Zeren Wang 82671596f3
feat(authz): add plugin resource targets, provenance, action and management enforcement (#5842)
* feat(authz): add plugin resource targets, provenance, action and management enforcement

PR1 of the extension-tool-authorization series
(docs/plans/2026-09-24-extension-tool-authorization-spec.md): plugin
authorization plumbing, no new author-facing declaration.

- `authz/plugin_targets.py` is the single encoder/validator for composite
  targets (`namespace/part`), with one validating composer behind three
  kind-checked constructors; invalid input raises instead of degrading.
- `authz/plugin_authz.py` is the harness decision layer (`plugin_action`,
  `plugin_management`, plus the batch filters the page slice will consume):
  disabled is a no-op, an explicit deny raises, and provider errors follow
  `fail_closed` like the sandbox gate.
- `POST /api/plugins/{ns}/actions/{name}` decides `plugin_action:invoke`
  after the action resolves and before the body is streamed.
- `deerflow_extension_api.auth` publishes `require_plugin_management` /
  `arequire_plugin_management` with two `app.state` resolver keys; the
  Gateway installs both. Contract version 0.2.3 -> 0.2.4.
- `tools/tool_provenance.py` records host-written plugin provenance for
  display (assembly descriptor, Layer-2 context later); no decision reads a
  label.
- Plugin providers use a `(config signature, loop key)` cache so a
  loop-affine provider is never handed to another loop or to a sync caller.
- RBAC gains `plugin_actions` / `plugin_management` aliases;
  `config_version` 47 -> 48 across the three mirrors.

Tests: new plugin target/provenance/action/management suites plus a
blocking-IO anchor whose offloads were reverted to prove red->green.

* fix(authz): decide plugin resources from the request's config snapshot

Review round 1 on PR #5842 (willem-bd).

P1 — the decision layer no longer reloads the configuration. The six
`authz/plugin_authz.py` functions take a required `app_config` snapshot (the
same request-scoped config the Gateway used to resolve the provider), and
`resolve_/aresolve_plugin_authorization` return it as a third element, so
`enabled`/`fail_closed` can never come from a second read that drifted from
the one that produced the provider. A snapshot the caller could not read at
all is *unavailable*, not disabled: it fails closed as
`authz.config_unavailable`. The Gateway's `_plugin_app_config` now separates
an absent `config.yaml` (no gate, today's behavior) from a config that exists
but cannot be read or validated (deny) instead of swallowing both through
`safe_app_config`.

P2 — `_validated_decision` requires `type(decision.allow) is bool` on both
the sync `authorize` and async `aauthorize` paths, so a provider returning
`AuthzDecision(allow="false")` is a malformed verdict that follows
`fail_closed` instead of being read as an allow.

Both fixes are covered by regression tests that were verified red against the
pre-fix behavior (P1: 200 vs 403 and resolver True vs False; P2: 12 cases
across fail_closed/fail_open and sync/async), plus tests pinning that an
absent config and `authorization.enabled: false` keep today's behavior.

* fix(authz): treat a request-time config absence as unavailable

Review round 2 on PR #5842 (willem-bd).

P1 — `_plugin_app_config[_async]` no longer maps a missing `config.yaml` to
`None` ("no gate"). A Gateway cannot have started without a readable config
(`app/gateway/app.py` reads it through this same accessor in `lifespan`), so
absence *during a request* means the configuration this process was running on
became unavailable — a hot reload, an atomic replace, a ConfigMap remount. It is
unavailable, not disabled: the error propagates,
`resolve_/aresolve_plugin_authorization` raise
`_PluginAuthorizationUnavailable(fail_closed=True)`, the action dispatcher
returns 403 and the management resolvers answer `False`. The dead
`(None, None, None)` allow path is gone, the resolvers return a non-optional
`AppConfig` as their third element, and callers key "authorization disabled" on
`provider is None` alone. This matches the rule the decision layer already
documented (`authz.config_unavailable`) and the public docs.

P2 — `_deny_reason_code` is total: a `reasons` that is not iterable degrades the
code to `authz.denied` instead of raising `TypeError` outside the guarded
provider path, which turned a denial into an unhandled error. It is deliberately
not folded into `_validated_decision`: `allow` was a real `bool`, so the verdict
is a valid denial, and treating it as malformed would flip it to an allow under
`fail_closed: false`.

Both fixes are covered by regression tests verified red against the pre-fix
behavior (P1: resolver True vs False, async `PermissionError` not raised, route
200 vs 403; P2: `TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not iterable` at
`plugin_authz.py:113`). The action-route tests in
`tests/test_plugin_contributions.py` now install a readable
`authorization.enabled: false` config instead of relying on a config-less
process, and `docs/full-stack-plugins.md` plus the PR1 decision log record the
new rule.

* fix(authz): apply the running policy when the plugin config is unreadable

Follow-up to f03d2ea9 (review round 2 on PR #5842, willem-bd).

The first attempt read the P1 finding as "absence is never disabled" and failed
every config read closed unconditionally. That is too broad for this repo: a
config-less host is deliberately treated as having no policy to apply
(`_get_route_authorization_config` falls back to a disabled config,
`sandbox_authz.safe_app_config` documents the same no-op for "CI runners and
direct-call tests"), and the rule turned the config-less e2e plugin host
(`extension_test_fixtures.bookmark_plugin_gateway`) into a 403 — the three
`bookmark-plugin.spec.ts` cases lost the save action. Reproduced locally:
`POST /api/plugins/community.bookmarks/actions/save` against that fixture host
returned 403 before, 200 after this change.

The rule is now "has this process loaded a configuration?", not "was the last
read successful?":

- No loaded config (`peek_loaded_app_config()`, new read-only accessor on
  `deerflow.config.app_config`) and no `config.yaml`: no policy to apply, so the
  gate stays a no-op — unchanged for CI runners, direct-call tests and hosts
  that mount only the plugins router.
- A loaded config whose file disappears or cannot be read: *unavailable*, never
  *disabled*. The resolvers raise `_PluginAuthorizationUnavailable` carrying the
  failure flag of the configuration this process runs on (authorization
  disabled there -> no gate; enabled -> that policy's `fail_closed`, `True` by
  default), so an enabled Gateway answers 403/False in the window instead of
  letting protected plugin actions and management routes through.
- A config file that exists but cannot be read or validated right now: fail
  closed when nothing is loaded (round 1's rule), otherwise the loaded policy
  decides.

`peek_loaded_app_config()` is preferred over a Gateway-side startup snapshot: it
reflects the last successfully loaded config, so a hot-reloaded policy is what
applies during the window, and there is no lifecycle hook to keep in sync.

Evidence: the three no-config/lost-config branches in
`tests/test_plugin_management_guard.py` and
`tests/test_plugin_action_authorization.py`, round 1's unreadable-config tests
unchanged, `test_peek_loaded_app_config_survives_a_missing_file` in
`tests/test_app_config_reload.py`, and the fixture-host probe above. Docs
(`docs/full-stack-plugins.md`, `reference.mdx` en/zh) and the PR1 decision log
state the final rule; the log records the superseded variant.

* fix(authz): keep a denial whose reasons raise while being read

* fix(authz): intersect plugin batch filters with the candidates

The plugin_page/plugin_management batch helpers returned the provider's
`filter_resources` answer verbatim, so a custom provider could hand the
projections a target that was never asked about ("*", another namespace,
a phantom page). Every other filter call site re-projects from its own
candidate list; do the same here, state the intersection on the provider
contract, and pin it with a regression test that fails on the old
pass-through.

* docs(plugins): map a management denial to 403 in the route example

The contributed-route example called `arequire_plugin_management` and let
the documented `PermissionError` escape. The Gateway installs no
`PermissionError` handler, so a route copied from the example answered 500
on a normal policy denial instead of 403. Both example routes now translate
the denial, and the surrounding bullets say why the translation is the
route's job.

* docs(extensions): point the 0.2.4 contract row at the PR that ships it

Every other row in the version-history table links the pull request that
shipped the version; 0.2.4 linked the authorization tracking issue instead.
Both the English and Chinese tables now link this PR.
2026-09-25 14:46:12 +08:00

117 lines
4.7 KiB
Python

"""Unified plugins participate in the ordinary tool assembly and authorization path."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import hashlib
import json
import logging
import re
from collections.abc import Mapping
from copy import deepcopy
from types import MappingProxyType
from deerflow_extension_api.auth import ExtensionPrincipal
from deerflow_extension_api.plugins import ToolContext
from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator
from langchain.tools import ToolRuntime
from langchain_core.tools import StructuredTool, ToolException
from deerflow.config.plugin_settings import defaults
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import resolve_runtime_user_id
from deerflow.tools.tool_provenance import tag_plugin_tool
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def plugin_settings(source, plugin):
"""Unified plugins use their deployment-owned manifest; no runtime override."""
return defaults(plugin.settings_contribution())
def validate_schema(schema, *, tool=False):
try:
plain = json.loads(json.dumps(schema))
if plain.get("type") != "object":
raise ValueError("Plugin schemas must describe objects")
# No reference resolution or network access during validation.
def check(value):
if isinstance(value, dict):
if any(key in value for key in ("$ref", "$dynamicRef", "$recursiveRef")):
raise ValueError("Inline plugin schemas are required")
for child in value.values():
check(child)
elif isinstance(value, list):
for child in value:
check(child)
check(plain)
if tool and {"runtime", "config"} & plain.get("properties", {}).keys():
raise ValueError("Reserved tool argument")
Draft202012Validator.check_schema(plain)
except Exception as exc:
raise ValueError("Invalid plugin object schema") from exc
def plugin_tool_name(namespace, name):
digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{namespace}:{name}".encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
return f"ext_{re.sub('[^a-z0-9_]', '_', namespace)[:20]}_{name[:25]}_{digest}"
def _build_tool(source, plugin, declaration):
schema = deepcopy(dict(declaration.input_schema))
validator = Draft202012Validator(schema)
async def invoke(runtime: ToolRuntime, **payload):
try:
settings = await asyncio.to_thread(plugin_settings, source, plugin)
if settings["enabled"] is not True:
raise ToolException("Plugin disabled by administrator.")
if len(json.dumps(payload, allow_nan=False).encode()) > 256 * 1024 or not validator.is_valid(payload):
raise ToolException("Invalid plugin tool input.")
context = runtime.context if isinstance(runtime.context, Mapping) else {}
tool_context = ToolContext(
ExtensionPrincipal(resolve_runtime_user_id(runtime)),
MappingProxyType(settings),
context.get("thread_id"),
)
async with asyncio.timeout(30):
result = await declaration.handler(MappingProxyType(payload), tool_context)
encoded = json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, allow_nan=False)
if len(encoded.encode()) > 64 * 1024:
raise ToolException("Plugin result exceeds 64 KiB.")
return encoded
except ToolException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("Plugin tool failed: %s/%s (%s)", plugin.namespace, declaration.name, type(exc).__name__)
raise ToolException("Plugin tool unavailable or input rejected.") from None
tool = StructuredTool(name=plugin_tool_name(plugin.namespace, declaration.name), description=declaration.description, args_schema=schema, coroutine=invoke, handle_tool_error=True)
tag_plugin_tool(tool, namespace=plugin.namespace, declaration=declaration.name, installation=source)
return tool
def build_plugin_tools(loaded, *, groups=None, reserved_names=()):
tools = []
names = set(reserved_names)
for source, plugin in loaded.plugins:
if not plugin.tools:
continue
try:
if plugin_settings(source, plugin)["enabled"] is not True:
continue
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("Plugin policy unavailable: %s (%s)", plugin.namespace, type(exc).__name__)
continue
for declaration in plugin.tools:
if groups is not None and declaration.group not in groups:
continue
tool = _build_tool(source, plugin, declaration)
if tool.name in names:
raise ValueError(f"Plugin tool name collision: {tool.name}")
names.add(tool.name)
tools.append(tool)
return tools