Wenchao An ca23703ef0
fix(subagents): preserve actionable acceptance gaps after compaction (#5287)
* fix: preserve actionable subagent acceptance gaps

Distinguish completed execution from acceptance in delegation guidance. Retain bounded unmet and unverified criteria after compaction and guide the lead to address remaining work within its budget.

* docs: keep acceptance guidance within instruction budget
2026-09-08 16:11:49 +08:00

1218 lines
58 KiB
Python

"""Task tool for delegating work to subagents."""
import asyncio
import concurrent.futures
import logging
import threading
import time
import uuid
from contextvars import ContextVar
from dataclasses import replace
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Annotated, Any, cast
from langchain.tools import InjectedToolCallId, tool
from langchain_core.callbacks import BaseCallbackManager
from langchain_core.messages import ToolMessage
from langgraph.config import get_stream_writer
from langgraph.types import Command
from deerflow.agents.middlewares.receipt_verification import verify_receipt_citations
from deerflow.authz.principal import normalize_authz_attributes
from deerflow.config import get_app_config
from deerflow.extensions import resolve_run_extensions
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import resolve_runtime_user_id
from deerflow.sandbox.security import LOCAL_BASH_SUBAGENT_DISABLED_MESSAGE, is_host_bash_allowed
from deerflow.subagents import SubagentExecutor, get_available_subagent_names, get_subagent_config
from deerflow.subagents.acceptance_checks import check_acceptance_criteria, render_acceptance_section
from deerflow.subagents.capacity import SubagentExecutionCapacity
from deerflow.subagents.config import resolve_subagent_model_name
from deerflow.subagents.executor import (
SubagentStatus,
cleanup_background_task,
force_cleanup_background_task,
get_background_task_result,
request_cancel_background_task,
run_on_isolated_subagent_loop,
)
from deerflow.subagents.status_contract import (
SubagentStatusValue,
SubagentStopReasonValue,
format_subagent_result_message,
make_subagent_additional_kwargs,
)
from deerflow.tools.types import Runtime
from deerflow.trace_context import DEERFLOW_TRACE_METADATA_KEY, resolve_trace_id
from deerflow.utils.custom_events import aemit_custom_event
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from deerflow.config.app_config import AppConfig
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Poll cadence for terminal-state waits in both the interrupted unwind and the
# deferred registry cleaner.
_SUBAGENT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 5.0
# How long the generic-error unwind waits for a terminal result before
# re-raising. This is deliberately a short grace period, not the full
# ``max_poll_count`` budget: a subagent blocked inside a long model/tool call
# may not observe cooperative cancellation for the whole execution timeout
# (~31 minutes by default), and an unrelated poller failure must not stall
# the parent run that long. The remaining lifecycle is handed to the deferred
# cleaner on the persistent subagent loop.
_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_GRACE_SECONDS = 5.0
# Sentinel returned by ``_peek_subagent_result`` when the registry entry exists
# but cannot be read (persistent status-lookup / status-object failure).
_STATUS_UNREADABLE = object()
_explicit_execution_capacity: ContextVar[SubagentExecutionCapacity | None] = ContextVar(
"deerflow_explicit_subagent_execution_capacity",
default=None,
)
_explicit_app_config: ContextVar[Any | None] = ContextVar(
"deerflow_explicit_subagent_app_config",
default=None,
)
def _record_middleware_on_parent_loop(journal: Any, kwargs: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Run one subagent middleware-journal append on the journal owner's loop."""
try:
journal.record_middleware(**kwargs)
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to record subagent middleware event", exc_info=True)
class _ParentLoopMiddlewareRecorderProxy:
"""Forward narrowly scoped subagent middleware events to the parent loop.
``RunJournal`` owns parent-loop tasks and may wrap an event store backed by
a loop-bound SQL pool. Subagents execute on a persistent isolated loop, so
the journal object itself must never be called there.
"""
def __init__(self, journal: Any, loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop) -> None:
self._journal = journal
self._loop = loop
self._state_lock = threading.Lock()
self._closed = False
self._claimed_tool_promotions: set[str] = set()
def claim_tool_promotions(self, tool_names: list[str]) -> list[str]:
"""Atomically deduplicate promotions within this one child execution."""
candidates = sorted(set(tool_names))
with self._state_lock:
if self._closed:
return []
claimed = [name for name in candidates if name not in self._claimed_tool_promotions]
self._claimed_tool_promotions.update(claimed)
return claimed
def record_middleware(self, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
with self._state_lock:
if self._closed or self._loop.is_closed():
logger.debug("Dropping subagent middleware event after parent loop shutdown")
return
try:
self._loop.call_soon_threadsafe(
_record_middleware_on_parent_loop,
self._journal,
dict(kwargs),
)
except RuntimeError:
# The loop may close between is_closed() and scheduling.
logger.debug("Dropping subagent middleware event after parent loop shutdown")
@property
def is_closed(self) -> bool:
"""Whether the task-tool boundary has fenced new child events."""
with self._state_lock:
return self._closed
async def aclose(self) -> None:
"""Fence late child events and drain every append accepted before it."""
if asyncio.get_running_loop() is not self._loop:
logger.warning("Cannot drain subagent middleware recorder from a non-owner loop")
return
with self._state_lock:
self._closed = True
if self._loop.is_closed():
return
# record_middleware holds _state_lock through call_soon_threadsafe, so
# all accepted callbacks are already ahead of this continuation.
await asyncio.sleep(0)
def _is_subagent_terminal(result: Any) -> bool:
"""Return whether a background subagent result is safe to clean up."""
return result.status in {SubagentStatus.COMPLETED, SubagentStatus.FAILED, SubagentStatus.CANCELLED, SubagentStatus.TIMED_OUT} or getattr(result, "completed_at", None) is not None
def _peek_subagent_result(execution_id: str, *, trace_id: str) -> Any:
"""Read a registry entry without letting a broken status object raise.
The generic-error unwind exists to handle poller failures caused by
persistent status-lookup/status-object errors; finalization re-reading
through the same failing accessor must not abort the unwind. Returns the
entry when readable, ``None`` when it is gone (nothing left to clean),
and ``_STATUS_UNREADABLE`` when it exists but cannot be read.
"""
try:
result = get_background_task_result(execution_id)
except Exception:
logger.warning(
f"[trace={trace_id}] Background status lookup failed for execution {execution_id}",
exc_info=True,
)
return _STATUS_UNREADABLE
if result is None:
return None
try:
_is_subagent_terminal(result)
except Exception:
logger.warning(
f"[trace={trace_id}] Background status object unreadable for execution {execution_id}",
exc_info=True,
)
return _STATUS_UNREADABLE
return result
async def _await_subagent_terminal(execution_id: str, max_polls: int, *, trace_id: str = "", grace_seconds: float | None = None) -> Any:
"""Poll until the background subagent reaches a terminal status.
Without ``grace_seconds`` the wait is bounded by ``max_polls`` polls (the
cancellation unwind's contract). With it, the wait is additionally bounded
by wall-clock time — the generic-error unwind must re-raise promptly
instead of stalling the parent run for the full execution timeout. Never
raises through a broken status accessor; propagates ``_STATUS_UNREADABLE``
to the caller instead.
"""
polls = 0
deadline = None if grace_seconds is None else time.monotonic() + grace_seconds
while True:
result = _peek_subagent_result(execution_id, trace_id=trace_id)
if result is None or result is _STATUS_UNREADABLE:
return result
if _is_subagent_terminal(result):
return result
if polls >= max_polls - 1:
return None
if deadline is not None:
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
return None
await asyncio.sleep(min(_SUBAGENT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS, remaining))
else:
await asyncio.sleep(_SUBAGENT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
polls += 1
async def _finalize_interrupted_subagent(
runtime: Runtime,
execution_id: str,
trace_id: str,
max_polls: int,
*,
grace_seconds: float | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Shared unwind for interrupted polling (cancellation or unexpected error).
Wait (shielded, bounded by ``max_polls`` or ``grace_seconds``) for the
subagent to reach a terminal state so the final token usage snapshot is
reported to the parent RunJournal, then remove the registry entry.
Terminal results are removed synchronously before re-raising; non-terminal
and unreadable ones defer removal to the process-owned persistent subagent
loop, which survives teardown of a short-lived caller loop (``asyncio.run``
cancels caller-loop tasks — including any detached cleanup task — on exit).
This function must never raise: it runs while an exception (the original
poller failure or cancellation) is already in flight, and any error it
raised would replace that exception and skip the cleanup attachment. A
persistently unreadable status object therefore falls through to the
deferred cleaner rather than propagating.
"""
try:
unreadable = False
terminal_result = None
try:
waited = await asyncio.shield(_await_subagent_terminal(execution_id, max_polls, trace_id=trace_id, grace_seconds=grace_seconds))
if waited is _STATUS_UNREADABLE:
unreadable = True
else:
terminal_result = waited
except asyncio.CancelledError:
# The shielded wait surfaces an outer cancellation here. The
# cancellation branch REQUIRES this absorb — re-raising would
# abort the unwind before the deferred-cleanup attachment. The
# generic-error branch shares this helper, so a cancellation
# landing inside its grace wait is absorbed too; that branch
# re-checks task.cancelling() after the unwind and re-raises
# CancelledError so the node still ends as an interrupted run
# (see the unwind call site in task_tool).
pass
# Report whatever the subagent collected (even if we timed out).
final_result = terminal_result
final_terminal = False
if final_result is not None:
final_terminal = _is_subagent_terminal(final_result)
else:
peek = _peek_subagent_result(execution_id, trace_id=trace_id)
if peek is _STATUS_UNREADABLE:
unreadable = True
elif peek is not None:
final_result = peek
final_terminal = _is_subagent_terminal(peek)
if unreadable:
# The entry exists but cannot be read; the terminal-gated sync
# cleanup cannot be trusted here. Attach the deferred cleaner,
# whose last resort force-removes unreadable entries.
_schedule_deferred_subagent_cleanup(runtime, execution_id, trace_id, max_polls)
return
if final_result is not None:
_report_subagent_usage(runtime, final_result)
if final_terminal:
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
else:
_schedule_deferred_subagent_cleanup(runtime, execution_id, trace_id, max_polls)
except Exception:
logger.error(
f"[trace={trace_id}] Interrupted-subagent finalization failed for execution {execution_id}",
exc_info=True,
)
def _deliver_final_usage_report(
usage_recorder: Any,
result: Any,
report_loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop | None,
*,
execution_id: str,
) -> None:
"""Schedule the FINAL usage report onto the loop that owns the RunJournal.
``RunJournal`` is deliberately ``deerflow_loop_bound``: its accumulators
are unlocked read-modify-write fields and ``_tokens_by_model`` is iterated
by ``get_completion_data()``, so reporting from any other thread races the
parent run's own journal writes (lost token updates, ``dictionary changed
size during iteration``). ``report_loop`` is captured at unwind time, when
the unwind paths still run on the parent run's loop. That loop is alive in
every path that continues the run — the polling-timeout branch returns
normally and a generic poller error becomes an error ``ToolMessage``, both
handing control back to the lead agent — so ``call_soon_threadsafe``
delivers the report on the journal's own loop, serialized with every other
journal access. ``usage_recorder`` is likewise resolved at unwind time:
the deferred cleaner must retain only the handler, not the whole
``runtime`` (whose journal and event store belong to the parent run and
would be pinned for the cleaner's whole poll budget otherwise).
A ``None`` recorder means this run has no journal at all — skip without
touching any loop.
On the synchronous ``asyncio.run`` path the loop may already be closed by
the time the deferred cleaner reaches a terminal result. The report is
then dropped on purpose: the run has finished and persisted its completion
data, so nothing reads those counters back — recording into a dead run's
journal would account nothing. This is the one path where a subagent's
tail usage goes permanently unaccounted (the registry entry is removed
right after, so the records exist nowhere else), so the drop is logged at
info with the execution id and the record count. The report bypasses the
snapshot's ``usage_reported`` flag so records accumulated after the
snapshot are counted; the journal itself dedupes by ``source_run_id``.
"""
if usage_recorder is None:
logger.debug("Deferred final usage report for execution %s skipped: no usage recorder on this run", execution_id)
return
if report_loop is None:
logger.info(
"Dropping deferred final usage report for execution %s: no parent loop captured (%d usage records unaccounted)",
execution_id,
len(getattr(result, "token_usage_records", None) or []),
)
return
try:
# A lambda, not plain arguments: call_soon_threadsafe forwards keyword
# arguments to the loop machinery (only ``context`` is its own), so
# passing ``final=True`` through it raises TypeError.
report_loop.call_soon_threadsafe(lambda: _report_usage_records(usage_recorder, result, final=True))
except Exception:
# Loop closed between the capture and this call, or scheduling was
# rejected — same drop rationale and same info-level visibility.
# Never-raise by contract: delivery problems must not block the
# caller's registry removal.
logger.info(
"Dropping deferred final usage report for execution %s: parent loop closed before delivery (%d usage records unaccounted)",
execution_id,
len(getattr(result, "token_usage_records", None) or []),
)
async def _deferred_cleanup_subagent_task(
usage_recorder: Any,
execution_id: str,
trace_id: str,
max_polls: int,
*,
report_loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Keep polling an interrupted subagent until it can be safely removed.
Only the resolved usage recorder is retained (plus ids and the captured
report loop) — never the whole ``runtime``: the strongly-referenced
cleanup task lives for up to the full poll budget, and through
``runtime`` it would pin the parent run's journal and event store for
that entire window.
On a terminal result, schedule the subagent's FINAL usage report (deltas
since the unwind snapshot included) onto the parent run's loop BEFORE
removing the entry, so the parent RunJournal sees everything the subagent
collected — the scheduled callback holds its own reference to the result,
so removal does not invalidate the pending report. When the entry exists
but stays unreadable through the whole poll budget, force-remove it:
cooperative cancellation was already requested, and a broken status
object must not leak the entry forever.
"""
cleanup_poll_count = 0
while True:
result = _peek_subagent_result(execution_id, trace_id=trace_id)
if result is None:
return
if result is _STATUS_UNREADABLE:
if cleanup_poll_count >= max_polls:
logger.warning(f"[trace={trace_id}] Deferred cleanup for execution {execution_id}: status stayed unreadable after {cleanup_poll_count} polls, force-removing")
force_cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
return
elif _is_subagent_terminal(result):
# Never-raise by contract: delivery problems (closed parent loop)
# are logged inside and must not block the registry removal.
_deliver_final_usage_report(usage_recorder, result, report_loop, execution_id=execution_id)
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
return
if cleanup_poll_count >= max_polls:
logger.warning(f"[trace={trace_id}] Deferred cleanup for execution {execution_id} timed out after {cleanup_poll_count} polls")
return
await asyncio.sleep(_SUBAGENT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
cleanup_poll_count += 1
def _log_cleanup_failure(cleanup_task: asyncio.Task[None] | concurrent.futures.Future, *, trace_id: str, execution_id: str) -> None:
if cleanup_task.cancelled():
return
exc = cleanup_task.exception()
if exc is not None:
logger.error(f"[trace={trace_id}] Deferred cleanup failed for execution {execution_id}: {exc}")
# Strong references to scheduled deferred cleanups. The event loop only keeps
# weak references to tasks, so an unreferenced cleanup could be garbage
# collected mid-poll; entries hold either an asyncio task (caller-loop
# fallback) or a concurrent future (persistent subagent loop).
_deferred_cleanup_tasks: set[asyncio.Task[None] | concurrent.futures.Future] = set()
def bind_task_tool(
execution_capacity: SubagentExecutionCapacity,
*,
app_config: "AppConfig | None" = None,
):
"""Return a task tool bound to one explicit SDK runtime capacity.
The copied tool keeps the original name, description, and argument schema;
only its coroutine is wrapped. ``ContextVar`` keeps concurrent direct
factories isolated while the resolved capacity is passed into the executor
before work crosses to the persistent subagent event loop.
"""
original_coroutine = task_tool.coroutine
if original_coroutine is None: # pragma: no cover - task_tool is async by contract
raise RuntimeError("task tool has no async implementation")
async def bound_coroutine(**kwargs):
capacity_token = _explicit_execution_capacity.set(execution_capacity)
config_token = _explicit_app_config.set(app_config)
try:
return await original_coroutine(**kwargs)
finally:
_explicit_app_config.reset(config_token)
_explicit_execution_capacity.reset(capacity_token)
return task_tool.model_copy(update={"coroutine": bound_coroutine})
def _schedule_deferred_subagent_cleanup(
runtime: Runtime,
execution_id: str,
trace_id: str,
max_polls: int,
) -> asyncio.Task[None] | concurrent.futures.Future:
"""Schedule the deferred registry cleanup on the process-owned subagent loop.
The persistent loop outlives the poller's own event loop, so the cleanup
still runs when the poller exits under synchronous tool invocation, where
``asyncio.run()`` cancels caller-loop tasks at teardown before a detached
``asyncio.create_task`` could execute. If the persistent loop cannot be
obtained, fall back to the caller loop rather than raising out of an
unwind path that is already handling an error.
"""
logger.debug(f"[trace={trace_id}] Scheduling deferred cleanup for cancelled execution {execution_id}")
# Resolve both cross-loop dependencies here, on the unwind path's loop:
# the parent run's loop, so the deferred final usage report can be
# delivered back onto the loop that owns the RunJournal (see
# ``_deliver_final_usage_report``), and the usage recorder itself, so the
# cleaner retains only the handler instead of pinning the whole
# ``runtime`` (journal + event store) for its whole poll budget.
try:
report_loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop | None = asyncio.get_running_loop()
except RuntimeError:
report_loop = None
usage_recorder = _find_usage_recorder(runtime)
coro = _deferred_cleanup_subagent_task(usage_recorder, execution_id, trace_id, max_polls, report_loop=report_loop)
try:
cleanup_handle = run_on_isolated_subagent_loop(coro)
except Exception:
# Unreachable in practice — the persistent loop backs the subagent
# execution itself, so it exists by the time a poller needs cleanup.
logger.warning(
f"[trace={trace_id}] Persistent subagent loop unavailable for deferred cleanup of {execution_id}; falling back to the caller loop",
exc_info=True,
)
try:
cleanup_handle = asyncio.create_task(coro)
except Exception:
# No caller loop either — close the coroutine so it is not left
# un-awaited, and let the unwind's error handling take over.
coro.close()
raise
_deferred_cleanup_tasks.add(cleanup_handle)
cleanup_handle.add_done_callback(_deferred_cleanup_tasks.discard)
cleanup_handle.add_done_callback(lambda task: _log_cleanup_failure(task, trace_id=trace_id, execution_id=execution_id))
return cleanup_handle
def _find_usage_recorder(runtime: Any) -> Any | None:
"""Find a callback handler with ``record_external_llm_usage_records`` in the runtime config.
LangChain may pass ``config["callbacks"]`` in three different shapes:
- ``None`` (no callbacks registered): no recorder.
- A plain ``list[BaseCallbackHandler]``: iterate it directly.
- A ``BaseCallbackManager`` instance (e.g. ``AsyncCallbackManager`` on async
tool runs): managers are not iterable, so we unwrap ``.handlers`` first.
Any other shape (e.g. a single handler object accidentally passed without a
list wrapper) cannot be iterated safely; treat it as "no recorder" rather
than raise.
"""
if runtime is None:
return None
config = getattr(runtime, "config", None)
if not isinstance(config, dict):
return None
callbacks = config.get("callbacks")
if isinstance(callbacks, BaseCallbackManager):
callbacks = callbacks.handlers
if not callbacks:
return None
if not isinstance(callbacks, list):
return None
for cb in callbacks:
if hasattr(cb, "record_external_llm_usage_records"):
return cb
return None
def _summarize_usage(records: list[dict] | None) -> dict | None:
"""Summarize token usage records into a compact dict for SSE events."""
if not records:
return None
return {
"input_tokens": sum(r.get("input_tokens", 0) or 0 for r in records),
"output_tokens": sum(r.get("output_tokens", 0) or 0 for r in records),
"total_tokens": sum(r.get("total_tokens", 0) or 0 for r in records),
}
def _report_usage_records(recorder: Any, result: Any, *, final: bool = False) -> None:
"""Deliver usage records to a resolved recorder (flag-gated, never raises).
Shared core of both report paths: the unwind reports directly with a
runtime (resolving the recorder on the parent loop), while the deferred
cleaner delivers onto the parent loop with the recorder resolved at
unwind time — retaining only the handler, never the whole ``runtime``
(which pins the run's journal and event store for the cleaner's whole
poll budget otherwise).
"""
if not final and getattr(result, "usage_reported", True):
return
records = getattr(result, "token_usage_records", None) or []
if not records:
return
if recorder is None:
logger.debug("No usage recorder found in runtime callbacks — subagent token usage not recorded")
return
try:
recorder.record_external_llm_usage_records(records)
result.usage_reported = True
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to report subagent token usage", exc_info=True)
def _report_subagent_usage(runtime: Any, result: Any, *, final: bool = False) -> None:
"""Report subagent token usage to the parent RunJournal, if available.
Each subagent task's snapshot must be reported only once (guarded by
usage_reported). The deferred cleaner's final report bypasses that flag
via ``final=True``: records accumulated after the snapshot are still
delivered, and the journal dedupes per ``source_run_id`` so nothing is
double-counted. Both call sites run on the parent run's loop — directly
from the poller, or via ``call_soon_threadsafe`` from the deferred
cleaner — preserving the journal's ``deerflow_loop_bound`` contract.
"""
_report_usage_records(_find_usage_recorder(runtime), result, final=final)
def _get_runtime_app_config(runtime: Any) -> "AppConfig | None":
explicit = _explicit_app_config.get()
if explicit is not None:
return cast("AppConfig", explicit)
context = getattr(runtime, "context", None)
if isinstance(context, dict):
app_config = context.get("app_config")
if app_config is not None:
return cast("AppConfig", app_config)
return None
def _merge_skill_allowlists(parent: list[str] | None, child: list[str] | None) -> list[str] | None:
"""Return the effective subagent skill allowlist under the parent policy."""
if parent is None:
return child
if child is None:
return list(parent)
parent_set = set(parent)
return [skill for skill in child if skill in parent_set]
def _task_result_command(
*,
tool_call_id: str,
status: SubagentStatusValue,
result: str | None = None,
error: str | None = None,
stop_reason: SubagentStopReasonValue | None = None,
model_name: str | None = None,
usage: dict[str, int] | None = None,
tool_receipts: list[dict] | None = None,
receipt_verdict: dict | None = None,
acceptance_verdict: dict | None = None,
) -> Command:
content, metadata_error = format_subagent_result_message(status, result=result, error=error, stop_reason=stop_reason)
if acceptance_verdict is not None:
# RFC #4651 PR4: the rendered checklist rides the model-visible result
# text; metadata carries the structured verdict for the ledger/judge.
content = f"{content}\n\n{render_acceptance_section(acceptance_verdict)}"
return Command(
update={
"messages": [
ToolMessage(
content=content,
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
name="task",
additional_kwargs=make_subagent_additional_kwargs(
status,
result=result,
error=metadata_error,
stop_reason=stop_reason,
model_name=model_name,
token_usage=usage,
tool_receipts=tool_receipts,
receipt_verdict=receipt_verdict,
acceptance_verdict=acceptance_verdict,
),
)
]
}
)
@tool("task", parse_docstring=True)
async def task_tool(
runtime: Runtime,
prompt: str,
subagent_type: str,
tool_call_id: Annotated[str, InjectedToolCallId],
*,
acceptance_criteria: list[str] | None = None,
description: str = "",
) -> str | Command:
"""Delegate a bounded task to a specialized subagent in its own context.
Delegate only when expected benefit clearly exceeds delegation overhead.
Useful benefits are:
- Material wall-clock savings from independent parallel work
- Specialist tools, skills, models, or domain instructions
- Context isolation for a bounded, unusually context-heavy investigation
Built-in subagent types:
- **general-purpose**: A capable agent for bounded exploration and action. Use
when the assignment has clear specialist or context-isolation benefit, or is
one of several independent, non-overlapping tasks that can actually run in
parallel.
- **bash**: Command execution specialist for running bash commands. This is only
available when host bash is explicitly allowed or when using an isolated shell
sandbox such as `AioSandboxProvider`. Use it only for a bounded shell workflow
with clear context-isolation or independent-parallel benefit.
Routine git, build, test, or deploy operations are not sufficient reason to delegate.
Additional custom subagent types may be defined in config.yaml under
`subagents.custom_agents`. Each custom type can have its own system prompt,
tools, skills, model, and timeout configuration. If an unknown subagent_type
is provided, the error message will list all available types.
When to use this tool:
- Independent tasks that materially reduce wall-clock time when run in parallel
- A specialist subagent provides capability unavailable on the direct path
- Bounded exploration that would otherwise displace important parent context
When NOT to use this tool:
- Merely because a task is complex, multi-step, verbose, or touches a large repo
- Splitting dependent steps across parallel subagents; keep the chain together
and delegate it as one bounded task only when specialist or context-isolation
benefit clearly wins
- Parallel work with overlapping files, shared mutable state, or external side effects
- Tasks requiring user interaction or clarification
Costs to include in the delegation decision:
- Repeating the same repository discovery in multiple contexts
- Coordination, verification, and synthesis of returned results
- Any task the parent can complete more cheaply with direct tools
Reading the result (subagent reports are SELF-REPORTS, not verified facts):
- While receipt verification is enabled (the default; `verification.receipts_enabled`
in config), the subagent is instructed to cite receipt ids `[rN]` from its
execution record for every action claim and to attach a verifiable handle
(absolute path, URL, ID, HTTP status) to every deliverable. In that
configuration the delegation ledger cross-checks those citations; a
completed report whose action claims carry no citation is flagged UNVERIFIED.
When receipt verification is disabled, reports carry no receipt citations
and no citation verdict — judge them by their verifiable handles alone.
- A resolved citation means the cited call happened with the recorded status
— it does not validate that the adjacent claim is correct. Before relying
on a load-bearing claim, spot-check its verifiable handle yourself.
- When you attach `acceptance_criteria`, the result includes a deterministic
acceptance checklist: decidable criteria (`file:<path> exists|non-empty`,
`file_written:<path>`, `tests_passed:<command>`) are checked in code
against the shared thread workspace and the recorded bash executions, and
every criterion that cannot be checked deterministically is marked
UNVERIFIED — never silently passed. A `holds` leaf is execution evidence,
not a guarantee that the deliverable is correct.
- `completed` means execution ended, not task acceptance. Read each criterion
and retain useful work. For `does not hold`, inspect the reason and repair
or recheck only the unmet condition, reusing unaffected outputs.
`UNVERIFIED` is missing evidence, not a failed condition: verify load-bearing
criteria against actual artifacts or primary evidence; when confirmation
is unavailable, preserve uncertainty. Handle both kinds in mixed results.
- Reuse outputs with `holds` checks while spot-checking load-bearing claims
beyond their scope. Without a checklist, inspect the self-report's handles.
Any further delegation must name the missing condition and cover only
remaining work. Do not repeat an unchanged attempt or restart the whole
task. Stay within the remaining delegation and execution budget; when
exhausted, deliver confirmed results with explicit gaps and uncertainty.
Args:
prompt: The task description for the subagent. Be specific and clear about what needs to be done.
subagent_type: The type of subagent to use.
acceptance_criteria: Optional list of completion requirements, handed to
the subagent as untrusted data appended to its task input (never as
system-prompt authority) and addressed one by one in its final
report. Attach them when
the outcome is objectively checkable; prefer the canonical forms
`file:<path> exists`, `file:<path> non-empty`, `file_written:<path>`,
and `tests_passed:<command>` — these are checked deterministically
against the shared thread workspace and the recorded execution
evidence when the subagent completes, while any other wording comes
back marked UNVERIFIED. Example for a report-writing delegation:
["file:../outputs/report.md non-empty"]. Omit for open-ended
exploration where no crisp acceptance condition exists.
description: Optional short (3-5 word) description of the task for logging/display.
"""
runtime_app_config = _get_runtime_app_config(runtime)
metadata: dict = runtime.config.get("metadata", {}) if runtime is not None else {}
allowed_subagents = metadata.get("allowed_subagents")
if allowed_subagents is None:
available_subagent_names = get_available_subagent_names(app_config=runtime_app_config) if runtime_app_config is not None else get_available_subagent_names()
else:
available_subagent_names = get_available_subagent_names(app_config=runtime_app_config, allowed_subagents=allowed_subagents) if runtime_app_config is not None else get_available_subagent_names(allowed_subagents=allowed_subagents)
# Preserve the dedicated sandbox-policy guidance before the generic
# registry/policy membership gate filters bash from the visible catalog.
if subagent_type == "bash":
host_bash_allowed = is_host_bash_allowed(runtime_app_config) if runtime_app_config is not None else is_host_bash_allowed()
if not host_bash_allowed:
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="failed",
error=LOCAL_BASH_SUBAGENT_DISABLED_MESSAGE,
)
# Get subagent configuration
config = get_subagent_config(subagent_type, app_config=runtime_app_config) if runtime_app_config is not None else get_subagent_config(subagent_type)
if config is None or subagent_type not in available_subagent_names:
if available_subagent_names:
available = ", ".join(available_subagent_names)
elif allowed_subagents is not None:
available = "none permitted by caller policy"
else:
available = "none"
error = f"Unknown subagent type '{subagent_type}'. Available: {available}"
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="failed",
error=error,
)
# Build config overrides
overrides: dict = {}
# Skills are loaded by SubagentExecutor per-session (aligned with Codex's pattern:
# each subagent loads its own skills based on config, injected as conversation items).
# No longer appended to system_prompt here.
# Extract parent context from runtime
sandbox_state = None
thread_data = None
uploaded_files = None
upload_state_available = False
thread_id = None
parent_model = None
trace_id = None
user_id = None
deerflow_trace_id = None
if runtime is not None:
sandbox_state = runtime.state.get("sandbox")
thread_data = runtime.state.get("thread_data")
parent_uploaded_files = runtime.state.get("uploaded_files")
if isinstance(parent_uploaded_files, list) and all(
isinstance(entry, dict) and isinstance(entry.get("filename"), str) and bool(entry["filename"]) and Path(entry["filename"]).name == entry["filename"] for entry in parent_uploaded_files
):
# Only a complete, validated boundary can safely exclude same-run
# files. SubagentExecutor snapshots it synchronously before work
# crosses to the isolated event loop.
uploaded_files = parent_uploaded_files
upload_state_available = True
thread_id = runtime.context.get("thread_id") if runtime.context else None
if thread_id is None:
thread_id = runtime.config.get("configurable", {}).get("thread_id")
# Try to get parent model from configurable
parent_model = metadata.get("model_name")
# Get or generate trace_id for distributed tracing
trace_id = metadata.get("trace_id") or str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
# Get user_id for tracing (uses standard resolution order)
user_id = resolve_runtime_user_id(runtime)
# Propagate the authenticated runtime context so delegated tool calls are
# evaluated by GuardrailMiddleware with the same identity/attribution as
# the lead agent. Sourced from the server-side context written by
# inject_authenticated_user_context (and run_id by the run worker); stays
# None when absent (e.g. internal-auth runs) so guardrail behavior is
# unchanged. Without this, role-aware policy silently mis-attributes any
# tool call delegated to a subagent (user_role=None).
parent_context = runtime.context if runtime is not None else None
parent_context = parent_context if isinstance(parent_context, dict) else {}
user_role = parent_context.get("user_role")
oauth_provider = parent_context.get("oauth_provider")
oauth_id = parent_context.get("oauth_id")
run_id = parent_context.get("run_id")
# IM-channel sender identity: group chats share one thread across senders,
# so delegated bash commands need the dispatching turn's channel_user_id.
channel_user_id = parent_context.get("channel_user_id")
# Propagate authorization identity: is_internal (strict bool) and
# authz_attributes (validated Mapping, copied). These follow the same
# server-side provenance as user_role/oauth — see inject_authenticated_user_context.
is_internal = parent_context.get("is_internal") is True
authz_attributes = normalize_authz_attributes(parent_context.get("authz_attributes"))
# The run's immutable extension snapshot, published by the run worker. Stays
# None outside that path (embedded client, standalone LangGraph Server), where
# the executor keeps its process-singleton fallback.
run_extensions = resolve_run_extensions(parent_context)
# Request-level correlation id, distinct from the short ``trace_id`` above
# that labels this one subagent execution in log prefixes. The parent
# runtime context is authoritative (worker._bind_trace_id always fills it);
# the ambient fallback covers tools invoked outside a Gateway run.
deerflow_trace_id = resolve_trace_id(parent_context.get(DEERFLOW_TRACE_METADATA_KEY))
parent_available_skills = metadata.get("available_skills")
if parent_available_skills is not None:
overrides["skills"] = _merge_skill_allowlists(list(parent_available_skills), config.skills)
if overrides:
config = replace(config, **overrides)
# Get available tools (excluding task tool to prevent nesting)
# Lazy import to avoid circular dependency
from deerflow.tools import get_available_tools
# Inherit parent agent's tool_groups so subagents respect the same restrictions
parent_tool_groups = metadata.get("tool_groups")
resolved_app_config = runtime_app_config
if config.model == "inherit" and parent_model is None and resolved_app_config is None:
resolved_app_config = get_app_config()
effective_model = resolve_subagent_model_name(config, parent_model, app_config=resolved_app_config)
# Subagents should not have subagent tools enabled (prevent recursive
# nesting). Ordinary task subagents receive a snapshot of the parent's
# current-run uploads below, so historical upload discovery is safe when
# that state channel is present. Non-standard callers without the channel
# remain fail-closed instead of misclassifying current uploads as history.
available_tools_kwargs = {
"model_name": effective_model,
"groups": parent_tool_groups,
"subagent_enabled": False,
"include_upload_tool": upload_state_available,
}
if resolved_app_config is not None:
available_tools_kwargs["app_config"] = resolved_app_config
tools = get_available_tools(**available_tools_kwargs)
# Create executor
executor_kwargs = {
"config": config,
"tools": tools,
"parent_model": parent_model,
"sandbox_state": sandbox_state,
"thread_data": thread_data,
"uploaded_files": uploaded_files,
"thread_id": thread_id,
"trace_id": trace_id,
"user_id": user_id,
"user_role": user_role,
"oauth_provider": oauth_provider,
"oauth_id": oauth_id,
"run_id": run_id,
"channel_user_id": channel_user_id,
"is_internal": is_internal,
"authz_attributes": authz_attributes,
"deerflow_trace_id": deerflow_trace_id,
# RFC #4651 PR3: lead-supplied acceptance criteria are handed to the
# executor, which appends them to the subagent's task HumanMessage as
# untrusted data (sanitized and boundary-framed by
# InputSanitizationMiddleware). The subagent's SystemMessage carries
# only a framework-owned pointer note, so criterion text can never gain
# system-channel authority over framework instructions.
"acceptance_criteria": acceptance_criteria,
}
middleware_recorder = None
parent_journal = parent_context.get("__run_journal")
if parent_journal is not None:
# The task tool runs on the parent run's loop. Pass only a proxy across
# the isolated-subagent boundary so middleware persistence is delivered
# on the loop that owns the RunJournal and its event store.
middleware_recorder = _ParentLoopMiddlewareRecorderProxy(
parent_journal,
asyncio.get_running_loop(),
)
executor_kwargs["loop_detection_recorder"] = middleware_recorder
executor_kwargs["tool_promotion_recorder"] = middleware_recorder
if resolved_app_config is not None:
executor_kwargs["app_config"] = resolved_app_config
if run_extensions is not None:
executor_kwargs["extensions"] = run_extensions
explicit_capacity = _explicit_execution_capacity.get()
if explicit_capacity is not None:
executor_kwargs["execution_capacity"] = explicit_capacity
executor = SubagentExecutor(**executor_kwargs)
# Keep the provider tool-call ID for stream/message correlation, but use a
# server-generated execution ID for process-wide background task control.
execution_id = executor.execute_async(prompt, task_id=tool_call_id)
# Poll for task completion in backend (removes need for LLM to poll)
poll_count = 0
last_status = None
last_message_count = 0 # Track how many AI messages we've already sent
# Polling timeout: execution timeout + 60s buffer, checked every 5s
max_poll_count = (config.timeout_seconds + 60) // 5
logger.info(f"[trace={trace_id}] Started background task {tool_call_id} (execution_id={execution_id}, subagent={subagent_type}, timeout={config.timeout_seconds}s, polling_limit={max_poll_count} polls)")
writer = get_stream_writer()
try:
# Send Task Started message. This is a real await point (registered
# handlers run here), so it belongs inside the guarded region: an emit
# failure must take the same cooperative-cancel + deferred-cleanup
# path as any other unexpected exit, not leak the background entry.
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_started",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"description": description or prompt,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
while True:
result = get_background_task_result(execution_id)
if result is None:
logger.error(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} execution {execution_id} not found in background tasks")
await aemit_custom_event(
{"type": "task_failed", "task_id": tool_call_id, "error": "Task disappeared from background tasks"},
writer=writer,
)
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
error = f"Task {tool_call_id} disappeared from background tasks"
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="failed",
error=error,
)
# Log status changes for debugging
if result.status != last_status:
logger.info(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} execution {execution_id} status: {result.status.value}")
last_status = result.status
# The collector publishes cumulative records. Reuse one snapshot for
# both live progress and the terminal event so the frontend can
# replace, rather than add, its per-task total.
usage = _summarize_usage(getattr(result, "token_usage_records", None))
# Check for new AI messages and send task_running events
ai_messages = result.ai_messages or []
current_message_count = len(ai_messages)
if current_message_count > last_message_count:
# Send task_running event for each new message
for i in range(last_message_count, current_message_count):
message = ai_messages[i]
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_running",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"message": message,
"message_index": i + 1, # 1-based index for display
"total_messages": current_message_count,
"usage": usage,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
logger.info(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} sent message #{i + 1}/{current_message_count}")
last_message_count = current_message_count
# Check if task completed, failed, or timed out
if result.status == SubagentStatus.COMPLETED:
_report_subagent_usage(runtime, result)
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_completed",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"result": result.result,
"usage": usage,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
logger.info(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} completed after {poll_count} polls")
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
# stop_reason carries a guardrail cap (token_capped / turn_capped)
# when the run was ended early but still produced a final answer
# — the work survives on result_brief like a clean success.
# RFC #4651 PR2: cross-check the report's [rN] citations
# against the harvested receipts once, here — the only point
# holding the full (untruncated) report text. receipts=None
# means no harvest happened (receipts_enabled=false, or the
# run ended before streaming): skip, keeping disabled
# deployments exactly pre-PR2. An empty list is a real
# harvest (zero stamped calls) and still gets a verdict.
receipts = getattr(result, "tool_receipts", None)
receipt_verdict = verify_receipt_citations(result.result or "", receipts) if receipts is not None else None
# RFC #4651 PR4: deterministic acceptance checklist. Runs only
# when the delegation carried criteria; offloaded because the
# file leaves perform sandbox IO. Failure-isolated like the
# citation check — a checker error never changes the outcome,
# the result just flows back without a checklist verdict.
acceptance_verdict = None
if acceptance_criteria:
try:
acceptance_verdict = await asyncio.to_thread(
check_acceptance_criteria,
acceptance_criteria,
runtime=runtime,
thread_data=thread_data,
bash_executions=getattr(result, "bash_executions", None),
)
except Exception:
logger.warning(f"[trace={trace_id}] Acceptance checklist failed for task {tool_call_id}; result flows back unchecked", exc_info=True)
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="completed",
result=result.result,
stop_reason=result.stop_reason,
model_name=effective_model,
usage=usage,
tool_receipts=receipts,
receipt_verdict=receipt_verdict,
acceptance_verdict=acceptance_verdict,
)
elif result.status == SubagentStatus.FAILED:
_report_subagent_usage(runtime, result)
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_failed",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"error": result.error,
"usage": usage,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
logger.error(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} failed: {result.error}")
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
# A turn-capped run with no usable output surfaces as failed +
# stop_reason=turn_capped; the cap note lets the lead tell "out
# of budget" from "broken subagent".
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="failed",
error=result.error,
stop_reason=result.stop_reason,
model_name=effective_model,
usage=usage,
tool_receipts=getattr(result, "tool_receipts", None),
)
elif result.status == SubagentStatus.CANCELLED:
_report_subagent_usage(runtime, result)
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_cancelled",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"error": result.error,
"usage": usage,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
logger.info(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} cancelled: {result.error}")
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="cancelled",
error=result.error,
model_name=effective_model,
usage=usage,
tool_receipts=getattr(result, "tool_receipts", None),
)
elif result.status == SubagentStatus.TIMED_OUT:
_report_subagent_usage(runtime, result)
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_timed_out",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"error": result.error,
"usage": usage,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
logger.warning(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} timed out: {result.error}")
cleanup_background_task(execution_id)
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="timed_out",
error=result.error,
model_name=effective_model,
usage=usage,
tool_receipts=getattr(result, "tool_receipts", None),
)
# Still running, wait before next poll
await asyncio.sleep(5)
poll_count += 1
# Polling timeout as a safety net (in case thread pool timeout doesn't work)
# Set to execution timeout + 60s buffer, in 5s poll intervals
# This catches edge cases where the background task gets stuck
if poll_count > max_poll_count:
timeout_minutes = config.timeout_seconds // 60
logger.error(f"[trace={trace_id}] Task {tool_call_id} polling timed out after {poll_count} polls (should have been caught by thread pool timeout)")
_report_subagent_usage(runtime, result)
usage = _summarize_usage(getattr(result, "token_usage_records", None))
await aemit_custom_event(
{
"type": "task_timed_out",
"task_id": tool_call_id,
"usage": usage,
"model_name": effective_model,
},
writer=writer,
)
# The task may still be running in the background. Signal cooperative
# cancellation and schedule deferred cleanup to remove the entry from
# _background_tasks once the background thread reaches a terminal state.
request_cancel_background_task(execution_id)
_schedule_deferred_subagent_cleanup(runtime, execution_id, trace_id, max_poll_count)
message = f"Task polling timed out after {timeout_minutes} minutes. This may indicate the background task is stuck. Status: {result.status.value}"
return _task_result_command(
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
status="polling_timed_out",
error=message,
model_name=effective_model,
usage=usage,
tool_receipts=getattr(result, "tool_receipts", None),
)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
# Signal the background subagent thread to stop cooperatively, then
# wait for the terminal result so the final token usage snapshot is
# reported to the parent RunJournal before the parent worker persists
# get_completion_data(). A failure here must not replace the
# CancelledError that is already in flight.
try:
request_cancel_background_task(execution_id)
except Exception:
logger.warning(
f"[trace={trace_id}] Failed to request cancellation for background task {execution_id} during unwind",
exc_info=True,
)
await _finalize_interrupted_subagent(runtime, execution_id, trace_id, max_poll_count)
raise
except Exception:
# Unexpected poller failure (emit error, status-lookup bug, writer
# failure, ...). Mirror the cancellation unwind: stop the subagent
# cooperatively, report its final usage, and remove the registry entry —
# synchronously when it already reached terminal, otherwise via
# deferred cleanup pinned to the process-owned subagent loop so it
# survives asyncio.run() teardown on the synchronous tool path. The
# unwind is bounded by a short grace period (not the full execution
# timeout) and never lets a failing status accessor or cancellation
# request replace the original exception.
try:
request_cancel_background_task(execution_id)
except Exception:
logger.warning(
f"[trace={trace_id}] Failed to request cancellation for background task {execution_id} during unwind",
exc_info=True,
)
await _finalize_interrupted_subagent(runtime, execution_id, trace_id, max_poll_count, grace_seconds=_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_GRACE_SECONDS)
current_task = asyncio.current_task()
if current_task is not None and current_task.cancelling():
# A graph-node cancellation landed inside the grace wait and was
# absorbed by the shared unwind (its never-raise contract catches
# CancelledError so the deferred-cleanup attachment still runs).
# Honour it here rather than reporting a tool failure: the node
# must end as an interrupted run, not a failed tool call.
raise asyncio.CancelledError
raise
finally:
if middleware_recorder is not None:
await middleware_recorder.aclose()