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* feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers `user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to register one MCP server entry per credential. Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets` carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block unmasked. Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key, because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"` opts out. Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context` and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning. Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from `langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the ambient-runtime fallback disabled. Closes #5005 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`. HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context` precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential. Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses. Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and the Gateway mirror. Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest` or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes `request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers. `_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context` instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`, not only a credential. The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`, which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names * fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
127 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
127 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
"""Per-user credential injection for shared MCP servers.
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One configured HTTP/SSE MCP server can serve several DeerFlow users, each
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authenticated to the remote service with their own credential. A server opts in
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by declaring a ``user_auth`` block (:class:`McpUserScopedAuthConfig`) mapping
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DeerFlow user ids to credential header values. On every tool call the
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interceptor resolves the authenticated user and rewrites the configured header
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via ``request.override(headers=...)`` — the same per-call mechanism the OAuth
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interceptor uses.
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The server entry's static ``headers`` are used only for startup tool discovery
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(``tools/list``); they never authenticate a user's tool call when ``user_auth``
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is enabled for that server, except under an explicit ``on_missing:
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"passthrough"`` opt-out.
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Fail-closed by default: an unmapped user (including the anonymous
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``DEFAULT_USER_ID`` fallback), or a mapped credential whose ``$ENV_VAR``
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reference resolved to an empty string, gets an actionable ``ToolException``
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instead of another user's credential or the discovery credential.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from typing import Any
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from langchain_core.tools import ToolException
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from deerflow.config.extensions_config import ExtensionsConfig, McpUserScopedAuthConfig
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from deerflow.mcp.headers import apply_header_overrides, header_spellings
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from deerflow.runtime.user_context import resolve_runtime_user_id
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def _current_runtime() -> Any | None:
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"""Best-effort access to the LangGraph runtime for the current tool call.
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``get_runtime()`` raises outside a runtime context (embedded clients, unit
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tests, discovery paths); ``resolve_runtime_user_id`` accepts ``None`` and
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falls back to LangGraph auth config and the request-scoped user
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ContextVar, so failures here reduce accuracy but never crash the call.
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"""
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try:
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from langgraph.runtime import get_runtime
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return get_runtime()
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except Exception:
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return None
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def build_user_scoped_auth_interceptor(extensions_config: ExtensionsConfig) -> Any | None:
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"""Build a tool interceptor injecting per-user credentials, or ``None``.
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Returns ``None`` when no enabled server declares an enabled ``user_auth``
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block, so callers can skip registration entirely (mirrors
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``build_oauth_tool_interceptor``).
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"""
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user_auth_by_server: dict[str, McpUserScopedAuthConfig] = {}
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# The server's static header spellings, so a configured ``header`` that
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# differs from the static one only in case still *replaces* it at the
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# adapter's case-sensitive connection merge (see ``mcp/headers.py``).
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spellings_by_server: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {}
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for server_name, server_config in extensions_config.get_enabled_mcp_servers().items():
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if server_config.user_auth is None or not server_config.user_auth.enabled:
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continue
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if server_config.type not in ("sse", "http"):
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# A stdio server has no HTTP headers: the pooled stdio path forwards
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# rewritten headers as call meta, never a transport header, so the
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# credential would go nowhere while deny errors still fired for
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# unmapped users. Warn-and-skip matches the existing convention for
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# transport/config mismatches (e.g. tool_call_timeout on non-stdio).
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logger.warning(
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"MCP server '%s' declares user_auth but uses the '%s' transport; user-scoped credentials only apply to 'sse'/'http' servers — ignoring user_auth for this server",
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server_name,
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server_config.type,
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)
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continue
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user_auth_by_server[server_name] = server_config.user_auth
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spellings_by_server[server_name] = header_spellings(server_config.headers)
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if not user_auth_by_server:
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return None
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async def user_scoped_auth_interceptor(request: Any, handler: Any) -> Any:
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user_auth = user_auth_by_server.get(request.server_name)
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if user_auth is None:
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return await handler(request)
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# Prefer the runtime attached to the request (set by the adapter when
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# the call originates inside a graph); fall back to the ambient
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# LangGraph runtime, then to resolve_runtime_user_id's own chain
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# (LangGraph auth config → request-scoped user ContextVar → default).
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runtime = getattr(request, "runtime", None)
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if runtime is None:
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runtime = _current_runtime()
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user_id = resolve_runtime_user_id(runtime)
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# Empty string covers a `$ENV_VAR` reference whose variable was unset:
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# ExtensionsConfig.resolve_env_variables stores "" for those, and an
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# empty credential must fail closed rather than send an empty header.
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credential = user_auth.users.get(user_id, "")
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if not credential:
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if user_auth.on_missing == "passthrough":
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return await handler(request)
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logger.warning(
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"Denied MCP tool call to server '%s': no user-scoped credential for user '%s'",
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request.server_name,
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user_id,
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)
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# The resolved id is included so the operator can copy the exact
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# ``users`` key: it differs by deployment path (a safe-slug like
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# ``alice-example-com-ab12cd34`` via LangGraph auth, a raw user
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# UUID via the embedded Gateway). It is the caller's own id, so
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# surfacing it leaks nothing across users.
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raise ToolException(
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f"No credential is configured for your account (user id '{user_id}') on MCP server '{request.server_name}'. Ask the operator to add this exact id to that server's user_auth.users map (or set its environment variable)."
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)
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updated_headers = apply_header_overrides(
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request.headers,
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{user_auth.header: credential},
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spellings=spellings_by_server.get(request.server_name),
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)
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return await handler(request.override(headers=updated_headers))
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return user_scoped_auth_interceptor
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