deer-flow/backend/tests/test_local_sandbox_command_timeout.py
Xinmin Zeng 09988caf95
feat(skills): request-scoped secrets for skills (closes #3861) (#3871)
* feat(sandbox): per-call env injection + platform-secret scrubbing for skills

Add an env parameter to Sandbox.execute_command (abstract + local + AIO) so request-scoped secrets can be injected into skill subprocesses, and scrub platform credentials (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*/*PASSWORD*/*CREDENTIAL*) from the inherited environment by default so scoped injection is not security theatre. LocalSandbox always passes an explicit scrubbed env; AioSandbox routes env-bearing commands through bash.exec(env=) on a fresh session and leaves the legacy persistent-shell path unchanged. Part of #3861. BEHAVIOR CHANGE: execute_command no longer inherits the full os.environ; Windows encoding tests updated to assert the scrubbed dict.

* feat(skills): parse required-secrets frontmatter declaration

Add SecretRequirement and Skill.required_secrets, and parse the required-secrets SKILL.md frontmatter field (a string list or {name, optional} mappings), dropping malformed entries with a warning so one bad declaration does not invalidate the skill. The declared name is both the context.secrets key and the env var injected at activation. Part of #3861.

* feat(runtime): request-scoped secret carrier (context.secrets)

Add SECRETS_CONTEXT_KEY + extract_request_secrets, centralising the context.secrets carrier contract. The existing context passthrough (build_run_config -> _build_runtime_context) already carries the sub-key to runtime.context without mirroring it into configurable; characterization tests lock that behaviour. Part of #3861.

* feat(skills): inject declared secrets at slash-activation into bash env

Binding point A: when a skill is slash-activated, SkillActivationMiddleware resolves its declared required-secrets against the request's context.secrets and writes the per-run injection set to runtime.context. The bash tool forwards that set to execute_command(env=). A skill cannot harvest a host platform credential (is_host_platform_secret guard, cf. GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf), and injected values are redacted from bash output (mask_secret_values) so an echoed secret never re-enters the prompt/trace. Part of #3861.

* test(skills): lock the five secret leak surfaces + add trace redaction helper

Regression tests assert the secret value is absent from all five surfaces: prompt (activation message), checkpoint (graph state vs context separation), audit (journal records names only), trace (metadata builder never copies context; never mirrored to configurable), and stdout (mask_secret_values). Add redact_secret_context_keys as a defensive helper for any context serialization. Part of #3861.

* docs(backend): document request-scoped secrets for skills

Add Request-Scoped Secrets subsection (Skills) + env policy note (Sandbox) and the execute_command(env=) signature change, per the doc-sync policy. Part of #3861.

* fix(skills): close gaps found by end-to-end verification of request-scoped secrets

Real-gateway e2e + independent review of #3861 surfaced three defects, now fixed:

1. Slash activation never fired in the live chain. InputSanitizationMiddleware
   wraps user input in BEGIN/END markers before SkillActivationMiddleware sees it,
   and the original text was only preserved when an upload or IM channel set it.
   For a plain text message the slash command became undetectable, so no secret
   was ever resolved. Fix: the sanitizer now setdefaults the pre-wrap text into
   ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY (additive; sanitization behaviour unchanged), so
   slash activation works for all messages. Pre-existing latent bug surfaced here.

2. The raw request config (with context.secrets) was persisted to runs.kwargs_json
   and echoed by the run API (RunResponse.kwargs). Fix: redact_config_secrets()
   strips secret-bearing context keys from the persisted/echoed copy in start_run;
   the live config that drives the run keeps them. build_run_config now also sets
   configurable.thread_id on the context path (the checkpointer requires it).

3. Connection-string credentials (DATABASE_URL, REDIS_URL, SENTRY_DSN, GH_PAT, ...)
   were not scrubbed from the inherited sandbox env. Fix: env_policy adds a *DSN*
   pattern plus an explicit connection-string denylist (no blanket *URL* — benign
   service URLs stay readable).

Verified end-to-end via a real gateway run (real LLM + skill activation + bash):
the secret reaches the sandbox subprocess and appears in NONE of prompt, trace,
checkpoint, audit, stdout, runs.kwargs_json, or the run API. Part of #3861.

* docs(backend): document the env scrub, persistence redaction, and sanitizer interaction

Sync the Request-Scoped Secrets section with the verification-driven fixes: inherited-env scrub (incl. connection-string denylist), run-record/run-API redaction as the 6th sealed leak surface, and the sanitizer preserving original content so slash activation fires. Part of #3861.

* fix(skills): inject caller secret over scrubbed host value; drop redundant host-name guard

A real-world demo (a skill calling a third-party cloud API with a request-scoped
key) exposed that the is_host_platform_secret guard was both wrong and harmful:
it refused to inject a caller-supplied secret whenever a same-named variable
existed in the Gateway env — which is exactly the #3861 use case (a per-user key
overriding a shared platform key). The guard was also redundant: build_sandbox_env
already scrubs secret-looking names from the inherited env before injection, so a
skill can never read a host credential — it only ever receives the caller's value.

Remove the guard; the injected (caller) value simply wins over the scrubbed host
value. Verified end-to-end: the agent called the real cloud API successfully with
the caller's key, the host's same-named key was scrubbed and never used, and the
caller's key leaked to none of the surfaces. Part of #3861.

* fix(skills): address review on request-scoped secrets (#3861)

Review fixes from PR #3871:

- E2BSandbox.execute_command now accepts env/timeout and routes them to
  commands.run(envs=, timeout=). The bash tool passes env= unconditionally,
  so the prior signature (command only) raised TypeError on every e2b bash
  call and broke e2b deployments entirely. env=None stays backward-compatible.
- SkillActivationMiddleware clears the active-secret set before resolving each
  activation, so a later skill in the same run never inherits an earlier
  skill's injection set (the #3861 contract: a skill only receives what the
  caller supplied AND that skill declared).
- AioSandbox env path uses a dedicated _DEFAULT_HARD_TIMEOUT — bash.exec exposes
  no idle/no-change timeout, so the prior reuse of the legacy idle constant
  conflated wall-clock vs idle semantics. The env path also retries on the
  ErrorObservation signature now, sharing the legacy persistent-shell recovery
  contract.
- mask_secret_values skips values below a minimum length floor so a short
  declared secret (e.g. "42") cannot shred unrelated bytes (exit codes,
  timestamps, sizes) of tool output. The secret is still injected into the
  subprocess; only the output mask skips it.

session_id reuse on the env path is intentionally NOT added: a shared session
could let request-scoped secrets ride the session env into later commands,
which the SDK does not contractually forbid. The fresh-session choice matches
the LocalSandbox model (each call is a fresh subprocess); the trade-off
(consecutive env-bearing calls do not share cwd/venv/exports) is documented on
_execute_with_env.
2026-07-03 07:51:22 +08:00

159 lines
6.2 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for blocking-command timeout handling in LocalSandbox.
These pin the fix for the "starting a server hangs the whole turn" bug:
a backgrounded long-lived process must not keep the bash tool blocked until
the timeout, and a genuinely blocking foreground command must be terminated
(process group and all) once it exceeds the timeout.
The POSIX cases exercise real subprocess/process-group semantics, so they are
skipped on Windows. Windows keeps the ``subprocess.run`` path, but timeout
errors still use the same user-facing notice.
"""
import os
import shlex
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import SandboxConfig
from deerflow.sandbox.local import local_sandbox
from deerflow.sandbox.local.local_sandbox import LocalSandbox
posix_only = pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX process-group semantics")
linux_proc_fd_only = pytest.mark.skipif(not Path("/proc/self/fd").exists(), reason="requires Linux /proc fd links")
@posix_only
def test_backgrounded_process_returns_promptly():
"""A backgrounded long-lived process (e.g. a dev server started with `&`)
must return as soon as the foreground command finishes, instead of
blocking the bash tool until the timeout because it inherited the
captured pipe."""
sandbox = LocalSandbox("t")
start = time.monotonic()
output = sandbox.execute_command("sleep 5 & echo serving", timeout=10)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
assert elapsed < 3, f"expected prompt return, took {elapsed:.1f}s"
assert "serving" in output
@posix_only
@linux_proc_fd_only
def test_backgrounded_process_does_not_inherit_deleted_temp_capture(tmp_path):
"""A backgrounded process that forgets to redirect output must not inherit
an anonymous deleted temp file for fd 1. That would be an invisible,
unbounded disk leak for long-lived processes that keep writing."""
marker = tmp_path / "fd1"
script = f"import os, pathlib, time; pathlib.Path({str(marker)!r}).write_text(os.readlink('/proc/self/fd/1')); time.sleep(2)"
sandbox = LocalSandbox("t")
output = sandbox.execute_command(f"{shlex.quote(sys.executable)} -c {shlex.quote(script)} & echo launched", timeout=10)
assert "launched" in output
for _ in range(50):
if marker.exists():
break
time.sleep(0.1)
assert marker.exists()
assert " (deleted)" not in marker.read_text()
@posix_only
def test_foreground_blocking_command_times_out_with_notice():
"""A foreground command that never exits is terminated at the timeout and
the agent receives an explanatory notice instead of a generic error."""
sandbox = LocalSandbox("t")
start = time.monotonic()
output = sandbox.execute_command("while true; do sleep 0.2; done", timeout=1)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
assert elapsed < 5, f"timeout not enforced, took {elapsed:.1f}s"
assert "timed out" in output.lower()
def test_timeout_notice_formats_fractional_and_singular_timeouts(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(LocalSandbox, "_get_shell", lambda self: "/bin/sh")
monkeypatch.setattr(LocalSandbox, "_run_posix_command", staticmethod(lambda args, timeout, env=None: ("", "", 0, True)))
assert "after 1.5 seconds" in LocalSandbox("t").execute_command("wait", timeout=1.5)
assert "after 1 second" in LocalSandbox("t").execute_command("wait", timeout=1)
def test_windows_timeout_expired_returns_notice(monkeypatch):
def fake_run(*args, **kwargs):
raise local_sandbox.subprocess.TimeoutExpired(cmd=args[0], timeout=kwargs["timeout"], output="partial out", stderr="partial err")
monkeypatch.setattr(local_sandbox.os, "name", "nt")
monkeypatch.setattr(LocalSandbox, "_get_shell", lambda self: "cmd.exe")
monkeypatch.setattr(local_sandbox.subprocess, "run", fake_run)
output = LocalSandbox("t").execute_command("wait", timeout=1.5)
assert "partial out" in output
assert "Std Error:" in output
assert "partial err" in output
assert "after 1.5 seconds" in output
assert "Unexpected error" not in output
@posix_only
def test_foreground_timeout_kills_whole_process_group(tmp_path):
"""On timeout the entire process group is killed, not just the direct
child, so child processes spawned by the command do not survive."""
marker = tmp_path / "alive"
sandbox = LocalSandbox("t")
sandbox.execute_command(f"while true; do touch {marker}; sleep 0.2; done", timeout=1)
assert marker.exists()
first_mtime = marker.stat().st_mtime
time.sleep(1.5)
assert marker.stat().st_mtime == first_mtime, "process group survived the timeout"
@posix_only
def test_command_reading_stdin_does_not_block():
"""stdin is redirected from /dev/null, so a command that reads stdin gets
immediate EOF instead of blocking until the timeout."""
sandbox = LocalSandbox("t")
start = time.monotonic()
output = sandbox.execute_command("read x; echo got", timeout=10)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
assert elapsed < 3, f"stdin read blocked, took {elapsed:.1f}s"
assert "got" in output
@posix_only
def test_normal_command_output_exit_code_and_stderr():
"""Ordinary commands keep their existing output contract: stdout,
appended Std Error section, and a non-zero Exit Code line."""
sandbox = LocalSandbox("t")
assert "hello" in sandbox.execute_command("echo hello")
assert "Exit Code: 3" in sandbox.execute_command("exit 3")
combined = sandbox.execute_command("echo out; echo oops >&2")
assert "out" in combined
assert "Std Error:" in combined
assert "oops" in combined
def test_sandbox_config_exposes_command_timeout_default():
cfg = SandboxConfig(use="deerflow.sandbox.local:LocalSandboxProvider")
assert cfg.bash_command_timeout == 600
def test_bash_tool_description_guides_backgrounding_long_lived_processes():
"""The bash tool description (seen by the model) must tell it to background
long-lived processes like servers, so it doesn't block the turn in the
foreground. This is the prompt-side half of the server-hang fix."""
from deerflow.sandbox.tools import bash_tool
description = bash_tool.description.lower()
assert "background" in description
assert "server" in description