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* feat(auth): introduce backend auth module Port RFC-001 authentication core from PR #1728: - JWT token handling (create_access_token, decode_token, TokenPayload) - Password hashing (bcrypt) with verify_password - SQLite UserRepository with base interface - Provider Factory pattern (LocalAuthProvider) - CLI reset_admin tool - Auth-specific errors (AuthErrorCode, TokenError, AuthErrorResponse) Deps: - bcrypt>=4.0.0 - pyjwt>=2.9.0 - email-validator>=2.0.0 - backend/uv.toml pins public PyPI index Tests: 12 pure unit tests (test_auth_config.py, test_auth_errors.py). Scope note: authz.py, test_auth.py, and test_auth_type_system.py are deferred to commit 2 because they depend on middleware and deps wiring that is not yet in place. Commit 1 stays "pure new files only" as the spec mandates. * feat(auth): wire auth end-to-end (middleware + frontend replacement) Backend: - Port auth_middleware, csrf_middleware, langgraph_auth, routers/auth - Port authz decorator (owner_filter_key defaults to 'owner_id') - Merge app.py: register AuthMiddleware + CSRFMiddleware + CORS, add _ensure_admin_user lifespan hook, _migrate_orphaned_threads helper, register auth router - Merge deps.py: add get_local_provider, get_current_user_from_request, get_optional_user_from_request; keep get_current_user as thin str|None adapter for feedback router - langgraph.json: add auth path pointing to langgraph_auth.py:auth - Rename metadata['user_id'] -> metadata['owner_id'] in langgraph_auth (both metadata write and LangGraph filter dict) + test fixtures Frontend: - Delete better-auth library and api catch-all route - Remove better-auth npm dependency and env vars (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, BETTER_AUTH_GITHUB_*) from env.js - Port frontend/src/core/auth/* (AuthProvider, gateway-config, proxy-policy, server-side getServerSideUser, types) - Port frontend/src/core/api/fetcher.ts - Port (auth)/layout, (auth)/login, (auth)/setup pages - Rewrite workspace/layout.tsx as server component that calls getServerSideUser and wraps in AuthProvider - Port workspace/workspace-content.tsx for the client-side sidebar logic Tests: - Port 5 auth test files (test_auth, test_auth_middleware, test_auth_type_system, test_ensure_admin, test_langgraph_auth) - 176 auth tests PASS After this commit: login/logout/registration flow works, but persistence layer does not yet filter by owner_id. Commit 4 closes that gap. * feat(auth): account settings page + i18n - Port account-settings-page.tsx (change password, change email, logout) - Wire into settings-dialog.tsx as new "account" section with UserIcon, rendered first in the section list - Add i18n keys: - en-US/zh-CN: settings.sections.account ("Account" / "账号") - en-US/zh-CN: button.logout ("Log out" / "退出登录") - types.ts: matching type declarations * feat(auth): enforce owner_id across 2.0-rc persistence layer Add request-scoped contextvar-based owner filtering to threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback repositories. Router code is unchanged — isolation is enforced at the storage layer so that any caller that forgets to pass owner_id still gets filtered results, and new routes cannot accidentally leak data. Core infrastructure ------------------- - deerflow/runtime/user_context.py (new): - ContextVar[CurrentUser | None] with default None - runtime_checkable CurrentUser Protocol (structural subtype with .id) - set/reset/get/require helpers - AUTO sentinel + resolve_owner_id(value, method_name) for sentinel three-state resolution: AUTO reads contextvar, explicit str overrides, explicit None bypasses the filter (for migration/CLI) Repository changes ------------------ - ThreadMetaRepository: create/get/search/update_*/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg; read paths filter by owner, writes stamp it, mutations check ownership before applying - RunRepository: put/get/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg - FeedbackRepository: create/get/list_by_run/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg - DbRunEventStore: list_messages/list_events/list_messages_by_run/ count_messages/delete_by_thread/delete_by_run gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg. Write paths (put/put_batch) read contextvar softly: when a request-scoped user is available, owner_id is stamped; background worker writes without a user context pass None which is valid (orphan row to be bound by migration) Schema ------ - persistence/models/run_event.py: RunEventRow.owner_id = Mapped[ str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True) - No alembic migration needed: 2.0 ships fresh, Base.metadata.create_all picks up the new column automatically Middleware ---------- - auth_middleware.py: after cookie check, call get_optional_user_from_ request to load the real User, stamp it into request.state.user AND the contextvar via set_current_user, reset in a try/finally. Public paths and unauthenticated requests continue without contextvar, and @require_auth handles the strict 401 path Test infrastructure ------------------- - tests/conftest.py: @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) _auto_user_context sets a default SimpleNamespace(id="test-user-autouse") on every test unless marked @pytest.mark.no_auto_user. Keeps existing 20+ persistence tests passing without modification - pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options]: register no_auto_user marker so pytest does not emit warnings for opt-out tests - tests/test_user_context.py: 6 tests covering three-state semantics, Protocol duck typing, and require/optional APIs - tests/test_thread_meta_repo.py: one test updated to pass owner_id= None explicitly where it was previously relying on the old default Test results ------------ - test_user_context.py: 6 passed - test_auth*.py + test_langgraph_auth.py + test_ensure_admin.py: 127 - test_run_event_store / test_run_repository / test_thread_meta_repo / test_feedback: 92 passed - Full backend suite: 1905 passed, 2 failed (both @requires_llm flaky integration tests unrelated to auth), 1 skipped * feat(auth): extend orphan migration to 2.0-rc persistence tables _ensure_admin_user now runs a three-step pipeline on every boot: Step 1 (fatal): admin user exists / is created / password is reset Step 2 (non-fatal): LangGraph store orphan threads → admin Step 3 (non-fatal): SQL persistence tables → admin - threads_meta - runs - run_events - feedback Each step is idempotent. The fatal/non-fatal split mirrors PR #1728's original philosophy: admin creation failure blocks startup (the system is unusable without an admin), whereas migration failures log a warning and let the service proceed (a partial migration is recoverable; a missing admin is not). Key helpers ----------- - _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size=500): async generator that cursor-paginates across LangGraph store pages. Fixes PR #1728's hardcoded limit=1000 bug that would silently lose orphans beyond the first page. - _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id): Rewritten to use _iter_store_items. Returns the migrated count so the caller can log it; raises only on unhandled exceptions. - _migrate_orphan_sql_tables(admin_user_id): Imports the 4 ORM models lazily, grabs the shared session factory, runs one UPDATE per table in a single transaction, commits once. No-op when no persistence backend is configured (in-memory dev). Tests: test_ensure_admin.py (8 passed) * test(auth): port AUTH test plan docs + lint/format pass - Port backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md and AUTH_UPGRADE.md from PR #1728 - Rename metadata.user_id → metadata.owner_id in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md (4 occurrences from the original PR doc) - ruff auto-fix UP037 in sentinel type annotations: drop quotes around "str | None | _AutoSentinel" now that from __future__ import annotations makes them implicit string forms - ruff format: 2 files (app/gateway/app.py, runtime/user_context.py) Note on test coverage additions: - conftest.py autouse fixture was already added in commit 4 (had to be co-located with the repository changes to keep pre-existing persistence tests passing) - cross-user isolation E2E tests (test_owner_isolation.py) deferred — enforcement is already proven by the 98-test repository suite via the autouse fixture + explicit _AUTO sentinel exercises - New test cases (TC-API-17..20, TC-ATK-13, TC-MIG-01..07) listed in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md are deferred to a follow-up PR — they are manual-QA test cases rather than pytest code, and the spec-level coverage is already met by test_user_context.py + the 98-test repository suite. Final test results: - Auth suite (test_auth*, test_langgraph_auth, test_ensure_admin, test_user_context): 186 passed - Persistence suite (test_run_event_store, test_run_repository, test_thread_meta_repo, test_feedback): 98 passed - Lint: ruff check + ruff format both clean * test(auth): add cross-user isolation test suite 10 tests exercising the storage-layer owner filter by manually switching the user_context contextvar between two users. Verifies the safety invariant: After a repository write with owner_id=A, a subsequent read with owner_id=B must not return the row, and vice versa. Covers all 4 tables that own user-scoped data: TC-API-17 threads_meta — read, search, update, delete cross-user TC-API-18 runs — get, list_by_thread, delete cross-user TC-API-19 run_events — list_messages, list_events, count_messages, delete_by_thread (CRITICAL: raw conversation content leak vector) TC-API-20 feedback — get, list_by_run, delete cross-user Plus two meta-tests verifying the sentinel pattern itself: - AUTO + unset contextvar raises RuntimeError - explicit owner_id=None bypasses the filter (migration escape hatch) Architecture note ----------------- These tests bypass the HTTP layer by design. The full chain (cookie → middleware → contextvar → repository) is covered piecewise: - test_auth_middleware.py: middleware sets contextvar from cookies - test_owner_isolation.py: repositories enforce isolation when contextvar is set to different users Together they prove the end-to-end safety property without the ceremony of spinning up a full TestClient + in-memory DB for every router endpoint. Tests pass: 231 (full auth + persistence + isolation suite) Lint: clean * refactor(auth): migrate user repository to SQLAlchemy ORM Move the users table into the shared persistence engine so auth matches the pattern of threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback — one engine, one session factory, one schema init codepath. New files --------- - persistence/user/__init__.py, persistence/user/model.py: UserRow ORM class with partial unique index on (oauth_provider, oauth_id) - Registered in persistence/models/__init__.py so Base.metadata.create_all() picks it up Modified -------- - auth/repositories/sqlite.py: rewritten as async SQLAlchemy, identical constructor pattern to the other four repositories (def __init__(self, session_factory) + self._sf = session_factory) - auth/config.py: drop users_db_path field — storage is configured through config.database like every other table - deps.py/get_local_provider: construct SQLiteUserRepository with the shared session factory, fail fast if engine is not initialised - tests/test_auth.py: rewrite test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields to use the shared engine (init_engine + close_engine in a tempdir) - tests/test_auth_type_system.py: add per-test autouse fixture that spins up a scratch engine and resets deps._cached_* singletons * refactor(auth): remove SQL orphan migration (unused in supported scenarios) The _migrate_orphan_sql_tables helper existed to bind NULL owner_id rows in threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback to the admin on first boot. But in every supported upgrade path, it's a no-op: 1. Fresh install: create_all builds fresh tables, no legacy rows 2. No-auth → with-auth (no existing persistence DB): persistence tables are created fresh by create_all, no legacy rows 3. No-auth → with-auth (has existing persistence DB from #1930): NOT a supported upgrade path — "有 DB 到有 DB" schema evolution is out of scope; users wipe DB or run manual ALTER So the SQL orphan migration never has anything to do in the supported matrix. Delete the function, simplify _ensure_admin_user from a 3-step pipeline to a 2-step one (admin creation + LangGraph store orphan migration only). LangGraph store orphan migration stays: it serves the real "no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path where a user's existing LangGraph thread metadata has no owner_id field and needs to be stamped with the newly-created admin's id. Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation) Lint: clean * security(auth): write initial admin password to 0600 file instead of logs CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data flagged 3 call sites that logged the auto-generated admin password to stdout via logger.info(). Production log aggregators (ELK/Splunk/etc) would have captured those cleartext secrets. Replace with a shared helper that writes to .deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt with mode 0600, and log only the path. New file -------- - app/gateway/auth/credential_file.py: write_initial_credentials() helper. Takes email, password, and a "initial"/"reset" label. Creates .deer-flow/ if missing, writes a header comment plus the email+password, chmods 0o600, returns the absolute Path. Modified -------- - app/gateway/app.py: both _ensure_admin_user paths (fresh creation + needs_setup password reset) now write to file and log the path - app/gateway/auth/reset_admin.py: rewritten to use the shared ORM repo (SQLiteUserRepository with session_factory) and the credential_file helper. The previous implementation was broken after the earlier ORM refactor — it still imported _get_users_conn and constructed SQLiteUserRepository() without a session factory. No tests changed — the three password-log sites are all exercised via existing test_ensure_admin.py which checks that startup succeeds, not that a specific string appears in logs. CodeQL alerts 272, 283, 284: all resolved. * security(auth): strict JWT validation in middleware (fix junk cookie bypass) AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8 expects junk cookies to be rejected with 401. The previous middleware behaviour was "presence-only": check that some access_token cookie exists, then pass through. In combination with my Task-12 decision to skip @require_auth decorators on routes, this created a gap where a request with any cookie-shaped string (e.g. access_token=not-a-jwt) would bypass authentication on routes that do not touch the repository (/api/models, /api/mcp/config, /api/memory, /api/skills, …). Fix: middleware now calls get_current_user_from_request() strictly and catches the resulting HTTPException to render a 401 with the proper fine-grained error code (token_invalid, token_expired, user_not_found, …). On success it stamps request.state.user and the contextvar so repository-layer owner filters work downstream. The 4 old "_with_cookie_passes" tests in test_auth_middleware.py were written for the presence-only behaviour; they asserted that a junk cookie would make the handler return 200. They are renamed to "_with_junk_cookie_rejected" and their assertions flipped to 401. The negative path (no cookie → 401 not_authenticated) is unchanged. Verified: no cookie → 401 not_authenticated junk cookie → 401 token_invalid (the fixed bug) expired cookie → 401 token_expired Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation) Lint: clean * security(auth): wire @require_permission(owner_check=True) on isolation routes Apply the require_permission decorator to all 28 routes that take a {thread_id} path parameter. Combined with the strict middleware (previous commit), this gives the double-layer protection that AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.9 documents: Layer 1 (AuthMiddleware): cookie + JWT validation, rejects junk cookies and stamps request.state.user Layer 2 (@require_permission with owner_check=True): per-resource ownership verification via ThreadMetaStore.check_access — returns 404 if a different user owns the thread The decorator's owner_check branch is rewritten to use the SQL thread_meta_repo (the 2.0-rc persistence layer) instead of the LangGraph store path that PR #1728 used (_store_get / get_store in routers/threads.py). The inject_record convenience is dropped — no caller in 2.0 needs the LangGraph blob, and the SQL repo has a different shape. Routes decorated (28 total): - threads.py: delete, patch, get, get-state, post-state, post-history - thread_runs.py: post-runs, post-runs-stream, post-runs-wait, list_runs, get_run, cancel_run, join_run, stream_existing_run, list_thread_messages, list_run_messages, list_run_events, thread_token_usage - feedback.py: create, list, stats, delete - uploads.py: upload (added Request param), list, delete - artifacts.py: get_artifact - suggestions.py: generate (renamed body parameter to avoid conflict with FastAPI Request) Test fixes: - test_suggestions_router.py: bypass the decorator via __wrapped__ (the unit tests cover parsing logic, not auth — no point spinning up a thread_meta_repo just to test JSON unwrapping) - test_auth_middleware.py 4 fake-cookie tests: already updated in the previous commit (745bf432) Tests: 293 passed (auth + persistence + isolation + suggestions) Lint: clean * security(auth): defense-in-depth fixes from release validation pass Eight findings caught while running the AUTH_TEST_PLAN end-to-end against the deployed sg_dev stack. Each is a pre-condition for shipping release/2.0-rc that the previous PRs missed. Backend hardening - routers/auth.py: rate limiter X-Real-IP now requires AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES whitelist (CIDR/IP allowlist). Without nginx in front, the previous code honored arbitrary X-Real-IP, letting an attacker rotate the header to fully bypass the per-IP login lockout. - routers/auth.py: 36-entry common-password blocklist via Pydantic field_validator on RegisterRequest + ChangePasswordRequest. The shared _validate_strong_password helper keeps the constraint in one place. - routers/threads.py: ThreadCreateRequest + ThreadPatchRequest strip server-reserved metadata keys (owner_id, user_id) via Pydantic field_validator so a forged value can never round-trip back to other clients reading the same thread. The actual ownership invariant stays on the threads_meta row; this closes the metadata-blob echo gap. - authz.py + thread_meta/sql.py: require_permission gains a require_existing flag plumbed through check_access(require_existing=True). Destructive routes (DELETE/PATCH/state-update/runs/feedback) now treat a missing thread_meta row as 404 instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow", closing the cross-user delete-idempotence gap where any user could successfully DELETE another user's deleted thread. - repositories/sqlite.py + base.py: update_user raises UserNotFoundError on a vanished row instead of silently returning the input. Concurrent delete during password reset can no longer look like a successful update. - runtime/user_context.py: resolve_owner_id() coerces User.id (UUID) to str at the contextvar boundary so SQLAlchemy String(64) columns can bind it. The whole 2.0-rc isolation pipeline was previously broken end-to-end (POST /api/threads → 500 "type 'UUID' is not supported"). - persistence/engine.py: SQLAlchemy listener enables PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON on every new SQLite connection. TC-UPG-06 in the test plan expects WAL; previous code shipped with the default 'delete' journal. - auth_middleware.py: stamp request.state.auth = AuthContext(...) so @require_permission's short-circuit fires; previously every isolation request did a duplicate JWT decode + users SELECT. Also unifies the 401 payload through AuthErrorResponse(...).model_dump(). - app.py: _ensure_admin_user restructure removes the noqa F821 scoping bug where 'password' was referenced outside the branch that defined it. New _announce_credentials helper absorbs the duplicate log block in the fresh-admin and reset-admin branches. * fix(frontend+nginx): rollout CSRF on every state-changing client path The frontend was 100% broken in gateway-pro mode for any user trying to open a specific chat thread. Three cumulative bugs each silently masked the next. LangGraph SDK CSRF gap (api-client.ts) - The Client constructor took only apiUrl, no defaultHeaders, no fetch interceptor. The SDK's internal fetch never sent X-CSRF-Token, so every state-changing /api/langgraph-compat/* call (runs/stream, threads/search, threads/{tid}/history, ...) hit CSRFMiddleware and got 403 before reaching the auth check. UI symptom: empty thread page with no error message; the SPA's hooks swallowed the rejection. - Fix: pass an onRequest hook that injects X-CSRF-Token from the csrf_token cookie per request. Reading the cookie per call (not at construction time) handles login / logout / password-change cookie rotation transparently. The SDK's prepareFetchOptions calls onRequest for both regular requests AND streaming/SSE/reconnect, so the same hook covers runs.stream and runs.joinStream. Raw fetch CSRF gap (7 files) - Audit: 11 frontend fetch sites, only 2 included CSRF (login/setup + account-settings change-password). The other 7 routed through raw fetch() with no header — suggestions, memory, agents, mcp, skills, uploads, and the local thread cleanup hook all 403'd silently. - Fix: enhance fetcher.ts:fetchWithAuth to auto-inject X-CSRF-Token on POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH from a single shared readCsrfCookie() helper. Convert all 7 raw fetch() callers to fetchWithAuth so the contract is centrally enforced. api-client.ts and fetcher.ts share readCsrfCookie + STATE_CHANGING_METHODS to avoid drift. nginx routing + buffering (nginx.local.conf) - The auth feature shipped without updating the nginx config: per-API explicit location blocks but no /api/v1/auth/, /api/feedback, /api/runs. The frontend's client-side fetches to /api/v1/auth/login/local 404'd from the Next.js side because nginx routed /api/* to the frontend. - Fix: add catch-all `location /api/` that proxies to the gateway. nginx longest-prefix matching keeps the explicit blocks (/api/models, /api/threads regex, /api/langgraph/, ...) winning for their paths. - Fix: disable proxy_buffering + proxy_request_buffering for the frontend `location /` block. Without it, nginx tries to spool large Next.js chunks into /var/lib/nginx/proxy (root-owned) and fails with Permission denied → ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING → ChunkLoadError. * test(auth): release-validation test infra and new coverage Test fixtures and unit tests added during the validation pass. Router test helpers (NEW: tests/_router_auth_helpers.py) - make_authed_test_app(): builds a FastAPI test app with a stub middleware that stamps request.state.user + request.state.auth and a permissive thread_meta_repo mock. TestClient-based router tests (test_artifacts_router, test_threads_router) use it instead of bare FastAPI() so the new @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorators short-circuit cleanly. - call_unwrapped(): walks the __wrapped__ chain to invoke the underlying handler without going through the authz wrappers. Direct-call tests (test_uploads_router) use it. Typed with ParamSpec so the wrapped signature flows through. Backend test additions - test_auth.py: 7 tests for the new _get_client_ip trust model (no proxy / trusted proxy / untrusted peer / XFF rejection / invalid CIDR / no client). 5 tests for the password blocklist (literal, case-insensitive, strong password accepted, change-password binding, short-password length-check still fires before blocklist). test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted: closes a shipped-without-coverage gap on the new UserNotFoundError contract. - test_thread_meta_repo.py: 4 tests for check_access(require_existing=True) — strict missing-row denial, strict owner match, strict owner mismatch, strict null-owner still allowed (shared rows survive the tightening). - test_ensure_admin.py: 3 tests for _migrate_orphaned_threads / _iter_store_items pagination, covering the TC-UPG-02 upgrade story end-to-end via mock store. Closes the gap where the cursor pagination was untested even though the previous PR rewrote it. - test_threads_router.py: 5 tests for _strip_reserved_metadata (owner_id removal, user_id removal, safe-keys passthrough, empty input, both-stripped). - test_auth_type_system.py: replace "password123" fixtures with Tr0ub4dor3a / AnotherStr0ngPwd! so the new password blocklist doesn't reject the test data. * docs(auth): refresh TC-DOCKER-05 + document Docker validation gap - AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md TC-DOCKER-05: the previous expectation ("admin password visible in docker logs") was stale after the simplify pass that moved credentials to a 0600 file. The grep "Password:" check would have silently failed and given a false sense of coverage. New expectation matches the actual file-based path: 0600 file in DEER_FLOW_HOME, log shows the path (not the secret), reverse-grep asserts no leaked password in container logs. - NEW: docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md documents the only un-executed block in the test plan (TC-DOCKER-01..06). Reason: sg_dev validation host has no Docker daemon installed. The doc maps each Docker case to an already-validated bare-metal equivalent (TC-1.1, TC-REENT-01, TC-API-02 etc.) so the gap is auditable, and includes pre-flight reproduction steps for whoever has Docker available. --------- Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com>
655 lines
24 KiB
Python
655 lines
24 KiB
Python
"""Tests for authentication module: JWT, password hashing, AuthContext, and authz decorators."""
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from datetime import timedelta
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
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from uuid import uuid4
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import pytest
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from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from app.gateway.auth import create_access_token, decode_token, hash_password, verify_password
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from app.gateway.auth.models import User
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from app.gateway.authz import (
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AuthContext,
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Permissions,
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get_auth_context,
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require_auth,
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require_permission,
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)
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# ── Password Hashing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_hash_password_and_verify():
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"""Hashing and verification round-trip."""
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password = "s3cr3tP@ssw0rd!"
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hashed = hash_password(password)
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assert hashed != password
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assert verify_password(password, hashed) is True
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assert verify_password("wrongpassword", hashed) is False
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def test_hash_password_different_each_time():
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"""bcrypt generates unique salts, so same password has different hashes."""
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password = "testpassword"
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h1 = hash_password(password)
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h2 = hash_password(password)
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assert h1 != h2 # Different salts
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# But both verify correctly
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assert verify_password(password, h1) is True
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assert verify_password(password, h2) is True
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def test_verify_password_rejects_empty():
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"""Empty password should not verify."""
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hashed = hash_password("nonempty")
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assert verify_password("", hashed) is False
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# ── JWT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_create_and_decode_token():
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"""JWT creation and decoding round-trip."""
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user_id = str(uuid4())
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# Set a valid JWT secret for this test
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import os
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os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
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token = create_access_token(user_id)
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assert isinstance(token, str)
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payload = decode_token(token)
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assert payload is not None
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assert payload.sub == user_id
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def test_decode_token_expired():
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"""Expired token returns TokenError.EXPIRED."""
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from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
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user_id = str(uuid4())
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# Create token that expires immediately
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token = create_access_token(user_id, expires_delta=timedelta(seconds=-1))
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payload = decode_token(token)
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assert payload == TokenError.EXPIRED
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def test_decode_token_invalid():
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"""Invalid token returns TokenError."""
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from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
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assert isinstance(decode_token("not.a.valid.token"), TokenError)
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assert isinstance(decode_token(""), TokenError)
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assert isinstance(decode_token("completely-wrong"), TokenError)
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def test_create_token_custom_expiry():
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"""Custom expiry is respected."""
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user_id = str(uuid4())
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token = create_access_token(user_id, expires_delta=timedelta(hours=1))
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payload = decode_token(token)
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assert payload is not None
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assert payload.sub == user_id
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# ── AuthContext ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_auth_context_unauthenticated():
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"""AuthContext with no user."""
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ctx = AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
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assert ctx.is_authenticated is False
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assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_context_authenticated_no_perms():
|
|
"""AuthContext with user but no permissions."""
|
|
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[])
|
|
assert ctx.is_authenticated is True
|
|
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_context_has_permission():
|
|
"""AuthContext permission checking."""
|
|
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
perms = [Permissions.THREADS_READ, Permissions.THREADS_WRITE]
|
|
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=perms)
|
|
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is True
|
|
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "write") is True
|
|
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "delete") is False
|
|
assert ctx.has_permission("runs", "read") is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_context_require_user_raises():
|
|
"""require_user raises 401 when not authenticated."""
|
|
ctx = AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
|
|
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
|
|
ctx.require_user()
|
|
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_context_require_user_returns_user():
|
|
"""require_user returns user when authenticated."""
|
|
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[])
|
|
returned = ctx.require_user()
|
|
assert returned == user
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── get_auth_context helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_auth_context_not_set():
|
|
"""get_auth_context returns None when auth not set on request."""
|
|
mock_request = MagicMock()
|
|
# Make getattr return None (simulating attribute not set)
|
|
mock_request.state = MagicMock()
|
|
del mock_request.state.auth
|
|
assert get_auth_context(mock_request) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_auth_context_set():
|
|
"""get_auth_context returns the AuthContext from request."""
|
|
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
|
|
|
|
mock_request = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_request.state.auth = ctx
|
|
|
|
assert get_auth_context(mock_request) == ctx
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── require_auth decorator ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_auth_sets_auth_context():
|
|
"""require_auth sets auth context on request from cookie."""
|
|
from fastapi import Request
|
|
|
|
app = FastAPI()
|
|
|
|
@app.get("/test")
|
|
@require_auth
|
|
async def endpoint(request: Request):
|
|
ctx = get_auth_context(request)
|
|
return {"authenticated": ctx.is_authenticated}
|
|
|
|
with TestClient(app) as client:
|
|
# No cookie → anonymous
|
|
response = client.get("/test")
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.json()["authenticated"] is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_auth_requires_request_param():
|
|
"""require_auth raises ValueError if request parameter is missing."""
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
|
|
@require_auth
|
|
async def bad_endpoint(): # Missing `request` parameter
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="require_auth decorator requires 'request' parameter"):
|
|
asyncio.run(bad_endpoint())
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── require_permission decorator ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_permission_requires_auth():
|
|
"""require_permission raises 401 when not authenticated."""
|
|
from fastapi import Request
|
|
|
|
app = FastAPI()
|
|
|
|
@app.get("/test")
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "read")
|
|
async def endpoint(request: Request):
|
|
return {"ok": True}
|
|
|
|
with TestClient(app) as client:
|
|
response = client.get("/test")
|
|
assert response.status_code == 401
|
|
assert "Authentication required" in response.json()["detail"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_permission_denies_wrong_permission():
|
|
"""User without required permission gets 403."""
|
|
from fastapi import Request
|
|
|
|
app = FastAPI()
|
|
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
|
|
@app.get("/test")
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "delete")
|
|
async def endpoint(request: Request):
|
|
return {"ok": True}
|
|
|
|
mock_auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
|
|
|
|
with patch("app.gateway.authz._authenticate", return_value=mock_auth):
|
|
with TestClient(app) as client:
|
|
response = client.get("/test")
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert "Permission denied" in response.json()["detail"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Weak JWT secret warning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── User Model Fields ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_user_model_has_needs_setup_default_false():
|
|
"""New users default to needs_setup=False."""
|
|
user = User(email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
assert user.needs_setup is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_user_model_has_token_version_default_zero():
|
|
"""New users default to token_version=0."""
|
|
user = User(email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
|
|
assert user.token_version == 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_user_model_needs_setup_true():
|
|
"""Auto-created admin has needs_setup=True."""
|
|
user = User(email="admin@example.com", password_hash="hash", needs_setup=True)
|
|
assert user.needs_setup is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields():
|
|
"""needs_setup and token_version survive create → read round-trip.
|
|
|
|
Uses the shared persistence engine (same one threads_meta, runs,
|
|
run_events, and feedback use). The old separate .deer-flow/users.db
|
|
file is gone.
|
|
"""
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
import tempfile
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
|
|
|
|
async def _run() -> None:
|
|
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
|
|
close_engine,
|
|
get_session_factory,
|
|
init_engine,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
|
|
url = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{tmpdir}/scratch.db"
|
|
await init_engine("sqlite", url=url, sqlite_dir=tmpdir)
|
|
try:
|
|
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(get_session_factory())
|
|
user = User(
|
|
email="setup@test.com",
|
|
password_hash="fakehash",
|
|
system_role="admin",
|
|
needs_setup=True,
|
|
token_version=3,
|
|
)
|
|
created = await repo.create_user(user)
|
|
assert created.needs_setup is True
|
|
assert created.token_version == 3
|
|
|
|
fetched = await repo.get_user_by_email("setup@test.com")
|
|
assert fetched is not None
|
|
assert fetched.needs_setup is True
|
|
assert fetched.token_version == 3
|
|
|
|
fetched.needs_setup = False
|
|
fetched.token_version = 4
|
|
await repo.update_user(fetched)
|
|
refetched = await repo.get_user_by_id(str(fetched.id))
|
|
assert refetched is not None
|
|
assert refetched.needs_setup is False
|
|
assert refetched.token_version == 4
|
|
finally:
|
|
await close_engine()
|
|
|
|
asyncio.run(_run())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted(tmp_path):
|
|
"""Concurrent-delete during update_user must hard-fail, not silently no-op.
|
|
|
|
Earlier the SQLite repo returned the input unchanged when the row was
|
|
missing, making a phantom success path that admin password reset
|
|
callers (`reset_admin`, `_ensure_admin_user`) would happily log as
|
|
'password reset'. The new contract: raise ``UserNotFoundError`` so
|
|
a vanished row never looks like a successful update.
|
|
"""
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
import tempfile
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserNotFoundError
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
|
|
|
|
async def _run() -> None:
|
|
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
|
|
close_engine,
|
|
get_session_factory,
|
|
init_engine,
|
|
)
|
|
from deerflow.persistence.user.model import UserRow
|
|
|
|
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
|
|
url = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{d}/scratch.db"
|
|
await init_engine("sqlite", url=url, sqlite_dir=d)
|
|
try:
|
|
sf = get_session_factory()
|
|
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(sf)
|
|
user = User(
|
|
email="ghost@test.com",
|
|
password_hash="fakehash",
|
|
system_role="user",
|
|
)
|
|
created = await repo.create_user(user)
|
|
|
|
# Simulate "row vanished underneath us" by deleting the row
|
|
# via the raw ORM session, then attempt to update.
|
|
async with sf() as session:
|
|
row = await session.get(UserRow, str(created.id))
|
|
assert row is not None
|
|
await session.delete(row)
|
|
await session.commit()
|
|
|
|
created.needs_setup = True
|
|
with pytest.raises(UserNotFoundError):
|
|
await repo.update_user(created)
|
|
finally:
|
|
await close_engine()
|
|
|
|
asyncio.run(_run())
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Token Versioning ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_jwt_encodes_ver():
|
|
"""JWT payload includes ver field."""
|
|
import os
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
|
|
|
|
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
|
|
token = create_access_token(str(uuid4()), token_version=3)
|
|
payload = decode_token(token)
|
|
assert not isinstance(payload, TokenError)
|
|
assert payload.ver == 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_jwt_default_ver_zero():
|
|
"""JWT ver defaults to 0."""
|
|
import os
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
|
|
|
|
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
|
|
token = create_access_token(str(uuid4()))
|
|
payload = decode_token(token)
|
|
assert not isinstance(payload, TokenError)
|
|
assert payload.ver == 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_token_version_mismatch_rejects():
|
|
"""Token with stale ver is rejected by get_current_user_from_request."""
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
import os
|
|
|
|
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
|
|
|
|
user_id = str(uuid4())
|
|
token = create_access_token(user_id, token_version=0)
|
|
|
|
mock_user = User(id=user_id, email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash", token_version=1)
|
|
|
|
mock_request = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_request.cookies = {"access_token": token}
|
|
|
|
with patch("app.gateway.deps.get_local_provider") as mock_provider_fn:
|
|
mock_provider = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_provider.get_user = AsyncMock(return_value=mock_user)
|
|
mock_provider_fn.return_value = mock_provider
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
|
|
asyncio.run(get_current_user_from_request(mock_request))
|
|
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
|
|
assert "revoked" in str(exc_info.value.detail).lower()
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── change-password extension ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_change_password_request_accepts_new_email():
|
|
"""ChangePasswordRequest model accepts optional new_email."""
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
|
|
|
|
req = ChangePasswordRequest(
|
|
current_password="old",
|
|
new_password="newpassword",
|
|
new_email="new@example.com",
|
|
)
|
|
assert req.new_email == "new@example.com"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_change_password_request_new_email_optional():
|
|
"""ChangePasswordRequest model works without new_email."""
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
|
|
|
|
req = ChangePasswordRequest(current_password="old", new_password="newpassword")
|
|
assert req.new_email is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_login_response_includes_needs_setup():
|
|
"""LoginResponse includes needs_setup field."""
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import LoginResponse
|
|
|
|
resp = LoginResponse(expires_in=3600, needs_setup=True)
|
|
assert resp.needs_setup is True
|
|
resp2 = LoginResponse(expires_in=3600)
|
|
assert resp2.needs_setup is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Rate Limiting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_rate_limiter_allows_under_limit():
|
|
"""Requests under the limit are allowed."""
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts
|
|
|
|
_login_attempts.clear()
|
|
_check_rate_limit("192.168.1.1") # Should not raise
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_rate_limiter_blocks_after_max_failures():
|
|
"""IP is blocked after 5 consecutive failures."""
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts, _record_login_failure
|
|
|
|
_login_attempts.clear()
|
|
ip = "10.0.0.1"
|
|
for _ in range(5):
|
|
_record_login_failure(ip)
|
|
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
|
|
_check_rate_limit(ip)
|
|
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 429
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_rate_limiter_resets_on_success():
|
|
"""Successful login clears the failure counter."""
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts, _record_login_failure, _record_login_success
|
|
|
|
_login_attempts.clear()
|
|
ip = "10.0.0.2"
|
|
for _ in range(4):
|
|
_record_login_failure(ip)
|
|
_record_login_success(ip)
|
|
_check_rate_limit(ip) # Should not raise
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Client IP extraction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_direct_connection_no_proxy(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""Direct mode (no AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES): use TCP peer regardless of X-Real-IP."""
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client.host = "203.0.113.42"
|
|
req.headers = {}
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_ignored_when_no_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""X-Real-IP is silently ignored if AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset.
|
|
|
|
This closes the bypass where any client could rotate X-Real-IP per
|
|
request to dodge per-IP rate limits in dev / direct mode.
|
|
"""
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client.host = "127.0.0.1"
|
|
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "127.0.0.1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_honored_from_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""X-Real-IP is honored when the TCP peer matches AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client.host = "10.5.6.7" # in trusted CIDR
|
|
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_rejected_from_untrusted_peer(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""X-Real-IP is rejected when the TCP peer is NOT in the trusted list."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client.host = "8.8.8.8" # NOT in trusted CIDR
|
|
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"} # client trying to spoof
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "8.8.8.8"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_xff_never_honored(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""X-Forwarded-For is never used; only X-Real-IP from a trusted peer."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client.host = "10.0.0.1"
|
|
req.headers = {"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.5"} # no x-real-ip
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "10.0.0.1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_invalid_trusted_proxy_entry_skipped(monkeypatch, caplog):
|
|
"""Garbage entries in AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES are warned and skipped."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "not-an-ip,10.0.0.0/8")
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client.host = "10.5.6.7"
|
|
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42" # valid entry still works
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_client_ip_no_client_returns_unknown(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""No request.client → 'unknown' marker (no crash)."""
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
|
|
|
|
req = MagicMock()
|
|
req.client = None
|
|
req.headers = {}
|
|
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "unknown"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── Common-password blocklist ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_register_rejects_literal_password():
|
|
"""Pydantic validator rejects 'password' as a registration password."""
|
|
from pydantic import ValidationError
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
|
|
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
|
|
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="password")
|
|
assert "too common" in str(exc.value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_register_rejects_common_password_case_insensitive():
|
|
"""Case variants of common passwords are also rejected."""
|
|
from pydantic import ValidationError
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
|
|
|
|
for variant in ["PASSWORD", "Password1", "qwerty123", "letmein1"]:
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
|
|
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password=variant)
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def test_register_accepts_strong_password():
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"""A non-blocklisted password of length >=8 is accepted."""
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from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
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req = RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="Tr0ub4dor&3-Horse")
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assert req.password == "Tr0ub4dor&3-Horse"
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def test_change_password_rejects_common_password():
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"""The same blocklist applies to change-password."""
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|
from pydantic import ValidationError
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|
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from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
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|
|
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with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
|
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ChangePasswordRequest(current_password="anything", new_password="iloveyou")
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|
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|
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def test_password_blocklist_keeps_short_passwords_for_length_check():
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|
"""Short passwords still fail the min_length check (not the blocklist)."""
|
|
from pydantic import ValidationError
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
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|
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
|
|
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="abc")
|
|
# the length check should fire, not the blocklist
|
|
assert "at least 8 characters" in str(exc.value)
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|
|
|
|
|
# ── Weak JWT secret warning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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|
|
|
|
|
def test_missing_jwt_secret_generates_ephemeral(monkeypatch, caplog):
|
|
"""get_auth_config() auto-generates an ephemeral secret when AUTH_JWT_SECRET is unset."""
|
|
import logging
|
|
|
|
import app.gateway.auth.config as config_module
|
|
|
|
config_module._auth_config = None
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_JWT_SECRET", raising=False)
|
|
|
|
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
|
|
config = config_module.get_auth_config()
|
|
|
|
assert config.jwt_secret # non-empty ephemeral secret
|
|
assert any("AUTH_JWT_SECRET" in msg for msg in caplog.messages)
|
|
|
|
# Cleanup
|
|
config_module._auth_config = None
|