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7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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hataa
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d811143b52
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feat(authz): filter per-caller skill visibility on the skill listing surfaces (#4063 Phase 4) (#5489)
* feat(authz): filter per-caller skill visibility on the listing surfaces (#4063 Phase 4) GET /api/skills, GET /api/skills/custom, and GET /api/skills/{name} now filter the user-scoped catalog through filter_resources(principal, "skill", ...) — mirroring list_models. Anonymous callers are unfiltered; provider errors follow authorization.fail_closed (fail-closed -> empty listing / 404, fail-open -> full listing). An invisible skill on the detail surface returns the standard 404 so the endpoint cannot become an existence oracle the filtered list closed. Management endpoints stay require_admin_user-gated; runtime activation is #4541's layer. resolve_skill_authorization joins resolve_model_authorization as a thin sibling over a shared _resolve_route_scoped_authorization core. * docs(authz): reflect per-caller skill visibility in OpenAPI metadata and implementation notes (#5489) Address the two non-blocking review findings on #5489: - The three user-facing GET routes (/skills, /skills/custom, /skills/{name}) now say in their /docs-visible descriptions that authorization filters the response (hidden skills 404 on detail). - Add the dated Phase 4 decision-log entry to the authorization implementation notes, per the convention of every prior merged authz PR: listing-visibility semantics, the 404-vs-403 existence-oracle rationale, anonymous-caller behavior, and the #4541 rebase reconciliation points (config.example.yaml roles comment + this file's decision log). * docs(authz): move route guidance into Gateway module guide --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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PeaceMaker-best
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72ba661b84
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feat(skills): install local skill archives (#5039)
* feat(skills): install local skill archives Signed-off-by: PeaceMaker-best <221849497+PeaceMaker-best@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(skills): enforce upload limits before parsing * fix(nginx): scope skill upload limit to upload route * fix(nginx): harden skill upload proxy handling * fix(skills): improve archive upload feedback * fix(skills): address upload review polish --------- Signed-off-by: PeaceMaker-best <221849497+PeaceMaker-best@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: PeaceMaker-best <221849497+PeaceMaker-best@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Xinmin Zeng
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f2e832330e
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fix(sandbox): enforce disabled skills in filesystem views (#4178)
* fix(sandbox): project enabled skills into sandbox views * fix(skills): keep projection mutations consistent * fix(skills): fail closed on projection errors * fix(skills): isolate per-scope failures during boot projection rebuild rebuild_all_skill_projections() propagated any exception from the public rebuild or from a single user's rebuild straight out of the gateway lifespan startup, uncaught. A single broken user directory (bad permissions, corrupted _skill_states.json, unreadable content) would therefore abort gateway boot for every user, not just that one - _rebuild_*_locked already fails closed internally (clears the view and re-raises), so the boot loop only needed to stop treating that re-raise as fatal. Each scope's rebuild now fails closed independently and boot continues; a scope left empty by a boot failure self-heals on the next sandbox acquire via ensure_skill_projections(). Also patches deerflow.skills.projection.rebuild_all_skill_projections in the memory-flush lifespan test fixture, matching the two sibling fixtures in the same file — this call is now on the lifespan startup path and the fixture's minimal SimpleNamespace config predates it. * test(skills): update authz test for the projection-aware public toggle _persist_shared_skill_state (introduced earlier in this branch) reads the shared extensions_config.json fresh from disk under the projection lock instead of through the cached get_extensions_config() singleton - that's the whole point of the fix (stale worker caches must not clobber another worker's concurrent update). The name no longer exists on the skills router module, so the test's monkeypatch of it started raising AttributeError instead of exercising the endpoint. The mock storage in this test isn't a real LocalSkillStorage instance, so _persist_shared_skill_state's projection-mutation branch is already skipped (nullcontext) and it falls back to a fresh ExtensionsConfig() for the nonexistent tmp config_path - no replacement monkeypatch needed. * fix(sandbox): make skill projection ensure best-effort in acquire acquire() called _ensure_skills_projection() directly, outside any try/except, in both LocalSandboxProvider and AioSandboxProvider. Every other skill-mount setup path in these providers has always caught exceptions and logged a warning rather than failing sandbox acquire outright (e.g. when config.yaml can't be resolved) - these two new call sites broke that contract, so any projection failure (including simply not having a config.yaml, as in CI's test environment) now failed acquire() itself instead of just leaving skill mounts off. _ensure_skills_projection now catches its own exceptions and returns None; both providers' callers already tolerate that (a None projection skips the skill-specific mounts, matching the existing degrade path) after making _append_public_skill_mapping and the custom/legacy mount block in LocalSandboxProvider explicitly None-safe. Caught by running the full suite with config.yaml removed, matching CI's environment - not caught locally because a real config.yaml was present, masking the failure. * fix(sandbox): make E2B skill projection mounts best-effort _skill_projection_mounts called ensure_skill_projections with no guard, unlike Local/AIO's _ensure_skills_projection. A raise propagated out of _apply_mounts before the configured-mounts loop ran, so a skills projection failure dropped the operator's own configured mounts too - only caught by create()'s outer warning, with nothing applied at all. Swallow here and return an empty mount list on failure, matching the Local/AIO pattern: still fail-closed for skills, but no longer widens the blast radius to unrelated configured mounts. Review feedback from PR #4178. * docs(skills): document projection trade-offs flagged in review - _update_tree_digest: note the metadata-only (not content) hashing trade-off and why runtime writes through this codebase are still covered regardless (rebuild-under-lock + rename always changes inode). - LocalSandboxProvider.acquire: note the acquire-time self-heal cost (cheap on a fresh manifest, ~400ms rebuild under lock on stale/drift). - skill_projection_mutation: drop the no-op except-Exception-then-raise; a raise from the mutation already propagates past the yield with the view left cleared, no explicit re-raise needed. - provisioner README: spell out that hostPath skills volumes require the gateway and K8s node to share DEER_FLOW_HOST_BASE_DIR (single-node or shared storage), and that the custom/legacy volumes' hostPath type Directory (not DirectoryOrCreate) makes a violation of that assumption a visible Pod-creation failure instead of a silent empty mount. Review feedback from PR #4178. * fix(skills): lazily repair user projections * fix(skills): close projection review gaps * fix(skills): refresh user projection enable state * fix(skills): close projection review follow-ups * fix(skills): preserve state across projection writes --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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ChenglongZ
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ca16b64b26
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feat(agent): support config-declared lead middlewares (#3964)
* feat(agent): support config-declared lead middlewares * fix(agent): preserve configured extension middlewares * fix(agent): address middleware extension review * fix(agent): tighten middleware extension docs and tests |
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Huixin615
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c9b6131f8f
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fix(skills): reload mounted skills without restarting Gateway (#4264)
* fix(skills): add admin-only reload endpoint * fix(skills): preserve cache when reload fails |
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Zhipeng Zheng
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53a80d3ad1
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feat(skills): per-user custom skill isolation with sandbox mounting (#3889)
* feat(skills): per-user skill isolation (#2905) Implement user-scoped skill storage that isolates custom skills between users while sharing public skills globally. Key changes: - Add UserScopedSkillStorage class for per-user custom skill directories - Introduce get_or_new_user_skill_storage() factory with user_id context - Auth middleware sets effective_user_id for request-scoped storage - Agent/prompt/middleware now use user-scoped storage and prompt cache - Sandbox mounts user-scoped skill directories for search/read tools - Add validate_skill_file_path() to SkillStorage for path security - Migration script supports --all-users bulk migration - Frontend: add editable field to Skill type, error check in enableSkill - All skill categories can be toggled (custom skills default to enabled) - Update skill-creator SKILL.md with isolation-aware instructions Tests: - Add test_user_scoped_skill_storage.py (new) - Update all existing skill tests for user-scoped storage - Update sandbox, client, and router tests * fix(skills): address second-round PR review feedback (#3889) - P1-1: restrict legacy skill mount to users without custom skills - P1-2: fail-closed for _is_disabled_skill_path (OSError → return True) - P2-1: AND-merge global extensions_config skill disabled state - P2-2: atomic write for _skill_states.json (mkstemp + replace) - P2-3: normalize X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id in trusted boundary - P2-4: LRU-bounded _enabled_skills_by_config_cache (OrderedDict, maxsize=256) - P2-5: clear global prompt cache on PUBLIC skill toggle - P2-6: invalidate skill caches on client.update_skill * fix(tests): correct tool policy test after merge * fix(skills): use DEFAULT_SKILLS_CONTAINER_PATH in UserScopedSkillStorage The "/mnt/skills" literal in UserScopedSkillStorage.__init__ triggers test_skill_container_path_defaults::test_mnt_skills_literal_is_owned_by_skill_constants_module on CI. Migrate the default to the existing deerflow.constants constant, matching the pattern already used by LocalSkillStorage, SkillStorage, and the durable/tool_error middlewares. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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Yi Deng
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331c949b95
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fix(gateway): require admin for global skills management endpoints (#3855)
* fix(gateway): require admin for global skills management endpoints The skills router exposed its management endpoints with no authorization check (only Depends(get_config)), while the MCP router guards the equivalent global extensions_config mutations with require_admin_user (added in the #3425 security hardening). Skills storage is global/shared across users (no per-user path), lives in the same extensions_config.json as MCP servers, and custom skill SKILL.md content is injected into every user's agent system prompt. Any authenticated non-admin user could mutate or read global skills that affect all tenants: - POST /api/skills/install: install from an arbitrary thread_id, writing into the global custom skills tree - PUT /api/skills/custom/{skill_name}: rewrite a global skill, injecting instructions into all users' agent prompts (cross-tenant prompt injection) - DELETE /api/skills/custom/{skill_name} and rollback: tamper with global skills - GET /api/skills/custom, GET .../{skill_name}, GET .../history: read raw global custom skill bodies/history - PUT /api/skills/{skill_name} (enable toggle): writes the shared extensions_config.json and refreshes the system prompt for every tenant, so a non-admin could enable/disable any skill globally. There is no per-user skill state, so this is a global mutation, not a preference. Add require_admin_user to every endpoint above, mirroring the MCP router. The shared read path used internally by update/rollback was extracted into a non-auth helper (_read_custom_skill_response) so internal reuse does not double-check auth. Only the read-only GET /api/skills and GET /api/skills/{skill_name} stay open to normal users: they return just name/description/enabled and back the user-facing settings UI. Tests: - New tests/test_skills_router_authz.py: a non-admin user gets 403 on every guarded endpoint (including the enable toggle); basic listing stays open; admins can still toggle. - Update tests/test_skills_custom_router.py to authenticate as admin. - pytest tests/ -k skill -> 350 passed, 1 skipped; ruff clean. Signed-off-by: DengY11 <151997860+DengY11@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(frontend): gate skill enable/install UI behind admin + handle 403 Follow-up to the backend change that made the global skills mutations admin-only. Without a matching UI change, a non-admin user would hit a silent 403 when toggling a skill in Settings -> Skills or clicking "Install skill" on a .skill artifact. - core/skills/api.ts: add SkillRequestError (status + isAdminRequired), throw it from loadSkills/enableSkill on non-ok responses and from installSkill on 403 (other install errors keep the soft-failure contract). - core/skills/hooks.ts: useSkills no longer retries on SkillRequestError. - skill-settings-page.tsx: show an "admin required" message on 403, and disable the enable toggle for non-admins (mirrors the MCP tools page). - artifact-file-detail.tsx / artifact-file-list.tsx: only render the "Install skill" action for admins, and surface an admin-required toast if a 403 still occurs. - i18n: add settings.skills.adminRequired / installAdminRequired (en + zh). Auth/no-auth and static-website modes synthesize an admin user, so these gates do not affect single-user/local deployments. Verified locally: pnpm check (eslint + tsc) passes with no new errors, pnpm build succeeds, and the dev server renders / and /login (200) with no compile/runtime errors. Signed-off-by: DengY11 <151997860+DengY11@users.noreply.github.com> * style(frontend): format skills hook for prettier Keep the admin-guard skills hook aligned with Prettier output so the frontend format check passes in CI. --------- Signed-off-by: DengY11 <151997860+DengY11@users.noreply.github.com> |