deer-flow/backend/tests/test_message_provenance.py
Nan Gao 13f0a7f263
feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did (#4863)
* feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did

DeerFlow's extension system can contribute middleware, services and routes,
but an extension cannot answer basic questions about a run without reaching
into host internals. Several of the facts it would need are destroyed by the
operations that produce them:

  * The middleware chain injects and rewrites a lot of context — date
    reminders, recalled memory, compaction summaries, durable-context data,
    image payloads, activated skill bodies. Downstream, none of it is
    attributable: at the model-call boundary an injected HumanMessage is
    indistinguishable from the user's own, and anything wanting to tell them
    apart has to pattern-match prompt wording, which breaks on the next copy
    edit.

  * Two runs of "the same agent" are only comparable if the chain enforced the
    same limits, prompts and thresholds. Recovering that from outside means
    reading private attributes and guessing which of them change behaviour — a
    guess that rots silently as middlewares gain fields.

  * The lead-agent factory resolves a model after runtime overrides, renders a
    prompt, filters tools through authorization and composes a stack, all
    inside one synchronous call, and none of it survives: a middleware sees its
    neighbours but not the prompt, the run worker sees a graph but not what
    went into it.

  * Summarization is destructive by design. N messages leave the context and
    one summary enters it; afterwards only the summary exists, so "which
    messages became this?" is not reconstructible.

This adds seven neutral facilities so those facts are recorded where they are
still true, and releases the contract package as 0.2.0.

Message provenance
  Producers stamp `deerflow_content_kind` / `deerflow_producer_kind` onto the
  messages they inject or rewrite. Stamping is unconditional — a fact whose
  presence depends on whether an observer is installed is not a fact — and the
  keys are server-owned, so provenance cannot be forged from a request.

Middleware self-description
  Twelve middlewares declare their own behaviour-affecting parameters through
  a duck-typed `release_policy_parameters()`. Long text is hashed rather than
  embedded: a declaration is an identity, not a copy of the prompt.

Agent assembly descriptor
  `assemble_lead_agent()` returns the graph plus a descriptor whose fingerprint
  answers "did anything about this agent change between these two runs?".
  `make_lead_agent()` keeps its graph-only signature — it is the LangGraph
  Server ABI declared in langgraph.json. Tools and skills are sorted before
  hashing because their assembly order is incidental; middlewares are not,
  because stack order decides what wraps what. Host build identity is reported
  but excluded from the fingerprint, so a redeploy does not invalidate every
  agent's identity.

Context compaction observation
  Summarization emits the content hashes of the messages it is about to remove
  joined to the summary that replaced them. Content is the only identity
  available at that seam: the summary does not become a message, and what later
  projects it into a request renders it bounded and escaped rather than
  verbatim.

Neutral policy, transform and MCP-source facts
  Guardrail decisions are published to runtime context under a `__`-prefixed
  key; result-rewriting middlewares append a declared, ordered transform trail;
  MCP tools carry their credential-free logical origin.

Extension route identity
  Contributed routes are session-authenticated and cannot opt out, but
  "logged in" and "administrator" are different questions. Extensions get a
  neutral projection of the caller rather than the host's auth context, and
  `require_admin` fails closed when identity cannot be determined.

Extension-owned tables
  An extension that persists data owns its own MetaData and migration chain, so
  its tables are absent from Base.metadata and `alembic revision --autogenerate`
  proposes dropping them. Extensions declare a table prefix, which is rejected
  at registration if it would shadow a host table.

The contract package stays dependency-free and imports no host code; every new
Protocol method has a default so later additions remain additive. The loader's
pre-1.0 rule requires an exact major.minor match, so extensions written against
0.1 are now refused at startup with an actionable install hint rather than
loading into a host that implements a different surface.

uv.lock records the contract package's new version, so `uv sync --locked` still
resolves on a fresh checkout.

* fix(backend): sort gateway service imports
2026-08-23 09:57:12 +08:00

278 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""Neutral message-provenance metadata.
The host stamps which component produced an injected or rewritten message.
An observer cannot reconstruct this after the fact: by the time a message
reaches the model-call boundary, its producer is no longer recoverable.
"""
from deerflow_extension_api import (
MESSAGE_CONTENT_KIND_KEY,
MESSAGE_PRODUCER_ENTITY_ID_KEY,
MESSAGE_PRODUCER_KIND_KEY,
PROVENANCE_KEYS,
ContentKind,
provenance_kwargs,
read_provenance,
)
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage
def test_kwargs_round_trip_through_a_message():
message = SystemMessage(
content="reminder",
additional_kwargs=provenance_kwargs(ContentKind.MIDDLEWARE_INJECTION, "dynamic_context"),
)
provenance = read_provenance(message)
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "middleware_injection"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "dynamic_context"
assert provenance.producer_entity_id is None
def test_optional_fields_are_omitted_rather_than_written_as_none():
kwargs = provenance_kwargs(ContentKind.MEMORY, "dynamic_context_memory")
assert MESSAGE_PRODUCER_ENTITY_ID_KEY not in kwargs
def test_optional_fields_round_trip_when_supplied():
message = HumanMessage(
content="a durable-context data block",
additional_kwargs=provenance_kwargs(
ContentKind.DURABLE_CONTEXT,
"durable_context_data",
producer_entity_id="run-7",
),
)
provenance = read_provenance(message)
assert provenance.producer_entity_id == "run-7"
def test_read_returns_none_for_an_unstamped_message():
assert read_provenance(HumanMessage(content="hi")) is None
def test_read_returns_none_when_the_required_pair_is_incomplete():
message = HumanMessage(content="hi", additional_kwargs={MESSAGE_CONTENT_KIND_KEY: "memory"})
assert read_provenance(message) is None
def test_read_ignores_non_string_values_rather_than_raising():
message = HumanMessage(
content="hi",
additional_kwargs={MESSAGE_CONTENT_KIND_KEY: 1, MESSAGE_PRODUCER_KIND_KEY: "x"},
)
assert read_provenance(message) is None
def test_every_key_is_declared_in_the_exported_set():
assert PROVENANCE_KEYS == {
MESSAGE_CONTENT_KIND_KEY,
MESSAGE_PRODUCER_KIND_KEY,
MESSAGE_PRODUCER_ENTITY_ID_KEY,
}
def test_gateway_treats_every_provenance_key_as_server_owned():
"""A caller must not be able to forge provenance on an inbound message."""
from app.gateway.services import _SERVER_OWNED_MESSAGE_METADATA_KEYS
assert PROVENANCE_KEYS <= _SERVER_OWNED_MESSAGE_METADATA_KEYS
class TestDynamicContextStamping:
"""The date reminder and the recalled-memory block are distinct producers."""
def _inject(self):
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.dynamic_context_middleware import DynamicContextMiddleware
middleware = DynamicContextMiddleware()
return middleware._inject({"messages": [HumanMessage(content="hello", id="u1")]})
def test_the_date_reminder_is_stamped_as_a_middleware_injection(self):
messages = self._inject()["messages"]
reminders = [m for m in messages if read_provenance(m) and read_provenance(m).content_kind == "middleware_injection"]
assert reminders, "expected the date reminder to carry provenance"
assert read_provenance(reminders[0]).producer_kind == "dynamic_context"
def test_the_users_own_message_is_never_stamped(self):
messages = self._inject()["messages"]
user_messages = [m for m in messages if m.content == "hello"]
assert user_messages
assert all(read_provenance(m) is None for m in user_messages)
class TestDynamicContextMemoryStamping:
"""The recalled-memory block is a distinct producer from the date reminder."""
def test_the_memory_block_is_stamped_as_memory(self, monkeypatch):
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage
from deerflow.agents.middlewares import dynamic_context_middleware as module
monkeypatch.setattr(module.DynamicContextMiddleware, "_build_full_reminder", lambda self, runtime=None: ("<system-reminder></system-reminder>", "some recalled memory"))
middleware = module.DynamicContextMiddleware()
result = middleware._inject({"messages": [HumanMessage(content="hello", id="u1")]})
memory_messages = [m for m in result["messages"] if str(m.id or "").endswith("__memory")]
assert memory_messages, "expected a memory block message"
provenance = read_provenance(memory_messages[0])
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "memory"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "dynamic_context_memory"
class TestDurableContextStamping:
"""The authority contract and the data block are distinct producers."""
def _inject(self, *, summary_text: str = "a compacted summary"):
from types import SimpleNamespace
from langchain.agents.middleware.types import ModelRequest
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.durable_context_middleware import DurableContextMiddleware
middleware = DurableContextMiddleware()
request = ModelRequest(
model=SimpleNamespace(),
messages=[],
state={"summary_text": summary_text, "delegations": [], "skill_context": []},
)
return middleware._inject(request)
def test_the_authority_contract_is_stamped_as_a_middleware_injection(self):
from langchain_core.messages import SystemMessage
result = self._inject()
system_messages = [m for m in result.messages if isinstance(m, SystemMessage)]
assert system_messages, "expected the authority-contract SystemMessage"
provenance = read_provenance(system_messages[0])
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "middleware_injection"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "durable_context"
def test_the_data_block_is_stamped_as_durable_context(self):
result = self._inject()
data_messages = [m for m in result.messages if "durable_context_data" in (m.additional_kwargs or {})]
assert data_messages, "expected the durable-context data block"
provenance = read_provenance(data_messages[0])
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "durable_context"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "durable_context_data"
class TestSystemMessageCoalescingStamping:
"""The coalesced leading SystemMessage is stamped as a middleware injection."""
def test_the_coalesced_system_message_is_stamped(self):
from types import SimpleNamespace
from langchain.agents.middleware.types import ModelRequest
from langchain_core.messages import SystemMessage
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.system_message_coalescing_middleware import _coalesce_request
request = ModelRequest(
model=SimpleNamespace(),
messages=[SystemMessage(content="extra system block")],
system_message=SystemMessage(content="base system prompt"),
)
coalesced = _coalesce_request(request)
assert coalesced is not None
provenance = read_provenance(coalesced.system_message)
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "middleware_injection"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "system_coalescing"
class TestViewImageStamping:
"""The hidden image-details message is stamped as an image payload."""
def test_the_image_context_message_is_stamped(self):
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.view_image_middleware import ViewImageMiddleware
message = ViewImageMiddleware._create_image_context_message(["some image content"])
provenance = read_provenance(message)
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "image_payload"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "view_image"
class TestSkillActivationStamping:
"""The hidden slash-skill activation reminder is stamped as a skill body."""
def test_the_activation_message_is_stamped(self):
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.skill_activation_middleware import SkillActivationMiddleware
target = HumanMessage(content="/some-skill do the thing", id="u1")
message = SkillActivationMiddleware._make_activation_message(target, "activation reminder text")
provenance = read_provenance(message)
assert provenance is not None
assert provenance.content_kind == "skill_body"
assert provenance.producer_kind == "skill_activation"
class TestStateWritesCannotForgeServerOwnedMetadata:
"""The run path strips these inside ``normalize_input``.
``POST /threads/{id}/state`` writes its values straight into a checkpoint,
so without the same treatment an authenticated client can persist forged
provenance and transform trails — and these keys exist precisely so a later
reader can treat them as facts about what the host did. Membership of the
key in a frozenset proves nothing on its own; these drive the stripper.
"""
@staticmethod
def _forged() -> dict:
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.tool_transform_meta import TOOL_TRANSFORMS_KEY
return {
MESSAGE_CONTENT_KIND_KEY: "memory",
MESSAGE_PRODUCER_KIND_KEY: "dynamic_context_memory",
TOOL_TRANSFORMS_KEY: [{"kind": "sanitized", "by": "ToolResultSanitizationMiddleware", "version": "1"}],
"hide_from_ui": True,
}
def test_a_forged_message_object_is_stripped(self):
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage
from app.gateway.services import strip_server_owned_state_metadata
values = {"messages": [HumanMessage(content="looks recalled", additional_kwargs=self._forged())]}
cleaned = strip_server_owned_state_metadata(values)["messages"][0]
assert not (PROVENANCE_KEYS & set(cleaned.additional_kwargs))
assert "deerflow_tool_transforms" not in cleaned.additional_kwargs
# Caller-owned keys must survive — this strips forgeries, not payload.
assert cleaned.additional_kwargs["hide_from_ui"] is True
assert cleaned.content == "looks recalled"
def test_a_forged_raw_dict_is_stripped(self):
"""The route forwards whatever the caller sent; it is not always coerced."""
from app.gateway.services import strip_server_owned_state_metadata
values = {"messages": [{"type": "human", "content": "looks recalled", "additional_kwargs": self._forged()}]}
cleaned = strip_server_owned_state_metadata(values)["messages"][0]
assert not (PROVENANCE_KEYS & set(cleaned["additional_kwargs"]))
assert "deerflow_tool_transforms" not in cleaned["additional_kwargs"]
assert cleaned["additional_kwargs"]["hide_from_ui"] is True
def test_unrelated_channels_pass_through_unchanged(self):
from app.gateway.services import strip_server_owned_state_metadata
values = {"title": "a thread", "todos": [{"content": "x", "status": "pending"}]}
assert strip_server_owned_state_metadata(values) == values
def test_the_state_route_actually_calls_the_stripper(self):
"""A stripper nothing calls is the same defect in a new place."""
import ast
from pathlib import Path
route = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "app/gateway/routers/threads.py"
called = {node.func.id for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(route.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))) if isinstance(node, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.func, ast.Name)}
assert "strip_server_owned_state_metadata" in called