deer-flow/backend/tests/test_stateless_runs_owner_isolation.py
Vanzeren 80848837b7
feat(gateway): seed checkpoint history (#4590)
* feat(runtime): seed empty run-event feed from checkpoint history

Threads created before the journaled run-event model hold their history
only in the LangGraph checkpoint. Before the first journaled run, backfill
an empty run-event message feed from the existing checkpoint head so
legacy history receives earlier thread-global seq numbers and remains
visible in the unified feed. Threads with no checkpoint or an already
populated feed skip the path.

The seed guard resolves the user explicitly instead of relying on the
store's AUTO default, which raises without a user contextvar (scheduler
launch path on the DB event store).

* docs: document checkpoint history seeding in thread runs

Before the first journaled run, an empty run-event message feed is
seeded from an existing checkpoint head so legacy checkpoint-only
history stays visible with earlier thread-global sequence numbers.

* fix(gateway): make checkpoint-history seed guard thread-scoped

The emptiness guard filtered by the current user whenever one was in
context, answering "does this user have any messages?" rather than
"has this thread's feed ever been journaled?". Seed rows stamped with
a different principal (NULL for ownerless seeds, or another user on a
shared NULL-owner thread) were invisible to the guard, so each new
principal re-seeded a duplicate history. Pass user_id=None
unconditionally; None also opts out of AUTO resolution, so the
ownerless scheduler path still cannot raise.

Adds a DbRunEventStore-backed regression test (the MemoryRunEventStore
tests cannot catch this — the memory store ignores user_id) proving the
ownerless-seed -> authenticated-run sequence seeds exactly once.
2026-07-31 17:25:07 +08:00

211 lines
8.5 KiB
Python

"""Cross-user isolation for the stateless ``POST /api/runs/stream`` and ``/wait`` endpoints.
These endpoints receive ``thread_id`` in the request body, so the
``@require_permission(owner_check=True)`` decorator — which reads the
``thread_id`` *path* parameter — cannot protect them. The owner check
lives inside ``services.start_run()`` instead; this suite pins it at the
HTTP layer so the gap cannot silently reopen.
Strategy
--------
``app.state.run_manager.create_or_reject`` raises ``ConflictError``, so a
request that *passes* the owner check deterministically short-circuits
with 409 before any agent code runs. The two outcomes:
- 404 + ``create_or_reject`` never awaited -> blocked by the owner check
- 409 + ``create_or_reject`` awaited -> passed the owner check
The thread store is a real ``MemoryThreadMetaStore`` (not a mock) so the
``check_access`` semantics under test — missing row allows, ``user_id``
NULL allows, foreign owner denies — are exercised through real code.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from contextlib import contextmanager
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
from uuid import uuid4
import pytest
from _router_auth_helpers import make_authed_test_app
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from langgraph.store.memory import InMemoryStore
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
from app.gateway.routers import runs
from deerflow.config.app_config import AppConfig, reset_app_config, set_app_config
from deerflow.persistence.thread_meta.memory import MemoryThreadMetaStore
from deerflow.runtime import ConflictError
USER_A = User(email="owner-a@example.com", password_hash="x", system_role="user", id=uuid4())
USER_B = User(email="intruder-b@example.com", password_hash="x", system_role="user", id=uuid4())
INTERNAL_USER = SimpleNamespace(id="default", system_role="internal")
THREAD_A = "thread-owned-by-a"
THREAD_SHARED = "thread-shared-null-owner"
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _stub_app_config():
"""Inject a minimal AppConfig so the allowed path (which builds a
RunContext via ``get_config()``) never reads config.yaml from disk."""
set_app_config(AppConfig.model_validate({"sandbox": {"use": "deerflow.sandbox.local:LocalSandboxProvider"}}))
yield
reset_app_config()
def _make_thread_store() -> MemoryThreadMetaStore:
store = MemoryThreadMetaStore(InMemoryStore())
async def _seed():
await store.create(THREAD_A, user_id=str(USER_A.id))
await store.create(THREAD_SHARED, user_id=None)
asyncio.run(_seed())
return store
@contextmanager
def _client(user):
"""Yield a ``TestClient`` authenticated as ``user`` plus the stubbed
``create_or_reject`` mock, closing the client (and its anyio portal /
background threads) on exit.
``create_or_reject`` raises ``ConflictError`` so a request that passes the
owner check short-circuits to 409 before any agent code runs.
"""
app = make_authed_test_app(user_factory=lambda: user)
app.include_router(runs.router)
app.state.thread_store = _make_thread_store()
app.state.stream_bridge = MagicMock()
app.state.checkpointer = MagicMock()
# start_run's checkpoint-history seeding runs before admission: give the
# store/checkpointer async stubs so the seed path sees an empty feed and
# no checkpoint head, then skips.
app.state.checkpointer.aget_tuple = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
app.state.store = MagicMock()
app.state.run_events_config = None
app.state.run_event_store = MagicMock()
app.state.run_event_store.list_messages = AsyncMock(return_value=[])
run_manager = MagicMock()
run_manager.create_or_reject = AsyncMock(side_effect=ConflictError("sentinel: owner check passed"))
app.state.run_manager = run_manager
with TestClient(app) as client:
yield client, run_manager.create_or_reject
def _body(thread_id: str | None = None) -> dict:
if thread_id is None:
return {}
return {"config": {"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id}}}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Denied: another user's thread
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_stream_cross_user_returns_404():
"""User B cannot start a run on user A's thread via /api/runs/stream."""
with _client(USER_B) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body(THREAD_A))
assert response.status_code == 404
assert response.json()["detail"] == f"Thread {THREAD_A} not found"
create_or_reject.assert_not_awaited()
def test_wait_cross_user_returns_404_without_channel_values():
"""User B cannot read user A's checkpoint state via /api/runs/wait."""
with _client(USER_B) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/wait", json=_body(THREAD_A))
assert response.status_code == 404
assert response.json() == {"detail": f"Thread {THREAD_A} not found"}
create_or_reject.assert_not_awaited()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Allowed: owner, fresh/untracked/shared threads, internal role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_stream_owner_passes_owner_check():
"""User A reaches run creation on their own thread (409 sentinel)."""
with _client(USER_A) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body(THREAD_A))
assert response.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()
def test_wait_owner_passes_owner_check():
with _client(USER_A) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/wait", json=_body(THREAD_A))
assert response.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()
def test_stream_without_thread_id_passes_owner_check():
"""Stateless run with no thread_id auto-creates a thread — never blocked."""
with _client(USER_B) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body())
assert response.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()
def test_stream_untracked_thread_passes_owner_check():
"""A thread_id with no thread_meta row (untracked legacy) stays accessible."""
with _client(USER_B) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body("never-created-thread"))
assert response.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()
def test_stream_shared_thread_passes_owner_check():
"""A thread_meta row with user_id NULL (shared / pre-auth data) stays accessible."""
with _client(USER_B) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body(THREAD_SHARED))
assert response.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()
def test_stream_internal_role_scoped_by_owner_header():
"""IM channels run with the internal system role on behalf of the
connection owner named in X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id — the owner check is
scoped to that owner rather than bypassed."""
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME
with _client(INTERNAL_USER) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post(
"/api/runs/stream",
json=_body(THREAD_A),
headers={INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME: str(USER_A.id)},
)
assert response.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()
def test_stream_internal_role_with_foreign_owner_header_returns_404():
"""The internal token alone must not grant access to another user's thread."""
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME
with _client(INTERNAL_USER) as (client, create_or_reject):
response = client.post(
"/api/runs/stream",
json=_body(THREAD_A),
headers={INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME: str(USER_B.id)},
)
assert response.status_code == 404
create_or_reject.assert_not_awaited()
def test_stream_internal_role_without_owner_header_is_scoped_to_internal_user():
"""Without an owner header internal callers keep access to their own and
shared/untracked threads, but not to user-owned threads."""
with _client(INTERNAL_USER) as (client, create_or_reject):
denied = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body(THREAD_A))
allowed = client.post("/api/runs/stream", json=_body(THREAD_SHARED))
assert denied.status_code == 404
assert allowed.status_code == 409
create_or_reject.assert_awaited()