mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
synced 2026-09-11 22:48:38 +00:00
* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#4849) Backend-first implementation of the PAT contract from #4849: show-once dfp_ tokens bound to their owning user (AUTH_SOURCE_PAT, is_internal=false), digest-only storage (migration 0017), strict credential precedence (invalid Bearer is a 401, never cookie fallback), CSRF double-submit skipped only for Bearer requests while auth-endpoint origin checks still run, scopes intersecting the authz route permissions, session-auth-only PAT management and password changes, and throttled best-effort last_used_at stamps. * fix(auth): harden PAT scope boundary and schema parity from adversarial review Independent review of the initial draft found: (1) scopes only constrained the threads/runs permission axis while admin routes treated a PAT as its (possibly admin) owner — is_admin_user now rejects PAT callers outright since no scope grants admin capability; (2) the model declared a column UNIQUE constraint while migration 0017 created a named unique index, so downgrade failed on create_all-bootstrapped DBs — both now use the named unique index; (3) auth-disabled mode is an operator override and now stays ahead of the Bearer check so a stray Authorization header cannot 401 an E2E sandbox; plus wiring the previously-unused constants, bounding the last_used_at stamp cache, and four new tests (middleware-level expiry, expires_in_days, admin-capability rejection with session control, and the auth-disabled precedence). * docs(api): document personal access tokens for programmatic API access * fix(auth): close PAT security boundaries from review (default-deny routes, extension admin suppression) P1-1: scope intersection only constrains @require_permission routes, so undecorated mutation routes (DELETE /api/memory, POST /api/agents, Lark credential switching, channel config) accepted a PAT holding a single read scope. AuthMiddleware now enforces a default-deny route policy in auth/pat.py: PAT requests are admitted only to the thread/run lifecycle routes the v1 scopes govern; everything else answers 403 regardless of scopes. Session-cookie callers are unaffected. P1-2: the extension principal resolver projected is_admin/roles from the raw system_role, so an admin-owned PAT passed deerflow_extension_api.require_admin on contributed routes despite the documented no-admin guarantee. The projection is now PAT-aware and suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers, mirroring deps.is_admin_user. Both fixes carry regression tests (route outside policy 403 + session control; production resolver admin suppression), and API.md documents the default-deny boundary. * fix(auth): enforce PAT scopes on stateless run entry and harden decorator Follow-up hardening from an independent audit of the P1 fixes: - POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait were the only allowlisted run entrypoints without @require_permission, so a threads:read-only PAT could still start runs (same bug class as P1-1, now closed): both now carry @require_permission("runs", "create"). POST /api/threads and POST /api/threads/search gain threads:write / threads:read for the same reason. Authorization-disabled deployments see no change (the permission set resolves to all permissions). - require_permission now binds the wrapped signature to locate a positionally-passed request before injecting the test stub, fixing 'got multiple values for argument' on direct positional unit-test calls. - API.md: the intro PAT example used GET /api/models, which the new default-deny policy 403s — replaced with GET /api/threads; the default-deny route list now spells out method sets. Regression test: threads:read-only PAT is 403 on the decorated stateless entry while a runs:create PAT passes. * fix(auth): address review P2s (empty Authorization header, PAT name trimming, API example) - CSRFMiddleware treats an explicitly empty Authorization header as present (is None), so an invalid credential always reaches AuthMiddleware's uniform 401 instead of a CSRF 403 that varies by method/CSRF state. Regression: empty-header request dies at auth. - PATCreateRequest strips the name and rejects whitespace-only values before token generation; created names are stored trimmed. - API.md intro PAT example now uses the implemented POST /api/threads/search endpoint (GET /api/threads does not exist). - AGENTS.md trimmed back under the guidance soft budget after the upstream merge. * fix(auth): tighten PAT route policy to implemented methods only The allowlist admitted GET /api/threads, a method no router implements. Pre-authorizing a dead method weakens the default-deny boundary: a future GET collection route added without a permission decorator would become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. Restrict the rule to POST, fix the stale GET description in API.md's PAT constraints, and document the default-deny boundary accurately in the gateway AGENTS.md guidance (only the threads/runs allowlist is PAT-reachable; every other authenticated route 403s PAT callers). Audited every remaining rule against the mounted routers: all other method+path entries map to real routes. Regression: test_pat_policy_does_not_pre_authorize_unimplemented_methods. * test(auth): guarantee the negative digest test mutates the token token[:-1] + "X" is identical to the original whenever the generated token already ends in X (1/62), making the negative digest assertion fail intermittently. Choose the replacement character based on the existing tail so the mutated token always differs. * fix(auth): require runs:cancel for cancel-then-stream requests stream_existing_run is gated at runs:read so action-less stream joins work with read-only credentials, but its ?action=interrupt|rollback branch cancels the run — a separate permission. A runs:read-only PAT passed both the PAT route policy and the route decorator and could interrupt or roll back an active run, bypassing the runs:cancel scope. Decorators cannot express query-parameter-conditional permissions, so the check lives in require_cancel_permission_when_action(), applied at the top of the handler. Regression drives the real helper through the production middleware: runs:read-only PAT + action is 403, the same token joins action-less, runs:read+cancel passes, session control unaffected. * docs(changelog): add the PAT feature entry * docs(readme): add personal access tokens section Repo documentation-update policy requires user-facing features to update README.md in the same changeset; the PAT feature previously touched only backend/docs/API.md and the gateway AGENTS.md. * fix(auth): require runs:cancel for mutating multitask strategies All five run-creation entrypoints were gated only by runs:create, but RunCreateRequest.multitask_strategy accepts interrupt/rollback and start_run forwards it to create_or_reject, which terminates an already-active run. A runs:create-only PAT could therefore kill an existing run through a create request, bypassing runs:cancel. Decorators cannot express body-parameter-conditional permissions, and per-route checks leave the same hole for the next entrypoint, so the gate lives in start_run itself — the single choke point every run-creation path (HTTP routes and internal launchers) flows through. Regenerate launches pass multitask_strategy="reject" and are unaffected; requests without a stamped auth context (internal/test compositions) skip the gate. The check is the shared authz.require_cancel_permission_if primitive; require_cancel_permission_when_action now delegates to it, so every request dimension that carries cancel capability (query action, body strategy) flows through one gate. Regression drives the real middleware stack: runs:create-only PAT + interrupt/rollback is 403 with the exact detail, reject (explicit and default) stays available, runs:create+cancel passes, session control unaffected; a source anchor pins the gate inside start_run. * fix(runs): keep observer joins from applying creator cancel-on-disconnect sse_consumer's finally block applied the record's on_disconnect=cancel policy on ANY consumer's disconnect. The join surfaces (GET /join and the action-less GET/POST stream join) feed it the existing RunRecord, so anyone with thread read access — including a runs:read-only PAT — could cancel a locally-owned running run simply by closing the SSE connection, without runs:cancel. The policy expresses the creator's intent for their own connection; an observer's disconnect must never be read as that intent. sse_consumer gains apply_on_disconnect (default True). The two join surfaces pass False; the creating endpoints (thread-scoped and stateless create-and-stream) keep the creator semantics unchanged. wait_for_run_completion needs no change: its callers are creator-side or post-explicit-cancel paths only. Regression exercises a real generator close — the same machinery Starlette drives on client disconnect — against the production sse_consumer: creator stream disconnect cancels, observer join disconnect does not; a wiring anchor pins both join call sites and the creator defaults. API.md documents the cancel-capability constraint (this fix plus the action/strategy gates) in PAT Constraints. * test(auth): pin the multitask gate behaviorally; state wait invariant Independent adversarial review of the round-5 fixes found the P1-a regression only mirror-pinned: the source anchor could be satisfied by a comment, and deleting the gate from start_run would not fail the suite. This drives the production start_run directly — a create-only auth context gets 403 with the exact detail for interrupt, and a reject request with no cancel permission at all proceeds past the gate (never a permission 403). Also documents wait_for_run_completion's creator-side invariant (every caller is the creating endpoint or post-explicit-cancel) so a future observer wiring thinks twice before reusing it — the one-caller- away variant of the observer-disconnect P1. * docs(changelog): correct the PAT entry's digest and route-policy description The entry said HMAC digests (the implementation stores SHA-256 digests, as documented in API.md and pinned by the repository tests) and claimed the route policy admits 'implemented stateless endpoints' (it admits the thread/run lifecycle routes, narrowing further by scopes). Also notes the cancel-capability gate now covering action and multitask strategies. * fix(auth): enumerate the PAT runs route policy per implemented subroute The runs subtree rule was a GET|POST /runs(/.*)? wildcard — it pre-authorized every current and future subroute under /runs, including methods the router never implemented (e.g. GET /runs/stream), which is the same latent default-deny weakening the threads collection rule was tightened for: a future route added under /runs would become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. The wildcard is replaced with six segment-precise rules covering exactly the 14 implemented method+path combinations; the {run_id} slot necessarily matches any single segment, so the POST-only collection names (stream, wait, regenerate, edit-regenerate) are excluded from the GET run-id rule via negative lookahead — no dead method stays pre-authorized. Behavior for implemented routes is unchanged. test_pat_runs_policy_admits_exactly_the_mounted_routes derives the expected set from the mounted thread_runs router instead of a hand-maintained list: every implemented GET/POST route under /runs must be admitted, routes in this router outside the subtree stay denied, and representative unimplemented neighbors are denied — so adding a route under /runs now fails CI until it is explicitly allowlisted, and a removed route leaves a dead rule visible. API.md's PAT constraints list the enumerated routes and drops a feedback mention that belonged to the stateless /api/runs axis. * docs(migration): add the 0017 renumbering coordination note to 0017 The PR's migration-coordination comment states each migration file carries the note; the file did not. Adds it: numbering was generated against main head 0016 alongside #5078 and #4843; whoever merges first keeps the slot, the others renumber on rebase (revision/down_revision plus the bootstrap head assertions). * fix(auth): pad base62 tokens to a fixed 43-char width int.from_bytes discards leading zero bytes, so the unpadded encoder returned a variable-length body — empty for all-zero input, and shorter than 40 characters for any draw below 62**39 (~1 in 14.5M), leaving test_generate_pat_token_format probabilistically flaky and the token body without stable width (review round 6, P3). _base62 now left-pads with "0" to _base62_width(len(data)) — the exact integer digit count (62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42, so 43 for 32 bytes). The format test asserts the exact fixed width instead of a probabilistic floor, and a new unit test pins the all-zero, leading-zero-byte, and max-value edges deterministically.
138 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
138 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
"""Contributed routers need the caller's identity without importing app.*.
|
|
|
|
Every extension route is session-authenticated (contributed routers cannot
|
|
enter host-reserved or auth-exempt prefixes), but "logged in" and "admin" are
|
|
different questions and an extension must be able to ask the second one.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from types import SimpleNamespace
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
from deerflow_extension_api import (
|
|
EXTENSION_PRINCIPAL_RESOLVER_KEY,
|
|
ExtensionPrincipal,
|
|
require_admin,
|
|
resolve_principal,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
ADMIN = ExtensionPrincipal(user_id="u1", is_admin=True, is_internal=False)
|
|
PLAIN = ExtensionPrincipal(user_id="u2", is_admin=False, is_internal=False)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _request(principal):
|
|
state = SimpleNamespace(**{EXTENSION_PRINCIPAL_RESOLVER_KEY: (lambda request: principal)})
|
|
return SimpleNamespace(app=SimpleNamespace(state=state))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_returns_the_hosts_principal():
|
|
assert resolve_principal(_request(ADMIN)) == ADMIN
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_returns_none_when_the_host_installed_no_resolver():
|
|
request = SimpleNamespace(app=SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace()))
|
|
assert resolve_principal(request) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_returns_none_rather_than_raising_when_the_resolver_fails():
|
|
def boom(request):
|
|
raise RuntimeError("nope")
|
|
|
|
state = SimpleNamespace(**{EXTENSION_PRINCIPAL_RESOLVER_KEY: boom})
|
|
request = SimpleNamespace(app=SimpleNamespace(state=state))
|
|
assert resolve_principal(request) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_admin_accepts_an_admin():
|
|
assert require_admin(_request(ADMIN)) == ADMIN
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_admin_rejects_a_plain_user():
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
|
|
require_admin(_request(PLAIN))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_require_admin_fails_closed_with_no_resolver():
|
|
"""An unanswerable authorization question must not resolve to 'allowed'."""
|
|
request = SimpleNamespace(app=SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace()))
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
|
|
require_admin(request)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.fixture
|
|
def _stub_app_config(monkeypatch):
|
|
"""Keep ``create_app()`` independent of a real ``config.yaml``.
|
|
|
|
The repo-root ``config.yaml`` is gitignored; a checkout that configures
|
|
plugins there would otherwise make this test load them for real and leak
|
|
a populated extension registry into the process-global singleton other
|
|
tests read through (see ``tests/test_extension_app_loading.py`` for the
|
|
same pattern).
|
|
"""
|
|
import app.gateway.app as app_module
|
|
from deerflow.config.app_config import AppConfig
|
|
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import SandboxConfig
|
|
from deerflow.extensions import reset_loaded_extensions, reset_runtime_diagnostics
|
|
|
|
config = AppConfig(sandbox=SandboxConfig(use="test"))
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(app_module, "get_app_config", lambda: config)
|
|
reset_loaded_extensions()
|
|
reset_runtime_diagnostics()
|
|
yield
|
|
reset_runtime_diagnostics()
|
|
reset_loaded_extensions()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_host_installs_a_resolver_on_app_state(_stub_app_config):
|
|
from app.gateway.app import create_app
|
|
|
|
app = create_app()
|
|
assert callable(getattr(app.state, EXTENSION_PRINCIPAL_RESOLVER_KEY, None))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_installed_resolver_projects_system_role_into_roles(_stub_app_config):
|
|
"""The host's only role concept is the single system_role column; the
|
|
projection must actually populate ``roles`` from it rather than reading a
|
|
"roles" attribute the user model never had (which would always resolve to
|
|
an empty tuple, silently breaking the documented contract)."""
|
|
from app.gateway.app import create_app
|
|
|
|
app = create_app()
|
|
resolver = getattr(app.state, EXTENSION_PRINCIPAL_RESOLVER_KEY)
|
|
|
|
admin_request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(user=SimpleNamespace(id="u1", system_role="admin"), auth_source=None))
|
|
assert resolver(admin_request).roles == ("admin",)
|
|
|
|
plain_request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(user=SimpleNamespace(id="u2", system_role="user"), auth_source=None))
|
|
assert resolver(plain_request).roles == ("user",)
|
|
|
|
no_role_request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(user=SimpleNamespace(id="u3", system_role=None), auth_source=None))
|
|
assert resolver(no_role_request).roles == ()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_the_installed_resolver_suppresses_admin_for_pat_callers(_stub_app_config):
|
|
"""P1 regression (#5041 review): an admin-owned PAT must not regain admin
|
|
capability through the extension principal projection. Every admin signal
|
|
— ``is_admin`` and the ``admin`` role — is suppressed for PAT callers,
|
|
matching the documented guarantee that PAT credentials never carry admin
|
|
capability."""
|
|
from app.gateway.app import create_app
|
|
from app.gateway.auth_disabled import AUTH_SOURCE_PAT, AUTH_SOURCE_SESSION
|
|
|
|
app = create_app()
|
|
resolver = getattr(app.state, EXTENSION_PRINCIPAL_RESOLVER_KEY)
|
|
|
|
pat_request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(user=SimpleNamespace(id="u1", system_role="admin"), auth_source=AUTH_SOURCE_PAT))
|
|
pat_principal = resolver(pat_request)
|
|
assert pat_principal.is_admin is False
|
|
assert "admin" not in pat_principal.roles
|
|
|
|
# Control: the same admin over a session cookie still projects admin.
|
|
session_request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(user=SimpleNamespace(id="u1", system_role="admin"), auth_source=AUTH_SOURCE_SESSION))
|
|
session_principal = resolver(session_request)
|
|
assert session_principal.is_admin is True
|
|
assert session_principal.roles == ("admin",)
|
|
|
|
# A non-admin PAT keeps its plain role: only admin signals are suppressed.
|
|
plain_pat_request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(user=SimpleNamespace(id="u2", system_role="user"), auth_source=AUTH_SOURCE_PAT))
|
|
assert resolver(plain_pat_request).roles == ("user",)
|