hataa 6091ce7576
feat(authz): derive Gateway route permissions from AuthorizationProvider (#4439)
* feat(authz): derive Gateway route permissions from AuthorizationProvider (Phase 2A, #4063)

Phase 2A: replace legacy _ALL_PERMISSIONS with provider-derived route
permissions. When authorization.enabled, each threads:*/runs:* permission
is evaluated independently via provider.aauthorize(resource='route').
Disabled mode preserves legacy behavior. owner_check and require_admin_user
remain unchanged.

10 new tests: disabled/enabled/RBAC policy/fail-closed/fail-open/
authenticate integration/middleware integration.

* fix(authz): move AuthorizationConfig import to runtime for fallback in _get_route_authorization_config
2026-07-27 14:19:04 +08:00

479 lines
18 KiB
Python

"""Authorization decorators and context for DeerFlow.
Inspired by LangGraph Auth system: https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/main/libs/sdk-py/langgraph_sdk/auth/__init__.py
**Usage:**
1. Use ``@require_auth`` on routes that need authentication
2. Use ``@require_permission("resource", "action", filter_key=...)`` for permission checks
3. The decorator chain processes from bottom to top
**Example:**
@router.get("/{thread_id}")
@require_auth
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
# User is authenticated and has threads:read permission
...
**Permission Model:**
- threads:read - View thread
- threads:write - Create/update thread
- threads:delete - Delete thread
- runs:create - Run agent
- runs:read - View run
- runs:cancel - Cancel run
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import functools
import inspect
import logging
from collections.abc import Callable
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, ParamSpec, TypeVar
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from deerflow.authz.principal import build_principal_from_context
from deerflow.authz.provider import AuthorizationProvider, AuthzDecision, AuthzRequest
from deerflow.authz.runtime import resolve_authorization_provider
from deerflow.config.authorization_config import AuthorizationConfig
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
P = ParamSpec("P")
T = TypeVar("T")
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Permission constants
class Permissions:
"""Permission constants for resource:action format."""
# Threads
THREADS_READ = "threads:read"
THREADS_WRITE = "threads:write"
THREADS_DELETE = "threads:delete"
# Runs
RUNS_CREATE = "runs:create"
RUNS_READ = "runs:read"
RUNS_CANCEL = "runs:cancel"
class AuthContext:
"""Authentication context for the current request.
Stored in request.state.auth after require_auth decoration.
Attributes:
user: The authenticated user, or None if anonymous
permissions: List of permission strings (e.g., "threads:read")
"""
__slots__ = ("user", "permissions")
def __init__(self, user: User | None = None, permissions: list[str] | None = None):
self.user = user
self.permissions = permissions or []
@property
def is_authenticated(self) -> bool:
"""Check if user is authenticated."""
return self.user is not None
def has_permission(self, resource: str, action: str) -> bool:
"""Check if context has permission for resource:action.
Args:
resource: Resource name (e.g., "threads")
action: Action name (e.g., "read")
Returns:
True if user has permission
"""
permission = f"{resource}:{action}"
return permission in self.permissions
def require_user(self) -> User:
"""Get user or raise 401.
Raises:
HTTPException 401 if not authenticated
"""
if not self.user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
return self.user
def get_auth_context(request: Request) -> AuthContext | None:
"""Get AuthContext from request state."""
return getattr(request.state, "auth", None)
_ALL_PERMISSIONS: list[str] = [
Permissions.THREADS_READ,
Permissions.THREADS_WRITE,
Permissions.THREADS_DELETE,
Permissions.RUNS_CREATE,
Permissions.RUNS_READ,
Permissions.RUNS_CANCEL,
]
def _make_test_request_stub() -> Any:
"""Create a minimal request-like object for direct unit calls.
Used when decorated route handlers are invoked without FastAPI's
request injection. Includes fields accessed by auth helpers.
"""
return SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(), cookies={}, _deerflow_test_bypass_auth=True)
def _get_route_authorization_config() -> AuthorizationConfig:
"""Return the hot-reloaded authorization config for this request.
Falls back to a disabled config when AppConfig is not available (e.g. test
environments without a config.yaml), preserving legacy all-permissions behavior.
"""
from deerflow.config.app_config import get_app_config
try:
return get_app_config().authorization
except (FileNotFoundError, RuntimeError):
return AuthorizationConfig()
# --- Provider cache (W1/F1) ---
# Keyed by config object identity (id) so the expensive model_dump() signature
# is only recomputed when get_app_config() returns a new object (hot-reload).
_route_provider_cache: dict[str, AuthorizationProvider] = {}
_route_provider_config_id: int | None = None
_route_provider_config_sig: str | None = None
def _get_cached_route_provider(config: AuthorizationConfig) -> AuthorizationProvider | None:
"""Resolve (or reuse) the authorization provider for route permissions.
The provider is cached per config object identity. When ``get_app_config()``
returns a new object (hot-reload), the signature is recomputed and compared;
only an actual content change triggers re-resolution. This avoids calling
``model_dump()`` on every request — the fast path is a single ``id()`` check.
"""
global _route_provider_config_id, _route_provider_config_sig, _route_provider_cache
config_id = id(config)
# Fast path: same config object as last time → return cached provider.
if config_id == _route_provider_config_id and _route_provider_cache:
return _route_provider_cache.get("provider")
# Config object changed (hot-reload): compute signature to check if
# content actually changed or just the wrapper object identity.
sig = repr(sorted(config.model_dump().items()))
if sig == _route_provider_config_sig and _route_provider_cache:
# Same content, different object — update id, reuse provider.
_route_provider_config_id = config_id
return _route_provider_cache.get("provider")
# Content changed (or first call): re-resolve into a local first,
# then publish id + sig + provider together to avoid a race window.
_route_provider_cache.clear()
provider = resolve_authorization_provider(config)
if provider is not None:
_route_provider_cache["provider"] = provider
_route_provider_config_id = config_id
_route_provider_config_sig = sig
return provider
async def resolve_route_permissions(user: User, *, is_internal: bool) -> list[str]:
"""Return the route permissions granted to an authenticated user.
Disabled authorization preserves the legacy all-permissions behavior.
When enabled, every registered ``resource:action`` permission is evaluated
independently so a provider failure affects only the route being checked.
Provider instances are cached per config signature (hot-reload safe).
"""
config = _get_route_authorization_config()
if config.enabled is not True:
return list(_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
try:
provider = _get_cached_route_provider(config)
if provider is None:
raise ValueError("authorization is enabled but provider resolution returned None")
except Exception:
logger.warning("Failed to resolve authorization provider for Gateway routes", exc_info=True)
return [] if config.fail_closed else list(_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
# Align with Phase 1B's tool path: internal callers (IM channel workers,
# scheduler) have system_role="internal", which is not a real RBAC role.
# Omit it so default_role applies, mirroring inject_authenticated_user_context
# which pops user_role for internal callers without a resolved owner.
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE
user_role = getattr(user, "system_role", None)
if user_role == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE:
user_role = None
principal = build_principal_from_context(
{
"user_id": str(user.id),
"user_role": user_role,
"oauth_provider": getattr(user, "oauth_provider", None),
"oauth_id": getattr(user, "oauth_id", None),
"is_internal": is_internal,
},
default_role=config.default_role,
)
# Evaluate all permissions in parallel (W2).
async def _evaluate(permission: str) -> str | None:
_, action = permission.split(":", maxsplit=1)
request = AuthzRequest(
principal=principal,
resource="route",
action=action,
target=permission,
)
try:
decision = await provider.aauthorize(request)
if not isinstance(decision, AuthzDecision):
raise TypeError("AuthorizationProvider.aauthorize must return AuthzDecision")
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except Exception:
logger.warning(
"Authorization provider failed while evaluating route permission %s",
permission,
exc_info=True,
)
return permission if not config.fail_closed else None
return permission if decision.allow else None
results = await asyncio.gather(*[_evaluate(p) for p in _ALL_PERMISSIONS])
return [p for p in results if p is not None]
async def _authenticate(request: Request) -> AuthContext:
"""Authenticate request and return AuthContext.
Delegates to deps.get_optional_user_from_request() for the JWT→User pipeline.
Returns AuthContext with user=None for anonymous requests.
"""
from app.gateway.deps import get_optional_user_from_request
user = await get_optional_user_from_request(request)
if user is None:
return AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
is_internal = _is_internal_caller(request, user)
permissions = await resolve_route_permissions(user, is_internal=is_internal)
return AuthContext(user=user, permissions=permissions)
def _is_internal_caller(request: Request, user: Any) -> bool:
"""Determine if the request originates from a trusted internal caller.
Checks three signals (any one suffices):
1. ``request.state.auth_source == AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL`` (set by AuthMiddleware).
2. ``user.system_role == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE`` (synthetic internal user).
3. The request carries a valid internal auth token header (decorator-only path
where AuthMiddleware may not have stamped ``auth_source`` yet).
"""
from app.gateway.auth_disabled import AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME, INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE, is_valid_internal_auth_token
if getattr(getattr(request, "state", None), "auth_source", None) == AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL:
return True
if getattr(user, "system_role", None) == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE:
return True
# Decorator-only path: check the internal token header directly.
internal_token = request.headers.get(INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME) if hasattr(request, "headers") else None
if internal_token and is_valid_internal_auth_token(internal_token):
return True
return False
def require_auth[**P, T](func: Callable[P, T]) -> Callable[P, T]:
"""Decorator that authenticates the request and enforces authentication.
Independently raises HTTP 401 for unauthenticated requests, regardless of
whether ``AuthMiddleware`` is present in the ASGI stack. Sets the resolved
``AuthContext`` on ``request.state.auth`` for downstream handlers.
Must be placed ABOVE other decorators (executes after them).
Usage:
@router.get("/{thread_id}")
@require_auth # Bottom decorator (executes first after permission check)
@require_permission("threads", "read")
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
auth: AuthContext = request.state.auth
...
Raises:
HTTPException: 401 if the request is unauthenticated.
ValueError: If 'request' parameter is missing.
"""
@functools.wraps(func)
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
request = kwargs.get("request")
if request is None:
# Unit tests may call decorated handlers directly without a
# FastAPI Request object. Inject a minimal request stub when
# the wrapped function declares `request`.
if "request" in inspect.signature(func).parameters:
kwargs["request"] = _make_test_request_stub()
else:
raise ValueError("require_auth decorator requires 'request' parameter")
request = kwargs["request"]
if getattr(request, "_deerflow_test_bypass_auth", False):
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
# Authenticate and set context
auth_context = await _authenticate(request)
request.state.auth = auth_context
if not auth_context.is_authenticated:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapper
def require_permission(
resource: str,
action: str,
owner_check: bool = False,
require_existing: bool = False,
) -> Callable[[Callable[P, T]], Callable[P, T]]:
"""Decorator that checks permission for resource:action.
Must be used AFTER @require_auth.
Args:
resource: Resource name (e.g., "threads", "runs")
action: Action name (e.g., "read", "write", "delete")
owner_check: If True, validates that the current user owns the resource.
Requires 'thread_id' path parameter and performs ownership check.
require_existing: Only meaningful with ``owner_check=True``. If True, a
missing ``threads_meta`` row counts as a denial (404)
instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow". Use on
**destructive / mutating** routes (DELETE, PATCH,
state-update) so a deleted thread can't be re-targeted
by another user via the missing-row code path.
Usage:
# Read-style: legacy untracked threads are allowed
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
...
# Destructive: thread row MUST exist and be owned by caller
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
async def delete_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
...
Raises:
HTTPException 401: If authentication required but user is anonymous
HTTPException 403: If user lacks permission
HTTPException 404: If owner_check=True but user doesn't own the thread
ValueError: If owner_check=True but 'thread_id' parameter is missing
"""
def decorator(func: Callable[P, T]) -> Callable[P, T]:
@functools.wraps(func)
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
request = kwargs.get("request")
if request is None:
# Unit tests may call decorated route handlers directly without
# constructing a FastAPI Request object. Inject a minimal stub
# when the wrapped function declares `request`.
if "request" in inspect.signature(func).parameters:
kwargs["request"] = _make_test_request_stub()
else:
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
request = kwargs["request"]
if getattr(request, "_deerflow_test_bypass_auth", False):
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
auth: AuthContext = getattr(request.state, "auth", None)
if auth is None:
auth = await _authenticate(request)
request.state.auth = auth
if not auth.is_authenticated:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
# Check permission
if not auth.has_permission(resource, action):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"Permission denied: {resource}:{action}",
)
# Owner check for thread-specific resources.
#
# 2.0-rc moved thread metadata into the SQL persistence layer
# (``threads_meta`` table). We verify ownership via
# ``ThreadMetaStore.check_access``: it returns True for
# missing rows (untracked legacy thread) and for rows whose
# ``user_id`` is NULL (shared / pre-auth data), so this is
# strict-deny rather than strict-allow — only an *existing*
# row with a *different* user_id triggers 404.
if owner_check:
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME, INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE
thread_id = kwargs.get("thread_id")
if thread_id is None:
raise ValueError("require_permission with owner_check=True requires 'thread_id' parameter")
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_store
thread_store = get_thread_store(request)
allowed = await thread_store.check_access(
thread_id,
str(auth.user.id),
require_existing=require_existing,
)
if not allowed and getattr(auth.user, "system_role", None) == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE:
# Trusted internal callers (channel workers) also act for
# the connection owner carried in X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id.
# Scope the check to that owner instead of bypassing it; a
# leaked internal token must not grant cross-user thread
# access. The header is honored only after ``auth`` proved
# the caller holds the internal token (mirrors
# get_trusted_internal_owner_user_id, which keys off the
# middleware-stamped ``request.state.user``).
header_owner = (request.headers.get(INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME) or "").strip()
if header_owner:
allowed = await thread_store.check_access(
thread_id,
header_owner,
require_existing=require_existing,
)
if not allowed:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found",
)
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapper
return decorator