deer-flow/backend/tests/test_auth.py
greatmengqi e75a2ff29a feat(auth): release-validation pass for 2.0-rc — 12 blockers + simplify follow-ups (#2008)
* feat(auth): introduce backend auth module

Port RFC-001 authentication core from PR #1728:
- JWT token handling (create_access_token, decode_token, TokenPayload)
- Password hashing (bcrypt) with verify_password
- SQLite UserRepository with base interface
- Provider Factory pattern (LocalAuthProvider)
- CLI reset_admin tool
- Auth-specific errors (AuthErrorCode, TokenError, AuthErrorResponse)

Deps:
- bcrypt>=4.0.0
- pyjwt>=2.9.0
- email-validator>=2.0.0
- backend/uv.toml pins public PyPI index

Tests: 12 pure unit tests (test_auth_config.py, test_auth_errors.py).

Scope note: authz.py, test_auth.py, and test_auth_type_system.py are
deferred to commit 2 because they depend on middleware and deps wiring
that is not yet in place. Commit 1 stays "pure new files only" as the
spec mandates.

* feat(auth): wire auth end-to-end (middleware + frontend replacement)

Backend:
- Port auth_middleware, csrf_middleware, langgraph_auth, routers/auth
- Port authz decorator (owner_filter_key defaults to 'owner_id')
- Merge app.py: register AuthMiddleware + CSRFMiddleware + CORS, add
  _ensure_admin_user lifespan hook, _migrate_orphaned_threads helper,
  register auth router
- Merge deps.py: add get_local_provider, get_current_user_from_request,
  get_optional_user_from_request; keep get_current_user as thin str|None
  adapter for feedback router
- langgraph.json: add auth path pointing to langgraph_auth.py:auth
- Rename metadata['user_id'] -> metadata['owner_id'] in langgraph_auth
  (both metadata write and LangGraph filter dict) + test fixtures

Frontend:
- Delete better-auth library and api catch-all route
- Remove better-auth npm dependency and env vars (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,
  BETTER_AUTH_GITHUB_*) from env.js
- Port frontend/src/core/auth/* (AuthProvider, gateway-config,
  proxy-policy, server-side getServerSideUser, types)
- Port frontend/src/core/api/fetcher.ts
- Port (auth)/layout, (auth)/login, (auth)/setup pages
- Rewrite workspace/layout.tsx as server component that calls
  getServerSideUser and wraps in AuthProvider
- Port workspace/workspace-content.tsx for the client-side sidebar logic

Tests:
- Port 5 auth test files (test_auth, test_auth_middleware,
  test_auth_type_system, test_ensure_admin, test_langgraph_auth)
- 176 auth tests PASS

After this commit: login/logout/registration flow works, but persistence
layer does not yet filter by owner_id. Commit 4 closes that gap.

* feat(auth): account settings page + i18n

- Port account-settings-page.tsx (change password, change email, logout)
- Wire into settings-dialog.tsx as new "account" section with UserIcon,
  rendered first in the section list
- Add i18n keys:
  - en-US/zh-CN: settings.sections.account ("Account" / "账号")
  - en-US/zh-CN: button.logout ("Log out" / "退出登录")
  - types.ts: matching type declarations

* feat(auth): enforce owner_id across 2.0-rc persistence layer

Add request-scoped contextvar-based owner filtering to threads_meta,
runs, run_events, and feedback repositories. Router code is unchanged
— isolation is enforced at the storage layer so that any caller that
forgets to pass owner_id still gets filtered results, and new routes
cannot accidentally leak data.

Core infrastructure
-------------------
- deerflow/runtime/user_context.py (new):
  - ContextVar[CurrentUser | None] with default None
  - runtime_checkable CurrentUser Protocol (structural subtype with .id)
  - set/reset/get/require helpers
  - AUTO sentinel + resolve_owner_id(value, method_name) for sentinel
    three-state resolution: AUTO reads contextvar, explicit str
    overrides, explicit None bypasses the filter (for migration/CLI)

Repository changes
------------------
- ThreadMetaRepository: create/get/search/update_*/delete gain
  owner_id=AUTO kwarg; read paths filter by owner, writes stamp it,
  mutations check ownership before applying
- RunRepository: put/get/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg
- FeedbackRepository: create/get/list_by_run/list_by_thread/delete
  gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg
- DbRunEventStore: list_messages/list_events/list_messages_by_run/
  count_messages/delete_by_thread/delete_by_run gain owner_id=AUTO
  kwarg. Write paths (put/put_batch) read contextvar softly: when a
  request-scoped user is available, owner_id is stamped; background
  worker writes without a user context pass None which is valid
  (orphan row to be bound by migration)

Schema
------
- persistence/models/run_event.py: RunEventRow.owner_id = Mapped[
  str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True)
- No alembic migration needed: 2.0 ships fresh, Base.metadata.create_all
  picks up the new column automatically

Middleware
----------
- auth_middleware.py: after cookie check, call get_optional_user_from_
  request to load the real User, stamp it into request.state.user AND
  the contextvar via set_current_user, reset in a try/finally. Public
  paths and unauthenticated requests continue without contextvar, and
  @require_auth handles the strict 401 path

Test infrastructure
-------------------
- tests/conftest.py: @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) _auto_user_context
  sets a default SimpleNamespace(id="test-user-autouse") on every test
  unless marked @pytest.mark.no_auto_user. Keeps existing 20+
  persistence tests passing without modification
- pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options]: register no_auto_user
  marker so pytest does not emit warnings for opt-out tests
- tests/test_user_context.py: 6 tests covering three-state semantics,
  Protocol duck typing, and require/optional APIs
- tests/test_thread_meta_repo.py: one test updated to pass owner_id=
  None explicitly where it was previously relying on the old default

Test results
------------
- test_user_context.py: 6 passed
- test_auth*.py + test_langgraph_auth.py + test_ensure_admin.py: 127
- test_run_event_store / test_run_repository / test_thread_meta_repo
  / test_feedback: 92 passed
- Full backend suite: 1905 passed, 2 failed (both @requires_llm flaky
  integration tests unrelated to auth), 1 skipped

* feat(auth): extend orphan migration to 2.0-rc persistence tables

_ensure_admin_user now runs a three-step pipeline on every boot:

  Step 1 (fatal):     admin user exists / is created / password is reset
  Step 2 (non-fatal): LangGraph store orphan threads → admin
  Step 3 (non-fatal): SQL persistence tables → admin
    - threads_meta
    - runs
    - run_events
    - feedback

Each step is idempotent. The fatal/non-fatal split mirrors PR #1728's
original philosophy: admin creation failure blocks startup (the system
is unusable without an admin), whereas migration failures log a warning
and let the service proceed (a partial migration is recoverable; a
missing admin is not).

Key helpers
-----------
- _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size=500):
  async generator that cursor-paginates across LangGraph store pages.
  Fixes PR #1728's hardcoded limit=1000 bug that would silently lose
  orphans beyond the first page.

- _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id):
  Rewritten to use _iter_store_items. Returns the migrated count so the
  caller can log it; raises only on unhandled exceptions.

- _migrate_orphan_sql_tables(admin_user_id):
  Imports the 4 ORM models lazily, grabs the shared session factory,
  runs one UPDATE per table in a single transaction, commits once.
  No-op when no persistence backend is configured (in-memory dev).

Tests: test_ensure_admin.py (8 passed)

* test(auth): port AUTH test plan docs + lint/format pass

- Port backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md and AUTH_UPGRADE.md from PR #1728
- Rename metadata.user_id → metadata.owner_id in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md
  (4 occurrences from the original PR doc)
- ruff auto-fix UP037 in sentinel type annotations: drop quotes around
  "str | None | _AutoSentinel" now that from __future__ import
  annotations makes them implicit string forms
- ruff format: 2 files (app/gateway/app.py, runtime/user_context.py)

Note on test coverage additions:
- conftest.py autouse fixture was already added in commit 4 (had to
  be co-located with the repository changes to keep pre-existing
  persistence tests passing)
- cross-user isolation E2E tests (test_owner_isolation.py) deferred
  — enforcement is already proven by the 98-test repository suite
  via the autouse fixture + explicit _AUTO sentinel exercises
- New test cases (TC-API-17..20, TC-ATK-13, TC-MIG-01..07) listed
  in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md are deferred to a follow-up PR — they are
  manual-QA test cases rather than pytest code, and the spec-level
  coverage is already met by test_user_context.py + the 98-test
  repository suite.

Final test results:
- Auth suite (test_auth*, test_langgraph_auth, test_ensure_admin,
  test_user_context): 186 passed
- Persistence suite (test_run_event_store, test_run_repository,
  test_thread_meta_repo, test_feedback): 98 passed
- Lint: ruff check + ruff format both clean

* test(auth): add cross-user isolation test suite

10 tests exercising the storage-layer owner filter by manually
switching the user_context contextvar between two users. Verifies
the safety invariant:

  After a repository write with owner_id=A, a subsequent read with
  owner_id=B must not return the row, and vice versa.

Covers all 4 tables that own user-scoped data:

TC-API-17  threads_meta  — read, search, update, delete cross-user
TC-API-18  runs          — get, list_by_thread, delete cross-user
TC-API-19  run_events    — list_messages, list_events, count_messages,
                           delete_by_thread (CRITICAL: raw conversation
                           content leak vector)
TC-API-20  feedback      — get, list_by_run, delete cross-user

Plus two meta-tests verifying the sentinel pattern itself:
- AUTO + unset contextvar raises RuntimeError
- explicit owner_id=None bypasses the filter (migration escape hatch)

Architecture note
-----------------
These tests bypass the HTTP layer by design. The full chain
(cookie → middleware → contextvar → repository) is covered piecewise:

- test_auth_middleware.py: middleware sets contextvar from cookies
- test_owner_isolation.py: repositories enforce isolation when
  contextvar is set to different users

Together they prove the end-to-end safety property without the
ceremony of spinning up a full TestClient + in-memory DB for every
router endpoint.

Tests pass: 231 (full auth + persistence + isolation suite)
Lint: clean

* refactor(auth): migrate user repository to SQLAlchemy ORM

Move the users table into the shared persistence engine so auth
matches the pattern of threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback —
one engine, one session factory, one schema init codepath.

New files
---------
- persistence/user/__init__.py, persistence/user/model.py: UserRow
  ORM class with partial unique index on (oauth_provider, oauth_id)
- Registered in persistence/models/__init__.py so
  Base.metadata.create_all() picks it up

Modified
--------
- auth/repositories/sqlite.py: rewritten as async SQLAlchemy,
  identical constructor pattern to the other four repositories
  (def __init__(self, session_factory) + self._sf = session_factory)
- auth/config.py: drop users_db_path field — storage is configured
  through config.database like every other table
- deps.py/get_local_provider: construct SQLiteUserRepository with
  the shared session factory, fail fast if engine is not initialised
- tests/test_auth.py: rewrite test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields to
  use the shared engine (init_engine + close_engine in a tempdir)
- tests/test_auth_type_system.py: add per-test autouse fixture that
  spins up a scratch engine and resets deps._cached_* singletons

* refactor(auth): remove SQL orphan migration (unused in supported scenarios)

The _migrate_orphan_sql_tables helper existed to bind NULL owner_id
rows in threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback to the admin on
first boot. But in every supported upgrade path, it's a no-op:

  1. Fresh install: create_all builds fresh tables, no legacy rows
  2. No-auth → with-auth (no existing persistence DB): persistence
     tables are created fresh by create_all, no legacy rows
  3. No-auth → with-auth (has existing persistence DB from #1930):
     NOT a supported upgrade path — "有 DB 到有 DB" schema evolution
     is out of scope; users wipe DB or run manual ALTER

So the SQL orphan migration never has anything to do in the
supported matrix. Delete the function, simplify _ensure_admin_user
from a 3-step pipeline to a 2-step one (admin creation + LangGraph
store orphan migration only).

LangGraph store orphan migration stays: it serves the real
"no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path where a user's existing LangGraph
thread metadata has no owner_id field and needs to be stamped with
the newly-created admin's id.

Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation)
Lint: clean

* security(auth): write initial admin password to 0600 file instead of logs

CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data flagged 3 call sites that
logged the auto-generated admin password to stdout via logger.info().
Production log aggregators (ELK/Splunk/etc) would have captured those
cleartext secrets. Replace with a shared helper that writes to
.deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt with mode 0600, and log only
the path.

New file
--------
- app/gateway/auth/credential_file.py: write_initial_credentials()
  helper. Takes email, password, and a "initial"/"reset" label.
  Creates .deer-flow/ if missing, writes a header comment plus the
  email+password, chmods 0o600, returns the absolute Path.

Modified
--------
- app/gateway/app.py: both _ensure_admin_user paths (fresh creation
  + needs_setup password reset) now write to file and log the path
- app/gateway/auth/reset_admin.py: rewritten to use the shared ORM
  repo (SQLiteUserRepository with session_factory) and the
  credential_file helper. The previous implementation was broken
  after the earlier ORM refactor — it still imported _get_users_conn
  and constructed SQLiteUserRepository() without a session factory.

No tests changed — the three password-log sites are all exercised
via existing test_ensure_admin.py which checks that startup
succeeds, not that a specific string appears in logs.

CodeQL alerts 272, 283, 284: all resolved.

* security(auth): strict JWT validation in middleware (fix junk cookie bypass)

AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8 expects junk cookies to be rejected with
401. The previous middleware behaviour was "presence-only": check
that some access_token cookie exists, then pass through. In
combination with my Task-12 decision to skip @require_auth
decorators on routes, this created a gap where a request with any
cookie-shaped string (e.g. access_token=not-a-jwt) would bypass
authentication on routes that do not touch the repository
(/api/models, /api/mcp/config, /api/memory, /api/skills, …).

Fix: middleware now calls get_current_user_from_request() strictly
and catches the resulting HTTPException to render a 401 with the
proper fine-grained error code (token_invalid, token_expired,
user_not_found, …). On success it stamps request.state.user and
the contextvar so repository-layer owner filters work downstream.

The 4 old "_with_cookie_passes" tests in test_auth_middleware.py
were written for the presence-only behaviour; they asserted that
a junk cookie would make the handler return 200. They are renamed
to "_with_junk_cookie_rejected" and their assertions flipped to
401. The negative path (no cookie → 401 not_authenticated)
is unchanged.

Verified:
  no cookie       → 401 not_authenticated
  junk cookie     → 401 token_invalid     (the fixed bug)
  expired cookie  → 401 token_expired

Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation)
Lint: clean

* security(auth): wire @require_permission(owner_check=True) on isolation routes

Apply the require_permission decorator to all 28 routes that take a
{thread_id} path parameter. Combined with the strict middleware
(previous commit), this gives the double-layer protection that
AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.9 documents:

  Layer 1 (AuthMiddleware): cookie + JWT validation, rejects junk
                            cookies and stamps request.state.user
  Layer 2 (@require_permission with owner_check=True): per-resource
                            ownership verification via
                            ThreadMetaStore.check_access — returns
                            404 if a different user owns the thread

The decorator's owner_check branch is rewritten to use the SQL
thread_meta_repo (the 2.0-rc persistence layer) instead of the
LangGraph store path that PR #1728 used (_store_get / get_store
in routers/threads.py). The inject_record convenience is dropped
— no caller in 2.0 needs the LangGraph blob, and the SQL repo has
a different shape.

Routes decorated (28 total):
- threads.py: delete, patch, get, get-state, post-state, post-history
- thread_runs.py: post-runs, post-runs-stream, post-runs-wait,
  list_runs, get_run, cancel_run, join_run, stream_existing_run,
  list_thread_messages, list_run_messages, list_run_events,
  thread_token_usage
- feedback.py: create, list, stats, delete
- uploads.py: upload (added Request param), list, delete
- artifacts.py: get_artifact
- suggestions.py: generate (renamed body parameter to avoid
  conflict with FastAPI Request)

Test fixes:
- test_suggestions_router.py: bypass the decorator via __wrapped__
  (the unit tests cover parsing logic, not auth — no point spinning
  up a thread_meta_repo just to test JSON unwrapping)
- test_auth_middleware.py 4 fake-cookie tests: already updated in
  the previous commit (745bf432)

Tests: 293 passed (auth + persistence + isolation + suggestions)
Lint: clean

* security(auth): defense-in-depth fixes from release validation pass

Eight findings caught while running the AUTH_TEST_PLAN end-to-end against
the deployed sg_dev stack. Each is a pre-condition for shipping
release/2.0-rc that the previous PRs missed.

Backend hardening
- routers/auth.py: rate limiter X-Real-IP now requires AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES
  whitelist (CIDR/IP allowlist). Without nginx in front, the previous code
  honored arbitrary X-Real-IP, letting an attacker rotate the header to
  fully bypass the per-IP login lockout.
- routers/auth.py: 36-entry common-password blocklist via Pydantic
  field_validator on RegisterRequest + ChangePasswordRequest. The shared
  _validate_strong_password helper keeps the constraint in one place.
- routers/threads.py: ThreadCreateRequest + ThreadPatchRequest strip
  server-reserved metadata keys (owner_id, user_id) via Pydantic
  field_validator so a forged value can never round-trip back to other
  clients reading the same thread. The actual ownership invariant stays
  on the threads_meta row; this closes the metadata-blob echo gap.
- authz.py + thread_meta/sql.py: require_permission gains a require_existing
  flag plumbed through check_access(require_existing=True). Destructive
  routes (DELETE/PATCH/state-update/runs/feedback) now treat a missing
  thread_meta row as 404 instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow",
  closing the cross-user delete-idempotence gap where any user could
  successfully DELETE another user's deleted thread.
- repositories/sqlite.py + base.py: update_user raises UserNotFoundError
  on a vanished row instead of silently returning the input. Concurrent
  delete during password reset can no longer look like a successful update.
- runtime/user_context.py: resolve_owner_id() coerces User.id (UUID) to
  str at the contextvar boundary so SQLAlchemy String(64) columns can
  bind it. The whole 2.0-rc isolation pipeline was previously broken
  end-to-end (POST /api/threads → 500 "type 'UUID' is not supported").
- persistence/engine.py: SQLAlchemy listener enables PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL,
  synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON on every new SQLite connection.
  TC-UPG-06 in the test plan expects WAL; previous code shipped with the
  default 'delete' journal.
- auth_middleware.py: stamp request.state.auth = AuthContext(...) so
  @require_permission's short-circuit fires; previously every isolation
  request did a duplicate JWT decode + users SELECT. Also unifies the
  401 payload through AuthErrorResponse(...).model_dump().
- app.py: _ensure_admin_user restructure removes the noqa F821 scoping
  bug where 'password' was referenced outside the branch that defined it.
  New _announce_credentials helper absorbs the duplicate log block in
  the fresh-admin and reset-admin branches.

* fix(frontend+nginx): rollout CSRF on every state-changing client path

The frontend was 100% broken in gateway-pro mode for any user trying to
open a specific chat thread. Three cumulative bugs each silently
masked the next.

LangGraph SDK CSRF gap (api-client.ts)
- The Client constructor took only apiUrl, no defaultHeaders, no fetch
  interceptor. The SDK's internal fetch never sent X-CSRF-Token, so
  every state-changing /api/langgraph-compat/* call (runs/stream,
  threads/search, threads/{tid}/history, ...) hit CSRFMiddleware and
  got 403 before reaching the auth check. UI symptom: empty thread page
  with no error message; the SPA's hooks swallowed the rejection.
- Fix: pass an onRequest hook that injects X-CSRF-Token from the
  csrf_token cookie per request. Reading the cookie per call (not at
  construction time) handles login / logout / password-change cookie
  rotation transparently. The SDK's prepareFetchOptions calls
  onRequest for both regular requests AND streaming/SSE/reconnect, so
  the same hook covers runs.stream and runs.joinStream.

Raw fetch CSRF gap (7 files)
- Audit: 11 frontend fetch sites, only 2 included CSRF (login/setup +
  account-settings change-password). The other 7 routed through raw
  fetch() with no header — suggestions, memory, agents, mcp, skills,
  uploads, and the local thread cleanup hook all 403'd silently.
- Fix: enhance fetcher.ts:fetchWithAuth to auto-inject X-CSRF-Token on
  POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH from a single shared readCsrfCookie() helper.
  Convert all 7 raw fetch() callers to fetchWithAuth so the contract
  is centrally enforced. api-client.ts and fetcher.ts share
  readCsrfCookie + STATE_CHANGING_METHODS to avoid drift.

nginx routing + buffering (nginx.local.conf)
- The auth feature shipped without updating the nginx config: per-API
  explicit location blocks but no /api/v1/auth/, /api/feedback, /api/runs.
  The frontend's client-side fetches to /api/v1/auth/login/local 404'd
  from the Next.js side because nginx routed /api/* to the frontend.
- Fix: add catch-all `location /api/` that proxies to the gateway.
  nginx longest-prefix matching keeps the explicit blocks (/api/models,
  /api/threads regex, /api/langgraph/, ...) winning for their paths.
- Fix: disable proxy_buffering + proxy_request_buffering for the
  frontend `location /` block. Without it, nginx tries to spool large
  Next.js chunks into /var/lib/nginx/proxy (root-owned) and fails with
  Permission denied → ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING → ChunkLoadError.

* test(auth): release-validation test infra and new coverage

Test fixtures and unit tests added during the validation pass.

Router test helpers (NEW: tests/_router_auth_helpers.py)
- make_authed_test_app(): builds a FastAPI test app with a stub
  middleware that stamps request.state.user + request.state.auth and a
  permissive thread_meta_repo mock. TestClient-based router tests
  (test_artifacts_router, test_threads_router) use it instead of bare
  FastAPI() so the new @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorators
  short-circuit cleanly.
- call_unwrapped(): walks the __wrapped__ chain to invoke the underlying
  handler without going through the authz wrappers. Direct-call tests
  (test_uploads_router) use it. Typed with ParamSpec so the wrapped
  signature flows through.

Backend test additions
- test_auth.py: 7 tests for the new _get_client_ip trust model (no
  proxy / trusted proxy / untrusted peer / XFF rejection / invalid
  CIDR / no client). 5 tests for the password blocklist (literal,
  case-insensitive, strong password accepted, change-password binding,
  short-password length-check still fires before blocklist).
  test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted: closes a
  shipped-without-coverage gap on the new UserNotFoundError contract.
- test_thread_meta_repo.py: 4 tests for check_access(require_existing=True)
  — strict missing-row denial, strict owner match, strict owner mismatch,
  strict null-owner still allowed (shared rows survive the tightening).
- test_ensure_admin.py: 3 tests for _migrate_orphaned_threads /
  _iter_store_items pagination, covering the TC-UPG-02 upgrade story
  end-to-end via mock store. Closes the gap where the cursor pagination
  was untested even though the previous PR rewrote it.
- test_threads_router.py: 5 tests for _strip_reserved_metadata
  (owner_id removal, user_id removal, safe-keys passthrough, empty
  input, both-stripped).
- test_auth_type_system.py: replace "password123" fixtures with
  Tr0ub4dor3a / AnotherStr0ngPwd! so the new password blocklist
  doesn't reject the test data.

* docs(auth): refresh TC-DOCKER-05 + document Docker validation gap

- AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md TC-DOCKER-05: the previous expectation
  ("admin password visible in docker logs") was stale after the simplify
  pass that moved credentials to a 0600 file. The grep "Password:" check
  would have silently failed and given a false sense of coverage. New
  expectation matches the actual file-based path: 0600 file in
  DEER_FLOW_HOME, log shows the path (not the secret), reverse-grep
  asserts no leaked password in container logs.
- NEW: docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md documents the only un-executed
  block in the test plan (TC-DOCKER-01..06). Reason: sg_dev validation
  host has no Docker daemon installed. The doc maps each Docker case
  to an already-validated bare-metal equivalent (TC-1.1, TC-REENT-01,
  TC-API-02 etc.) so the gap is auditable, and includes pre-flight
  reproduction steps for whoever has Docker available.

---------

Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com>
2026-04-11 11:25:38 +08:00

655 lines
24 KiB
Python

"""Tests for authentication module: JWT, password hashing, AuthContext, and authz decorators."""
from datetime import timedelta
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
from uuid import uuid4
import pytest
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.gateway.auth import create_access_token, decode_token, hash_password, verify_password
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
from app.gateway.authz import (
AuthContext,
Permissions,
get_auth_context,
require_auth,
require_permission,
)
# ── Password Hashing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_hash_password_and_verify():
"""Hashing and verification round-trip."""
password = "s3cr3tP@ssw0rd!"
hashed = hash_password(password)
assert hashed != password
assert verify_password(password, hashed) is True
assert verify_password("wrongpassword", hashed) is False
def test_hash_password_different_each_time():
"""bcrypt generates unique salts, so same password has different hashes."""
password = "testpassword"
h1 = hash_password(password)
h2 = hash_password(password)
assert h1 != h2 # Different salts
# But both verify correctly
assert verify_password(password, h1) is True
assert verify_password(password, h2) is True
def test_verify_password_rejects_empty():
"""Empty password should not verify."""
hashed = hash_password("nonempty")
assert verify_password("", hashed) is False
# ── JWT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_create_and_decode_token():
"""JWT creation and decoding round-trip."""
user_id = str(uuid4())
# Set a valid JWT secret for this test
import os
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
token = create_access_token(user_id)
assert isinstance(token, str)
payload = decode_token(token)
assert payload is not None
assert payload.sub == user_id
def test_decode_token_expired():
"""Expired token returns TokenError.EXPIRED."""
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
user_id = str(uuid4())
# Create token that expires immediately
token = create_access_token(user_id, expires_delta=timedelta(seconds=-1))
payload = decode_token(token)
assert payload == TokenError.EXPIRED
def test_decode_token_invalid():
"""Invalid token returns TokenError."""
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
assert isinstance(decode_token("not.a.valid.token"), TokenError)
assert isinstance(decode_token(""), TokenError)
assert isinstance(decode_token("completely-wrong"), TokenError)
def test_create_token_custom_expiry():
"""Custom expiry is respected."""
user_id = str(uuid4())
token = create_access_token(user_id, expires_delta=timedelta(hours=1))
payload = decode_token(token)
assert payload is not None
assert payload.sub == user_id
# ── AuthContext ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_auth_context_unauthenticated():
"""AuthContext with no user."""
ctx = AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
assert ctx.is_authenticated is False
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is False
def test_auth_context_authenticated_no_perms():
"""AuthContext with user but no permissions."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[])
assert ctx.is_authenticated is True
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is False
def test_auth_context_has_permission():
"""AuthContext permission checking."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
perms = [Permissions.THREADS_READ, Permissions.THREADS_WRITE]
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=perms)
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is True
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "write") is True
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "delete") is False
assert ctx.has_permission("runs", "read") is False
def test_auth_context_require_user_raises():
"""require_user raises 401 when not authenticated."""
ctx = AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
ctx.require_user()
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
def test_auth_context_require_user_returns_user():
"""require_user returns user when authenticated."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[])
returned = ctx.require_user()
assert returned == user
# ── get_auth_context helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_get_auth_context_not_set():
"""get_auth_context returns None when auth not set on request."""
mock_request = MagicMock()
# Make getattr return None (simulating attribute not set)
mock_request.state = MagicMock()
del mock_request.state.auth
assert get_auth_context(mock_request) is None
def test_get_auth_context_set():
"""get_auth_context returns the AuthContext from request."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
mock_request = MagicMock()
mock_request.state.auth = ctx
assert get_auth_context(mock_request) == ctx
# ── require_auth decorator ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_require_auth_sets_auth_context():
"""require_auth sets auth context on request from cookie."""
from fastapi import Request
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/test")
@require_auth
async def endpoint(request: Request):
ctx = get_auth_context(request)
return {"authenticated": ctx.is_authenticated}
with TestClient(app) as client:
# No cookie → anonymous
response = client.get("/test")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["authenticated"] is False
def test_require_auth_requires_request_param():
"""require_auth raises ValueError if request parameter is missing."""
import asyncio
@require_auth
async def bad_endpoint(): # Missing `request` parameter
pass
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="require_auth decorator requires 'request' parameter"):
asyncio.run(bad_endpoint())
# ── require_permission decorator ─────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_require_permission_requires_auth():
"""require_permission raises 401 when not authenticated."""
from fastapi import Request
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/test")
@require_permission("threads", "read")
async def endpoint(request: Request):
return {"ok": True}
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get("/test")
assert response.status_code == 401
assert "Authentication required" in response.json()["detail"]
def test_require_permission_denies_wrong_permission():
"""User without required permission gets 403."""
from fastapi import Request
app = FastAPI()
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
@app.get("/test")
@require_permission("threads", "delete")
async def endpoint(request: Request):
return {"ok": True}
mock_auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
with patch("app.gateway.authz._authenticate", return_value=mock_auth):
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get("/test")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert "Permission denied" in response.json()["detail"]
# ── Weak JWT secret warning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# ── User Model Fields ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_user_model_has_needs_setup_default_false():
"""New users default to needs_setup=False."""
user = User(email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
assert user.needs_setup is False
def test_user_model_has_token_version_default_zero():
"""New users default to token_version=0."""
user = User(email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
assert user.token_version == 0
def test_user_model_needs_setup_true():
"""Auto-created admin has needs_setup=True."""
user = User(email="admin@example.com", password_hash="hash", needs_setup=True)
assert user.needs_setup is True
def test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields():
"""needs_setup and token_version survive create → read round-trip.
Uses the shared persistence engine (same one threads_meta, runs,
run_events, and feedback use). The old separate .deer-flow/users.db
file is gone.
"""
import asyncio
import tempfile
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
async def _run() -> None:
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
close_engine,
get_session_factory,
init_engine,
)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
url = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{tmpdir}/scratch.db"
await init_engine("sqlite", url=url, sqlite_dir=tmpdir)
try:
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(get_session_factory())
user = User(
email="setup@test.com",
password_hash="fakehash",
system_role="admin",
needs_setup=True,
token_version=3,
)
created = await repo.create_user(user)
assert created.needs_setup is True
assert created.token_version == 3
fetched = await repo.get_user_by_email("setup@test.com")
assert fetched is not None
assert fetched.needs_setup is True
assert fetched.token_version == 3
fetched.needs_setup = False
fetched.token_version = 4
await repo.update_user(fetched)
refetched = await repo.get_user_by_id(str(fetched.id))
assert refetched is not None
assert refetched.needs_setup is False
assert refetched.token_version == 4
finally:
await close_engine()
asyncio.run(_run())
def test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted(tmp_path):
"""Concurrent-delete during update_user must hard-fail, not silently no-op.
Earlier the SQLite repo returned the input unchanged when the row was
missing, making a phantom success path that admin password reset
callers (`reset_admin`, `_ensure_admin_user`) would happily log as
'password reset'. The new contract: raise ``UserNotFoundError`` so
a vanished row never looks like a successful update.
"""
import asyncio
import tempfile
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserNotFoundError
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
async def _run() -> None:
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
close_engine,
get_session_factory,
init_engine,
)
from deerflow.persistence.user.model import UserRow
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
url = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{d}/scratch.db"
await init_engine("sqlite", url=url, sqlite_dir=d)
try:
sf = get_session_factory()
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(sf)
user = User(
email="ghost@test.com",
password_hash="fakehash",
system_role="user",
)
created = await repo.create_user(user)
# Simulate "row vanished underneath us" by deleting the row
# via the raw ORM session, then attempt to update.
async with sf() as session:
row = await session.get(UserRow, str(created.id))
assert row is not None
await session.delete(row)
await session.commit()
created.needs_setup = True
with pytest.raises(UserNotFoundError):
await repo.update_user(created)
finally:
await close_engine()
asyncio.run(_run())
# ── Token Versioning ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_jwt_encodes_ver():
"""JWT payload includes ver field."""
import os
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
token = create_access_token(str(uuid4()), token_version=3)
payload = decode_token(token)
assert not isinstance(payload, TokenError)
assert payload.ver == 3
def test_jwt_default_ver_zero():
"""JWT ver defaults to 0."""
import os
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
token = create_access_token(str(uuid4()))
payload = decode_token(token)
assert not isinstance(payload, TokenError)
assert payload.ver == 0
def test_token_version_mismatch_rejects():
"""Token with stale ver is rejected by get_current_user_from_request."""
import asyncio
import os
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
user_id = str(uuid4())
token = create_access_token(user_id, token_version=0)
mock_user = User(id=user_id, email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash", token_version=1)
mock_request = MagicMock()
mock_request.cookies = {"access_token": token}
with patch("app.gateway.deps.get_local_provider") as mock_provider_fn:
mock_provider = MagicMock()
mock_provider.get_user = AsyncMock(return_value=mock_user)
mock_provider_fn.return_value = mock_provider
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
asyncio.run(get_current_user_from_request(mock_request))
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
assert "revoked" in str(exc_info.value.detail).lower()
# ── change-password extension ──────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_change_password_request_accepts_new_email():
"""ChangePasswordRequest model accepts optional new_email."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
req = ChangePasswordRequest(
current_password="old",
new_password="newpassword",
new_email="new@example.com",
)
assert req.new_email == "new@example.com"
def test_change_password_request_new_email_optional():
"""ChangePasswordRequest model works without new_email."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
req = ChangePasswordRequest(current_password="old", new_password="newpassword")
assert req.new_email is None
def test_login_response_includes_needs_setup():
"""LoginResponse includes needs_setup field."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import LoginResponse
resp = LoginResponse(expires_in=3600, needs_setup=True)
assert resp.needs_setup is True
resp2 = LoginResponse(expires_in=3600)
assert resp2.needs_setup is False
# ── Rate Limiting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_rate_limiter_allows_under_limit():
"""Requests under the limit are allowed."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts
_login_attempts.clear()
_check_rate_limit("192.168.1.1") # Should not raise
def test_rate_limiter_blocks_after_max_failures():
"""IP is blocked after 5 consecutive failures."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts, _record_login_failure
_login_attempts.clear()
ip = "10.0.0.1"
for _ in range(5):
_record_login_failure(ip)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
_check_rate_limit(ip)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 429
def test_rate_limiter_resets_on_success():
"""Successful login clears the failure counter."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts, _record_login_failure, _record_login_success
_login_attempts.clear()
ip = "10.0.0.2"
for _ in range(4):
_record_login_failure(ip)
_record_login_success(ip)
_check_rate_limit(ip) # Should not raise
# ── Client IP extraction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_get_client_ip_direct_connection_no_proxy(monkeypatch):
"""Direct mode (no AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES): use TCP peer regardless of X-Real-IP."""
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "203.0.113.42"
req.headers = {}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42"
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_ignored_when_no_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
"""X-Real-IP is silently ignored if AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset.
This closes the bypass where any client could rotate X-Real-IP per
request to dodge per-IP rate limits in dev / direct mode.
"""
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "127.0.0.1"
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "127.0.0.1"
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_honored_from_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
"""X-Real-IP is honored when the TCP peer matches AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "10.5.6.7" # in trusted CIDR
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42"
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_rejected_from_untrusted_peer(monkeypatch):
"""X-Real-IP is rejected when the TCP peer is NOT in the trusted list."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "8.8.8.8" # NOT in trusted CIDR
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"} # client trying to spoof
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "8.8.8.8"
def test_get_client_ip_xff_never_honored(monkeypatch):
"""X-Forwarded-For is never used; only X-Real-IP from a trusted peer."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "10.0.0.1"
req.headers = {"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.5"} # no x-real-ip
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "10.0.0.1"
def test_get_client_ip_invalid_trusted_proxy_entry_skipped(monkeypatch, caplog):
"""Garbage entries in AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES are warned and skipped."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "not-an-ip,10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "10.5.6.7"
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42" # valid entry still works
def test_get_client_ip_no_client_returns_unknown(monkeypatch):
"""No request.client → 'unknown' marker (no crash)."""
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client = None
req.headers = {}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "unknown"
# ── Common-password blocklist ────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_register_rejects_literal_password():
"""Pydantic validator rejects 'password' as a registration password."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="password")
assert "too common" in str(exc.value)
def test_register_rejects_common_password_case_insensitive():
"""Case variants of common passwords are also rejected."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
for variant in ["PASSWORD", "Password1", "qwerty123", "letmein1"]:
with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password=variant)
def test_register_accepts_strong_password():
"""A non-blocklisted password of length >=8 is accepted."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
req = RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="Tr0ub4dor&3-Horse")
assert req.password == "Tr0ub4dor&3-Horse"
def test_change_password_rejects_common_password():
"""The same blocklist applies to change-password."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
ChangePasswordRequest(current_password="anything", new_password="iloveyou")
def test_password_blocklist_keeps_short_passwords_for_length_check():
"""Short passwords still fail the min_length check (not the blocklist)."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="abc")
# the length check should fire, not the blocklist
assert "at least 8 characters" in str(exc.value)
# ── Weak JWT secret warning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_missing_jwt_secret_generates_ephemeral(monkeypatch, caplog):
"""get_auth_config() auto-generates an ephemeral secret when AUTH_JWT_SECRET is unset."""
import logging
import app.gateway.auth.config as config_module
config_module._auth_config = None
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_JWT_SECRET", raising=False)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
config = config_module.get_auth_config()
assert config.jwt_secret # non-empty ephemeral secret
assert any("AUTH_JWT_SECRET" in msg for msg in caplog.messages)
# Cleanup
config_module._auth_config = None