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* feat(authz): admin role-assignment API for configured custom roles (#4063 gap 2) The RBAC provider accepts arbitrary configured role names (guest, ...), but nothing could assign them to real users: User.system_role was pinned to Literal["admin", "user"] at the API layer while the DB column stayed a plain String(16) for exactly this future, and zhfeng's #3462 audit listed the missing assignment surface as gap 2 — custom roles were declarable in YAML but unreachable for authenticated web users. - User/UserResponse.system_role widens to a non-empty string; whether a role is *assignable* is the admin API's contract, not the model's. - RbacAuthorizationProvider exposes known_roles; the Gateway's new assignable_role_names() unions the built-ins with the provider's configured role names (custom providers: built-ins only). - New admin-only router /api/v1/admin/users: GET lists users with their role; PATCH assigns — role validated against assignable names (an unknown role would silently fall through to default_role on every decision), 404 for missing users, and the last remaining admin cannot be demoted (bootstrap lockout protection). Enforcement is unchanged: the assignment only changes which role the principal carries; the @require_permission route guards and runtime provider decisions remain the single enforcement points. - SQLite repository gains list_users (ordered oldest-first). Tests: router guard/422/404/409/no-op/happy-path, last-admin invariant (both directions), assignable names union, principal carries the configured role; the two old Literal-rejection contract tests updated to the new contract (custom role representable; empty string still rejected). * fix(auth): widen the frontend user schema for custom roles (review-lessons catch) The role-assignment API's review-lessons sweep found the one consumer class the implementation had not enumerated: the FRONTEND parses /me with a strict userSchema whose system_role was z.enum(["admin", "user"]) — a user assigned a provider-configured custom role (guest) would fail userSchema.parse in server.ts and break the auth flow before rendering anything. - types.ts: system_role widens to z.string().min(1), kept in lockstep with the backend model (min_length=1). All existing consumers compare === "admin", so any other value is simply non-admin — no behavior change for admin/user. - server.test.ts: contract tests — custom role parses verbatim; empty string still rejected. - config.example.yaml: the authorization comment now says custom roles become reachable via PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{id} and that a declared-but-unassigned role grants nothing. * fix(auth): commit the admin_users router, drop the stale type-ignore, document the surface Review catch on #6382: the router module was never staged — app.py and the tests import it, so the pushed branch could not boot (ImportError in create_app). The local tree kept it as an untracked file, which is why every check passed before the push. - Actually commit app/gateway/routers/admin_users.py. - _row_to_user: drop the now-stale '# type: ignore[arg-type]' on system_role — the model field is a plain string now (keep the comma). - README: the authorization paragraph now mentions the admin role-assignment surface (GET/PATCH /api/v1/admin/users, admin-only, last-admin demotion protected, declared-but-unassigned grants nothing). - server.test.ts import-order lint fix from the frontend sweep. * fix(auth): field-scoped role writes close the demotion-undo race Review round 2 on #6382 — three findings, one design: - [P1] update_user copied system_role from the caller's account snapshot, so a password change that read the user as admin could restore a role concurrently revoked by the demotion route (stale-snapshot write-back). Account writes are now field-scoped against each other: update_user is the credential/profile writer (never touches the role, mirrors the row's current role back), update_system_role is the only role writer (single-column, never touches credentials or token_version). - The last-admin lockout check moved inside the role write's serialized transaction: count-then-write across two sessions let two concurrent demotions of the only two admins both pass. Same idiom as create_first_admin — BEGIN IMMEDIATE on SQLite, pg_advisory_xact_lock on a distinct key on Postgres, raise on unknown dialects. - UserNotFoundError from the racing-delete window maps to the route's 404 instead of a 500. Tests 11->12: real-repo regression covering the P1 interleaving (demotion lands -> stale credential snapshot writes -> role stays revoked, credentials applied), field isolation both directions, and the last-admin invariant raised from inside the write with the row intact. Mutation-verified: restoring the role write-back in update_user fails it. * style(auth): format the server auth tests * fix(tests): migrate the personal-MCP demote revocation to update_system_role The role-write field-scoping (66e2cec23) made update_user a credential/profile-only writer, so the demote branch of test_revocation_blocks_discovery... silently no-oped and CI failed on all four shards (assert 2 == 1 — the role never changed). - The demote now goes through update_system_role, the sole role writer. - The fixture gains a second admin: the revocation test demotes its sole synthetic admin, which the new last-admin lockout guard correctly blocks — a second admin keeps the scenario legal without weakening either invariant. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
96 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
96 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
"""Admin user-management surface: list users and assign system roles.
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RFC #4063 / issue #3462 gap 2: the RBAC provider accepts arbitrary configured
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role names (``guest``, ...), but no surface could assign them to real users —
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``User.system_role`` was pinned to admin/user at the API layer while the DB
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column stayed a plain string for exactly this future. This router is that
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surface: admin-only (§12 Q6 — management surfaces stay admin-gated), role
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names validated against the provider's configured roles, and the last
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remaining admin cannot be demoted (bootstrap lockout protection).
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Enforcement is unchanged: the assignment only changes which role the
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principal carries; the Gateway's ``@require_permission`` route guards and the
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runtime provider decisions remain the single enforcement points.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from uuid import UUID
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
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from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import LastAdminRemainsError, UserNotFoundError
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from app.gateway.authz import assignable_role_names
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from app.gateway.deps import get_user_repository, require_admin_user
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
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from app.gateway.auth.models import UserResponse
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/admin/users", tags=["admin-users"])
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class UserRoleUpdate(BaseModel):
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"""Assignment payload: a built-in or provider-configured role name."""
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system_role: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=16, description="Built-in (admin/user) or a role configured in the authorization provider's roles mapping")
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def _to_response(user) -> UserResponse:
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return UserResponse(
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id=str(user.id),
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email=str(user.email),
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system_role=str(user.system_role),
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needs_setup=bool(getattr(user, "needs_setup", False)),
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oauth_provider=getattr(user, "oauth_provider", None),
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)
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@router.get("")
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async def list_users(request: Request, repository: SQLiteUserRepository = Depends(get_user_repository)) -> list[UserResponse]:
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"""List all users with their system role (admin-only)."""
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await require_admin_user(request, detail="admin user listing requires an admin credential")
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users = await repository.list_users()
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return [_to_response(user) for user in users]
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@router.patch("/{user_id}")
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async def update_user_role(
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request: Request,
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user_id: UUID,
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update: UserRoleUpdate,
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repository: SQLiteUserRepository = Depends(get_user_repository),
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) -> UserResponse:
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"""Assign a user's system role (admin-only).
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The role must be a built-in ("admin"/"user") or declared in the
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authorization provider's roles configuration — an unknown name would make
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the user's principal fall through to ``default_role`` on every decision,
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which is never what an operator intended. Demoting the last remaining
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admin is rejected so a deployment cannot lock itself out of management.
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"""
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await require_admin_user(request, detail="role assignment requires an admin credential")
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assignable = assignable_role_names()
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if update.system_role not in assignable:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
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detail=f"unknown role '{update.system_role}'; assignable roles: {sorted(assignable)}",
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)
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try:
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# Single serialized column write: the last-admin count and the write
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# share one transaction (two concurrent demotions cannot both pass),
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# and credential writers can never race this — see
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# SQLiteUserRepository.update_system_role / update_user.
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user = await repository.update_system_role(str(user_id), update.system_role)
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except UserNotFoundError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="user not found") from None
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except LastAdminRemainsError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="cannot demote the last remaining admin") from None
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return _to_response(user)
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