresh per-call load.
- Class membership swept: skill_activation_allowed() sync call sites are
  exactly four (stamping sync path and describe's sync implementation are
  legitimately sync); the only two async-reachable fallback points (the
  _activation_allowed helpers) are both construction-guarded now.
  Structural hardening (typed async-batch decision object where a map
  miss is fail-closed by construction) recorded in the plan notes as a
  follow-up, anchored at those two helpers.
- _RegistryArg type alias replaces the degenerate dict|object|None union
  in the policy middleware signatures.

Tests (test_skills_authorization.py 50->54): transient prepass failure ->
builtins-only with exactly one storage attempt and zero provider calls;
ordinary async step -> zero registry scans; two-call scenario -> entry
binding zeroed while the slash binding survives; entries resolve against
the prepass snapshot under a mid-step rename. Mutations verified red:
marker reverted to None, over-broad slash kill, snapshot bypass.

* fix(authz): correct secret-binding reference points and gate the rendered skill reminder

Review round 9 (willem-bd) plus construction-audit follow-ups on the same
class — every async divergence between two loads of the same data now has
an explicit, pinned reference point:

- Slash secret source resolves from a FRESH post-activation registry: the
  prepass snapshot is taken before the aauthorize awaits, so binding the
  slash source from it would activate NEW_KEY content while injecting
  OLD_KEY when a skill's declared secrets change in that window. The
  'one scan per step' bonus that motivated sharing the snapshot is
  withdrawn — consistency wins. The two secret sources resolve
  independently: a transient fresh-load failure zeroes only the slash
  binding; entries keep binding from their own snapshot.
- Same-skill dominance: when a skill is both the slash source (fresh) and
  a persisted entry (snapshot), only the activation-era declaration binds
  — unioning both eras injected a secret the skill no longer declares.
  Aligns with the tool-policy rule (slash activation dominates for the
  run); different-skill entries still stack additively.
- The rendered 'Active skills' reminder (DurableContextMiddleware) no
  longer advertises skills the provider denies — surface consistency with
  describe_skill. Publication/consumption split: the activation
  middleware publishes per-step path-keyed skill:activate decisions into
  the run context (async: reused from the prepass snapshot, zero extra
  I/O; sync: one scan + authorize() only when entries exist — passive
  steps stay scan-free), the renderer consumes them and filters its
  render copy (state untouched; unpublished = permissive, matching the
  other run-context carriers). New carrier key listed in
  REDACTED_CONTEXT_KEYS with a redaction regression.
- Wiring regressions on both chains for everything added above (user_id
  to the stamp gate, skill_authorization + token pairing + activation-
  before-durable ordering to the durable renderer): each mutation
  verified red (M4-M13 across this change set).
- Tests 54->65: slash post-activation lookup, source independence,
  dominance, sync-chain sync-API path, render filter (async/sync/
  disabled with load-count assertions), chain wiring x2, redaction
  listing. Plan notes record rounds 9-2..6 including the reference-point
  post-mortem and the audit axes exhausted.

* fix(authz): anchor same-skill dominance on the slash identity, not binding results

Review round 10 (willem-bd) plus a self-audit extension the new checklist
items caught in the first fix itself:

- R10 (P2): the same-skill exclusion was derived from successfully BOUND
  slash sources. When the prepass snapshots required-secrets [OLD_KEY]
  and the operator strips the declaration during the await window, the
  slash source binds nothing (required_secrets gate) — the exclusion set
  stayed empty and the stale entry view kept injecting OLD_KEY for a
  skill that now declares no secrets. The exclusion now derives from the
  AUTHENTICATED slash activation identity (run-context source path,
  owner-token checked): the identity's declared name resolves from the
  fresh registry first, then the entry snapshot, and joins the exclusion
  set regardless of binding success.
- Self-audit (value->gate->downstream on the fix itself): the declared
  name can also change mid-run (same path, foo->bar). A name-anchored
  exclusion then holds only the new name while the snapshot entry
  resolves the same path to the old one — both eras bound again. The
  PATH is the stable identity shared by the activation and every earlier
  read: entries at the slash identity's path are now excluded before
  registry resolution (exclude_paths), independent of what either
  version calls the skill; the name-based set remains for cross-path
  same-name shadowing.

Tests 65->67: no-secrets-era dominance (ACTIVE secrets None under the
OLD_KEY-to-empty interleaving), path-anchored dominance across a mid-run
rename (only the activation-era key binds). Mutations verified red:
identity-derived exclusion disabled (M14), path exclusion disabled
(M16).

* test(authz): pass explicit config to lead middleware wiring test

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-09-30 19:45:07 +08:00

475 lines
20 KiB
Python

"""Tests for Phase 1B tool authorization enforcement."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
import pytest
from langchain_core.tools import StructuredTool
from deerflow.agents.lead_agent import agent as lead_agent_module
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.tool_error_handling_middleware import (
build_lead_runtime_middlewares,
build_subagent_runtime_middlewares,
)
from deerflow.authz.adapter import GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter
from deerflow.authz.enforcement import filter_tools_by_authorization
from deerflow.authz.provider import AuthzDecision, AuthzReason, Principal
from deerflow.authz.rbac import RbacAuthorizationProvider
from deerflow.config.app_config import AppConfig
from deerflow.config.authorization_config import AuthorizationConfig, AuthorizationProviderConfig
from deerflow.config.guardrails_config import GuardrailProviderConfig, GuardrailsConfig
from deerflow.config.model_config import ModelConfig
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import SandboxConfig
from deerflow.guardrails.middleware import GuardrailMiddleware
from deerflow.tools.builtins.tool_search import assemble_deferred_tools
from deerflow.tools.mcp_metadata import tag_mcp_tool
def _tool(name: str) -> StructuredTool:
return StructuredTool.from_function(lambda: name, name=name, description=name)
class _FilterProvider:
name = "filter"
def __init__(self, allowed: list[str]) -> None:
self.allowed = allowed
self.calls: list[tuple[Principal, str, list[str]]] = []
def authorize(self, request):
return AuthzDecision(allow=True)
async def aauthorize(self, request):
return self.authorize(request)
def filter_resources(self, principal: Principal, resource_type: str, candidates: list[str]) -> list[str]:
self.calls.append((principal, resource_type, candidates))
return [candidate for candidate in candidates if candidate in self.allowed]
class _ExplodingFilterProvider(_FilterProvider):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__([])
def filter_resources(self, principal: Principal, resource_type: str, candidates: list[str]) -> list[str]:
raise RuntimeError("provider failed")
def _app_config(
*,
authorization: AuthorizationConfig,
guardrails: GuardrailsConfig | None = None,
models: list[ModelConfig] | None = None,
) -> AppConfig:
return AppConfig(
models=models or [],
sandbox=SandboxConfig(use="test"),
authorization=authorization,
guardrails=guardrails or GuardrailsConfig(),
)
class TestAuthorizationToolFilter:
def test_keeps_only_provider_allowed_tools_and_preserves_input_order(self):
provider = _FilterProvider(["web_search", "read_file"])
tools = [_tool("bash"), _tool("web_search"), _tool("read_file")]
filtered = filter_tools_by_authorization(
tools,
provider=provider,
principal=Principal(role="user"),
fail_closed=True,
)
assert [tool.name for tool in filtered] == ["web_search", "read_file"]
assert provider.calls == [(Principal(role="user"), "tool", ["bash", "web_search", "read_file"])]
def test_provider_error_fails_closed_to_an_empty_tool_set(self):
tools = [_tool("bash"), _tool("web_search")]
filtered = filter_tools_by_authorization(
tools,
provider=_ExplodingFilterProvider(),
principal=Principal(role="user"),
fail_closed=True,
)
assert filtered == []
def test_provider_error_fails_open_only_when_configured(self):
tools = [_tool("bash"), _tool("web_search")]
filtered = filter_tools_by_authorization(
tools,
provider=_ExplodingFilterProvider(),
principal=Principal(role="user"),
fail_closed=False,
)
assert filtered == tools
@pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_result", ["bash", ("bash",), ["bash", 1]])
def test_invalid_provider_result_fails_closed(self, invalid_result):
class _InvalidResultProvider(_FilterProvider):
def filter_resources(self, principal, resource_type, candidates):
return invalid_result
filtered = filter_tools_by_authorization(
[_tool("bash")],
provider=_InvalidResultProvider([]),
principal=Principal(role="user"),
fail_closed=True,
)
assert filtered == []
def test_provider_cannot_add_tools_outside_the_candidate_set(self):
class _InjectingProvider(_FilterProvider):
def filter_resources(self, principal, resource_type, candidates):
return [*candidates, "injected_tool"]
filtered = filter_tools_by_authorization(
[_tool("bash")],
provider=_InjectingProvider([]),
principal=Principal(role="user"),
fail_closed=True,
)
assert [tool.name for tool in filtered] == ["bash"]
class TestAuthorizationGuardrailWiring:
def test_deferred_tool_search_bypasses_layer_two_for_filtered_catalog(self):
provider = RbacAuthorizationProvider(roles={"guest": {"tools": {"allow": ["mcp_allowed"]}}})
filtered_tools = filter_tools_by_authorization(
[tag_mcp_tool(_tool("mcp_allowed"))],
provider=provider,
principal=Principal(role="guest"),
fail_closed=True,
)
_final_tools, deferred_setup = assemble_deferred_tools(filtered_tools, enabled=True)
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
default_role="guest",
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(use="unused:Provider"),
)
)
middlewares = build_lead_runtime_middlewares(
app_config=config,
authorization_provider=provider,
deferred_setup=deferred_setup,
)
authorization_middleware = next(middleware for middleware in middlewares if isinstance(middleware, GuardrailMiddleware) and isinstance(middleware.provider, GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter))
request = MagicMock()
request.tool_call = {
"name": "tool_search",
"args": {"query": "mcp_allowed"},
"id": "call-search",
}
request.runtime = SimpleNamespace(context={"user_role": "guest"})
expected = MagicMock()
handler = MagicMock(return_value=expected)
result = authorization_middleware.wrap_tool_call(request, handler)
assert result is expected
handler.assert_called_once_with(request)
def test_tool_search_without_deferred_catalog_is_not_exempt(self):
provider = RbacAuthorizationProvider(roles={"guest": {"tools": {"allow": ["web_search"]}}})
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
default_role="guest",
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(use="unused:Provider"),
)
)
middlewares = build_lead_runtime_middlewares(
app_config=config,
authorization_provider=provider,
)
authorization_middleware = next(middleware for middleware in middlewares if isinstance(middleware, GuardrailMiddleware) and isinstance(middleware.provider, GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter))
request = MagicMock()
request.tool_call = {"name": "tool_search", "args": {}, "id": "call-search"}
request.runtime = SimpleNamespace(context={"user_role": "guest"})
handler = MagicMock()
result = authorization_middleware.wrap_tool_call(request, handler)
assert result.status == "error"
handler.assert_not_called()
def test_subagent_deferred_tool_search_bypasses_layer_two_async(self):
provider = RbacAuthorizationProvider(roles={"guest": {"tools": {"allow": ["mcp_allowed"]}}})
filtered_tools = filter_tools_by_authorization(
[tag_mcp_tool(_tool("mcp_allowed"))],
provider=provider,
principal=Principal(role="guest"),
fail_closed=True,
)
_final_tools, deferred_setup = assemble_deferred_tools(filtered_tools, enabled=True)
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
default_role="guest",
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(use="unused:Provider"),
)
)
middlewares = build_subagent_runtime_middlewares(
app_config=config,
authorization_provider=provider,
deferred_setup=deferred_setup,
)
authorization_middleware = next(middleware for middleware in middlewares if isinstance(middleware, GuardrailMiddleware) and isinstance(middleware.provider, GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter))
request = MagicMock()
request.tool_call = {
"name": "tool_search",
"args": {"query": "mcp_allowed"},
"id": "call-search",
}
request.runtime = SimpleNamespace(context={"user_role": "guest"})
expected = MagicMock()
handler = AsyncMock(return_value=expected)
result = asyncio.run(authorization_middleware.awrap_tool_call(request, handler))
assert result is expected
handler.assert_awaited_once_with(request)
def test_authorization_wires_adapter_with_the_build_provider_instance(self):
provider = _FilterProvider(["bash"])
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(use="deerflow.authz.rbac:RbacAuthorizationProvider", config={"roles": {"user": {}}}),
)
)
middlewares = build_lead_runtime_middlewares(app_config=config, authorization_provider=provider)
authorization_middleware = next(middleware for middleware in middlewares if isinstance(middleware, GuardrailMiddleware) and isinstance(middleware.provider, GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter))
assert authorization_middleware.provider._provider is provider
assert authorization_middleware.fail_closed is True
def test_authorization_and_explicit_guardrail_both_run(self):
provider = _FilterProvider(["bash"])
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(use="deerflow.authz.rbac:RbacAuthorizationProvider", config={"roles": {"user": {}}}),
),
guardrails=GuardrailsConfig(
enabled=True,
provider=GuardrailProviderConfig(
use="deerflow.guardrails.builtin:AllowlistProvider",
config={"allowed_tools": ["bash"]},
),
),
)
middlewares = build_lead_runtime_middlewares(app_config=config, authorization_provider=provider)
guardrails = [middleware for middleware in middlewares if isinstance(middleware, GuardrailMiddleware)]
assert len(guardrails) == 2
assert isinstance(guardrails[0].provider, GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter)
assert guardrails[0].provider._provider is provider
assert type(guardrails[1].provider).__name__ == "AllowlistProvider"
def test_wired_authorization_middleware_denies_execution_with_runtime_principal(self):
class _DenyingProvider(_FilterProvider):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__(["bash"])
self.requests = []
def authorize(self, request):
self.requests.append(request)
return AuthzDecision(
allow=False,
reasons=[AuthzReason(code="authz.denied", message="blocked")],
)
provider = _DenyingProvider()
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(use="unused:Provider"),
)
)
middlewares = build_lead_runtime_middlewares(
app_config=config,
authorization_provider=provider,
)
authorization_middleware = next(middleware for middleware in middlewares if isinstance(middleware, GuardrailMiddleware) and isinstance(middleware.provider, GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter))
request = MagicMock()
request.tool_call = {"name": "bash", "args": {"command": "whoami"}, "id": "call-1"}
request.runtime = SimpleNamespace(
context={
"user_id": "u1",
"user_role": "guest",
"thread_id": "t1",
"run_id": "r1",
}
)
handler = MagicMock()
result = authorization_middleware.wrap_tool_call(request, handler)
handler.assert_not_called()
assert result.status == "error"
assert "authz.denied" in result.content
assert provider.requests[0].principal == Principal(user_id="u1", role="guest")
assert provider.requests[0].target == "bash"
assert provider.requests[0].context["run_id"] == "r1"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("is_bootstrap", [False, True])
def test_lead_agent_filters_all_model_visible_tools_and_reuses_provider(monkeypatch, is_bootstrap):
"""Layer 1 covers late framework tools and Layer 2 receives its provider."""
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(
use="deerflow.authz.rbac:RbacAuthorizationProvider",
config={"roles": {"user": {"tools": {"allow": ["safe_tool", "history_read"]}}}},
),
),
models=[
ModelConfig(
name="test-model",
display_name="Test model",
use="langchain_openai:ChatOpenAI",
model="test-model",
)
],
)
config.skills.deferred_discovery = True
config.task_continuity.enabled = True
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "_resolve_model_name", lambda *args, **kwargs: "test-model")
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "create_chat_model", lambda **kwargs: object())
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "create_agent", lambda **kwargs: kwargs)
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "apply_prompt_template", lambda **kwargs: "prompt")
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "build_tracing_callbacks", lambda: [])
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "_load_enabled_available_skills", lambda *args, **kwargs: [])
monkeypatch.setattr(
lead_agent_module,
"build_skill_search_setup",
lambda *args, **kwargs: SimpleNamespace(
describe_skill_tool=_tool("describe_skill"),
skill_names=frozenset({"example"}),
),
raising=False,
)
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.skills.describe.build_skill_search_setup", lead_agent_module.build_skill_search_setup)
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.tools.get_available_tools", lambda **kwargs: [_tool("safe_tool"), _tool("denied_tool")])
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "should_use_memory_tools", lambda memory_config: True)
monkeypatch.setattr(
lead_agent_module,
"_append_memory_tools_without_name_conflicts",
lambda tools: tools.append(_tool("memory_search")),
)
captured: dict[str, object] = {}
def _capture_middlewares(*args, **kwargs):
captured.update(kwargs)
return []
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "build_middlewares", _capture_middlewares)
runtime_context = {"user_role": "user"}
if is_bootstrap:
runtime_context["is_bootstrap"] = True
result = lead_agent_module._make_lead_agent({"context": runtime_context}, app_config=config)
assert [tool.name for tool in result["tools"]] == ["safe_tool", "history_read"]
assert captured["authorization_provider"] is not None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"skills_allow,deferred,expected_names",
[
(["bootstrap"], True, frozenset({"bootstrap"})),
([], True, frozenset()),
([], False, None),
],
)
def test_bootstrap_assembly_uses_filtered_skill_set(monkeypatch, skills_allow, deferred, expected_names):
"""[P1 regression] The bootstrap branch must feed the authorization-filtered
set to ``build_middlewares`` and ``apply_prompt_template`` — not the raw
``_BOOTSTRAP_SKILL_NAMES`` — and must preserve an empty ``skill_names``
index instead of converting it to ``None`` (a None falls through to the
legacy full-metadata prompt, which reloads every enabled skill from storage
and re-advertises the policy-denied one; a raw {"bootstrap"} set re-admits
it to slash activation)."""
config = _app_config(
authorization=AuthorizationConfig(
enabled=True,
provider=AuthorizationProviderConfig(
use="deerflow.authz.rbac:RbacAuthorizationProvider",
config={"roles": {"user": {"skills": {"allow": skills_allow}}}},
),
),
models=[
ModelConfig(
name="test-model",
display_name="Test model",
use="langchain_openai:ChatOpenAI",
model="test-model",
)
],
)
config.skills.deferred_discovery = deferred
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "_resolve_model_name", lambda *args, **kwargs: "test-model")
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "create_chat_model", lambda **kwargs: object())
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "create_agent", lambda **kwargs: kwargs)
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "build_tracing_callbacks", lambda: [])
# Emulate the real loader's allowlist filtering so the allowed case keeps
# the bootstrap skill and the denied case drops it.
monkeypatch.setattr(
lead_agent_module,
"_load_enabled_available_skills",
lambda available_skills, **kwargs: [s for s in (SimpleNamespace(name="bootstrap"), SimpleNamespace(name="other")) if available_skills is None or s.name in available_skills],
)
# Emulate the real setup mapping (bootstrap_skills -> skill_names) without
# depending on SkillCatalog internals; the real mapping has its own tests.
monkeypatch.setattr(
lead_agent_module,
"build_skill_search_setup",
lambda skills, *, enabled, container_base_path, skill_authorization=None: SimpleNamespace(
describe_skill_tool=None,
skill_names=frozenset(s.name for s in skills),
),
raising=False,
)
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.tools.get_available_tools", lambda **kwargs: [])
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "should_use_memory_tools", lambda memory_config: False)
captured: dict[str, dict] = {}
def _capture_middlewares(*args, **kwargs):
captured.setdefault("middlewares", kwargs)
return []
def _capture_prompt(**kwargs):
captured.setdefault("prompt", kwargs)
return "prompt"
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "build_middlewares", _capture_middlewares)
monkeypatch.setattr(lead_agent_module, "apply_prompt_template", _capture_prompt)
lead_agent_module._make_lead_agent({"context": {"is_bootstrap": True, "user_role": "user"}}, app_config=config)
expected_available = {"bootstrap"} if "bootstrap" in skills_allow else set()
assert captured["middlewares"]["available_skills"] == expected_available
assert captured["prompt"]["available_skills"] == expected_available
# The empty index must survive as a set, never round-trip through None.
assert captured["prompt"]["skill_names"] == expected_names
assert captured["prompt"]["skill_names"] is not None or expected_names is None